SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTER'S RECORD VOLUME 7 OF 25

CAUSE NO. PR-11-3238-1

COURT OF APPEALS NO. 05-18-01317-FILED IN 5th COURT OF APPEALS

DALLAS, TEXAS
THE SPROBBITE SOURT

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LISA MATZ Clerk

IN THE ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED

JO N. HOPPER Plaintiff,

v.

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A. STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER Defendants.

JOHN L. MALESOVAS d/b/a
MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE
SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP
Intervenors,

v.

STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, and JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A.,

Defendants.

FILED IN
5th COURT OF APPEALS
DALLAS, TEXAS
6/3/2019 11:01:00 AM
LISA MATZ
Clerk

NUMBER ONE

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER HEARING

On the 9th day of April, 2018, A.D., the following proceedings came on for hearing in the above-entitled and numbered cause before the HONORABLE COURT, BRENDA HULL THOMPSON, Judge Presiding, held in Dallas, Dallas County, Texas.

Proceedings reported by oral stenography.

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EXHIBITS

Intervenors	Description	Offered	Admitted
No. 1	Contingency Fee Contract signed By Laura Wassmer, Interlineated	28	34
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[PROCEEDINGS]

THE COURT: All right, this is PR-11-3238 the Estate of Max Hopper versus Jo Hopper versus JPMorgan Chase and John L. Malesovas versus Stephen Hopper, et al. All right so, let's start with the announcements over here.

MR. LAUTEN: Good afternoon Your Honor,
Brian Lauten appearing on behalf of John Malesovas and
Lenny Vitullo of Fee Smith Sharp & Vitullo, the
interveners.

MR. PENNINGTON: Good afternoon Your

Honor, I'm Jim Pennington I'm here appearing on behalf

of Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer as defendants to the

intervention filed by Mr. Malesovas and the Fee Smith

Sharp and Vitullo law firm.

MR. LEVINGER: Your Honor, my name is

Jeff Levinger together with Mr. Cecere here, sitting

behind me and we represent Laura Wassmer and Stephen

Hopper in the Estate, in connection with their claims

against JPMorgan Chase, that have now settled, effective

last Wednesday, according to the Court's hearings on

Thursday and Friday.

MR. BECKWITH: Your Honor, Van Beckwith and Jessica Pulliam on behalf of JPMorgan Chase N.A.

Your Honor, we're here just simply to make sure that the settlement agreement, proposed settlement agreement, the

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     terms of which are protected and remain confidential,
     which one of the key terms. So, we'll enter an
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     appearance for that purpose.
                    MR. TOBEY: Your Honor, Robert Tobey for
     Block Garden & McNeill. That is another law firm for
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     the Plaintiffs in this lawsuit.
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                    THE COURT: For the Plaintiffs?
                    MR. TOBEY: For the -- I'm sorry, we're
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 9
     in a different lawsuit. For Ms. Wassmer and Dr. Hopper.
     And we're not a party to this case but, we're here as an
10
11
     interested observer.
12
                    THE COURT: All right so what other case
13
     are you talking about?
14
                                The primary case that was
                    MR. TOBEY:
15
     pending against JPMorgan.
16
                    THE COURT: So are you replacing --
17
                    MR. TOBEY: We are not replacing anybody.
18
                    THE COURT: Which side are you joining
19
     on?
                    MR. TOBEY: We're an interested observer
20
21
     in this hearing. My clients have a contingent fee
22
     agreement with the clients --
23
                    THE COURT: All right well --
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                    MR. TOBEY: -- Mrs. Wassmer and Dr.
25
     Hopper.
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THE COURT: All right, so your client is 1 2 who? MR. TOBEY: Our client is the law firm of Block Garden & McNeill. THE COURT: Sir? MR. LOEWINSOHN: And way in the back, 7 Your Honor, Alan Loewinsohn is here representing Mrs. 8 Hopper. I don't anticipate I will be participating but, 9 not knowing the direction of the hearing, I thought I needed to make sure that I didn't need to participate. 10 11 So, I will be here but probably relatively quiet in the 12 back. 13 THE COURT: Thank you. All right so what I have set today is the Application for Temporary 14 15 Restraining Order; is that correct? 16 MR. LAUTEN: Yes, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: All right. 18 MR. LAUTEN: Your Honor, I'll try to be 19 really brief. Let me tell you four things: The facts, the law, what we want, and why we're entitled to it. 20 First, on April 4^{th} , a confidential settlement was 21 reached in this case, and as this Court is undoubtedly 22 23 aware, Mr. Vitullo has lived and breathed this case for 24 two years or so. He tried a jury trial in this Court 25 for a month.

On April 5th I believe he was in this

Court an actually had a conversation with the Court off
the record, and said look there's a confidential
settlement, enjoyed being in here. Literally, within an
hour of that announcement, we get a letter terminating
us, as the lawyer for the clients, in this case. After
all the works been done, within minutes of the
settlement, we're terminated and we're told that the
agreement, the contingency agreement is unenforceable;
we're not going to pay you for your work. They won't
tell us the exact amount that's in dispute but, they say
you know what, we'll take the entire contingency fee
interest and we'll put it in our new lawyer's trust
account.

Let me tell you first and foremost what the law is on that. I've got these cases and I'll approach in a minute and ask you if I can and give them to you highlighted. I've done a bunch of fee disputes; this is what I do. A big part of my practice is representing lawyers, in these kind of cases. The law's real clear. Once an attorney under a contingency fee agreement has performed, substantially performed or completed his work, at that moment in time, the clients are estopped to not pay the lawyer. That's Tillery v. Zurich.

Actually Dale Tillery who's the Judge in the 134th District Court, when he was a lawyer he had this issue in the *Enoch's* case. They say look, if you could do this Your Honor, people would do it. I just settled this big contingency case; I've got a great idea. I'm going to fire my lawyer and not pay him. You lose all of your defenses under the agreement, if the client does that. As a matter of law, once there's substantial performance, the lawyer's entitled to his fee. That's the law; I've got those cases.

So what do we want? What we're asking the Court to do, number one is, they need to tell us what's in dispute. Are they saying we're entitled to 20 percent of the fee, 30 percent of the fee? 45 percent is what the agreement says. I'm happy to tender the contingency agreement in camera. I'm happy to tender the termination letter in camera. They won't tell us that.

What we're asking the Court to do, therefore, to keep the status quo, is to deposit whatever they say the disputed funds are, with respect to the contingency fee interest at issue, into the registry of the Court; we can do it under seal. We're not here to violate the confidential agreement; the Court doesn't need to know what that is. But we want

the money put in the registry of the Court, if they're going to take the position, we get to keep your work and we don't get to pay you.

They've raised this point, I think, which is: Does the Court have jurisdiction to do this? The Court absolutely, has jurisdiction to do it. The Court has the inherit power to do it. Those cases are Prodego v. Ware, Diana River v. Calvillo and the Supreme Court's case in Castilleja. I've got those cases highlighted and before I finish, if I can, I'll approach and give them to you. And here's what they say. They say the Court absolutely has jurisdiction, under its inherit authority, to put money in the registry of the Court especially, in Probate Court 37.005 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, that says this Court has declaratory judgment relief to decide money that's ancillary to an estate.

