ACCEPTED 05-18-00856-cv FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS DALLAS, TEXAS 7/26/2018 4:54 PM LISA MATZ CLERK

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FILED IN

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DALLAS, TEXAS

FIFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT DALLAS 6/2018 4:54:57 PM

LISA MATZ

Clerk

### In re Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer,

#### Relators.

#### MANDAMUS RECORD

From the Probate Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas, Cause No. PR-11-03238-1, Hon. Brenda Hull Thompson, Presiding.

Anne M. Johnson State Bar No. 00794271 Andrew W. Guthrie State Bar No. 24078606 HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP 2323 Victory Avenue, Suite 700

Dallas, Texas 75219

Telephone: (214) 651-5376 Facsimile: (214) 200-0487

anne.johnson@haynesboone.com andrew.guthrie@haynesboone.com James E. Pennington State Bar No. 15758510 LAW OFFICES OF JAMES E. PENNINGTON, P.C. 900 Jackson Street, Suite 440 Dallas, Texas 75202-4473

Telephone: (214) 741-3022 Facsimile: (214) 741-3055

jep@jeplawyer.com

Attorneys for Relators

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## Respectfully Submitted,

### /s/ Anne M. Johnson

Anne M. Johnson

State Bar No. 00794271

Anne.Johnson@haynesboone.com

Andrew W. Guthrie

State Bar No. 24078606

Andrew.Guthrie@haynesboone.com

### HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP

2323 Victory Avenue, Suite 700

Dallas, Texas 75219

Telephone: (214) 651-5000

Telecopier: (214) 651-5940

James E. Pennington

State Bar No. 15758510

jep@jeplawyer.com

### LAW OFFICES OF JAMES E. PENNINGTON, P.C.

900 Jackson Street, Suite 440

Dallas, Texas 75202-4473

Telephone: (214) 741-3022

Facsimile: (214) 741-3055

### **Attorneys for Relators**

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was forwarded to all counsel of record in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on the 26th day of July, 2018 and will be hand delivered to the probate court.

Brian P. Lauten
BRIAN LAUTEN, P.C.
3811 Turtle Creek Boulevard
Suite 1450
Dallas, Texas 75219
blauten@brianlauten.com

Attorney for Real Parties in Interest John Malesovas and Fee Smith Sharp & Vitullo, LLP

Honorable Brenda Hull Thompson Judge, Probate Court No. 1 Renaissance Tower 1201 Elm Street, Suite 2400-A Dallas, Texas 75270 John L. Malesovas
MALESOVAS LAW FIRM
1801 South Mopac Expressway
Suite 320
Austin, TX 78746
john@malesovas.com

Attorney for Real Party in Interest John Malesovas

/s/ Anne M. Johnson
Anne M. Johnson

4852-7899-7613

### CORRECTED CLERK'S RECORD TRIAL COURT CAUSE PR-11-03238-1 IN THE COUNTY PROBATE COURT

OF DALLAS COUNTY

FILED IN 5th COURT OF APPEALS

HONORABLE BRENDA H THOMPSON JUDGE PRESIDANCS, TEXAS

6/1/2018 8:09:38 AM

LISA MATZ Clerk

# IN THE MATTER OF MAX HOPPER, DECEDENT

Appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas, at Dallas, Texas.

Attorney for Appellant:

Name

ANNE M. JOHNSON

HAYNES AND BOONE LLP

Address

2323 VICTORY AVENUE, SUITE 700

DALLAS, TEXAS 75219

Telephone No.

214-651-5376

Delivered to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas, at Dallas, Texas on 31st day of May, 2018.

•

Trinidad Pimentel, Deputy Clerk



### THE STATE OF TEXAS

Probate Court

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Estate of: IN THE MATTER OF MAX HOPPER, DECEDENT

Cause No. PR-11-03238-1/05-18-00558CV

I, JOHN F. WARREN, County Clerk and Clerk of the County and Probate Courts, in and for said county, do hereby certify that the following is the true and correct original instruments and plain copies of miscellaneous papers (i.e., correspondence) in the matter of the above named and styled cause.

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The same appear now on file and of record in the Probate Courts of Dallas County, Texas a certified copy of the original instruments and miscellaneous papers (i.e., correspondence).

WITNESS MY HAND AND OFFICIAL SEAL OF OFFICE, this 31st day of May, 2018.



JOHN F. WARREN, County Clerk Dallas County, Texas

By: TRINIDAD PIMENTEL

Deputy

#### CAPTION

The State of Texas
County of Dallas

In the Probate Court of Dallas County, Texas, the Honorable BRENDA H. THOMPSON Judge presiding, the following proceedings were held and the following instruments and other papers were filed in this cause, to wit:

#### Trial Court Cause No. PR-11-03238-1

	§	IN THE PROBATE COURT
	§ 8	
	§	O.F.
IN THE MATTER OF MAX HOPPER, DECEDENT	§	OF
MAX HOLLER, DECEMBER	§	
vs.	§ 8	
PROBATE COURT NO. 1	§	DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

#### CAUSE NO. PR-11-03238-1

IN RE: ESTATE OF IN THE PROBATE COURT MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED JO N. HOPPER Plaintiff, v. JP MORGAN CHASE, N.A., STEPHEN B. HOPPER and LAURA S. WASSMER NO. 1 Defendants. JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP Intervenors, v. STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, and JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,

#### INTERVENTION DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF ACCELERATED APPEAL

Intervention Defendants Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer state their desire, under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 25.1 and 28.1, to appeal the temporary injunction order signed by this Court on April 24, 2018, as well as any other adverse orders or rulings merged into, subsumed within, or relied upon in issuing the temporary injunction, in *In re: Estate of Max D. Hopper*, Cause No. PR-11-03238-1, in Probate Court No. 1 of Dallas County, Texas. Intervention Defendants appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas at Dallas. This is an accelerated, interlocutory appeal of an order granting a temporary injunction, as

NOTICE OF ACCELERATED APPEAL

Defendants.

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DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

authorized by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(4). This accelerated appeal does not involve a parental termination or child protection case.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Anne M. Johnson

Anne M. Johnson
State Bar No. 00794271
Andrew W. Guthrie
State Bar No. 24078606
HAYNES AND BOONE LLP
2323 Victory Avenue, Suite 700
Dallas, Texas 75219
Telephone: (214) 651-5376
Facsimile: (214) 200-0487
anne.johnson@haynesboone.com
andrew.guthrie@haynesboone.com

James E. Pennington
State Bar No. 15758510
LAW OFFICES OF JAMES E. PENNINGTON, P.C.
900 Jackson Street, Suite 440
Dallas, Texas 75202-4473
Telephone: (214) 741-3022
Facsimile: (214) 741-3055
jep@jeplawyer.com

Attorneys for Intervention Defendants Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 14th day of May, 2018, the foregoing *Notice of Accelerated Appeal* was filed using the e-filing system which will send notification of such filing to the following parties via email:

Brian P. Lauten BRIAN LAUTEN, P.C. 3811 Turtle Creek Boulevard, Ste. 1450 Dallas, Texas 75219 blauten@brianlauten.com

#### Attorney for Intervenor Fee Smith Sharp & Vitullo, LLP

John L. Malesovas MALESOVAS LAW FIRM State Bar No. 12857300 1801 South Mopac Expressway, Suite 320 Austin, TX 78746 john@malesovas.com

#### Attorney for Intervenor, John Malesovas

Alan S. Loewinsohn
Jim L. Flegle
Kerry F. Schonwald
LOEWINSOHN FLEGLE DEARY SIMON LLP
12377 Merit Dr., Suite 900
Dallas, Texas 75251
alanl@lfdslaw.com
jimf@lfdslaw.com
kerrys@lfdslaw.com

#### Attorneys for Plaintiff Jo Hopper

Jeffrey S. Levinger
J. Carl Cecere
LEVINGER PC
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500
Dallas, TX 75202
jlevinger@levingerpc.com
ccecere@cecerepc.com

Attorneys for Defendants, Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

NOTICE OF ACCELERATED APPEAL

John C. Eichman Grayson L. Linyard HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LLP 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700 Dallas, TX 75202 214-468-3599 Facsimile jeichman@hunton.com glinyard@hunton.com

Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, Deceased, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., in its Corporate Capacity

Van H. Beckwith
Jessica B. Pulliam
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700
Dallas, TX 75201
214-661-4677 Facsimile
van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com
jessica.pulliam@bakerbotts.com

Evan A. Young BAKER BOTTS L.L.P. 98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500 Austin, TX 78701 512-322-8306 Facsimile evan.young@bakerbotts.com

Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

/s/ Anne M. Johnson
Anne M. Johnson

#### CAUSE NO. PR-11-3238-1

IN RE: ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED,	& & &	IN THE PROBATE COURT
JO N. HOPPER,	<i>\$\$</i> \$\$ \$\$ \$\$ \$\$ \$\$ \$\$\$ \$\$\$\$\$\$\$\$\$\$\$\$\$\$\$	
Plaintiff,	8	
V.	Ø	NO.1
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., STEPHEN B. HOPPER, and LAURA S. WASSMER,	<i>©</i> © © © © ©	
Defendants.	83 893	OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM,	<i>©</i> © © © © © © © ©	
Intervenor,	ş Ş	
γ,	8	
STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, and JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,	00 00 00 00 00 00	
Defendants.	Ş	

#### PETITION IN INTERVENTION

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW Intervenor, John L. Malesovas, d/b/a Malesovas Law Firm ("Intervenor"), and files this Petition in Intervention complaining of Defendants, STEPHEN B. HOPPER ("Hopper"), LAURA S. WASSMER ("Wassmer"), or (hereinafter collectively "Clients") and JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. ("JPM"), and for cause would show the following:

PETITION IN INTERVENTION

#### I. DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN

1.01 Intervenor requests this lawsuit proceed under a Level 3 Discovery Control Plan pursuant to Rule 190.4 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

#### II. PARTIES

- 2.01 Intervenor is an individual licensed to practice law in the State of Texas and doing business as Malesovas Law Firm.
- 2.02 Defendant, Stephen B. Hopper ("Hopper"), was a former client of Intervenor and is being served herewith pursuant to TRCP 21a.
- 2.03 Defendant, Laura S. Wassmer ("Wassmer"), was a former client of Intervenor and is being served herewith pursuant to TRCP 21a. Hopper and Wassmer are hereinafter jointly referred to as "Clients."
- 2.04 Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("JPM"), is a Defendant in the underlying case and is being served herewith pursuant to TRCP 21a.

# III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3.01 Venue is proper in Dallas County, Texas pursuant to §15.002(a)(1), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code, as Dallas County is the county in which all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred and because venue is proper in the underlying action. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this claim because Intervenor has an interest in the matter in controversy.

