## SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTER'S RECORD VOLUME 9 OF 25

CAUSE NO. PR-11-3238-1

COURT OF APPEALS NO. 05-18-01317-FILED IN 5th COURT OF APPEALS

DALLAS, TEXAS
THE PROBLET 55:17 AM

LISA MATZ Clerk

IN THE ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED

Plaintiff,

JO N. HOPPER

v.

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A. STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER
Defendants.

JOHN L. MALESOVAS d/b/a
MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE
SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP
Intervenors,

v.

STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, and JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A., Defendants.

FILED IN
5th COURT OF APPEALS
DALLAS, TEXAS
6/3/2019 11:01:00 AM
LISA MATZ
Clerk

NUMBER ONE

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

On the 8th day of May, 2018, A.D., the following proceedings came on for hearing in the above-entitled and numbered cause before the HONORABLE COURT, BRENDA HULL THOMPSON, Judge Presiding, held in Dallas, Dallas County, Texas.

Proceedings reported by oral stenography.

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## INDEX

	PAGE
Style and Caption	1
Appearances	2
Index	3
Proceedings, May 8, 2018	4
Court Reporter's Certificate	41

Exhibits [None offered or admitted]

## PROCEEDINGS THE COURT: All right. This is PR-11-3 3238 in the Matter of Max Hopper. May I have the attorneys announce, please? MS. JOHNSON: Yes, Your Honor, Ann Johnson, Jim Pennington and Andrew Guthrie for the 6 intervention Defendants, Stephen Hopper and Laura 8 Wassmer. 9 MR. LAUTEN: Good afternoon, Your Honor, Brian Lauten on behalf of Fee Smith and John Malesovas, 10 and Michelle, my paralegal, is here, too. 11 MS. PULLIAM: Your Honor, Jessica Pulliam 12 13 of Baker Botts on behalf of JPMorgan. We do not anticipate participating today. I just wanted to let 14 15 you know we are here. 16 THE COURT: All right, what's your last 17 name? 18 MS. PULLIAM: Pulliam. P-u-l-l-i-a-m. 19 THE COURT: Anyone else? 20 MR. TOBEY: Your Honor, Robert Tobey for 21 the law firm of Block Garden & McNeill. I'm an 22 interested observer today. 23 THE COURT: All right, what -- Block --24 Block, B-l-o-c-k. MR. TOBEY: 25 Oh, okay. THE COURT:

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                    MR. TOBEY:
                                Garden, G-a-r-d-e-n and
    McNeill, M-c-N-e-i-l-l. It's a law firm.
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                    THE COURT: Yes.
                    MR. TOBEY: They're counsel for Dr.
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    Hopper and Ms. Wassmer, also. They're filing a motion
     in order to withdraw.
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                    THE COURT: Your clients are filing a
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    motion to withdraw?
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                    MR. TOBEY: They are.
                    THE COURT:
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                                Okay.
                    MR. TOBEY: We'll e-file that. I do not
11
     anticipate participating in this hearing.
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                    THE COURT: All right.
                         How long do you anticipate, Ms.
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    Johnson?
                    MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I think I have
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     about 10 or 15 minutes.
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                    THE COURT: All right. Proceed.
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                    MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, we're here
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     today on the Motion to Compel Arbitration of Stephen
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    Hopper and Laura Wassmer. We're asking the Court today
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     for an order enforcing the arbitration provisions, in
     the fee agreements that were drafted by the attorneys,
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     in the case, and we're asking the Court to compel
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     arbitration and stay all proceedings in this Court.
                                                          I'd
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like to start by talking about the arbitration provision. May I approach, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, this is a copy of the arbitration provision. I know the Court has seen it before. It's contained in the fee agreements that are in the record. The fee agreements here, it's undisputed that they contain unambiguous, broad, unlimited, arbitration provisions that cover all matters that may arise between attorneys and clients, including fee disputes.

And the highlighted language here, Your Honor if I could just read that. "Any controversy or claim arises out of or is related to this agreement, any services provided by attorneys to client in connection with clients' claims or any other matter that may arise between client and attorney including malpractice claims and fee disputes. Attorneys and client both waive any right to bring a court action or have a jury trial and agree that the dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration."

Then it goes on to give details about how that arbitration should be conducted. Your Honor, there's no challenge to the enforceability of this provision. In fact, quite the opposite, the lawyer's

pleadings in this case state and I quote, that they fully embrace the fee agreements, including specifically, this arbitration provision. Nor is there any argument about the broad and unambiguous scope of this agreement, Your Honor.

They are not taking the position that the dispute at issue here is not within the scope of the agreement. They're not saying this is not a fee dispute, which it most certainly is. They're not saying that this is not a matter that has arisen between clients and attorneys, which it most certainly is. Having shown a valid arbitration clause -- this was our burden, Your Honor, we had to show a valid arbitration clause and we have to show that the fee dispute at issue in this proceeding, is within the scope of that clause.