It gets better, Your Honor. You don't have to grant a TRO today, you don't have to grant an injunction today because what these cases say is that putting money into the registry of the Court that's in dispute, which this is, we have a property right. We've earned the money; we did the work; is a non-appealable order. It cannot be appealed. The Court has inherent authority to do it and the Court can put that money into

the registry. Can I approach and show you these cases?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LAUTEN: And I've got copies for the other side. The first one is *River*, and the second is *Prodego* and I've got copies. Can I approach, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LAUTEN: In other cases exactly like this one that was put in dispute. So, we want the disputed funds put in the registry and we want the Court to enter an expedited discovery order. I'd like to go depose these Plaintiffs. And I want to come back and next month and I want a summary judgment, because we're entitled to be paid; it's just that simple. Now let me briefly respond to what the position of the clients is. And just look at this from the optics of fairness.

You did all the work. You got a favorable jury verdict. You successfully defended a three-million-dollar counter claim. We're not going to pay you, now that the case is settled. We want you to put the money in our lawyer's, our new lawyer's trust account, where you can't get it outside the registry of the Court. And we want to go to arbitration, under the agreement we say, is unenforceable. That doesn't work. So at the end of the day what we're -- oh, and they made

one argument: Oh, we've waived the right to be here.

The Court -- you can't waive subject matter
jurisdiction, Your Honor.

So here's what we're asking the Court to do. Number one, the precedent of allowing a client to allow a lawyer to allow a lawyer to spend two years working on a file, to terminate the day they did the settlement, allow the client to take the money into their new lawyer's trust account and say' we'll get it back to you in a couple of years after arbitration' is absolutely preposterous and it's offensive. We're asking the Court to put the money in the registry up to the disputed percentage; they need to say what that is.

The Court can enter that order under seal so there's no prejudice of the confidentiality. I want an expedited discovery order, which this Court can grant, under the TRO rules germane to fee disputes, and this Court has jurisdiction because the corpus is germane to an estate, and I want to come back in 30 days and have a summary judgment and my client needs to be paid. That's what I'm asking the Court to do. I'm happy to answer any of your questions and again, I've got these cases.

I'd like to approach if I could give you the Enoch's case because this case stands for a

1 proposition that, they can talk about their defenses all they want. Once you perform, it's over. You can't eat 2 3 the cake at the restaurant and say, God I just didn't like it; I'm not going to pay for it. That's the situation we're in. We wanted a TRO. The money needs to be put in the registry. We can do all this under 6 7 seal. And we want to depose these people and we want to 8 get to the bottom of it, and we're entitled to be paid. 9 I'm happy to answer any of your questions you've got but that's the situation we're in. I also 10 11 have a copy of 37.005, which is the Civil Practice and Remedies Code provision that gives this Court 12 13 jurisdiction over DEC actions germane to the estate. 14 And subject to any of the questions you've got, I 15 appreciate the time. I'm happy to respond to whatever 16 they come up with. 17 MR. PENNINGTON: May I respond, Your 18 Honor? 19 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 20 MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, have you had 21 an opportunity to read our objection that we filed, with the Court, earlier today? 22 THE COURT: No sir, I've been on this 23 24 bench all day long.

25

MR. PENNINGTON:

I understand Your Honor.

I just ask so I'll know ahead of time, how much detail I wanted to go into with you, with respect to our objection and response. If I could approach the bench?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. PENNINGTON: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, we have raised a number of objections in our response. The first, foremost objection is that the contingency fee agreement that their trying to enforce in this case, contains an arbitration clause. And when we claim the Court does not have jurisdiction, as I put in my objection my response, the reason why we put that in there is because Mr. Vitullo and his law firm, waived their right to pursue any action, in Court. It doesn't specify all the different types of action but, it was clear the language in there, I've quoted it in my response on page 2, but this is the exact wording taken out of the contingency fee agreement, which they are now seeking to enforce, in this Court.

The clear language of this provision shows, that they waived their right to pursue any claim in Court. Any action at all. The case law is very clear, with respect to this issue, and because of that, I think that this case does not belong to this Court; it belongs in arbitration. We have asked the Court to sustain our objection and to compel Mr. Vitullo, his

firm, and Mr. Malesovas to pursue their claims in arbitration, if they wish to pursue those. But, those claims are not ripe, this Court does not have -- should not have allowed them to pursue this claims before this Court.

And Your Honor, a copy of the contingency fee agreement was actually attached to one of the, it was the initial intervention filed by Mr. Malesovas. He attached the copy of the fee agreement to his petition in intervention, as an exhibit, which is why I did not attach it to my response. But it is in the Court's record. Now, I might add, Your Honor that the attorney's at Fee Smith, including Mr. Vitullo, were the ones who actually drafted this agreement so, I don't think they can claim that they weren't aware of it or that the arbitration provision is somehow unfair.

The other objection that I have raised Your Honor, is that with respect to the request for temporary restraining order, subject to our objections of this matter going forward in this Court, we had pointed out in our response, there is no imminent harm here. That is obviously, one of their requisite elements that they have to satisfy, in order to get any type of injunctive relief. And the reason why there is no imminent harm Your Honor, is because we have offered,

I have offered specifically, on behalf of my clients, to allow the disputed portion of the settlement proceeds to remain in a trust account, specifically Mr. Levinger's trust account. If they're not happy with that, I've offered to receive the funds, disputed portion of the funds, in my trust account.

THE COURT: All right well, I guess I'm not understanding; what is the disputed portion of the funds that we're talking about?

MR. LAUTEN: Good question.

MR. PENNINGTON: Well they claim, they claim --

MR. BECKWITH: Oh, I didn't say anything it yet, Your Honor but I do want to be really careful just on behalf of JPMorgan Chase. We haven't agreed to pay anybody anything, yet. I mean, we're still working through the terms of the settlement agreement. And we certainly haven't agreed to pay money in the registry of the Court. So, I do want to be careful that if Your Honor ordered something to be placed into the registry of the Court, we worry about the confidentiality of the settlement agreement, which is inviolate is not supposed to be disclosed to anyone.

Mr. Loewinsohn and I, as Your Honor

knows, and Your Honor spent a lot of time last Thursday and Friday working though Ms. Hopper's request for judgment, and I do have concerns that if the value or amount of this settlement agreement, the one between the heirs and JPMorgan Chase, was disclosed even to Your Honor, given where we find ourselves with a pending request for a judgment, that that would be potentially prejudicial to and certainly objected to by JPMorgan Chase.

I just want to make sure we're crystal clear on that. We have no agreement to pay any money right now, into a registry of the Court. And we have no agreement, right now signed, to pay the heirs money. I do join though, in Mr. Pennington's request, and Mr. Levinger's request; I know you asked to see Mr. Vitullo and Mr. Levinger in Court so, here we are. But it does seem that, since a lawyer's bar license is tied to their trust account, that that would be the most logical place to place this money.

So, I just wanted to make that objection clear, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, things disappear from trust accounts too but I'm willing to listen so, go ahead.