PETITION IN INTERVENTION

# IV. FACTS AND CAUSES OF ACTION

4.01 Intervenor, along with Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP (jointly "Attorneys"), entered into a contingent fee agreement with Clients, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A ("Agreement"). Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Attorneys fully performed and this case against JPM was tried to a very favorable verdict in this Court.

4.02 Thereafter, on or about April 3 and 4, 2018, through another attorney whom Clients hired for appellate purposes, Jeff Levinger, Clients unilaterally settled the case with JPM without Attorneys authority, agreement and consent. A Rule 11 agreement was filed with the Court on April 4 confirming the settlement between Clients and JPM, and the settlement was announced in open court at 9:00 am on April 5, 2018. Within one (1) hour thereafter, at approximately 10:10 a.m., April 5, 2018, Clients terminated Attorneys under the Agreement and advised Attorneys that they were not going to pay the fee due under the Agreement. Clients also advised Attorneys that they were going to instruct Mr. Levinger to retain an unspecified percentage of the settlement proceeds from JPM in his trust account.

4.03 Intervenor has a justiciable interest in the pending suit in that Intervenor has a lien on and interest in the settlement proceeds of the settlement Clients have entered into with JPM. As such, pursuant to *Texas Mut. Ins. Co, v. Ledbetter*, 251 S.W.3d 31 (Tex. 2008), Intervenor as a lienholder in the settlement proceeds of this case, has an absolute right to intervene. Further, as stated by the Supreme Court in *Ledbetter*, to the extent that Clients, JPM and/or their attorneys settle a case without reimbursing a lienholder, "everyone involved is liable ... for conversion." Thus, Intervenor seeks a declaration from this Court pursuant to Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem Code 37.001 et. seq. confirming Intervenor's security interest in the settlement proceeds and directing JPM and Clients to pay such interest directly to Intervenor.

PETITION IN INTERVENTION

4.04 In addition, Clients' actions as described above constitute a breach of the Agreement, as well as an anticipatory breach of the Agreement, thereby entitling Intervenor to the full amount of the fee from the settlement as set forth in the Agreement for which Intervenor sues Clients,

4.05 Attorneys fully performed under the Agreement with no complaint from Clients and secured a very favorable jury verdict. As a result of this favorable jury verdict, Clients were able to secure a settlement with JPM. Only after Clients unilaterally settled with JPM did Clients terminate the Agreement and cook up baseless reasons for not paying the fee due under the Agreement. Clients accepted, used and enjoyed the services of Attorneys which resulted in the settlement with JPM. In accordance with the Courts' holdings in *Tillery & Tillery v. Zurich Ins.*Co., 54 S.W.3d 356 (Tex.App. – Dallas 2018, no pet.) and Enochs v. Brown, 872 S.W.2d 312 (Tex.App. – Austin 1994, no writ), Clients are estopped and quasi-estopped from challenging the validity of the Agreement and the fee due Intervenor thereunder. Further, it would be unconscionable for Clients to challenge the validity of the Agreement after having already accepted the benefits from Attorneys under the contract. Accordingly, Intervenor moves the Court to declare pursuant to Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem Code 37.001 et. seq. that the Agreement is valid and enforceable and order that the fee due Intervenor under the Agreement from the proceeds of the settlement must be paid by JPM and Clients directly to Intervenor.

4.06 In addition, Intervenor seeks his attorneys' fees from Clients pursuant to Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem Code 37.009 as well as Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem Code 38.001. All conditions precedent have been satisfied pursuant to Tex.Civ.Prac.& Rem Code 38.001.

PETITION IN INTERVENTION

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Intervenor moves the Court for all relief requested herein, as well as such other and further relief, in law or in equity, to which he may show himself justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

John L. (Malesovas MALESOVAS LAW FIRM

State Bar No. 12857300

1801 South Mopac Expressway, Suite 320

Austin, TX 78746

Telephone:

PETITION IN INTERVENTION

(512) 708-1777

Telecopier:

(512) 708-1779

john@malesovas.com

ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENOR

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MR:015

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has been served on all counsel of record on April 6, 2018, in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to:

Alan S. Loewinsohn
Jim L. Flegle
Kerry F. Schonwald
Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP
12377 Merit Dr., Suite 900
Dallas, Texas 75251
214-572-1717 Facsimile
alan@lfdslaw.com
jimf@lfdslaw.com
kerrys@lfdslaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Jo Hopper

Jeffrey S. Levinger
J. Carl Cecere
Levinger PC
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500
Dallas, TX 75202
214-855-6808 Facsimile
jlevinger@levingerpc.com
cceoere@cecerepc.com

Attorneys for Defendants, Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

John C. Eichman
Grayson L. Linyard
Hunton & Williams, LLP
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700
Dallas, TX 75202
214-468-3599 Facsimile
jeichman@hunton.com
glinyard@hunton.com

Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, Deceased, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., in its Corporate Capacity

PETITION IN INTERVENTION

Van H. Beckwith
Jessica B. Pulliam
Baker Botts L.L.P.
2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700
Dallas, TX 75201
214-661-4677 Facsimile
van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com
jessica.pulliam@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Evan A. Young
Baker Botts L.L.P.

98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
Austin, TX 78701

512-322-8306 Facsimile
evan.young@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

PETITION IN INTERVENTION

John L. Malesovas

#### CAUSE NO. PR-11-3238-1

IN RE: ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED,	89 89 89 89	IN THE PROBATE COURT
JO N. HOPPER,	<i>\$\text{\tint}\xi}\\\ \text{\tert{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\tin}\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\texitt{\texitil\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texitint{\texitilex{\tiint{\texitilex{\tiin}\tint{\texi}\t</i>	
Intervenor,	8 8	
V.	§ S	NO. 1
•	8	* ,
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,	§	
STEPHEN B. HOPPER, and LAURA	§	
S. WASSMER,	§	
Defendants.	Ş	OF DALLAG COUNTRY TREATED
Defendants,	3	OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a	§	
MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and		
FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP	§	
	§	
Intervenors,	§	
	Ş	
ν,	Š	
STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S.	8	
WASSMER, and JPMORGAN	@ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @	
CHASE BANK, N.A.,	8 8	
	s §	
Defendants.	§	

# FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP'S PETITION IN INTERVENTION, APPLICATION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF, REQUEST FOR TRO AND TEMPORARY INJUNCTION

#### TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW Intervenor, Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP ("Intervenor"), and files this Petition in Intervention and Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and for Temporary Injunction complaining of Defendants, STEPHEN B. HOPPER ("Hopper"), LAURA S. WASSMER ("Wassmer"), or (hereinafter collectively "Clients")

PETITION IN INTERVENTION

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and/or "Defendants") and JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. ("JPM"), and for cause would show the following:

# I. DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN

1.01 Intervenor requests this lawsuit proceed under a Level 3 Discovery Control Plan pursuant to Rule 190.4 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

#### II. <u>PARTIES</u>

- 2.01 Intervenor is a limited liability partnership and law firm and doing business as Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP.
- 2.02 Defendant, Stephen B. Hopper ("Hopper"), was a former client of Intervenor and is being served herewith pursuant to TRCP 21a.
- 2.03 Defendant, Laura S. Wassmer ("Wassmer"), was a former client of Intervenor and is being served herewith pursuant to TRCP 21a. Hopper and Wassmer are hereinafter jointly referred to as "Clients".
- 2.04 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("JPM"), is a Defendant in the underlying case and an interested party to this Petition in Intervention and is being served herewith pursuant to TRCP 21a.

# III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3.01 Venue is proper in Dallas County, Texas pursuant to §15.002(a)(1), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code, as Dallas County is the county in which all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred and because venue is proper in the underlying action. This Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear this claim because Intervenor has an interest in the matter in controversy that involves the Defendants and The Estate of Max D. Hopper. To

PETITION IN INTERVENTION

the extent that The Estate of Max D. Hopper is a party to the settlement with JPM or to the extent that beneficiaries of The Estate of Max D. Hopper are parties to the settlement with JPM then this Court and only this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over this matter,

#### IV. FACTS

- 4.01 Intervenor, along with John L. Malesovas, d/b/a Malesovas Law Firm, (jointly "Attorneys"), represented Defendants pursuant to a valid and enforceable contingency fee agreement in the underlying lawsuit pending in this Court. Intervenor's have fully performed under the terms of the contingency fee agreement. On April 3, 2018 and April 4, 2018, Defendants Appellate Counsel Jeff Levinger filed a Rule 11 agreement with the Court notifying the Court that there was a settlement between Defendants and JP Morgan Chase. At approximately 9:05 am on April 5, 2018, Anthony L. Vitullo on behalf of Defendant's announced in open court that a settlement between Defendant and JP Morgan Chase had been reached (without violating the confidentiality). At approximately 10:10 am on April 5, 2018, Defendants terminated Intervenor's without "Cause". On April 6, 2018, Intervenor, Fee, Smith, Sharp and Vitullo LLP withdrew from representing Defendants in the underlying lawsuit. Intervenors Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo own a property right in the "Settlement Proceeds" from the settlement between Defendant and JP Morgan Chase. Intervenor files this Petition in Intervention and Declaratory Judgment and TRO and Temporary Injunction to enforce its property rights in the "Settlement Proceeds."
- 4.02 Intervenor has a justiciable interest and property interest in the pending suit in that Intervenor has a lien on and interest in the settlement proceeds of the settlement Clients have entered into with JPM. This lawsuit is a simple declaratory judgment action to enforce Intervenors property rights. As such, pursuant to *Texas Mut. Ins. Co, v. Ledbetter*, 251 S.W.3d

PETITION IN INTERVENTION

31 (2008), Intervenor as a lienholder in the settlement proceeds of this case, has an absolute right to intervene. Further, as stated by the Supreme Court in *Ledbetter*, to the extent that Clients, JPM and/or their attorneys settle a case without reimbursing a lienholder, "everyone involved is liable ... for conversion." Thus, Intervenor seeks a declaration from this Court pursuant to Tex. CIV. PRAC. & REM CODE § 37.001 et. seq. (Vernon 2014), confirming Intervenor's security interest in the settlement proceeds and directing JPM and Clients to pay such interest directly to Intervenor. This lawsuit is a simple declaratory judgment action to enforce Intervenor's property rights.