Having met that burden, Your Honor, the Court should compel arbitration. The attorneys do not raise any defenses to arbitration. They do not claim that this cause is unconscionable. They do raise a number of arguments in an effort to avoid arbitration and I want to address those, briefly. The first argument they raise is that the Court cannot compel arbitration against a non-signatory. Certainly, there are a lot of issues when the Court is presented with an issue of arbitration as to a non-signatory but, none of

those are flagged here because there is no one -- we are not trying to compel a non-signatory, that is, JPMorgan to this dispute.

I would refer the Court to JPMorgan's filing on Friday, which was a notice to the Court about their position related to the temporary injunction. And here is what they said. They said we are not holding disputed funds and there is no need -- we are not holding disputed funds because we have no obligation to make a settlement payment until certain conditions precedent are met, right, and the Court knows that. The release of the liens and order from this Court saying that they can do so.

So, none of those conditions have been met and as a practical matter Your Honor, none of those conditions will be met until this fee dispute is resolved between the lawyers and the clients, in arbitration. They are not holding disputed funds and there is no need for this Court to compel them to do anything. They are akin to an interpleader Plaintiff. They're not a party to dispute, and we are not seeking to compel them to arbitrate.

The second argument that the lawyers have made to avoid arbitration is an estoppel argument and there are really two pieces to this. The first, they

say that we can't enforce an arbitration provision in the contract. You can't do that if you're also claiming that the contract is void or invalid. And Your Honor, that precise argument has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court, in the 2006 case of Buckeye Check Cashing.

what the Court held there was that an arbitration provision in a contract is severable and of course, that is true here. We have a severance provision in this contract, its paragraph 15, which says that if any part of this contract is held unenforceable, it doesn't make the remainder of the contract unenforceable. In addition, the Court held explicitly in that case that any challenge to the enforceability of a contract should be decided by the arbitrator and not the Court.

What that means is that the situation we have here will happen, and it's not uncommon, which is that a court may enforce an arbitration provision in an agreement that an arbitrator may later find to be void. In fact, the lawyers, if anyone has taking any consistent position here, Your Honor, we submit that it is intervention Plaintiffs, because they are saying we fully embrace this contract that we drafted, that contains an arbitration provision yet, the arbitration

provision is invalid. There is absolutely no case authority for this inconsistency. If this were permitted Your Honor, it would render arbitration provision meaningless.

THE COURT: All right, tell me the case you cited, again?

MS. JOHNSON: Yes, Your Honor, I have a copy if you'd like it.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. JOHNSON: Thank you. The case is

Buckeye Check Cashing. The other kind of estoppel

argument they're making Your Honor, is really a quasi
estoppel argument that goes to the merits of dispute and
has no bearing on whether or not this Court should

compel arbitration. Essentially, they're saying our
right to recover a 45 percent fee is vested and secured
and so there's nothing for an arbitrator to decide and
there is no issue that should go to arbitration.

Well, Your Honor, that's belied by their own summary judgment filing. They filed a summary judgment motion in this court that is asking this Court, improperly asking this Court, to rule on the merits of the dispute. They've set that summary judgment motion for May 23rd and they're asking this Court for a merits ruling that should be decided by the arbitrator. And

that summary judgment filing, in their own petition, confirms that this is a merits issue. They give you -- they cite these cases, *Tillery* and *Enochs and* they really go to the merits, Your Honor, about what amount should be paid to these lawyers and they have nothing to do with arbitration and they are not arbitration cases.

And Your Honor, I would remind the Court of the testimony that I think you heard at the temporary injunction hearing, which is that our clients do not dispute that compensation is owed to these lawyers.

That has never been a dispute. The issue, the merits issue that should be decided in arbitration is the amount of that compensation. That is the disputed issue. That is the disputed issue that must be decided, according to the lawyer's own agreement, by an arbitrator.

Your Honor, I also want to point out the timing issues related, that we have relevant to this issue, which is, we had a Texas Supreme Court opinion that's very clear that motions to compel arbitration must be resolved without delay and that a court abuses its discretion if it delays ruling on a Motion to Compel Arbitration. We have a particular urgency here, which has been created by the lawyer's filings. They have filed a merit summary judgment motion which is set for

May 23rd; our Response to that is due next week, May 16, and the Dallas Court of Appeals has been very clear in cases -- The Dallas Court of Appeals --, it's cited in our brief, Your Honor, the Dallas Court of Appeals has been very clear that a court cannot rule on -- its Tantrum is the name of the case, Your Honor.

A court cannot rule on a summary judgment motion while a Motion to Compel Arbitration is pending.