MR. PENNINGTON: Well, Your Honor with

respect to that issue, I have put my request in writing to the extent that there's any dispute about that and I'm happy to offer that letter and will do so into evidence. But, on April 6th I sent a letter to Mr. Lauten and Mr. Malesovas, offering to place the entire 45 percent interest, that they claim as a contingency fee, to allow that to remain in Mr. Levinger's trust account.

And to be clear, I cited the ethical obligations, under Rule 1.14 of any attorney receiving funds, that he knows are in dispute. That rule makes it clear, that any lawyer in possession of funds, has an obligation to place those funds into his trust account and not to disburse those funds, until the matter has been finally, resolved. So, I cited the rule, assured Mr. Lauten that we would comply with that rule, and alternatively, if they weren't happy with that Your Honor, we even offered to place those funds into another escrow account, maintained by an independent third party.

And so, we're not, by any means we're not trying to just make a quick grab for the settlement, then pay the money all directly to my clients. What we're trying to do is we acknowledge that the dispute exists, we're trying to comply with the remedy that's

set forth in Rule 1.14 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules, which govern all attorney's, and we've suggested that we would comply with all of those obligations. And if there's a dispute about whether it's Mr. Levinger or my trust account, as I mentioned, we're willing to agree to a third party to set up a different trust account, to place those funds until the matter is resolved.

One thing is clear Your Honor, is that they also, under that rule, there's actually case law on point, with respect to this issue, to emphasize how important an attorney's obligation is under Rule 1.14 but, if Mr. Levinger received those funds and he paid them out knowing there's a dispute, his bar license would be on the line. And I can cite the Court the case law but, if that is a concern notwithstanding that, as I've mentioned, we've offered to alleviate that concern, by putting them into a third parties trust account.

In addition to that Your Honor, there has been no threat; no one has actually threatened to pay out those funds to anyone. And one of the things I pointed out in my response was that, just the fear alone that someone may do something, is not enough. That's insufficient to support the Court entering a temporary restraining order. You have to have actual evidence, that someone has threatened to do something against the

law or inappropriate with your property, and that simply does not exist, in this case.

To the contrary, we have shown the other side that we are willing not to pay those funds, or disburse those funds to the clients, until the matter has been finally resolved. The other problem with this matter pending in this Court Your Honor is that there's an extreme risk of a violation of Rule 1.05. Rule 1.05 has to do with the confidentiality of information regarding clients, and this goes back to our claim for arbitration. If this case goes forward in this Court, or the Court allows that to happen, then the problem is that there's a risk that all of this disclosure of confidential information will end up happening in this Court, and will be a matter of public record.

And not only that, but, it'll leave something to the adverse parties, to which my clients were previously, on the opposite side of the case from. And there is an exception in Rule 1.05, which I'm sure Mr. Lauten would address with you but the exception under that rule says that under certain circumstances, when a lawyer is trying to recover a fee, he can, to the extent reasonably necessary, reveal confidential information but there are limitations on that. The rule itself says, to the extent reasonably necessary.

In our position, in this case, is that it is not reasonable or necessary to disclose any information in this Court, regarding the merits of the fee dispute claim. All that should be taken in an arbitration setting, where the privacy interest of the parties, can be protected. And so for that reason, we feel, in addition to all the other reasons that we set forth in our response, that this case has no place in this Court, and the Court should compel arbitration and compel Mr. Vitullo and his firm to seek their claims in arbitration. They simply have another place to do that.

In addition to that, Your Honor, by going forward in this case, they threaten to change the status quo. The whole purpose of a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo of the parties, until the dispute can be resolved, or there could be a further hearing. In this case, by them taking the actions they have, they're actually endangering and jeopardizing the very settlement that my clients have reached, with JPMorgan Chase. If they wanted to pursue their fee dispute claim, they can do it in arbitration, under the protection of the privacy interest, which would serve to protect all of the parties and would also not jeopardize the settlement, because all of those matters would be protected, under the stroke of the arbitration statute.

Your Honor, after they filed their initial request for a temporary restraining order, then we filed our objection and our response, and then they shifted their strategy. And now their strategy, what they put in their amended petition and intervention, is now they've asked the Court to deposit the funds in the registry of the Court.

THE COURT: I'm not following you, sir.

MR. PENNINGTON: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: What are you saying the initial strategy was and what is the shift?

MR. PENNINGTON: The initial strategy
Your Honor, was they asked for a temporary restraining
order and injunctive relief. And their initial papers
they filed, with respect to the intervention, they
mentioned nothing about putting the funds in the
registry of the Court, under a motion to deposit the
funds. They have now amended their petition in
intervention and actually, filed a motion to deposit the
funds in the registry of the Court. And they've cited
these cases that Mr. Lauten handed to you just a moment
ago.

The River case, and I've forgotten the other cases he mentioned but, there are a series of cases that he cites in his motion and that he provided

to you just a moment ago, that allows for, in certain instances, for funds to be put into the registry of the Court. The problem that Mr. Lauten has though, in this case, is that his client and Mr. Malesovas, have waived their right to seek any kind of action in Court, under the arbitration clause.

So, they cannot even come into Court and request those funds to be put in the registry of the Court. They would have to do that under the --with the Triple A or some other arbitration panel but one thing is clear they cannot do it in this Court. But separate and apart from that Your Honor, they have another even bigger problem, and that is those cases require, before this Court can order funds to be paid under the registry of the Court, they have to present evidence that the funds are in danger of being lost or depleted. And there simply is no evidence of that in this case.

And if I can approach Your Honor, I have a case I'd like to show the Court that stands for that very proposition. May I approach, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. PENNINGTON: This is a Dallas Court of Appeals case, that actually deals with this very issue, and in that case, the Applicant sought both a temporary restraining order and asked the Court to

deposit funds in the registry of the Court. That went up on appeal and the Dallas Court of Appeals said that it was an abuse of discretion for the Court in that case, to order the funds to be paid in the registry of the Court, because there was no evidence that the funds were in danger of being lost or depleted. And that is the exact situation, here. We are not -- there's no threat that my clients are going to run away with the money. Instead, it's just the opposite.

We have offered to take the disputed portion of the funds, and whether we put them in my trust account, or in Mr. Levinger's account, or some other third party, we've offered a remedy to them under Rule 1.14 and they have remedy of law under that same rule. So, they just don't like it but, they do have a remedy. In addition to that Your Honor, they can also go to the arbitration association the American Arbitration Association and obtain the same relief with the Triple A if they want but, they haven't done that.

So, for all of those reasons Your Honor, we would request that their motion be denied, and we would request that this Court compel this matter, compel Mr. Vitullo, his firm, and Mr. Malesovas to pursue their claims in arbitration and to strike the interventions and to otherwise, deny all their relief.

MR. LAUTEN: Can I respond, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LAUTEN: First of all, there is no Motion to Compel binding arbitration, before you or set for hearing today, at all, point number one; it's not even before you. Point number two, is you asked a great question and it's a question that I have emailed them about and I've asked them about. What is the dispute? What's the amount in dispute? What's the dispute? He can't even tell you that. What's in dispute is simply his clients don't want to pay. That's it. That's all I've heard.