Attorneys fully performed under the Agreement and secured a very favorable jury 4.03 verdict. As a result of the auspicious jury verdict, Clients were able to secure a confidential settlement with JPM. Only after Clients through their appellate attorney Jeff Levinger unilaterally settled with JPM did Clients terminate Attorneys. Clients accepted, used and enjoyed the services of Attorneys which resulted in the settlement with JPM. In accordance with the Courts' holdings in Tillery & Tillery v. Zurich Ins. Co., 54 S.W.3d 356, 360-61 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, no pet.), Enochs v. Brown, 872 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no writ), disapproved of on unrelated grounds, by Roberts v. Williamson, 111 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. 2003); Mandell & Wright, 441 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. 1969). Clients are estopped from challenging the validity of the Agreement and the fee due Intervenor thereunder and the property rights Intervenors have to the "Settlement Proceeds." The optics of Defendants terminating Intervenor—literally as the confidential settlement is being announced—is enormously telling and should be seen for what it is. Further, it would be unconscionable for Clients to challenge the property rights of Intervenor after having already accepted the benefits from Attorneys under the contingency fee agreement. Accordingly, Intervenor moves the Court to declare that the

PETITION IN INTERVENTION

Intervenor owns a property right in the "Settlement Proceeds" and that the Agreement is valid and enforceable and ordering that the fee due Intervenor under the Agreement from the proceeds of the settlement must be paid my JPM and Clients directly to Intervenor. Alternatively, Intervenor asks this Court to take judicial notice under Rule 201 of the Texas Rules of Evidence that Defendants have waived each and every defense they have, if any, by virtue of the fact that they terminated *after* the settlement was reached. That is long standing and undeniable Texas law. *See Tillery*, 54 S.W.3d at 360-61; *Enochs*, 872 S.W.2d at 317; *Mandell*, 441 S.W.2d at 847.

4.04 In addition, Intervenor seeks its attorneys' fees from Clients pursuant to TEX.CIV. PRAC. & REM CODE § 37.009 as well as TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM CODE § 38.001. All conditions precedent to Intervenor's claim for relief have been performed, have occurred, or been waived.

# V. <u>SUIT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF</u>

5.01 Intervenor incorporates all of the preceding paragraphs as if they were set forth in their entirety herein.

5.02 Intervenor seeks from this court a declaratory judgment for the following reasons: An actual and justiciable controversy (ies) exists and has arisen between Intervenor and Defendants, and specific orders from this Court as follows as to each of the matters below. Intervenor further seeks judgment against Defendants pursuant to the UDJA declaring the rights, status and other legal relations of Intervenor and Defendants regarding the rights and obligations hereunder of the parties, one to another and to have this Honorable Court declare the rights and legal relations in respect to any and all interests of the parties in relation to the property rights of the Intervenors in the "Settlement Proceeds" from the settlement between Clients, the Estate, and JPM. To the extent JPM entered into a settlement with the Estate of Max D. Hopper this

PETITION IN INTERVENTION

Honorable Court has exclusive jurisdiction to declaring any rights Intervenor's may have in the "Settlement Proceeds".

- 5.03 Intervenor is entitled to a declaration from this Honorable Court as follows:
- 1. Intervenor's own a property right to the "Settlement Proceeds."
- 2. Intervenor is entitled to immediate possession of its property right to the "Settlement Proceeds."
- 3. To the extent that the Estate of Max D. Hopper is a party to the settlement with JPM, this Honorable Court has exclusive jurisdiction to declare the rights of the parties including the property rights of the Intervenor.
- Intervenor is entitled to the full and exclusive use, possession and enjoyment of its interest in the "Settlement Proceeds'.
- 5. That the JPM as IA of The Estate of Max D. Hopper, pursuant to the Texas Probate Code, that it is in the best interest of the Estate to pay Intervenor its interest in the "Settlement Proceeds".
- 6. That the Court Order JPM as IA of the Estate of Max D. Hopper to pay Intervenor's interest in the "Settlement Proceeds".
- 7. This Count seeks judgment against Defendants pursuant to the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act ("UDJA"), Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Section 37.001 et seq. Intervenor and Defendants are legal or natural persons having an interest in the matters set forth herein that would be affected by the declarations sought herein, as provided under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, Section 37.006(a). Plaintiff also seeks all legal fees and expenses as allowed under law and set forth elsewhere in this pleading, all of which are incorporated by reference herein

PETITION IN INTERVENTION

in support hereof.

8. As a result of the aforementioned actions of Defendants, Intervenor has been damaged in an amount in excess of the minimum jurisdictional limits of the Court, for which they now sue.

#### VI. <u>ATTORNEY'S FEES</u>

- 6.01 Pursuant to Section 38.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Intervenor seeks its reasonable and necessary attorney's fees in this case which include the following:
  - a. Preparation and trial of this lawsuit;
  - b. Post-Trial, pre-appeal legal services;
  - c. An appeal to the court of appeals;
  - d. Making or responding to an application for writ of error to the Supreme Court of Texas;
  - e. An appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas in the event application for writ of error is granted; and
  - f. Post-judgment discovery and collection in the event execution on the judgment is necessary.

# VII. ELEMENTS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

- 7.01 In light of the above described facts, Intervenor seeks recovery from Defendants. The nature of the lawsuit is an action for breach of a written attorney fee agreement, unjust enrichment, and damages based on Defendants' failure to pay for the legal services fully performed under the fee agreement.
  - 7.02 Intervenor is likely to succeed on the merits of this lawsuit because Intervenor

PETITION IN INTERVENTION

shows a probable right to the relief it seeks on final hearing. On final hearing, Intervenor is likely to prove each and every element of all claims asserted against the respective Defendants as the evidence above shows that Intervenor fully performed under the written fee agreement. Defendants represented and agreed to pay Intervenor for the legal services rendered and Defendants have informed Intervenor that they do not intend to pay for the legal services rendered.

- 7.03 Unless this Honorable Court immediately restrains the Defendants, the Intervenor will suffer immediate and irreparable injury, for which there is no adequate remedy at law to afford Intervenor complete, final, and equal relief. More specifically, Intervenor will show the court the following:
  - a) The harm to Intervenor is imminent because Defendants have started to finalize the settlement in the underlying lawsuit and requested that the settlement proceeds be provided to Defendants' attorney, Jeff Levinger.
  - b) This imminent harm will cause Intervenor irreparable injury in that once Defendants provide the "Settlement Proceeds" to Jeff Levinger he is obligated to protect the settlement proceeds for the benefit of his clients—the Defendants. In addition, the settlement proceeds will not be protected from unauthorized distributions, conversion, or bank failure; and, moreover, Intervenor should not be forced to give an interest free loan to either Defendants or Mr. Levinger's bank with money that belongs in equity and good conscience to Intervenor.
  - c) There is no adequate remedy at law which will give Intervenor complete, final and equal relief because once Defendants do not have sufficient assets to satisfy Intervenor's damages, Intervenor will not be able to recover its damages from Defendants if

PETITION IN INTERVENTION

Intervenor were to prevail on the merits of this suit.

#### VIII. BOND

8.01 Intervenor is willing to post a reasonable temporary restraining order bond and request the court to set such bond; be that as it may, there should be no bond because Defendants should be forced to explain with clear and specific evidence what it monetarily disputes with any delta going into either the court's registry or an interest bearing account under the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.

# IX. TRO REMEDY

- 9.01 Intervenor has met its burden by establishing each element which must be present before injunctive relief can be granted by this court; and, therefore, Intervenor is entitled to the requested temporary restraining order.
- 9.02 Intervenor requests that the court restrain Defendants from the following actions (the "Actions") with regard to the "Settlement Proceeds":
  - taking any action to transfer, liquidate, convert, encumber, pledge, loan, share, sale, market for sale, conceal, hide, hypothecate, secret, dissipate, deplete, neglect, misuse, damage and/or destroy, lease, assign, granting a lien, security interest, or other interest in, allow the use of, or otherwise dispose of any and all part of the Settlement Proceeds; and
  - encouraging, requesting, assisting, suggesting, directing, or implying to anyone that
    any natural or legal person perform or do any of the matters or things otherwise
    prohibited by the temporary restraining order.
- 9.03 It is essential that the court immediately and temporarily restrain Defendants herein, from committing any of the above Actions.
- 9.04 In order to preserve the *status quo* during the pendency of this action, Intervenor requests that the Defendants be temporarily enjoined from committing the above Actions.

PETITION IN INTERVENTION

- 9.05 On final trial on the merits, that the Court permanently enjoin Defendants herein, from committing the above Actions.
- 9.06 That the Court order the Intervenor's interests in the "Settlement Proceeds" be placed in the Registry of the Court or an interest-bearing court for the benefit of Defendants within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Intervenor respectfully requests that the Defendants be cited to appear and answer, as required by law, and that Intervenors have the following relief;

- Actual, direct, indirect, economic, non-economic, and consequential damages in the amount determine to have been sustained by Intervenors;
- 2. Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest;
- Costs of this lawsuit, including reasonable attorney's fees, experts fees, and other disbursements; and
- 4. A temporary restraining order will issue against the Defendants;
- The Court sets a reasonable bond for the temporary restraining order; or, places the disputed funds into the registry;
- 6. After notice and hearing, a temporary injunction will issue enjoining and restraining Defendants', Defendants' officers, agents, employees, successors and assigns, and attorneys from directly or indirectly committing any of the above listed Actions.
- 7. After trial on the merits, the Court permanently enjoin Defendants', Defendants' officers, agents, employees, successors and assigns, and attorneys from directly or indirectly committing any of the above listed Actions.
- 8. That the Intervenor's interest in the "Settlement Proceeds" be placed in the Registry

PETITION IN INTERVENTION

of the Court.

9. Such other and further relief, at law or in equity, to which Intervenors may show themselves to be justly entitled.

Respectfully Submitted,

BRIAN LAUTEN, P.C.

BRIAN P. LAUTEN

State Bar No. 24031603 blauten@brianlauten.com 3811 Turtle Creek Boulevard

Ste. 1450

Dallas, Texas 75219 (214) 414-0996 telephone

ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENOR FEE SMITH SHARP & VITULLO, LLP

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

In accordance with Rule 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has been served upon all counsel of record via the ECF case manager system and by electronic filing on April 6, 2018.

Ce:

Alan S. Loewinsohn
Jim L. Flegle
Kerry F. Schonwald
Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP
12377 Merit Dr., Suite 900
Dallas, Texas 75251
214-572-1717 Facsimile
alan@lfdslaw.com
jimf@lfdslaw.com

Attorneys for Intervenor Jo Hopper

kerrys@lfdslaw.com

Jeffrey S. Levinger
J. Carl Cecere
Levinger PC
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500
Dallas, TX 75202
214-855-6808 Facsimile
ilevinger@levingerpc.com
ccecere@cecerepc.com

Attorneys for Defendants, Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

John C. Eichman Grayson L. Linyard Hunton & Williams, LLP 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700 Dallas, TX 75202 214-468-3599 Facsimile jeichman@hunton.com glinyard@hunton.com

Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, Deceased, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., in its Corporate Capacity

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Van H. Beckwith
Jessica B. Pulliam
Baker Botts L.L.P.
2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700
Dallas, TX 75201
214-661-4677 Facsimile
van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com
jessica.pulliam@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Evan A. Young
Baker Botts L.L.P.
98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
Austin, TX 78701
512-322-8306 Facsimile
evan.young@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant,
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

BRIAN P. LAUTEN ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENOR

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# CAUSE NO. PR-11-3238-1

IN RE: ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED,	00 co	IN THE PROBATE COURT			
JO N. HOPPER,	8				
Intervenor,	§ §				
v.	8 8 8	NO. 1			
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., STEPHEN B. HOPPER, and LAURA S. WASSMER,	co c				
Defendants.	Ş	OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS			
JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP Intervenors, v. STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, and JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendants.	an				
VERIFICATION					
STATE OF TEXAS					
COUNTY OF DALLAS )					

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared ANTHONY L. VITULLO, who, being by me duly sworn on oath, deposed and stated that he is a Senior Partner at Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP, named as Intervenor in the above-entitled and numbered

cause; that he has read the Petition in Intervention and Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and for Temporary Injunction; and that every statement contained therein is within his personal knowledge and is true and correct, and that he is authorized to sign on behalf of Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP.