Nor, can it force a party to litigate by filing a response to the summary judgment motion because to do so would deprive that party of its contractual right to arbitration. Let me just make two final points Your Honor, just so you're up to speed on what developments in the case since we were last here on the temporary injunction hearing.

Garden, which is another law firm that is seeking to recover their fees. They have filed a demand for arbitration so I just want to let the Court know that. They have a similar arbitration provision in their contract. The second development obviously, is that the Court has entered a temporary injunction and I want to remind the Court that when we were here the temporary injunction hearing, the authority that was proffered to the Court for the Court's ability to enter an injunction

was the Texas Arbitration Act.

The provision was 171.086 and what that provision says is that this Court, in support of arbitration, may sign various orders that promote case resolution, through arbitration. The other authority the Court was given was the *Center* case from the Dallas Court of Appeals. What that case said is that this Court can only render an injunction in support of arbitration.

So, we submit Your Honor, that the basis for the injunction that was proffered to you by the attorneys and on which this court entered injunction, was that this case would proceed to arbitration. Your Honor, in conclusion, all paths here lead to arbitration. We have an undisputed arbitration clause. We have a broad unambiguous scope. We have lawyer's filings saying that they are embracing that arbitration clause.

We have a summary judgment motion that tees up the merits that should be decided by the arbitrator, and we have this Court's own temporary injunction, which was rendered based on authority that presumes this issue is being decided in arbitration.

So, we ask this Court to grant the Motion to Compel Arbitration and stay all of the proceedings in this

case, pending arbitration.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LAUTEN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. First, no disrespect intended, Ms. Johnson was nice enough to move this hearing to accommodate a conflict I had and unfortunately, Mr. Vitullo is on vacation, and couldn't get back in time. So, no disrespect intended by him not being here. There are three reasons why this motion should be denied. And I'll talk about those in a second.

The first thing she did say that was correct is there's absolutely an enforceable arbitration clause in this dispute, no question. But its prong two of the analysis as to why this motion should be denied today, as the pleadings currently stand, without prejudice. The first issue is: Are there actually claims on file today that are within the course and scope in the umbrella of the arbitration provision? There are not. And there are three reasons why this motion should be denied.

First, there is no claim before this

Court that is subject to the arbitration provision at issue. Number two, they're fully estopped; there is nothing to arbitrate right now. And three, they've taken irreconcilable positions. Let me start with the

first issue. What Ms. Johnson didn't talk about is what is actually plead. We filed a second amended plea in intervention. There's only one claim pending before this Court and it's an application for declaratory relief under 37.005, JPM remains the Independent Administrator of the Estate.

Junier 37.005, this Court has exclusive jurisdiction to dispose of property incident to the Estate and that is the settlement proceeds. The settlement proceeds, albeit it hasn't been funded, are entirely with JPM. Our DEC action complaint -- there's no breach of contract that's been filed. There's no legal malpractice case that's been filed. There's no breach of fiduciary duty case that's been filed. All of the claims that would fall within the orbit of an arbitration clause, none of that has been filed.

Our dispute primarily, is with who has the property, and that's JPM. We have no agreement with JPM. JPM's not only a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement, the lawyers have no agreement on any kind with JPM. The jurisdiction, the corpus at issue is in the hands of a party before you, who is not bound by any agreement, much less an arbitration agreement. I've got a case for you that's right on point. I've got copies of it and it's cited in our brief, if I can approach?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LAUTEN: Let the record reflect this is Transamerica v. Rapid Settlements, 284S.W.3d 385 and I would submit to you that that case is on all fours with the Instant (phonetic) case. Let me tell you what happened. That was a situation where you had a personal injury Plaintiff, injured in a car accident or something like that; they enter into a settlement agreement and instead of taking the cash, the lump sum for the settlement, the Plaintiff, which is, you know what happens all the time, is they structured the settlement to get an annuity over a certain amount of years.

Well the Plaintiff in that case decided that he wanted the money; that he didn't want to wait for the annuity stream. So, what happened, which is not wholly uncommon, is the Plaintiff reached out to this company called Rapid Settlements, which is one of these factoring companies and it enters it -- the Plaintiff, who settled this case, structures a settlement; the annuity provider was Transamerica. The Plaintiff enters into this agreement with Rapid Settlements and agrees that Rapid Settlements in going to write him a check for \$5,000 and he's going to give him the annuity rights to \$100,000.

So, he's got a contract with Rapid

Settlements with an arbitration agreement. But the people who actually have the money Transamerica, they're not a party to any agreement. They're the JPM in this fact pattern. What happens? They go to arbitration and they simply, the client who entered the agreement with Rapid, but not the person that actually had the money Transamerica, they weren't a party to that contract. They go arbitrate. They move to compel the arbitration award. The Plaintiff loses. The arbitrator says you entered into an agreement; you gave up your rights on that annuity; you're bound by that.