He offered into evidence the termination letter. I have no objection to that. I hope you'll admit it because what you'll find in that letter is that he's taking the position, that the agreement that he now want to enforce in arbitration, he terminated on the basis that it probably, wasn't enforceable.

THE COURT: All right. I have not seen the termination letter and I'm looking through what I have here, and I don't have any contingency fee agreement.

MR. LAUTEN: And I brought that to admit into evidence, in camera. I figured they would say, oh, that's confidential, you can't enforce your rights,

1 which they're now doing. They're saying well, we hold 2 all the cards, we get to keep your money, you can't try 3 to get your money because you breaching confidentiality. I anticipate that argument. I've got the contingency 5 agreements. I'll offer them into evidence right now, as Exhibits 1 and 2, in camera. If they want a foundation 7 or a predicate, I'll put Mr. Vitullo on the stand right 8 now, we can prove them up; I brought them. 9 If he's got a problem with confidentiality, let's kick everybody out, we'll do it 10 11 in camera, and I'll put Mr. Vitullo on the stand right here, Your Honor. 12 13 MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor I --14 MR. LAUTEN: Tell me what you want to do. 15 MR. PENNINGTON: If I could see a copy of 16 the agreement, I doubt very seriously, that I would dispute the authenticity of the agreement. But, it was 17 18 attached and I can show the Court a copy, with the 19 attachment. 20 THE COURT: I'm just saying I don't have 21 it. 22 I understand, Your MR. PENNINGTON: 23 Honor. 24 THE COURT: All right. 25 I was going to show you MR. PENNINGTON:

1 a copy, that was actually attached, to the petition in intervention. 2 THE COURT: Well I need to know whether or not there's an offering to admit it into evidence and 5 if there's an objection. And if the offer is in camera, whether or not that makes a difference to you. 6 MR. LAUTEN: I'd offer into evidence 8 right now Exhibits 1 and 2, which are the signed 9 agreements of the client. If he has an objection of confidentiality, then I'm happy to offer them, subject 10 11 to in camera, in camera of evidentiary finding. 12 MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, I have no 13 objection to the authenticity of these documents. would prefer that they be submitted in camera. 14 15 Although, this one, as I said was -- it's my 16 understanding it was attached to the petition in intervention so it's already a public record. 17 18 MR. LAUTEN: No, it's -- the two 19 agreements are different, Your Honor and I'm offering two separate exhibits, Exhibits 1 and 2. If I could 20 21 approach, I can give you copies. 22 THE COURT: All right, let me see what 23 you're talking about. 24 MR. LAUTEN: Do you have stickers? 25 [Exhibits marked]

Your Honor, I've handed you what I've already marked, pre-marked for identification, as Exhibits 1 and 2 to the hearing, and I'd offer those into evidence now.

[Intervenors Exhibits 1 and 2 offered]

THE COURT: Mr. Pennington?

MR. PENNINGTON: No objection, Your

Honor.

MR. LAUTEN: Your Honor, I'd offer the termination letter, as Exhibit 3 into evidence, dated April 5, 2018.

[Intervenors Exhibit 3 offered]

THE COURT: All right. Now, let me understand that your Exhibit 1 is a contingency contract of representation and then, we have the same caption on Exhibit 2. Are they the same thing or--?

MR. LAUTEN: Good question, Your Honor.

Exhibits 1 and 2 are signed by each client. They're the same underlying agreement but, different signatures on both but it's really important that the Court understands this is a big deal. If you look at Ms.

Wassmer's interlineations on the contingency agreement, she said we're responsible for defending the counter claims. Why is that important? Because there was a three-million-dollar defense of those claims. We're

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1
     entitled to a contingency fee on those claims, above the
     45 percent. I've been trying to find out for three
 2
 3
     days, what is in dispute.
                    THE COURT: All right. Well my question
 5
     is -- as I said, are both of these documents the
     operative documents?
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                    MR. LAUTEN: Correct, your Honor.
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                    THE COURT: All right so, -- Sir?
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                    MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, with respect
     to Exhibit 3, I do not --
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                    THE COURT: Let's not move to three.
     Let's stay with one and two okay?
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                    MR. PENNIGTON: I understand.
                    THE COURT: All right, I need to
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15
     understand.
                 Exhibit 1 has some interlineations and it
16
     looks like they're initialed by at least, Laura Wassmer.
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     And then Exhibit 2 doesn't have any -- All right Exhibit
     1 is not dated; Exhibit 2 seems to be dated so --
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19
                    MR. LAUTEN: I'd offer Exhibit's 1 and 2.
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     If there's a problem with the foundation, I'm happy to
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     put Mr. Vitullo up on the stand right now. I'm happy to
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     prove it up, if that's what you want me to do.
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                    MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, we don't
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     object to the authenticity of either of those exhibits.
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     We believe those to be duplicate copies of the
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contingency fee agreements that were signed by my clients.

THE COURT: Okay. So, I guess the question is: Were these two signed at two different times, or what?

MR. PENNINGTON: My understanding, Your Honor, is I think that one client signed one version, and the other client made some interlineations, and then signed -- it's the same contract. At least, that's my understanding but, that the, one of the clients made some notes, on their version that they signed, then they sent it back.

MR. LAUTEN: That's correct. I agree with that.

THE COURT: Okay so one client agrees on a different scope of representation than the other client?

MR. LAUTEN: That's my position, Your

Honor. My position is that Laura Wassmer is at risk for
an additional contingency fee for the successful defense
of the claims, based on the very interlineations she
wrote. That would only go to show one thing, the 45
percent they want escrow, is insufficient under the
agreements they signed, if that's what they want to do.
But be that as it may, all we're really here -- what

that documents prove is this.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not asking you that. I'm just asking the question. Am I to understand that we are operating under one agreement for Laura Wassmer, and another agreement for Stephen Hopper?

MR. LAUTEN: That's my position, Your Honor, yes. Albeit, they're the same with respect to the contingency, on the affirmative claims.

MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, the more important matter is that both of these agreements contain an arbitration clause.

THE COURT: Well, I'm just trying to get my question answered, okay?

MR. PENNINGTON: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: I see that they both have an arbitration clause.

MR. VITILLO: Your Honor, I can speak to that question, since I'm the one that presented the contingency fee contracts, to both my clients. If I may, without revealing any -- I want to make sure I don't reveal any confidential information; I don't believe it is but the first contract, Your Honor, was signed by Stephen Hopper. The second contract, which is the same contract, was signed by Laura Wassmer, which she may interlineations, but she made changes to that

contract to include the defense of the JPMorgan Chase counterclaims.

After those two contracts were signed, fist by Stephen Hopper and the Laura Wassmer, I then had a conversation, a phone conversation with both of them, to make sure all of us were on the same page, okay? So, that's how those contracts evolved. And so, it was first signed by Stephen Hopper, then it was signed and changed by Laura Wassmer, and then I had a conference call with Stephen and Laura to make sure that my scope of representation does, in fact, include defending the counterclaims of JPMorgan Chase.

THE COURT: Okay. And is there documentation of that?

MR. VITULLO: Of me defending the counterclaims, yes, Your Honor. But, -- absolutely.

THE COURT: All right. I'm sorry I interrupted you.