ANTHONY L. VITULLO

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 6 day of

NOTARY PUBLIC IN AN THE STATE OF TEXAS

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 9-19-2019

MELINDA SPURGEON Notary Public, State of Texas My Commission Expires September 19, 2019

#### CAUSE NO. PR-113238-1

IN RE: ESTATE OF \$
MAX D. HOPPER, \$
DECEASED \$
\$

JO N. HOPPER

Plaintiff,

v.

JP MORGAN CHASE, N.A., STEPHEN B. HOPPER and LAURA S. WASSMER

Defendants.

JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP

Intervenors,

STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, and JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,

Defendants.

IN THE PROBATE COURT

NO. 1

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

# **OBJECTION TO PETITIONS IN INTERVENTION**

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW, Defendants, Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer ("the Clients"), and file this Objection to the Petitions in Intervention filed by Intervenors John Malesovas and Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitulio, LLP ("Intervenors"), and respectfully show the Court the following:

#### This Court Lacks Jurisdiction

This Court has no jurisdiction over this dispute. The contract, which the Intervenors rely OBJECTION TO INTERVENTION

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upon to support their claims, contains a mandatory arbitration provision. The language contained in the aforementioned contract states as follows:

20. ARBITRATION: . . . should a dispute arise between Attorney and Client, a prompt and fair resolution is in the interests of all concerned. To this end, if any controversy or claim arises out of is related to this agreement, any services provided by Attorneys to Client in connection with Client's Claims, or any other matter that may arise between Client and Attorney (including malpractice claims and fee disputes), Attorneys and Client both waive any right to bring a court action or have a jury trial and agree that the dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration to be conducted in Dallas, Texas before the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA with one arbitrator who must be an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Texas.<sup>1</sup>

This agreement was signed by both Intervenors. Based on this arbitration provision, this Court does *not* have jurisdiction over this matter; Intervenors have waived their right to bring any action in this Court or any other court.

Any doubts regarding the existence or scope of an agreement are resolved in favor of arbitration. *In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A.*, 52 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex. 2001). The arbitration provision in the agreement applies to "any controversy or claim [that] arises out of is related to this agreement." This type of language is construed broadly. *In re Conseco Fin. Serv. Corp.*, 19 S.W.3d 562, 568 (Tex. App. - Waco 2000, orig. proceeding). There is no question that Intervenors' claims arise out of, and are related to, the agreement. Intervenors maintain throughout their petitions that they are entitled to a contingent fee under the agreement.<sup>2</sup> The Clients dispute this fee, which is a matter within the scope of the arbitration clause. Intervenors also seek declaratory relief regarding their rights under the agreement and claim that the Clients breached the agreement. Once it is determined that an arbitration provision exists and the claim falls within the scope of that provision, a court has no discretion — it must compel arbitration and

<sup>2</sup> Petition in Intervention at 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See p. 7 of Exhibit A attached to Petition in Intervention filed by Malesovas (emphasis supplied).

stay any further proceedings. See Pepe Int'l Dev. Co. v. Garcia, 915 S.W.2d 925, 930-31 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, orig. proceeding).

Although the Clients dispute the enforceability of the contingent fee agreement, this issue should be decided by the arbitrator — not this Court. Once there is an agreement to arbitrate, substantive attacks on the validity of the contract are to be resolved by the arbitrator, and not by the court. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2006); FUNimation Entm't v. SC Films Int'l, 2013 WL 5770383, (E.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2013); Lawrence v. Comprehensive Bus. Serv. Co., 833 F.2d 1159, 1162 (5th Cir.1987) (submitting issue regarding illegality defense to arbitration); Mesa Operating Ltd. P'ship v. La. Intrastate Gas Corp., 797 F.2d 238, 244 (5th Cir.1986) (submitting claim that contract was void ab initio to arbitration because parties failed to demonstrate that the arbitration agreement was "invalid separately from the entire contract").

Additionally, and without waiving their position that the agreement is unenforceable, in the alternative event that the agreement is determined to be enforceable – the Clients contend that the Intervenors breached the agreement. Pleading alternative theories does not defeat the effect of an arbitration clause that broadly covers all disputes that arise out of the underlying agreement. *In re Kellogg Brown & Root Inc.*, 166 S.W.3d 732, 740 (Tex. 2005).

For those reasons set forth above, the Clients object to Intervenors' improper attempt to invoke this Court's jurisdiction. This Court this court should strike the interventions and/or compel the Intervenors to pursue their claims in arbitration. Subject to and without waiving this objection, the Intervenors have not established a right to seek any equitable relief for those reasons discussed below.

# Lack of Imminent Harm

A threat of imminent harm is a prerequisite for injunctive relief. Operation Rescue-Nat'l v. Planned Parenthood of Houston and Se. Tex., Inc., 975 S.W.2d 546, 554 (Tex. 1998). Fear or apprehension of injury will not support a temporary injunction. Frey, 647 S.W.2d at 248; Matrix Network, Inc. v. Ginn, 211 S.W.3d 944, 947-48 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.). "An injunction will not issue unless it is shown that the respondent will engage in the activity enjoined." State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 946 (Tex. 1994). If the evidence shows no intent to do the thing sought to be enjoined, the injunctive relief must be denied. Luccous v. J.C. Kinley Co., 376 S.W.2d 336, 341 (Tex. 1964); see also Dallas Gen. Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers v. Wamix, Inc., of Dallas, 156 Tex. 408, 416, 295 S.W.2d 873, 879 (1956).

Intervenors have not shown — and cannot show — there is a threat of imminent harm. The Clients have agreed to place the disputed fee into their attorney's (Jeff Levinger) trust account. Further, they have agreed not to disburse those funds (the disputed fee amount) from Mr. Levinger's trust account until this matter is finally resolved. This situation is governed by Rule 1.14 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. Under Rule 1.14, a lawyer in Mr. Levinger's position is required to maintain the disputed portion of any settlement in his trust account (or other escrow account) and not disburse the disputed amount until the matter is resolved. Both the Clients and Mr. Levinger have agreed to comply with their obligations under Rule 1.14. Accordingly, there is no imminent harm or danger regarding the disbursement of the disputed fee amount.

Intervenors claim, incorrectly, that they are entitled to the full and exclusive use, possession and enjoyment of their interest in the settlement proceeds. However, Rule 1.14 states otherwise: If a dispute arises concerning a lawyer's interest in settlement funds, "the portion in

dispute shall be kept separated by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved, and the undisputed portion shall be distributed appropriately." Rule 1.14 Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct. Even if an attorney believes he has earned a fee – if the fee is disputed, the funds must be maintained in a trust account until the dispute was resolved. *Fry v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline*, 979 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Tex. App. – Houston [14thDist.] 1998, pet. denied). Thus, Intervenors have no entitlement to the exclusive use or possession of the disputed fee amount.

#### Intervenors Have an Adequate Remedy at Law

Intervenors claim that that they do not have an adequate remedy because they will not be able to recover their damages from the Clients if Intervenors prevail on their claims. This allegation is not supported by – and it is *contrary to* – the evidence. In the unlikely event that Intervenors prevail on their claims, the disputed funds will be available for distribution because they will remain in Mr. Levinger's trust account (or other escrow account). Rule 1.14 provides an adequate remedy to Intervenors. An injury is not irreparable if the applicant has an adequate remedy at law. *Midway CC Venture I, LP v. O&V Venture LLC*, 527 S.W.3d 531, 534 (Tex. App. —Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no writ); see also McGlothlin v. Kliebert, 672 S.W.2d 231, 232 (Tex. 1984) ("A temporary injunction will not be granted where there is a plain and adequate remedy at law.").

#### Violation of Rule 1.05 - Confidentiality of Information

The Clients dispute whether Intervenors are likely to prevail on their claims; however, they should not be forced to litigate this matter before this Court. Litigating this issue in a public forum and in front of other parties – including the Clients' adversaries – would require the disclosure of confidential and privileged information. Rule 1.05 requires attorneys to maintain the confidentiality of this information, with very few exceptions. The only applicable exception

is contained in Rule 1.05(c)(5), which allows a lawyer to reveal confidential information "to the extent reasonably necessary to enforce a claim" on behalf of the lawyer. The comments to Rule 1.05 also provide, when a lawyer is seeking to collect a fee from a client, "Any disclosure by the lawyer, however, should be as protective of the client's interests as possible." Comment 15 to Rule 1.05, Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.

However, Intervenors have ignored the express limitations set forth in Rule 1.05. It is not reasonable or necessary for Intervenors to reveal any confidential information in *court* – where the Clients' adversaries and other parties have access to this information. This should be done in arbitration, where the Clients' confidential information can be protected from disclosure to other parties. Intervenors themselves included a mandatory arbitration provision in their attorney's fee contract to govern this precise dispute; yet, they have ignored both the arbitration provision and their own ethical obligations under Rule 1.05 to be as protective of the Clients' interests as possible.

#### Intervenors' Requested Relief Threatens to Change the Status Quo

On April 4, 2018, the Clients and JP Morgan Chase Bank filed a Rule 11 agreement confirming they agreed to settle this case based on confidential terms, including the amount of the settlement. Intervenors' requested relief -- seeking to have the disputed funds placed in the registry of this Court -- threatens to violate the confidentiality of the settlement agreement. The relief sought by Intervenors would necessarily require the amount of the settlement to be disclosed -- either directly or indirectly -- and become a matter of public record. Arguably, this would violate the confidentiality of the settlement agreement and/or jeopardize the settlement. Thus, contrary to Intervenors' allegations, a temporary restraining order would *not* preserve the status quo; rather, it would have the opposite affect -- it could potentially *change the status quo* 

regarding the settlement. For this reason as well, the Clients object to the relief sought by Intervenors.

#### Conclusion

For those reasons set forth herein, the Clients request this Court to sustain their objections to the Petitions in Intervention, strike the interventions, compel the Intervenors to pursue their claims in arbitration, that the interventions be stayed, and/or that this Court deny all other relief sought by Intervenors.