Well, then they move to confirm the award, like coming back to this Court. The JPM in that particular scenario, Transamerica, who had no arbitration agreement with them said we're not bound by that, we're a non-signatory, you couldn't compel us to arbitration; we didn't go to arbitration. We're not going to comply with the arbitrator's award. We don't care about your arbitration award. Our contract's with the Plaintiff and that's what we're going to honor. And in that case, the Court said, that's right.

And in the Houston case, they held that it was reversible error to confirm the arbitration award because the person that actually had the money, the person that actually had the settlement, was not bound

by an arbitration award and they weren't privy to an agreement. That's exactly what we have here. We have a confluence. We have three parties. It's not just client and lawyer. It's client, lawyer and JPM and JPM's got the money. We had no agreement with them. They're not moving to compel arbitration with respect to JPM.

And furthermore, I would disagree that this is just a fee dispute; it's not. It's an ownership and property right dispute. We're entitled to that property right now. We own it. We have filed a DEC action and we're only seeking six findings. No legal malpractice claim, no breach of fiduciary duty claim. Why in the thunder would we go to arbitration and take a dozen depositions and spend three months to a year in arbitration when we're entitled to the property right now, in the hands of a party who is not subject to any arbitration agreement.

So, that's issue one, is there is no claim subject to the arbitration agreement as things currently stand. I totally agree with her. If we were to amend and sue them for breach of contract and all kinds of other things, yeah, I get that. If they were to sue us for legal malpractice, I get that. None of that is on file today. Point number two: They are

fully estopped. There's nothing to arbitrate. That's what *Tillery* says; that's what *Enochs* says. Those findings have been made in the injunction order, those cases are cited in your order, and lastly, they have taken a reconcilable position.

She is absolutely, right; I do not disagree with *Buckeye*. She is correct and she is telling you the truth when she says, that generally, that's up to the arbitrator, that the arbitration agreement can be severed from the contract. She's absolutely telling the truth on that. But there's a bigger point to be made here and that is simply this: The policy of this is absolutely, awful. They have accepted all of the benefits of this work, they terminate the lawyers literally within minutes of the settlement being reached; they fire the lawyers.

They say we agree the lawyers should be paid but they say we're not going to tell you what that number is nor are we going to pay any of it until an arbitrator or court tells us otherwise. And they want to be in a better position than they were before they did all of this and they created this mess and that is simply wrong.

I'm just telling you, Your Honor, if you were to allow -- if a personal injury Plaintiff was

allowed to simply wait until the case is settled, until the Frank Bransons and Ted Lyons and Windle Turleys of the world, we're just not going to pay you. We're going to go to arbitration now and spend a year there. That's simply not the law. They are fully estopped. Lastly, I want to leave you if I could, with a copy of the DEC action statute. Can I approach?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LAUTEN: And this is not just a DEC action statute, this is a unique provision of Chapter 37 that gives a Probate Court exclusive jurisdiction over this type of claim. In the Civil Rights and Remedies Code it says: "Declarations relating to trusts or estate". This is the statute that we plead in the only claim before this Court. And under 37.005 one, you have exclusive jurisdiction as the Probate Court to deal with a class of creditors who have an interest in funds germane to the Estate. We're a creditor. We're owed this money. We have a vested property right.

The Fifth Circuit applied Texas substantive law has held the minute the contingency fee is earned, it's a vested secured, fully vested estopped ownership right. That's it. Under this provision, the Court maintains exclusive jurisdiction to dispose of the corpus. I will just remind the Court this, JPM again,

who we have no agreement with, they have no agreement with, other than the settlement agreement -- by the way, I would love to see what the choice of law or forum selection is in that agreement, which we haven't seen.

But be that as it may, nobody has any agreement with them that they're the Independent Administrator. They got the property and they are not bound by any agreement to arbitrate. So, therefore, for these reasons we would ask the Court to do this: Deny the Motion to Compel Arbitration without prejudice as it stands right now, if the pleadings are later amended and broadened, it has to be re-analyzed to see if claims fall in the scope of that arbitration provision.

The bottom line is this, no, we're not running from our agreement. Our agreement's our best friend. Our agreement's why this case is over before it starts. Number one, there is no claim to arbitrate as things are currently plead. I'd ask the Court to consider and take judicial notice of our second amended petition in intervention. Number two, they are fully estopped under *Enochs* and *Tillery*. There is nothing to go back in time and litigate.