MR. PENNINGTON: That's all right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay what was your -
MR. LAUTEN: Before you do that -- I'm

sorry to interrupt. Can I please get a ruling on

offering Exhibit 3 into evidence, Your Honor? I offered

Exhibit 3, the termination letter and I didn't get a

1 ruling on that. THE COURT: Well, I'm going to get to it 3 but I'm trying to get finished with 1 and 2 --MR. LAUTEN: Sure. THE COURT: -- okay? So, I think I've gotten my questions answered with respect to 1 and 2. 6 7 Do you have anything you want to add? 8 MR. PENNINGTON: With respect to 1 and 2, 9 Your Honor, the only thing is what I've just pointed out which is, that they both contain an arbitration 10 provision. 11 12 THE COURT: All right. 13 MR. PENNINGTON: So, it's now undisputed 14 that both of the agreements they're trying to enforce, 15 contain that arbitration clause, which requires this 16 matter to go to arbitration. And it contains the 17 language that I quoted in my response. 18 THE COURT: Okay. 19 MR. PENNINGTON: Are you ready for me to 20 respond to the rest of the arguments or are you --21 THE COURT: No, just a minute. 22 MR. PENNINGTON: Yes, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: All right. Now, the Court's 24 going to admit Exhibits 1 and 2. And then, with respect 25 to Exhibit 3?

[Intervenors Exhibits 1 and 2 admitted]

MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, with respect to Exhibit 3, which I believe is the termination letter, I don't dispute -- I would agree to the authenticity of this letter. The authenticity of it is not disputed. The only objection I have, with respect to this exhibit being admitted into evidence, is that it does contain what is information I consider not to be or to be confidential. And this goes back to my previous claim, about part of the problem why this case should be in arbitration and not in your Court is because, we're now getting into matters which are confidential.

If I have to start explaining why my clients terminated Mr. Vitullo to justify their termination, that opens up a whole can of worms and matters, which should not be disclosed to the public. They are private and especially, in light of the fact that all the parties signed an arbitration provision, those matters should be decided in arbitration and not here in this Court.

But, I have no objection to this Exhibit 3 being admitted into evidence, provided that there's some, that it's done under seal or under some order of confidenti --

THE COURT: What portion of this letter

is confidential?

MR. PENNINGTON: It's in the first paragraph where we start getting into the decision, the reason for the --

THE COURT: Well, just tell me exactly, what language you consider to be confidential.

MR. PENNINGTON: Well, Your Honor, if I may, if I point that language out on the record, counsel for JPMorgan Chase is here in the courtroom, and I don't want to reveal any confidential information that might have an adverse effect on the settlement. So, that's my concern. I feel like I'm being put in a box right now.

THE COURT: Well, I mean I appreciate what you're saying but, you know, I guess you know --

MR. PENNINGTON: Well maybe I could do it this way, Your Honor. If I start with the sentence that I believe, contains the confidential information but, this is on the -- it's the third sentence that says: "Their decision to terminate this relationship is based on a number of factors." That sentence all the way through the next-to-last sentence, which says: "As a result, I'm notifying you that my clients are, effective immediately, terminating the relationship." Everything in between that, I believe, is confidential. And I would ask the Court to have that be admitted, just in

camera.

THE COURT: Mr. Lauten?

MR. LAUTEN: I don't have any objection to it being admitted either under seal or in camera but, I would like it to be before the Court, for the purpose of this hearing so, it's up to you.

THE COURT: Well, it's before the Court;

I'm holding it.

MR. LAUTEN: Well I'm offering it into evidence but, I don't want someone to, you know, have some basis to file a grievance against us. So, if that's what the implication is, I'm happy to offer it into evidence, you know, in camera, outside the presence of parties that are adverse, to us. But, at the same time, my point though obviously, is there's nothing confidential in here.

THE COURT: Mr. Beckwith?

MR. BECKWITH: Your Honor, I just want to make sure, since I've been shown this letter and I've been told I shouldn't see the letter, that it doesn't say anything about the terms of the settlement and the amount of the settlement. That's my biggest concern, Your Honor. I don't think anybody wants to -
MR. PENNINGTON: I'll represent to you it's not.

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                    MR. PENNINGTON: Okay. Then with that
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     representation, Your Honor, I'll sit back down.
                    THE COURT: All right. So, the Court is
     going to admit Exhibit 3.
                  [Intervenors Exhibit 3 admitted]
                    MR. PENNINGTON: Is it going to be
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     admitted in camera, Your Honor or for all purposes?
                    THE COURT: I think I'm going to admit
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 9
     Exhibit 3, for all purposes.
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                    MR. PENNINGTON: So, my objection is
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     overruled, Your Honor?
                    THE COURT: Yes.
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                    MR. LAUTEN: I don't know exactly where
     we are but could I make a big point here? Were you -- I
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     can't remember where we left it.
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                    MR. PENNINGTON: I'm sorry but I wasn't
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     through.
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                    MR. LAUTEN: Oh, go ahead, that's fine.
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                    MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, in response
     to that letter, I would like to offer Exhibit 4.
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                      [Exhibit No. 4 offered]
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                    MR. LAUTEN: Object hearsay, object
23
     relevance.
                    MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, Exhibit 4, I
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25
     mean, if I have to -- if they won't stipulate to the
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authenticity of this, I will represent to the Court that this is a true and correct copy of a letter that was sent to Mr. Lauten on April 6, 2018. And I would request that this document be admitted, at this time.

MR. LAUTEN: My objection is not to authenticity. My objection is to relevance and hearsay.

MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, the relevance is that this letter shows that I have agreed to put the funds into either Mr. Levinger's trust account, my trust account or that of an offer to put it into that of a third party. And it goes to the very heart, I mean, they have to show that there's some imminent harm that the funds will be lost or depleted or removed. And if those funds — if I'm agreeing on behalf of my client, to put those funds and to hold them at the Trust, until the settlement or until this matter is finally resolved, there is no danger or imminent threat of the funds being lost or depleted because they're going to remain in a trust account, either mine Mr. Levinger's or some other third parties.

MR. LAUTEN: This is important point,

Your Honor, and this is the big issue here. This is why
we're in a separate box. This is an ownership issue at
this point and Mr. Loewinsohn, back there, had this
issue in the Hunton Hill fee dispute and that is this:

On the one hand you have the Mandal right line of cases that say, if you terminate your contingency fee lawyer without cause, you get the entire contingency fee interest but, if with cause, you get quantum meruit.

We're not under that body of case law. The reason is because we've done the work. The case is over. It's our property. We own those funds. We have a vested interest. There's no dispute here. They can't wait until aha, we've got a settlement now and we don't want to pay you. And when they argue we want to put it in Mr. Levinger's account, he's the one that is criticizing Mr. Vitullo in Exhibit 3, that you've just admitted.

Why should we surrender control of our money that we own? We have a property right per Exhibit 1 and 2 and they're in evidence. And those contingency fee agreements, the moment we do the work, we own it.

Not their portion, our portion. It works both ways. We can't hold their money any more than they can hold our money. And if they think that it's all protected because lawyers are subject to bar rules, well then, give it to us and let us put it in our trust account.