Respectfully submitted,

s/James E. Pennington
James E. Pennington
State Bar No. 15758510
LAW OFFICES OF JAMES E. PENNINGTON, P.C. 900 Jackson Street, Suite 440
Dallas, Texas 75202-4473
Telephone: (214) 741-3022
Facsimile: (214) 741-3055
jcp@jeplawyer.com

Attorneys for Defendants
Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ·

I hereby certify that on this 9<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2018, the foregoing *Objection to Petitions in Intervention* was filed using the e-filing system which will send notification of such filing to the following parties via email:

Brian P. Lauten
Brian Lauten, P.C.
3811 Turtle Creek Boulevard, Ste. 1450
Dallas, Texas 75219
blauten@brianlauten.com
Attorneys for Intervenor Fee Smith Sharp & Vitullo, LLP

OBJECTION TO INTERVENTION

7

John L. Malesovas
Malesovas Law Firm
State Bar No. 12857300
1801 South Mopac Expressway, Suite 320
Austin, TX 78746
john@malesovas.com
Attorney for Intervenor, John Malesovas

Alan S. Loewinsohn
Jim L. Flegle
Kerry F. Schonwald
Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP
12377 Merit Dr., Suite 900
Dallas, Texas 75251
alanl@lfdslaw.com
jimf@lfdslaw.com
kerrys@lfdslaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Jo Hopper

Jeffrey S. Levinger
J. Carl Cecere Levinger PC
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500
Dallas, TX 75202
jlevinger@levingerpc.com
ceceere@cecerepc.com
Attorneys for Defendants, Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

John C. Eichman Grayson L. Linyard Hunton & Williams, LLP 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700 Dallas, TX 75202 214-468-3599 Facsimile jeichman@hunton.com glinyard@hunton.com

Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, Deceased, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., in its Corporate Capacity

Van H. Beckwith Jessica B. Pulliam Baker Botts L.L.P. 2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700 Dallas, TX 75201

214-661-4677 Facsimile
van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com
jessica.pulliam@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Evan A. Young
Baker Botts L.L.P.
98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
Austin, TX 78701
512-322-8306 Facsimile
evan.young@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

s/ James E. Pennington
James E. Pennington

#### CAUSE NO. PR-11-3238-1

IN RE: ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED,  JO N. HOPPER, Intervenor,	00 eps co	§ IN THE PROBATE COURT § §			
	യാ ശാ <i>ശാ</i> ശാ				
			v.	8	NO. 1
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., STEPHEN B. HOPPER, and LAURA S. WASSMER,	9 89 89 8				
Defendants.	3 69 69	OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS			
JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a	8				
MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and	3 8				
FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP	9 69				
Attorneys,	Ş				
ν.	ş Ş				
STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S.	8 8				
WASSMER, individually and as	ş Ş	•			
Beneficiaries of the ESTATE OF	§ §				
MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED,	§				
the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER,	§				
DECEASED, JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,	හා යා				
Defendants.	8	*			

JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM AND FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULO, LLP'S CONSOLIDATED FIRST AMENDED JOINT PETITION IN INTERVENTION AND PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION, AND MOTION TO DEPOSIT FUNDS IN THE REGISTRY

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW Attorneys, John L. Malesovas, d/b/a Malesovas Law Firm ("MLF") and Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP ("FSSV") (MLF and FSSV hereinafter jointly

referred to as "Attorneys"), and files this Petition in Intervention and Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and for Temporary Injunction complaining of Defendants, STEPHEN B. HOPPER ("Hopper"), LAURA S. WASSMER ("Wassmer"), individually and as beneficiaries of the Estate of Max D. Hopper (hereinafter collectively "Clients" and/or "Defendants"), the Estate of Max D. Hopper, deceased and JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. ("JPM"), and for cause would show the following:

# I. DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN

1.01 Intervenor requests this lawsuit proceed under a Level 3 Discovery Control Plan pursuant to Rule 190.4 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

# II. PARTIES

- 2.01 John L. Malesovas is an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Texas and doing business as Malesovas Law Firm.
- 2.02 FSSV is a limited liability partnership and law firm and doing business as Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP.
- 2.03 Defendant, Stephen B. Hopper ("Hopper"), individually and as a beneficiary of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, deceased, was a former client of Attorneys and is being served herewith pursuant to TRCP 21a.
- 2.04 Defendant, Laura S. Wassmer ("Wassmer"), individually and as a beneficiary of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, deceased, was a former client of Attorneys and is being served herewith pursuant to TRCP 21a. Hopper and Wassmer are hereinafter jointly referred to as "Clients".

- 2.05 The Estate of Max D. Hopper is an estate in administration under the jurisdiction of this Court, and Clients have asserted claims herein on behalf of the Estate as the beneficiaries of the Estate.
- 2.06 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("JPM"), is a Defendant in the underlying case and an interested party to this Petition in Intervention and is being served herewith pursuant to TRCP 21a.

# III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3.01 Venue is proper in Dallas County, Texas pursuant to §15.002(a)(1), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code, as Dallas County is the county in which all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred and because venue is proper in the underlying action. This Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear this claim because Intervenor has an interest in the matter in controversy that involves the Defendants and The Estate of Max D. Hopper. See Tex. Estates Code Ann. § 32.007 et seq. (Vernon 2014), and, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.005 et seq. (Vernon 2014) (authorizing declaratory judgment actions in probate court when such relief is germane to an Estate). To the extent that The Estate of Max D. Hopper is a party to the settlement with JPM or to the extent that beneficiaries of The Estate of Max D. Hopper are parties to the settlement with JPM then this Court and only this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over this matter.

# IV. FACTS

4.01 MLF and FSSV, (jointly "Attorneys"), represented Defendants pursuant to a valid and enforceable contingency fee agreement in the underlying lawsuit pending in

this Court. A true and correct copy of the contingent fee agreement will be tendered to the Court for in camera inspection at the hearing (hereinafter "Agreement"). Intervenors have fully performed under the terms of the Agreement. On April 3, 2018 and April 4, 2018, Clients' Appellate Counsel, Jeff Levinger, settled Clients' claims against JPM and on April 4, 2018 PM filed a Rule 11 agreement with the Court notifying the Court that there was a settlement between Clients and JPM ("Settlement"). At approximately 9:05 am on April 5, 2018, Anthony L. Vitullo appeared before this Court on behalf of Clients and announced in open court and on the record the confidential settlement between Clients and JPM. At approximately 10:10am on April 5, 2018, Clients' attorney, Jim Pennington, terminated Attorneys without cause and advised Attorneys that they were not going to pay the fee due under the Agreement. Mr. Pennington also advised Attorneys that he was going to instruct Mr. Levinger to retain an unspecified percentage of the Settlement proceeds in his trust account. On April 6, 2018, FSSV withdrew from representing Clients in the underlying lawsuit. Attorneys own a property right in the Settlement proceeds. Attorneys file this Petition in Intervention and Declaratory Judgment and Request for TRO and Temporary Injunction to enforce their property rights in the Settlement proceeds.

4.02 Attorneys have a justiciable interest and property interest in the pending suit in that Attorneys have a lien on and interest in the Settlement proceeds. This lawsuit is a simple declaratory judgment action to enforce Attorneys property rights. As such, pursuant to *Texas Mut. Ins. Co, v. Ledbetter*, 251 S.W.3d 31 (2008), Attorneys are lienholders in the Settlement proceeds of this case, and have an absolute right to intervene. Further, as stated by the Supreme Court in *Ledbetter*, to the extent that

Clients, JPM and/or their attorneys settle a case without reimbursing a lienholder, "everyone involved is liable ... for conversion." Thus, Attorneys seek a declaration from this Court pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code § 37.001 et. seq. confirming Attorneys' security interest in the Settlement proceeds and directing JPM and Clients to pay such interest directly to Attorneys. This lawsuit is a simple declaratory judgment action to enforce Attorneys' property rights.

4.03 Attorneys fully performed under the Agreement with no complaint from Clients and secured a very favorable jury verdict. As a result of this favorable jury verdict, Clients were able to secure a confidential settlement with JPM. Only after Clients, through their appellate attorney Jeff Levinger, unilaterally settled with JPM did Clients terminate Attorneys. Clients accepted, used and enjoyed the services of Attorneys which resulted in the Settlement. In accordance with the Courts' holdings in Tillery & Tillery v. Zurich Ins. Co., 54 S.W.3d 356 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, no pet.) and Enochs v. Brown, 872 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. App. - Austin 1994, no writ), Clients are estopped and quasi-estopped from challenging the validity of the Agreement and the fee due Attorneys thereunder and the property rights Attorneys have to the Settlement proceeds. Further, it would be unconscionable for Clients to challenge the property rights of Attorneys under the Agreement after having already accepted the benefits from Attorneys under the Agreement. Further, by accepting the benefits under the Agreement without complaint, Clients have waived any right to complain about the Agreement. Accordingly, Attorneys move the Court to declare that Attorneys own a property right in the Settlement proceeds" and that the Agreement is valid and

enforceable and to further order Clients and JPM to pay all fees and expenses due Attorneys under the Agreement directly to Attorneys from the Settlement proceeds.

4.04 In addition, Attorneys seek their attorneys' fees from Clients pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code §§ 37.009, 38.001 (Vernon 2014). All conditions precedent to Attorneys' claim for relief have been performed or have occurred.

#### V. SUIT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF

- 5.01 Attorneys incorporate all of the preceding paragraphs as if they were set forth in their entirety herein.
- 5.02 Attorneys' seek a declaratory judgment pursuant to the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act ("UDJA"), Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Section 37.001 et seq. An actual and justiciable controversy exists and has arisen between Attorneys and Clients. Attorneys seek judgment against Defendants pursuant to the UDJA declaring the rights, status and other legal relations of Attorneys and Clients regarding the payment of Attorneys interest in the Settlement proceeds. Because the Estate is a party to the Settlement, this Honorable Court has exclusive jurisdiction to declare Attorneys legal interests in the Settlement proceeds.
- 5.03 Attorneys are entitled to a declaration from this Honorable Court to the following:
  - a. Attorneys own a property right in the Settlement proceeds:
  - Attorneys are entitled to immediate possession of their property right in the Settlement proceeds;
  - c. This Honorable Court has exclusive jurisdiction to declare the rights of the parties to the Settlement proceeds;

- d. Attorneys are entitled to the full and exclusive use, possession and enjoyment of their interest in the Settlement proceeds;
- e. That it is in the best interest of the Estate to pay Attorneys their interest in the Settlement proceeds; and
- f. That the Clients and JPM be directed to pay Attorneys interest in the Settlement proceeds directly to Attorneys.
- 5.04 Attorneys also seek all legal fees and expenses from Clients as allowed under the UDJA as this would be fair and equitable given the facts and circumstances of this dispute.