THE COURT: Just a second. The second amended petition is --

MR. LAUTEN: Yes, Your Honor, if you want

1 I can give you a copy of mine, a file-stamped copy. 2 filed it on May 1st at 1:13 if I could approach? I don't have an extra copy for you Anne, but --4 5 MS. JOHNSON: I got it. THE COURT: So, you're asking for 7 judicial notice of that? Take judicial notice of the 8 MR. LAUTEN: 9 only pleading that could possibly be before the Court with respect to their motion is one claim for 10 declaratory relief. 11 THE COURT: Any objection? 12 13 MS. JOHNSON: Uh, no, Your Honor. 14 MR. LAUTEN: And so, that's my argument. 15 I appreciate your time. I know that we've taken a 16 tremendous amount of your time away from how busy you are on Mr. Loewinsohn's side of the case. 17 I'm happy to answer any questions you've got, but again, I'd ask the 18 19 Court to deny the Motion to Compel Arbitration without prejudice at this time. I got a proposed order if the 20 21 Court wants me to leave it. 22 THE COURT: All right. The Court's going 23 to take judicial notice of the second amended petition 24 in intervention. And the Court will take proposed orders from both sides. 25

MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, may I just respond, briefly?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. But I will take

proposed orders today.

MS. JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, Mr. Lauten's a very clever lawyer and he's made some very clever arguments here but they drafted this arbitration provision. This is the first time we've heard by the way, that their pleadings are outside the scope, but there is a whole bucket of law about how artful pleadings do not get you out of an arbitration clause. This arbitration clause does not say breach of contract claims go to arbitration. It says any matter that arises between the attorneys and the clients goes to arbitration. Any matter, Your Honor.

It is one of the broadest most unambiguous, unlimited arbitration clauses there can be. And simply because they have plead this as a DEC action, let's be very clear about the relief they are seeking. They are seeking that this Court declare that they are entitled to immediate disbursement of 45 percent of the settlement proceeds. They can dress that up as a DEC action, they can say oh, it's not breach of contract

it's not that. That is a matter that has arisen between attorneys and clients. That is a fee dispute that is specifically covered in this arbitration clause.

Your Honor, the Transamerica case they're coming up with -- and again, Mr. Lauten's a very clever lawyer but there is no non-signatory. Transamerica would only apply to bring JPMorgan in if they'd said we're not paying, no matter what, we're not paying. Then they would need to be a party to the arbitration but that is the opposite of what JPMorgan has said.

JPMorgan has said we have no dog in this fight. We will hold on to the proceeds until this dispute gets resolved, until this Court gives us an order that we can release it and then we will pay.

Your Honor, there is no non-signatory issue and if this Court stays the arbitration -- I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Excuse me. The last time I heard from Mr. Beckwith, he said that they were working with a settlement sheet, that they did not have a signed settlement agreement. And I guess the Court raised -- he represented that they would comply with the settlement sheet, but he didn't say unequivocally, that Chase might or could not possibly back out of the settlement agreement and he didn't say that

unequivocally.

So, I guess one of the concerns that the Court has, because I've seen it happen, is that settlement agreements fall apart down here. And so, one of the problems with what they were proposing to me, as a resolution of the issue with the disputed funds, was that there was some guarantee in place that, you know, that Chase would not disburse the funds under certain conditions. However, you know, Chase probably would still retain an option to say that the conditions were not satisfied or that they had changed their mind.

And so, as I said, I didn't hear from Mr. Beckwith that Chase was unequivocally yoked to the settlement agreement. In fact, he said that the settlement agreement had not been signed or fleshed out. He said that they were working with the settlement terms.

MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I would like Ms. Pulliam to respond to this but, I also refer the Court to JPMorgan's filing on Friday. They filed --

THE COURT: I haven't seen it.

MS. PULLIAM: I have a copy for you, Your

Honor.

MS. JOHNSON: I understand but just to be clear, JPMorgan makes very clear that they will abide by

existing court orders regarding payment and that they holding -- they are waiting for this Court to make an order.

THE COURT: I understand that but a settlement agreement is not a settlement agreement until it's signed and --

MS. JOHNSON: It is signed Your Honor.

MS. PULLIAM: Your Honor, I just want to make clear because I was standing with Mr. Beckwith at the last hearing and if we weren't clear, we certainly intended to be clear that there was a signed settlement agreement at that time.

THE COURT: All right, well what I heard was that there were settlement terms that had been signed off on. I didn't --

MS. JOHNSON: Definitely. Your Honor, there was a Rule 11 Agreement that was filed with the Court and then there were two notices that JPMorgan has filed.

THE COURT: I have not seen them.

MS. JOHNSON: And if I may approach, I can give you the one that we filed most recently on last Friday, May 4th. So, in that notice, the excerpt portions of the confidential signed settlement agreement and those portions contained the conditions precedent to

settlement. I'll give you just a second to look at it, Your Honor but I would direct to you the second page that contains the excerpts to the settlement agreement. So, Your Honor, this is a representation by JPMorgan again, that there is a signed settlement agreement.

I believe Mr. Lauten was incorrect when he said that the bank is not bound by anything. It is certainly bound by this agreement. It's also made a representation to the Court about the terms that are contained in the settlement agreement. Those terms, as outlined in our filing, contain conditions precedent prior to any release of funds.