I mean under the rule of *Goose v. Gander*, it works both ways. So, but that's the big issue here, these aren't disputed funds. We own the property right,

because we've done the work. The Tillery case and the Enoch case that I handed you, say they are estopped. you could do this Your Honor, every time Mr. Branson or Ted Lyon or somebody went and got a thirty or fortymillion dollar-settlement, it would be malpractice for the client to say, I'm firing you. Let me keep the money we'll go arbitrate. Let me see if I can get a discount on what I already owe you. People would do that if you could do that. You can't. And that's what Enoch said.

If we were six months before trial or three months before trial or a year before trial, absolutely. But they can't tie up the money that we now That is the distinction between the former and the own. latter is we have done the work and now that Exhibits 1 through 3 are in evidence, it is undisputed in this courtroom, that they terminated on the very day the settlement was announced, in here. You've got undisputed proof that they terminated the day the case ended, for all practical purposes.

MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor --

THE COURT: All right. It's almost 5 O'clock so let's wrap it up.

24 MR. PENNINGTON: I'll make it quick, Your You know, Rule 1.14 gives the Court the exact Honor.

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remedy that needs to be applied in this case and that is, I mean, they don't like it but, the ethical rules require that any disputed funds, be held in a large trust account or escrow account. We've agreed to comply with that. The only disagreement we're having is the place where those funds are going to be held.

And Your Honor, I mean they may not, you know, he's citing this good for the goose, good for the gander rule but, the bottom line here is, Rule 1.14 says exactly what the remedy is and that's, it's held in trust or escrow. If they don't like it, they can go to the Triple A, the arbitration panel, and ask them for some kind of injunctive relief or ask them to put the funds into the registry of the arbitration panel.

They have many other remedies available to them but, they don't have the remedy of coming into this Court and asking for the funds to be deposited into the registry. They waived it when they signed the arbitration agreement. And the problem I've got right now is, I can't fairly defend my client and explain to you, why they terminated their clients, and give you a full explanation, which I think if I could give it to you, I think it might affect whether or not you believe that they're entitled to their fee or not.

I'm in a box right now and I shouldn't be

here, because we should be in arbitration where I can explain to an arbitrator why my clients are disputing the fee. Mr. Lauten is trying to put the burden on me and say that I have the burden to tell this Court the amount that's in dispute. I don't have that burden. He's the one who's trying to have the Court put funds in the registry.

He's got to come forward and tell the Court how much those funds are, without disclosing any settlement amount. That's why I said we would withhold the entire 45 percent. I'm not going to give you an amount but, I'll tell you the percentage and I've also asked them to tell me if they've got any expenses that they've incurred, and we'll withhold those, too. But all that can be done under the arbitration umbrella, and not in this Court.

Now, I did move to compel, in my response, on page three, at the bottom of my objection, I specifically asked this Court to compel that their claims be submitted to binding arbitration. So, Mr. Lauten is incorrect on that. They filed their petition in intervention at noon on Friday so, I have had all weekend, that's it, to get ready. But I did ask for that relief in my papers, my objection I filed, I asked the Court to compel this matter to arbitration.

repeat this line of cases, the *Tillery* case, which say that my plan is estopped, once they fully perform. Well first of all, it's a disputed issue about whether they have fully performed. We have put that in our response that if that agreement is enforceable, which we have an issue over but, if it is enforceable, we believe that Mr. Vitullo's firm breached that agreement. And, I can't go into the details as to why, because that would breach confidentiality and so forth but, one thing I can tell you is that the case law he relies upon, the *Tillery* case and the *Enoch's* case, both of those cases were questioned by a more recent case, a Dallas Court of Appeals case, called *Neece v. Lyon*.

And this is a 2015 case, where the Dallas Court of Appeals specifically, addressed this issue, and they said that -- and this was a fight between a client and a lawyer over some fees, and then that case, the Court recognized that the clients could, even after the lawyer fully performed, the clients could assert a claim for restitution and rescission of the agreement, after the fact, and that they did have those defenses available to them.

MR. LAUTEN: I'm the lawyer in that case.

That was a barratry case; still pending and that's not

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     what it says. I represent Mr. Lyon in that case.
     you want to talk about it, that's not what it says.
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     It's a barratry case.
                                     Well, I --
                    MR. PENNINGTON:
                    MR. LAUTEN: In fact, Rod Phelan and I
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     did that case.
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                    THE COURT: Excuse me, sir. I don't
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     allow --
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                    MR. LAUTEN: I apologize for the
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     interruption.
                    I'm sorry.
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                    MR. PENNINGTON: I've got a copy of the
     case Your Honor, if you want it.
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                    THE COURT: All right, thank you.
                    MR. PENNINGTON: But the bottom line,
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     Your Honor is whatever the remedy is and whatever
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     defenses my clients may or may not have, those are all
     issues that should be decided in arbitration and not in
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     this Court. Your Honor, I just want to make sure before
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     I finish, if I could get a ruling on my offer of exhibit
20
     four.
21
                    THE COURT: Uh, let's see --
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                    MR. PENNINGTON: That was the April 6^{th}
23
     letter, Your Honor.
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                    THE COURT: Any objection?
25
                                 I object to relevance and
                    MR. LAUTEN:
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hearsay.

MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, I apologize,
I misspoke. I said Exhibit 4, It's Defendants Exhibit
1, that I handed to you, I apologize.

THE COURT: Sir?

MR. LAUTEN: Here's the problem with the relevance: 1.14 that he keeps citing you about putting the money in the lawyer's trust account, that's this lawyer's trust account. Not the person criticizing is over here. If he wants us to put the disputed money in Mr. Vitullo's trust account as 1.14 says, and hold it there, I have no problem with that.

MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, but -MR. LAUTEN: Hold on, let me finish.

MR. PENNINGTON: Sorry.

MR. LAUTON: But, what he's trying to say is, the ethical rule when there's a dispute between a lawyer and a client, it goes in that lawyer's trust account. That's Mr. Vitullo. What he's saying is put the money in this lawyer's account, who follows our instructions, not yours. Well what happens when that happens, Your Honor? Who's going to tell Mr. Levinger what to do with that money? A Court's going to have to tell him to give it back. He's not going to give it back to us because he thinks it's right. It's our

property.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Beckwith?

MR. BECKWITH: Yes, Your Honor, just briefly. The status quo as we are here today, is we have a Rule 11 Agreement that's been filed with the Court, there was an announcement that announced that the heirs and JPMorgan had reached a settlement. There is a definitive, confidential term sheet and the parties are negotiating a final definitive settlement agreement. The money that is part of the settlement, is at JPMorgan today. A material term of the settlement is confidentiality and I don't think Mr. Vitullo, Mr. Lauten, Mr. Pennington, Mr. Levinger or anybody wants to violate that. But the material term of the settlement is the confidentiality.

I've expressed to you my deep concern that after all of the time that you invested in the judgment hearing last week, I do think it would be inappropriate for Your Honor to gain knowledge of the heirs' settlement, as you're trying to weigh the decision on the judgment of that important decision.

Here's what -- I did say earlier that I joined in Mr.