# VI. ATTORNEY'S FEES

- 6.01 Pursuant to 37,009 and/or 38.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Attorneys seek all reasonable and necessary attorney's fees in this case which include the following:
  - a. Preparation and trial of this lawsuit;
  - b. Post-Trial, pre-appeal legal services;
  - c. An appeal to the court of appeals;
  - d. Making or responding to an application for writ of error to the Supreme Court of Texas:
  - e. An appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas in the event application for writ of error is granted; and
  - f. Post-judgment discovery and collection in the event execution on the judgment is necessary.

VII.

#### **ELEMENTS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF**

Attorneys have a probable right to relief they seek on final hearing. On final hearing Attorneys are likely to prove each and every element of all claims asserted against Clients as foregoing shows that Attorneys fully performed under the Agreement. Attorneys have a security interest in the Settlement proceeds and Clients have informed Attorneys that they do not intend to pay or honor Attorneys interest in the Settlement proceeds.

To 2 Unless this Honorable Court immediately restrains Clients form diverting the Settlement proceeds to their own attorneys, the Attorneys will suffer immediate and irreparable injury, for which there is no adequate remedy at law, because in effect, Attorneys will have lost the protection of their security interest in the Settlement proceeds. Attorneys have a lien on and security interest in the Settlement proceeds, the purpose of which is to prevent Clients from taking all of the Settlement proceeds and unilaterally controlling their use and disposition. The Clients simply saying that they will instruct their attorney to keep some unspecified portion of the Settlement proceeds in his trust account eviscerates Attorneys' security interest in the Settlement Proceeds. Attorneys will show the court the following:

- a) The harm to Attorneys is imminent because Clients have started to finalize the Settlement and are attempting to have Attorneys' interest in the Settlement proceeds paid to Clients' attorney, Jeff Levinger.
- b) This imminent harm will cause Attorneys irreparable injury in that once Defendants pay the Settlement proceeds to Jeff Levinger, Attorneys will not

be able to enforce their lien and security interest because Levinger will claim that he is obligated to hold the funds in his trust account, interest free, until the ownership of the fees is resolved. But Rules 1.14 of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct do not require, nor do they even allow, Clients attorney to even take possession of the Settlement proceeds. Instead, Attorneys' lien and security interest allow them to take possession of their interest in the Settlement proceeds. Thus, unless a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction are issued, Attorney's lien and security interest in the Settlement proceeds will be eviscerated. In addition, Attorneys' interest in the Settlement proceeds will not be protected from unauthorized distributions, conversion, or bank failure.

c) There is no adequate remedy at law which will enforce Attorneys' lien and security interest absent action from this Court. Further, Clients will not be financially able to respond in damages upon final trial from this intervention unless Attorney's interest in the Settlement proceeds is protected by this Court.

# VIII. BOND

8.01 Attorneys are willing to post a reasonable temporary restraining order bond and request the court to set such bond.

#### IX. TRO REMEDY

9.01 Attorneys have met Attorneys' burden by establishing each element which must be present before injunctive relief can be granted by this court, therefore Attorneys

are entitled to the requested temporary restraining order.

- 9.02 Attorneys request the court to issue an Order:
  - a. Restraining Clients from taking any action to transfer, liquidate, convert, encumber, pledge, loan, share, sale, market for sale, conceal, hide, secret, dissipate, deplete, neglect, misuse, damage and/or destroy, lease, assign, granting a lien, security interest, or other interest in, allow the use of, or otherwise dispose of any and all part of Attorneys' interest in the Settlement proceeds;
  - b. Ordering that Defendants and any of his, her, their, or its agents, servants, employees, successors, assigns and those persons in active concert or participation therewith, must:
    - 1. Deposit into the registry of this Court the portion of Attorneys' interest in the Settlement proceeds which Clients contend they do not owe Attorneys under the Agreement, which shall remain on deposit in the registry until further Order of the Court, when such funds become available and are ripe for distribution from JPMorgan Chase, N.A. to the underlying Plaintiffs in satisfaction of the confidential settlement agreement reached herein:
    - 2. Pay directly to Attorneys the portion of Attorneys' interest in the Settlement proceeds which Clients do not dispute to be due and owing from the Settlement proceeds immediately when those funds become available under the terms of the Settlement.
- 9.03 It is essential that grant a temporary restraining order as requested herein in order to preserve the status quo during the pendency of this action.
- 9.04 That after notice and hearing the Court convert the temporary restraining order into a temporary injunction, and that on final trial on the merits, that the Court disburse to Attorneys all funds deposited into the registry of the Court pursuant to the

temporary restraining order and temporary injunction.

# X. MOTION TO REQUIRE DEPOSIT OF FUNDS (WHICH IS A NON-APPEALABLE ORDER THAT IS NOT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF—AS A MATTER OF LAW)

10.01 This court has the inherent power to order that disputed funds be deposited in the registry of the court. See Prodeco Exploration, Inc. v. Ware, 684 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ) ("The trial court has the inherent authority to direct [a party] to deposit disputed funds into the registry of the court pending the outcome of the litigation."); see also Castilleja v. Camero, 414 S.W.2d 431, 433 (Tex. 1967). In addition, in order to secure an order directing a party to deposit disputed funds in the registry of the Court, a party does not have to satisfy the prerequisite for securing a temporary restraining order or temporary injunction. Diana River & Assocs., P.C. v. Calvillo, 986 S.W.2d 795, 797-798 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.) (citing McQuadev. E.D. Sys. Corp., 570 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1978, no writ)). Orders to deposit money into the registry of the court cannot be characterized as temporary injunctions and are non-appealable. Prodeco, 684 S.W.2d at 201; Alpha Petroleum Co. v. Dunn, 60 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1933, writ dism'd).

10.02 Clients have filed a pleading in response to Attorneys' intervention wherein Clients admit that there are disputed funds from the Settlement proceeds. But Clients do not identify the amount of the disputed portion of the Settlement proceeds. Clients suggest that this unidentified amount of funds be kept in their possession, through their attorney, Jeff Levinger, pending the outcome of this dispute. In essence, Clients want to continue to control all disputed funds without oversight from this Court

and without even identifying the amount they dispute. That is obviously unacceptable to Attorneys to let the fox guard the hen house pending the outcome of this matter.

10.03 Accordingly, pursuant to this Court's inherent power, Attorneys move this Court to order that all of the Settlement proceeds be deposited into the registry of this Court pending further order of this Court so that the Settlement can be funded, JPM can be dismissed, and all parties with any interest in the Settlement proceeds can assert their claims and they can be resolved without any fear that one party or the other will dissipate the funds or secure an advantage over the other through possession of the funds pending the outcome of this dispute. The Court can then determine. What amount is in dispute, who is making a claim to the disputed amount, the basis for any such claim, and ultimately to whom the funds should be distributed.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Attorneys respectfully request for all relief requested herein, as well as such other and further relief, in law or in equity, to which they may show themselves justly entitled.

Respectfully Submitted,

**BRIAN LAUTEN, P.C.** 

**BRIAN P. LAUTEN** 

State Bar No. 24031603 blauten@brianlauten.com 3811 Turtle Creek Boulevard

Ste. 1450

Dallas, Texas 75219

(214) 414-0996 telephone

ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENORS

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

In accordance with Rule 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has been served upon all counsel of record via the ECF case manager system and by electronic filing on April 9, 2018.

Alan S. Loewinsohn
Jim L. Flegle
Kerry F. Schonwald
Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP
12377 Merit Dr., Suite 900
Dallas, Texas 75251
214-572-1717 Facsimile
alani@lfdslaw.com
imf@lfdslaw.com
kerrys@lfdslaw.com
Attorneys for Intervenor Jo Hopper

Jeffrey S. Levinger
J. Carl Cecere
Levinger PC
1445 Ross Avenue, Sulte 2500
Dallas, TX 75202
214-855-6808 Facsimile
ilevinger@levingerpc.com

ccecere@cecerepc.com

Attorneys for Defendants, Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

John C. Eichman
Grayson L. Linyard
Hunton & Williams, LLP
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700
Dallas, TX 75202
214-468-3599 Facsimile
jeichman@hunton.com
glinyard@hunton.com

Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, Deceased, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., in its Corporate Capacity

Van H. Beckwith
Jessica B. Pulliam
Baker Botts L.L.P.
2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700
Dallas, TX 75201
214-661-4677 Facsimile
van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com
jessica.pulliam@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Evan A. Young
Baker Botts L.L.P.
98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
Austin, TX 78701
512-322-8306 Facsimile
evan.young@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant,
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

BRIAN P. LAUTEN
ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENORS

14

# CAUSE NO. PR-11-3238-1

IN RE: ESTATE OF MAX D, HOPPER, DECEASED,	\$ 69 89	IN THE PROBATE COURT		
JO N. HOPPER,	§ §			
Intervenor,	§ §			
v.	00 00 O	NO. 1		
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., STEPHEN B. HOPPER, and LAURA S. WASSMER,	> 40 40 40 40 40 40			
Defendants.	§ §	OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS		
JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP Intervenors,  v.  STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, individually and as Beneficiaries of the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendants.	\$\times \times \			
VERIFICATION				
STATE OF TEXAS )				
COUNTY OF DALLAS )				

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BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared ANTHONY L. VITULLO, who, being by me duly sworn on oath, deposed and stated that he is a Senior Partner at Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP, named as Intervenor in the above-entitled and numbered cause; that he has read JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM AND FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP'S CONSOLIDATED FIRST AMENDED JOINT PETITION IN INTERVENTION AND PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION AND REQUESTS FOR DISCLOSURES; and that every statement contained therein is within his personal knowledge and is true and correct, and that he is authorized to sign on behalf of Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP.

ANTHONY L. VITULLO

, 2018,

MELINDA SPURGEON

Notary Public, State of Texas My Commission Expires

September 19, 2019

**SWORN** 

**BEFORE** this

THE STATE OF TEXAS

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:

2

2 ORIGINAL

# CAUSE NO. PR-11-3238-1

IN RE: ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, § IN THE PROBATE COURT DECEASED, JO N. HOPPER, Intervenor, NO. 1 JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., STEPHEN B. HOPPER, and LAURA S. WASSMER, Defendants. OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP Intervenors, STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, individually and as Beneficiaries of the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, 99999 DECEASED, JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendants.

#### TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

Came to be heard on the 9<sup>TH</sup> day of April 2018, the minimum amount of notice having been duly provided pursuant to Local Rule 2.02(a) of Dallas County, Fee Smith Sharp & Vitullo, LLP and John L. Malesovas d/b/a Malesovas Law Firm's (collectively, "Intervenors") *Verified Petition(s) in Intervention, Application for Temporary Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction, and Application for Declaratory Relief* against, *inter alia*,

PN - 11 - U9230 - 1 CTRU ONDER - TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORD 1899741 Page 58 Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer, individually and as beneficiaries of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, deceased, (hereinafter jointly "Clients") and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (hereinafter "JPM") (Clients and JPM hereinafter jointly, "Defendants" with respect to the claims now pending in this Intervention).