So, this idea that there are settlement proceeds currently that anybody has a property interest in, is incorrect. There are no settlement proceeds currently that are owed to anyone under the settlement agreement.

THE COURT: Well, I understand that but I guess --

Go ahead.

MR. LAUTEN: If you were to read this into the record right now it would be unbelievably unclear procedurally, where we are. And this is a true fact, that supplement is not in evidence. I haven't seen it. You haven't seen it in

camera. We have a lawyer telling you what an agreement says that nobody on this side of the table or the Court has actually seen and the point that was made at the prior hearing, which I think you're latching onto, is simply this: They can get together and change their own agreement at any time. We're not a party to that agreement. I haven't even seen their agreement. That's the point. They may file something today and say we'll do this and then tomorrow, they turn around and say we won't. That's the threat. And that was germane to the injunction, which the Court granted.

MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I just want to get us back to the issue. Is this is a dispute that should be compelled to arbitration? Whether or not -- if this Court compels arbitration, this Court's temporary injunction stays in place. And Your Honor, if I may approach again, this is a really important point. Mr. Lauten told you at temporary injunction hearing, the reason this Court had the right to enter an injunction -- it's really important that the Court understands this -- is that under the Texas Arbitration Act, before arbitration proceedings begin in support of arbitration, this Court can enter injunctions if it thinks there's going to be destruction of property.

This was the authority that was given to

this Court. If this Court orders arbitration that will not affect the temporary injunction, those proceeds aren't going anywhere until this arbitration is concluded. Those proceeds aren't going anywhere.

JPMorgan has said that. They have told this Court they are going to abide by the temporary injunction. We have said that. This corpus stays because JPMorgan has no obligation to pay these funds.

So, this court has entered a temporary injunction in support of arbitration. That is the authority that Mr. Lauten gave you and he's not disputing that. So, those funds are going to stay put. JPMorgan's going to hold on to those until this gets resolved and this Court enters a different order. This is a lot of noise trying to distract the Court from the issue that is before the Court, which is: Is this a dispute that needs to go to arbitration? It most certainly is and to be clear what they are asking for, they have filed a summary judgment motion and they're asking this Court to order, give us 45 percent of settlement proceeds right now. That is a fee dispute. It is a matter between attorney and client and it must be decided by an arbitrator.

MS. PULLIAM: Your Honor, again, we don't take a position on the arbitration issue. If this Court

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has any questions whatsoever after the representations that Mr. Beckwith made at the last hearing about the existence of a settlement agreement or the representations that my firm and Mr. Beckwith made in our May 4<sup>th</sup> hearing about the existence of a settlement agreement, including representations that there were excerpts from that settlement agreement included in our filing, we are happy to address that with filing an in camera redacted portion of it.

THE COURT: Well, the question was not whether or not there was a settlement agreement. The question in my mind was whether or not that settlement agreement could be changed or altered or not honored. I mean, I see people change their minds every day. And so, the question in my mind was whether the representation was that there was a settlement agreement.

The question in my mind was well do I hang my hat on something that could change. And so, I'm not privy to the negotiations between the Intervenors and Chase Bank and so I don't know that, I mean, without having seen that, I don't know whether or not there's an opt-out provision in the settlement agreement, whether or not there's a -- you see what I'm saying?

MS. PULLIAM: Yeah.

THE COURT: I basically -- I made the observation that -- you're asking me to make a decision without much information. And so, you know, with those questions hanging in the air nobody decided to give the Court any more information so, I reached the conclusion that I reached.

MS. PULLIAM: And to be clear there is a signed settlement agreement by both parties that --

THE COURT: I'm clear on that, ma'am.

MS. PULLIAM: -- creates obligation and what is clear is that that will not change. That there is a settlement agreement that obligates my client that is signed by my client and that fact will not change.

And again, we're happy to present in camera if the Court is interested, a redacted version of the settlement agreement, subject to discussion with counsel.

MS. JOHNSON: And Your Honor, let me just speak, this is so important. This whole business about whether the settlement agreement can change, the Court has already protected against that, because you have entered a temporary injunction. You have said JPMorgan, nobody's getting these settlement funds.

THE COURT: Well, the settlement agreement and the temporary injunction -- I mean the injunction protects the funds. It doesn't protect the

1 agreement. MS. JOHNSON: That's true, Your Honor but 3 isn't that what the issue is? THE COURT: No. The issue and I'll say 5 it again, the issue is I am not sure about the settlement agreement. I'm not sure whether or not the 6 7 settlement agreement can be changed or modified without 8 the Court being aware of it. I don't know. 9 MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, we will represent -- we will propose today that we will notify 10 the Court immediately if the party's change any part of 11 the settlement agreement. But the point is everybody 12 13 here is concerned about what happens to these funds. Nothing is happening to these funds while there's an 14 15 arbitration. The Court has entered a temporary 16 injunction preventing that. 17 THE COURT: I understand. 18 MS. JOHNSON: Yeah. 19 MS. PULLIAM: So, really, --20 THE COURT: That's why I entered the 21 temporary injunction. 22 MS. JOHNSON: That's right. And that 23 stays in place pending arbitration unless it's reversed 24 by the Court of Appeals or unless the Court reverses 25 That temporary injunction maintains those itself.