Pennington's request for the trust account. I join in Mr. Lauten's request, too. There are five lawyers in front of the bar here, all of whom are duty bound to

keep money in their trust account subject to licensure literally, their state bar license hangs on the line.

And so any of the five lawyers ought to be able to take the money, Mr. Vitullo, Mr. Lauten, anybody.

on the phone this morning trying to solve this is, there are a ton of banks and title companies and trust companies. Your Honor could say, you-all go find one and send it there. But I think those are the simple solutions here. So then, we can keep the settlement on track, and then let the lawyers go fight about it as they need to fight about it in arbitration, or in Your Honors Court. But let's just find a place to put the money. There are five trust accounts here that we could put it in or, in a bank or, a title or, a trust company. I hope that's helpful.

MR. LAUTEN: And to Mr. Beckwith's point, we're happy to agree to an independent third party to hold this money, as long as, it's subject to your order on when it gets released. If you simply just tell us to leave and put it in Mr. Levinger's trust account, we're never going to get that money back until we go to you or a different court and say give it back. That's why we need the Court to maintain jurisdiction over the corpus. But I don't have a problem with Mr. Beckwith's

suggestion, if it's a third-party escrow agent or bank or whoever.

But Mr. Levinger, he's a great lawyer, dear friend of mine; he answers to his clients as we all do. He doesn't answer to me and he doesn't answer to Mr. Vitullo. If you want to do a third party, that's' duty bound to follow the order of you or this Court, I'm fine with that.

THE COURT: All right. We need to wrap up. We're past the allocated time. Can you hear me?

MR. PENNINGTON: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: I said can you hear me?

MR. PENNINGTON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. This is my concern and you know we have invested a considerable amount of time in this Hopper case. And, I guess, Mr. Pennington, I believe that your clients have created a problem that jeopardizes all the work that's in this case. And I'm concerned that, I mean based on what I'm hearing from Mr. Beckwith, I'm just kind of reading between the lines and basically, he's saying that they're negotiating the terms of the agreement.

And so, I guess one of my concerns is, that the agreement may fall apart, which would be problematic for your clients and possibly, for this

case. And also, there's an intervention that was filed, which means that it may be problematic, in terms of getting a final judgment on all of the work that has already been done. And with respect to your client's concerns about -- I mean, there's something here that I don't understand.

I don't understand how Mr. Levinger and Mr. Cecere were the Appellate Counsel on a case with Mr. Vitullo and now they're on opposite sides. So, that's not clear to me how that works and I find that an odd posture. And I find it an odd posture to suggest that given that circumstance, that Mr. Levinger should be the person that I should trust to hold the funds. Because it appears that his interest now, is adverse to Mr. Vitullo.

And, of course, you've got the Court in the position of, you don't want me to understand what the settlement is because of the effect on the confidentiality, and Mr. Beckwith doesn't want the Court to know or doesn't want it put into the Court registry because, somebody can do the math and figure out what they paid. And so, you know, when I look at the root cause of all this problem, it comes back to your clients and your client's decisions.

And I'm concerned that, I mean, I

understand that there's an issue with respect to whether or not the arbitration agreement is enforceable but, I don't think that the issue should be whether or not the Court has authority to protect whatever assets are in the case or not in the case. And you know, I'm really challenged to understand why this issue cannot be worked out because of the risk to all of the work that we have put into this case. And I --

MR. PENNINGTON: As to that point, Your Honor, and I'm not trying to interrupt you, I apologize but, as to that very issue, I mean, I heard Mr. Lauten just agree on behalf of his clients, that they would do that, with a third party.

THE COURT: Well, I have been party to cases, in fact, I probably have some cases down here where there's been some funny business with trust accounts, so I'm not persuaded that that's the most protection that I can give, okay because, even if I put funds in a trust account, that person is not bonded. And that law firm may not be bonded sufficiently or insured sufficiently if that person decides to take a permanent vacation on that money.

And so, I mean, I'm very concerned about the protection of everyone's interest but, I think that, you know, I'm kind of in a box too, without knowing what

I'm protecting. I mean, as I said, this whole thing has developed from your clients' decisions. And your clients are not providing the Court, in my judgment, an appropriate resolution. So, I mean, I'm willing to give you a chance to talk with Mr. Lauten but, I mean, maybe the resolution is that Chase Bank keeps the money, until you-all work out your disputes.

MR. BECKWITH: That's what I was just asking my client, Your Honor, but the settlement -
MR. LAUTEN: I think we're okay with that.

MR. BECKWITH: The final terms of the settlement is that we have finality, you can sign the settlement agreement and then, the money can be funded, once the arbitration is solved.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not --

MR. LAUTEN: Well, I'm not agreeing to that part. But, I was with you until you said arbitration.

THE COURT: I'm not going to say whether or not -- I need to read this stuff -- but I'm not going to say whether or not I'm going to refer you to arbitration today. But I am saying to you that I think it's disingenuous to suggest that the assets will be protected. And no disrespect to Mr. Levinger or any of

you-all but, I just, -- You know, the bar rules, and I teach ethics all the time, are, you know, they're the rules but they're not the protection.

MR. BECKWITH: Your Honor, I didn't mean to suggest arbitration order, Your Honor, but we are happy to finalize settlement and the money will just sit there and someday, be funded upon the proper orders of the arbitrators or the Court.

MR. LEVINGER: Well, for clarity, the portion of the money that indisputably belongs to the clients, should go to the clients.

THE COURT: Well, sir, I mean, they have created this problem. And so, why should I put them in a better position than they were in, before they created this problem?

MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, with all due respect, I mean, my clients haven't really been afforded an opportunity to explain their position.

THE COURT: Well, but you come down here,
I mean, I guess my frustration is I've spent a huge
amount of time on this case, and I would expect, that as
officers of the Court, that issues like this would have
been worked out. I understand that they haven't and
that's why you're here but, as I said, I'm really
concerned about the impact on getting to a point of

final judgment on the underlying case. And what you're doing is basically, you're taking the Court's time away from that case, moving into this issue.

MR. PENNINGTON: Well Your Honor, we're not doing that. That's what Mr. Vitullo's doing.

THE COURT: Well, you are doing it.

MR. LAUTEN: We got terminated, yeah,

sorry.

THE COURT: Okay, you are doing it. I mean I have a mountain of stuff to read from the last couple days of the hearing and now, I'm having to turn my attention to this issue and that's a problem.

MR. PENNINGTON: Well and I regret that you're having to do that, Your Honor and that's why I've asked for this matter to be compelled in arbitration.

THE COURT: Well and as I said, I have to even read a lot of stuff to decide whether or not that makes sense to me. And, you know, I haven't been fully informed on that issue because, I mean, this is just basically, a TRO hearing. And I'm sure that you have more information to provide me on whether or not the arbitration provision is enforceable, or whether or not there's waiver.

I'm not in a position to make that decision, today but, I need a resolution that protects

the alleged property interest that Mr. Vitullo or Mr. Lauten is asserting and I want to come up with something that is fair to your clients, as well as protect the interest of JPMorgan Chase, and hopefully not damage Ms. Hopper's interest.

MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, if Mr. --

MR. LOEWINSOHN: Your Honor, if I may state on that. Your Honor raises obviously, a very important procedural point. I'm just going to put all parties on the notice here that, we're going to need to figure out procedurally how to remove this action from the rest of the actions because, it will prejudice Mrs. Hopper from obtaining her final judgment. And I will be speaking to all counsel here about dealing with these proceedings and separating them out.

MR. PENNINGTON: We can sever. We'll agree to severance. It's no problem. Don't worry Allan.

MR. LEVINGER: Further, Your Honor, -THE COURT: I don't know that The Court's
going to agree to it so we just need to -- I need to
have all of the information before I make that decision.
I mean you're piling the decisions that I need to make
pretty high that's what I'm saying to you. And I'm
willing to make the decisions but, I think that you

1 can't -- you can't expect me to just agree with you. MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, what I heard 3 Mr. Beckwith offer just a moment ago was that his client would be willing to retain the funds, the disputed 5 amount and that --THE COURT: If I agree that Mr. 7 Beckwith's client retain the funds, he's going to retain 8 all of it. 9 MR. PENNINGTON: Well Your Honor --MR. BECKWITH: Your Honor, we are not --10 I'm not retaining them in some sort of special escrow 11 account. I'm just agreeing not to pay them until 12 13 somebody tells me the settlement is scheduled. 14 MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, --15 MR. BECKWITH: When the settlement 16 agreement is done, it's going to be signed. But then 17 the funding of the settlement can depend upon appropriate orders of the Court or the arbitrators. 18 19 THE COURT: I mean, why should I put your 20 clients in a better position and they've created this 21 issue? 22 MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, the reason 23 why is because Rule 1.14 is --24 THE COURT: Sir, I'm very familiar with 25 And as I said, I don't agree that a trust account 1.14.

just of --MR. PENNINGTON: And no, I'm not talking 3 about that right now, Your Honor. What I was going to say was Rule 1.14 addresses the portion that's 5 undisputed. THE COURT: Well but, you're unwilling to 7 tell me what's disputed or undisputed or why there is a 8 dispute and so, I am without sufficient information to 9 make an informed decision. 10 MR. PENNINGTON: I'm sorry Your Honor, 11 but as to that issue, I think my letter, Defendant's Exhibit 1, the April 6th letter says that the amount, we 12 13 can calculate the amount without telling the Court because we know that they're claiming a 45 percent 14 15 interest. So what I'm suggesting is that if Mr. Beckwith wants to retain 45 percent of the settlement 16 17 proceeds, and not pay that portion --18 THE COURT: I'm not --19 MR. LAUTEN: I can't agree to that. 20 THE COURT: We're not saying the same thing, sir. If I have to order Mr. Beckwith to retain 21 22 the settlement, I'm going to order him to retain all of 23 it --24 MR. PENNINGTON: Can I just point out one 25 other thing?

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                    THE COURT: -- if that's the option I
 2
     select.
                    MR. PENNINGTON:
                                     The other part of that
     is that, what you're saying now is you're going to order
 5
     the entire amount --
                    THE COURT: I said if I make that
 7
     decision, it's going to be the entire amount.
 8
                    MR. PENNINGTON: And the only reason -- I
 9
     disagree with that Your Honor position --
10
                    THE COURT: I understand.
11
                    MR. PENNINGTON: And I just want to
     specifically point out that Rule 1.14 does say
12
13
     specifically, that if there's any amount that is not in
14
     dispute, that at least that portion, should be paid to
15
     the client.
16
                    THE COURT: All right well they're not
17
     telling me that any of that is not in dispute. Are you
18
     saying that it's all in dispute or not?
19
                    MR. LAUTEN: That's exactly right, Your
20
     Honor.
21
                    MR. PENNINGTON: That is not true, Your
22
     Honor.
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                    MR. LAUTEN: I'm telling you my position.
                    MR. PENNINGTON: Well, they put in their
24
25
     papers that they're only disputing the percentage that
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1 they're owed, under the contract. THE COURT: Well, as I said, I don't have 3 any information to respond to. I'm not saying yes or I don't know what I am dealing with. And I'm 5 prohibited from knowing what I'm dealing with so, you know, you've kind of got me in a difficult spot. Well I 7 haven't read all this. I will look at it and I'll look 8 at your cases. 9 MR. LAUTEN: May I leave my proposed order, Your Honor? 10 11 THE COURT: If there's something else that you think you can tell me that would be helpful, 12 13 I'm open to that. MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, before we 14 15 leave, can I just get a formal ruling on my offer of 16 Defendant's Exhibit 1? 17 THE COURT: All right. I'll admit Defendant's 1. 18 19 [Defendant's Exhibit No. 1 admitted] 20 MR. LAUTEN: Can I approach, Your Honor? 21 THE COURT: Yes. 22 MR. LAUTEN: This is a proposed TRO and a 23 proposed order for deposit into the registry. And if 24 you want, I've got it on a thumb drive in Word so, 25 you're welcome to it or however, you want.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. BECKWITH: And Your Honor, I do object to the temporary restraining order to the extent that it calls for certain amount of money to be placed into the registry of the Court. I think that ruling will jeopardize these proceedings, jeopardize Your Honor as you are trying to work out the judgment with respect to Mrs. Hopper and the JNOV take nothing judgment that I requested or the judgment Mr. Loewinsohn requested and so, we would object.

Perhaps, an easier solution is to simply order that the funds be placed in some other well-known bank. Bank of America could take the funds I'm sure, Wells Fargo could take the funds, somebody could take the funds or you could order these parties to sit down and try to find a place to put these funds but, we would object to Your Honor and the registry.

MR. LEVINGER: I join in that objection for a slightly different reason, Your Honor and that is if a certain percentage goes into the registry of the Court, that would allow the public to determine what the amount of the settlement is and that's confidential.

MR. BECKWITH: I hope I was making that clear but that is the principal objection.

MR. LAUTEN: We're happy to let JPMorgan

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Chase hold all of it as long as it takes.
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                    THE COURT: Any redaction or anything
     new?
                    MR. PENNINGTON: Nothing new, Your Honor.
     I think it would be improper to order that they hold all
     of it.
 6
                    THE COURT: Well, thank you very much.
 7
                    MR. LAUTEN: Thank you for your time,
 8
 9
     Your Honor.
10
                    MR. PENNINGTON: Thank you, Your Honor.
11
                         [End of Proceedings]
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     STATE OF TEXAS
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COUNTY OF DALLAS X

I, Jackie Galindo, Deputy Official Court
Reporter for the Probate Court Number One, Dallas
County, Texas, do hereby certify that the above and
foregoing contains a true and correct transcription of
all portions of evidence and other proceedings requested
in writing by counsel for the parties to be included in
this request in the above-styled and numbered cause, all
of which occurred in open court or in chambers and were
reported by me.

I further certify that this Reporter's
Record of the proceedings does truly and correctly
reflects the exhibits, if any, offered by the respective
parties.

WITNESS MY OFFICIAL HAND, this the 1st day of June, 2018.

/S/: Jackie Galindo

Jackie Galindo, Texas CSR #7023
Expiration Date: 12/31/19
Official Court Reporter
The Probate Court,
Renaissance Tower, 2400-A
Dallas County, Texas
214-653-6066