The Court, after considering the *Intervenors' Collective Verified Original Petition* in *Intervention, Application for Temporary Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction, and Application for Declaratory Relief*, the evidence submitted by Intervenors *in camera*, the relevant exhibits, the arguments of counsel, concludes that—unless immediately restrained, Defendants will irreparably injure Intervenors.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute brought before it under both, Tex. Estates Code Ann. § 32.007 et seq. (Vernon 2014), and, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.005 et seq. (Vernon 2014) (authorizing declaratory judgment actions in probate court when such relief is germane to an Estate).

Intervenors respective Pleas and application for TRO are timely filed, given that this Court has yet to sign a judgment; and, therefore, retains plenary power over this proceeding. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 60 et seq.

This Court has, preliminarily, taken judicial notice, pursuant to Rule 201 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, of the following facts that, in reasonable probability, appear to be true at this preliminary stage of the proceeding:

- In, around, or about November of 2015, Clients executed a valid and enforceable contingency agreement ("CA") with Intervenors;
- 2.) On or about April 5, 2018, attorneys for Clients and JPM appeared before this Court and announced, without revealing any of the substantive terms, that a confidential settlement had been reached between them in the underlying dispute pending in this Court (hereinafter "Settlement");
- 3.) On or about the same day, April 5, 2018, but—literally what appears to have been within minutes after the Court was informed that a settlement had been reached by the parties in this underlying dispute—Clients terminated their CA with Intervenors by and through their attorney, James Pennington;

- 4.) Intervenors have filed what, by all accounts, appears to be a valid and enforceable First Party Attorney's Fees Lien in the proceeds of the Settlement;
- 5.) Intervenors fully performed; or, at the very least, substantially and materially performed all of their duties, responsibilities, and obligations under the CA at or before the time Clients terminated the CA—as those legal terms are meant in, *Tillery & Tillery v. Zurich Ins. Co.*, 54 S.W.3d 356, 360-61 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, no pet.), *Enochs v. Brown*, 872 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no writ), *disapproved of on unrelated grounds*, by *Roberts v. Williamson*, 111 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. 2003), and *Mandell & Wright*, 441 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. 1969); and
- 6.) Given the timing of the termination of Intervenors, Clients are estopped, quasi-estopped, and/or have waived any and all defenses, if any, that could or would be lodged to the CA or the quality of the legal services performed by Intervenors.

Based upon these preliminary findings, this Court is of the opinion that Intervenors have established a probability of success on the merits on their application for, *inter alia*, declaratory relief. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.004 et seq. (Vernon 2014). This Court is of the opinion that, unless restrained, one or more Defendants are likely to cause permanent damage to Intervenors, should they be allowed to transfer, hypothecate, assign, or take title to Intervenors' interest in the settlement proceeds before the pleas in Intervention are adjudicated on the merits. Such harm would be irreparable because this Court is of the opinion that there is no showing; or, in the alternative, an inadequate showing that Defendants could timely and immediately pay the disputed funds to Intervenors, should Intervenors ultimately prevail in this proceeding, and because Intervenors have a security interest in and lien upon a portion of the settlement proceeds which would be eviscerated by allowing Clients to dispose of 100% of the settlement proceeds as they saw fit. Moreover, given the

Court's preliminary findings set forth above in (i)-(vi), Intervenors have established a property right and secured interest in the proceeds at issue.

The Court is, THEREFORE, of the opinion that Intervenors are entitled to the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and that such an Order is necessary to protect Intervenors' rights. This ORDER is necessary because of the immediate need to enforce the security interest and lien which Intervenors have in a portion of the settlement proceeds and to stop the wrongful flow of funds in the near future from being disseminated to either Clients or their attorneys, or some other third party subject to Clients' direction and control, upon which Intervenors would have no adequate remedy at law. Without intervention by this Court, Intervenors' property right, that is Intervenors' security interest in and lien upon the settlement proceeds, would be destroyed and there would be no way to restore that property right in the Settlement proceeds themselves.

This Court is further of the opinion that Intervenors are entitled to an **EXPEDITED DISCOVERY ORDER**. Therefore, Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer shall be made available for deposition on and certainly no later than **Tuesday**, **April 17**, **2018**. If the parties cannot agree on a suitable location for these depositions, they shall be taken in this Court's jury room. The depositions are limited solely to the matters in dispute in the pled Intervention filings and shall last no longer than two hours per deponent (per side). In addition, Intervenors may serve a *duces tecum* with the deposition notices, which shall be limited to no more than seven (7) discovery requests. The deposition notice shall provide two business days notice to the deponent.

It is further **ORDERED** that Intervenors may move this Court for a dispositive summary judgment on 14 days notice of any hearing; and any response shall be due to be filed within 5 days of the hearing; and any reply shall be due to be filed within 2 days of the hearing.

It is therefore **ORDERED**, **ADJUDGED**, and **DECREED** that Defendants, Stephen Hopper, Laura Wassmer, and JPMorgan Chase, N.A., and any of his, her, their, or its agents, servants, employees, successors, assigns and those persons in active concert or participation therewith, must:

- Deposit all of the settlement proceeds due to Stephen B. Hopper and Laura s. Wassmer, individually and as beneficiaries of the Estate of Max Hopper, Deceased, into a safekeeping account with JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, to be held in trust until further Order of this Court. Funds in the safekeeping account shall be withdrawn <u>only</u> upon Order of this Court;
- 2) The parties are **ORDERED** to preserve and prevent the destruction of all documents, including electronic data, emails, and notes, that relate in any way to the matters and claims set forth in the Intervenors' respective Pleas on file—and, moreover, all electronic storage devices must be imaged and preserved.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this order is effective immediately upon Conforming Surety on continuous deposit with the appropriate clerk of this Court appoint in the amount of \$\sqrt{0,177} \times \times 0.00 (U.S. dollars).

injunction is set for an evidentiary hearing and will be heard before this Court on will be heard before this Court on o'clock a.m., and that Stephen Hopper, Laura Wassmer, and JPMorgan Chase, N.A. appear and show cause, if any, why this Temporary Restraining Order should not be continued and converted into a Temporary Injunction until final hearing and trial hereon.

Signed and issued this the 10 day of April 2018, at 4:00 o'clock p.m.

JUDGE PRESIDING

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PR11-323-62-I

#### CAUSE NO. PR-113238-1

IN RE: ESTATE OF §
MAX D. HOPPER, §
DECEASED §
8

JO N. HOPPER

Plaintiff,

٧.

JP MORGAN CHASE, N.A., STEPHEN B. HOPPER and LAURA S. WASSMER

Defendants.

JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP

Intervenors,

STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, and JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,

Defendants.

IN THE PROBATE COURT

NO. 1

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

#### MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW, Defendants, Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer ("the Clients"), and file this Motion to Compel Arbitration of the claims asserted by Intervenors John Malesovas and Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP ("Intervenors"), and respectfully show the Court the following:

The Clients request this Court to order the parties to arbitrate Intervenors' claims. The agreement(s), which the Intervenors rely upon to support their claims, contains a mandatory MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

Page 63

arbitration provision. The language contained in the aforementioned agreement states as follows:

20. ARBITRATION: . . . should a dispute arise between Attorney and Client, a prompt and fair resolution is in the interests of all concerned. To this end, if any controversy or claim arises out of is related to this agreement, any services provided by Attorneys to Client in connection with Client's Claims, or any other matter that may arise between Client and Attorney (including malpractice claims and fee disputes), Attorneys and Client both waive any right to bring a court action or have a jury trial and agree that the dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration to be conducted in Dallas, Texas before the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA with one arbitrator who must be an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Texas.

Intervenors introduced copies of the agreements (signed by Intervenors) into evidence at a hearing on April 9, 2018 regarding Intervenor's request for a temporary restraining order.<sup>2</sup> On April 10, 2018, this Court determined that the Clients and Intervenors executed the agreements.<sup>3</sup> It is undisputed that both agreements contain an arbitration provision, as set forth above. The Clients have requested that Intervenors pursue their claims in arbitration; however, Intervenors refused to arbitrate their claims.

A court shall order the parties to arbitrate on application of a party showing an agreement to arbitrate and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate. *Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code, Section 171.021*. Pursuant to the aforementioned statute, the Clients request this Court to compel the parties to arbitration. Additionally, the Clients request this Court to stay the intervention pursuant to Sections 171.021 and 171.025 of the Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code.

Intervenors have waived their right to bring any action in this Court or any other court. Any doubts regarding the existence or scope of an agreement are resolved in favor of arbitration. In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex. 2001). The arbitration provision in the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See p. 7 of Exhibit A attached to Petition in Intervention filed by Malesovas (emphasis supplied).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Intervenors and/or Plaintiffs' Exhibits 1 and 2. There were two separate agreements signed by each of the Clients.
<sup>3</sup> April 10, 2018 Order at 2. The Clients do not dispute they executed the agreements; however, they dispute, among other things, whether the attorney's fee provision in the agreements is enforceable or valid. See discussion *infra*. at

agreement applies to "any controversy or claim [that] arises out of is related to this agreement." This type of language is construed broadly. *In re Conseco Fin. Serv. Corp.*, 19 S.W.3d 562, 568 (Tex. App. - Waco 2000, orig. proceeding). There is no question that Intervenors' claims arise out of, and are related to, the agreement. Intervenors maintain throughout their petitions that they are entitled to a contingent fee under the agreement. The Clients dispute this fee, which is a matter within the scope of the arbitration clause. Intervenors also seek declaratory relief regarding their rights under the agreement and claim that the Clients breached the agreement. Once it is determined that an arbitration provision exists and the claim falls within the scope of that provision, a court has no discretion — it must compel arbitration and stay any further proceedings. *See Pepe Int'l Dev. Co. v. Garcia*, 915 S.W.2d 925, 930-31 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, orig. proceeding).

Although the Clients dispute the enforceability of the contingent fee agreement, this issue should be decided by the arbitrator -- not this Court. Once there is an agreement to arbitrate, substantive attacks on the validity of the contract are to be resolved by the arbitrator, and not by the court. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445–46 (2006) (holding that an arbitration provision is severable from the remainder of the contract and, unless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract's validity is considered by the arbitrator). In Buckeye, the United States Supreme Court held that "because respondents challenge the Agreement, but not specifically its arbitration provisions, those provisions are enforceable apart from the remainder of the contract. The challenge should therefore be considered by an arbitrator, not a court." Id. at 446. See also, FUNimation Entm't v. SC Films Int'l, 2013 WL 5770383, (E.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2013); Lawrence v. Comprehensive Bus. Serv. Co., 833 F.2d 1159, 1162 (5th Cir.1987) (submitting issue regarding illegality defense to arbitration);

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> First Amended Joint Petition in Intervention at 3-5; see also Original Petition in Intervention at 5.