1 funds. JPMorgan -- nothing is happening to those funds. THE COURT: It maintains the funds, 3 ma'am. It doesn't necessarily maintain the agreement. You see what I'm saying? MS. JOHNSON: I do understand, Your Honor and I don't know what to say other than we will inform 6 7 the Court if something changes in the agreement, but and 8 none of this, and again, Your Honor, all of this goes 9 to, all of this goes to an argument that there is now a non-signatory who cannot be compelled to arbitration. 10 11 Again, there is absolutely no argument that's been articulated related to JPMorgan that should prevent this 12 13 court from compelling its dispute to arbitration. 14 THE COURT: All right. 15 Ma'am? 16 MS. PULLIAM: Your Honor, I just want to 17 offer again, that we have a copy of the redacted version of the settlement agreement that I'm happy to offer in 18 19 camera if the Court chooses subject to --20 MS. JOHNSON: We have no objection to 21 that, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: What about you? 23 MS. PULLIAM: I don't think she's looking 24 at me, Brian. 25 MR. LAUTEN: I don't have a copy to offer

into evidence, Your Honor so, if she wants to offer the 1 agreement in camera, I don't have a problem with that. 2 3 I don't have a problem with seeing the agreement. THE COURT: Well, they're not offering 5 the agreement. They're offering a redacted copy of the 6 agreement. 7 MR. LAUTEN: Well, I would need to know 8 what they're redacting. I mean, it's hard to object to 9 something you haven't seen, that's being shown to the 10 Court without me getting a copy. 11 MS. PULLIAM: Your Honor, I can represent the only thing redacted in the settlement agreement is 12 13 the amount of the settlement proceeds. 14 MR. LAUTEN: I don't have a problem with 15 the Court seeing it in camera. 16 THE COURT: All right. 17 MS. PULLIAM: Your Honor, to assist the Court, the portions of the settlement agreement that are 18 19 quoted in our May 4th filings are contained in section 2 20 on page 3. 21 THE COURT: Thank you. 22 MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, we're just 23 asking, given the timing, that we have a ruling quickly. 24 I understand we put all that in our papers that we have

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a summary judgment response due next week.

In the event

the Court denies our Motion to Compel Arbitration we would ask the Court for a stay of proceedings that we can seek emergency relief in the Dallas Court of Appeals and alternatively, we would ask the Court to continue the summary judgment hearing, which is set for May 23rd. That would give everybody more space to be able to resolve this issue.

THE COURT: The Court doesn't -- I don't have very many days left in this month that aren't already committed to other matters. And if the Motion for Summary Judgment is taken up on the 23<sup>rd</sup>, I'm planning to be out the following week.

MS. JOHNSON: The problem Your Honor, is that we would have to file a response on the summary judgment motion May 16<sup>th</sup>. We can't be forced to proceed to continue to litigate the case while there's a Motion to Compel pending and we would say even if the Court wants more time to rule that would give everybody more space if the Motion for Summary Judgment was continued.

THE COURT: All right, is there an objection?

MR. LAUTEN: If that pleases the Court, that's fine with us, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LAUTEN: It's totally up to you.

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THE COURT: All right.
                         Sheriff?
                    THE BAILIFF: Yes.
                    THE COURT: Could you get Amanda, please?
                         I'm just running over with motions
     for summary judgment down here. I thought I'd had
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 7
     enough motions for summary judgment in Hopper but it
 8
     looks like I'm not done yet, I've done easily 20
 9
     something.
10
                    THE COURT: When is that set for?
                    MR. LAUTEN: I'm not sure, Your Honor,
11
     off the top of my head. I thought it was 30 minutes but
12
     I'm not 100 percent confident in telling you that's
13
14
     accurate.
15
                    MS. JOHNSON: It's set at 2 p.m. on May
     23<sup>rd</sup>.
16
17
                    THE COURT: You have an hour. Okay, I
18
     have any time Tuesday afternoon, on June 5th.
19
                    MS. JOHNSON: That's fine with me.
                                                          Is
20
     that okay with you, Jim?
21
                    MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, I've got a
     trial starting on June the 4^{th}. I'm told it's the number
22
23
     one setting.
24
                    THE COURT: All right, what about 9
25
     O'clock, June 6th. You think you'll be finished?
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                    MR. PENNINGTON: No, unfortunately, it's
 2
    going to be about a week.
                    THE COURT: I'm sorry?
                    MR. PENNINGTON: It's going to be about
 5
     approximately one week, Your Honor.
                    MS. PULLIAM: Your Honor, I think that
 7
    JPMorgan is a party to that hearing.
                                           I think the
 8
     summary judgment is also directed to the bank. I have
 9
    my availability here but I don't have Mr. Beckwith's.
10
                    THE COURT: I can't hear you.
11
                    MS. PULLIAM: I have my availability on
    my calendar here with me, but I don't have Mr.
12
    Beckwith's. One thing we can do is confer and -- If I'm
13
14
    wrong, I'm happy to be wrong about that.
15
                    THE COURT: Okay, I could give you June
     11th from 9-10 or I could give you June 11th at 3.
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17
                    MS. PULLIAM: The 9-10 would be
    preferable on my end but again, I haven't been able to
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19
     confer with Mr. Beckwith.
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                    MR. LAUTEN: We can make these times
21
    work, Your Honor. You tell us when to be here and we'll
22
    be here.
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                    MS. JOHNSON: Those times are fine with
24
    us too, Your Honor.
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                    THE COURT: Okay, well I can, I mean, if
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1 you aren't finish Monday morning, it'll run into my 10 O'clock docket but I can put you on say at 3 O'clock or 2 move a case up to 1 O'clock and be finished at 2:30. I 3 can put you on say 2:30-4 on Monday afternoon, worst 5 case 3-5, Monday afternoon. Do you want to do that? MR. LAUTEN: Sure. 7 MS. PULLIAM: The morning spot would be 8 preferable for me. I think I have to get on a plane 9 later that afternoon, but --THE COURT: Can you text him or email 10 11 him? MS. PULLIAM: I just did. I just did. 12 13 THE COURT: All right. Okay. What we'll 14 do is I'll move the date and you'll have an extended amount of time to respond. 15 16 MR. LAUTEN: Your Honor, can I approach 17 the bench and give you a proposed order? I think Ms. Johnson may have already given you hers. 18 19 THE COURT: Yes. 20 MR. LAUTEN: Thank you. 21 MS. JOHNSON: So, Your Honor, that would 22 mean that our response would be June  $4^{th}$  and so we would 23 ask that the Court give us, that we have a ruling on 24 arbitration one way or the other a couple of weeks 25 before our response is due. Thank you.

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THE COURT: Well, what I'll do is we'll
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     set it on June 11th. You'll either have the 9-10 slot or
 2
     you'll have the 2:30-3:30 or 4, depending on --
                    MS. PULLIAM: We'll get back to you
 5
     tomorrow morning.
                    THE COURT: Okay, is everybody okay with
 7
     that? Can you all work that out?
 8
                    MR. LAUTEN: Sure, Your Honor.
 9
                    THE COURT: All right, and then your
     response date would be --
10
11
                    MS. JOHNSON: I believe June 4th, Your
     Honor.
12
                    [Counsel confer about dates]
13
14
                    THE COURT: All right, so everybody's
15
     clear, either 9-10 on June 11^{th} or 2:30-3:30 on June 11^{th}
16
     or I can go a little bit later. Anything else? Just
17
     notify the Court tomorrow.
18
                    MS. PULLIAM: Absolutely, Your Honor.
19
                    MR. LAUTEN: Your Honor, thank you.
20
                    MR. LAUTEN: Did you say 2:30 or 3:30 on
21
     June 11<sup>th</sup>?
22
                    THE COURT: I'm going to start another --
23
     I'll have a motion for summary judgment in front of
24
     yours that's going to start at 1pm and so, I've given
25
     them an hour-and-a-half. Let's start you at 3 O'clock
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to make sure I've given them enough time.
                     MR. LAUTEN: Thanks, Judge.
                     MS. JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
                     THE COURT: Okay, thank you very much.
                        [End of proceedings]
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STATE OF TEXAS X

COUNTY OF DALLAS X

I, Jackie Galindo, Deputy Official Court
Reporter for the Probate Court Number One, Dallas
County, Texas, do hereby certify that the above and
foregoing contains a true and correct transcription of
all portions of evidence and other proceedings requested
in writing by counsel for the parties to be included in
this request in the above-styled and numbered cause, all
of which occurred in open court or in chambers and were
reported by me.

I further certify that this Reporter's

Record of the proceedings truly and correctly reflects

the exhibits, if any, offered by the respective parties.

WITNESS MY OFFICIAL HAND, this the 1st day of June, 2018.

/S/: Jackie Galindo

Jackie Galindo, Texas CSR #7023 Expiration Date: 12/31/19 Official Court Reporter The Probate Court, Renaissance Tower, 2400-A Dallas County, Texas 214-653-6066