Mesa Operating Ltd. P'ship v. La. Intrastate Gas Corp., 797 F.2d 238, 244 (5th Cir.1986) (submitting claim that contract was void ab initio to arbitration because parties failed to demonstrate that the arbitration agreement was "invalid separately from the entire contract").

Additionally, and without waiving their position that the agreement is unenforceable, in the alternative event that the agreement is determined to be enforceable – the Clients contend that the Intervenors breached the agreement. Pleading alternative theories does not defeat the effect of an arbitration clause that broadly covers all disputes that arise out of the underlying agreement. *In re Kellogg Brown & Root Inc.*, 166 S.W.3d 732, 740 (Tex. 2005).

### Request for Immediate Hearing and/or Ruling

The Clients request this Court to set this matter for hearing in the immediate future *before* any discovery is conducted and *before* the April 24, 2018 hearing on Intervenors' temporary injunction. This Court may *not* defer any ruling on the Clients' motion to compel arbitration. *In re MHI Partnership, Ltd.*, 7 S.W.3d 918, 923 (Tex. App. – Houston [1<sup>st</sup> Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding). Delaying a decision on the merits of arbitrability substantially defeats the policy behind section 171.021's abbreviated procedure, and it violates section 171.021's mandate to decide the issues summarily. *Id.* at 923. Deferring a ruling on this matter would effectively force the Clients to litigate Intervenors' claims in court. Thus, it would be an abuse of discretion to defer any ruling on arbitrability until after discovery and/or the temporary injunction hearing, scheduled for April 24, 2018. *Id.* at 923.

#### Conclusion

For those reasons set forth herein, the Clients request this Court to set this matter for an immediate hearing and/or that the Court issue a ruling on this motion immediately, that this Court compel the Intervenors to pursue their claims in arbitration, that the interventions be

MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

stayed, and that the Clients have all other relief, at law or in equity, which the Clients may be entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

s/James E. Pennington
James E. Pennington
State Bar No. 15758510
LAW OFFICES OF JAMES E. PENNINGTON, P.C. 900 Jackson Street, Suite 440
Dallas, Texas 75202-4473
Telephone: (214) 741-3022
Facsimile: (214) 741-3055
jep@jeplawyer.com

Attorneys for Defendants Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 11<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2018, the foregoing *Motion to Compel Arbitration* was filed using the e-filing system which will send notification of such filing to the following parties via email:

Brian P. Lauten
Brian Lauten, P.C.
3811 Turtle Creek Boulevard, Ste. 1450
Dallas, Texas 75219
blauten@brianlauten.com
Attorneys for Intervenor Fee Smith Sharp & Vitulio, LLP

John L. Malesovas Malesovas Law Firm State Bar No. 12857300 1801 South Mopac Expressway, Suite 320 Austin, TX 78746 john@malesovas.com Attorney for Intervenor, John Malesovas

MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

Alan S. Loewinsohn Jim L. Flegle Kerry F. Schonwald Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP 12377 Merit Dr., Suite 900 Dallas, Texas 75251 alanl@lfdslaw.com jimf@lfdslaw.com kerrys@lfdslaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiff Jo Hopper

Jeffrey S. Levinger J. Carl Cecere Levinger PC 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500 Dallas, TX 75202 ilevinger@levingerpc.com ccecere@cecerepc.com Attorneys for Defendants, Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

John C. Eichman Gravson L. Linvard Hunton & Williams, LLP 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700 Dallas, TX 75202 214-468-3599 Facsimile jeichman@hunton.com

glinyard@hunton.com

Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, Deceased, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., in its Corporate Capacity

Van H. Beckwith Jessica B. Pulliam Baker Botts L.L.P. 2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700 Dallas, TX 75201 214-661-4677 Facsimile van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com jessica.pulliam@bakerbotts.com Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Evan A. Young Baker Botts L.L.P. 98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500 Austin, TX 78701 512-322-8306 Facsimile

MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

evan.young@bakerbotts.com Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

s/ James E. Pennington
James E. Pennington

### LAW OFFICES OF JAMES E. PENNINGTON

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 900 JACKSON STREET, SUITE 440 DALLAS, TEXAS 75202-4473

JAMES E. PENNINGTON
LICENSED IN TEXAS AND COLORADO

PHONE (214) 741-3022 FAX (214) 741-3055 E-MAIL Jep@Jeplawyer.com

April 11, 2018

VIA ELECTRONIC FILING AND HAND DELIVERY

The Honorable Brenda Hull Thompson Judge, Probate Court No. 1 Dallas County 1201 Elm Street, Suite 2400-A Dallas, Texas 75207

Re: Cause No. PR-11-3238-1; Estate of Max D. Hopper; Jo N. Hopper v. Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer v. JPMorgan Chase Bank pending in Probate Court No. 1, Dalias County, Texas

Dear Judge Thompson:

A motion to compel arbitration was filed today in the above-referenced matter. On behalf of the movants, I respectfully request this matter be set for hearing immediately. As explained the motion, movants are entitled to an immediate ruling on this matter before discovery and/or the temporary injunction hearing scheduled on April 24, 2018. This Court may not defer a ruling on the motion to compel arbitration. In re MHI Partnership, Ltd., 7 S.W.3d 918, 923 (Tex. App. – Houston [1<sup>st</sup> Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding). Deferring a ruling on this matter would effectively force movants to litigate Intervenors' claims in court. Thus, it would be an abuse of discretion to defer any ruling on arbitrability until after discovery and/or the temporary injunction hearing, scheduled for April 24, 2018. Id. at 923. Accordingly, I respectfully request that a hearing be scheduled on this motion later this week. Thank you for your consideration of this matter.

Sincerely

amed E. Pennington

cc: All counsel (via electronic filing)

### NO. PR-11-3238-1

IN RE: ESTATE OF	§	IN THE PROBATE COURT
MAX D. HOPPER,	§ §	
DECEASED	§ §	
JO N. HOPPER,	& & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & & &	
Plaintiff,	600 600 c	NO. 1
y.	89 89 89	
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,	8	
STEPHEN B. HOPPER and LAURA S. WASSMER,	§ §	
Defendants.	§ §	DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

### JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A.'S NOTICE OF RECEIPT OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. ("JPMorgan"), in its capacity as the independent administrator of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, deceased, and in its corporate capacity, has received the Court's April 10, 2018, Temporary Restraining Order. As the Court is aware, the parties signed and filed an April 4, 2018, Rule 11 agreement announcing their settlement pursuant to a confidential term sheet. JPMorgan notifies the Court that, as of today, the parties have not yet signed their Settlement and Release Agreement. Once signed, JPMorgan notifies the Court that certain conditions precedent must occur before JPMorgan has any obligation to make any settlement payment, JPMorgan writes simply to inform the Court that it is aware of and will abide by the Temporary Restraining Order if it remains in effect when JPMorgan's obligation to make a settlement payment arises.

Respectfully submitted,

BAKER & BOTTS L.L.P.

Van H. Beckwith State Bar No. 02020150

van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com

Jessica B. Pulliam

State Bar No. 24037309

jessica.pulliam@bakerbotts.com

2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700

Dallas, Texas 75201

Telephone: (214) 953-6500

Telecopy: (214) 661-4677

### **HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP**

John C. Eichman State Bar No. 06494800 jeichman@hunton.com Grayson L. Linyard State Bar No. 24070150 glinyard@hunton.com

1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700 Dallas, Texas 75202-2700 Telephone: (214) 468-3300

Telecopy: (214) 468-3599

ATTORNEYS FOR
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
IN ITS CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE
OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED AND
IN ITS CORPORATE CAPACITY

### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has been served on the following counsel of record via the electronic service manager and/or by email on this 11th day of April, 2018.

Alan S. Loewinsohn
Jim L. Flegle
Kerry F. Schonwald
LOEWINSOHN FLEGLE DEARY SIMON L.L.P.
12377 Merit Drive, Suite 900
Dallas, Texas 75251
alanl@lfdslaw.com
jimf@lfdslaw.com
kerrys@lfdslaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Brian P. Lauten
BRIAN LAUTEN, P.C.
3811 Turtle Creek Boulevard
Ste. 1450
Dallas, Texas 75219
blauten@brianlauten.com
Attorney for Intervenors

Jeffrey S. Levinger
J. Carl Cecere
LEVINGER PC
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500
Dallas, Texas 75202
jlevinger@levingerpc.com
ccecere@cecerepc.com

James E. Pennington
LAW OFFICES OF JAMES E. PENNINGTON, P.C.
900 Jackson Street, Suite 440
Dallas, Texas 75202
jep@jeplawyer.com
Attorneys for Defendants
Laura Wassmer and Stephen Hopper

Kan H. Beckwith

MR:073

### LAW OFFICES OF JAMES E. PENNINGTON

A Professional Corporation 900 Jackson Street, Suite 440 Dallas, Texas 75202-4473

JAMES E. PENNINGTON LICENSED IN TEXAS AND COLORADO

PHONE (214) 741-3022 FAX (214) 741-3055 E-MAIL Jep@Jeplawyer.com

April 12, 2018

### VIA ELECTRONIC FILING AND HAND DELIVERY

The Honorable Brenda Hull Thompson Judge, Probate Court No. 1 Dallas County 1201 Elm Street, Suite 2400-A Dallas, Texas 75207

### URGENT - IMMEDIATE HEARING REQUESTED

Re: Cause No. PR-11-3238-1; Estate of Max D. Hopper; Jo N. Hopper v. Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer v. JPMorgan Chase Bank pending in Probate Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas

Dear Judge Thompson:

Yesterday, I filed a motion to compel arbitration in the above-referenced matter and requested an immediate hearing and/or ruling on this matter. As explained in the motion and my correspondence to the Court, movants are entitled to an immediate ruling on this matter *before* any discovery takes place. Pursuant to your April 10, 2018 order, Intervenors have scheduled the depositions of movants for April 16, 2018. Additionally, a temporary injunction hearing is scheduled for April 24, 2018.

Accordingly, it is imperative that we obtain a hearing and/or a ruling on the motion to compel arbitration before April 16, 2018. See, In re MHI Partnership, Ltd., 7 S.W.3d 918, 923 (Tex. App. – Houston [1<sup>st</sup> Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding). Accordingly, I respectfully request that a hearing be scheduled on this motion immediately -- before the depositions commence on April 16, 2018. Thank you for your consideration and timeliness in responding to this matter.

Sincerely,

James E. Penpingto

cc: All counsel (via electronic filing)

### CAUSE NO. PR-113238-1

IN RE: ESTATE OF	§ IN THE PROBATE COURT
MAX D. HOPPER,	Š
DECEASED	8
<del></del>	8
JO N. HOPPER	~
	Š
Plaintiff,	Š
·	Š
V.	§ NO. 1
	Š
JP MORGAN CHASE, N.A.,	§
STEPHEN B. HOPPER and LAURA S.	Š.
WASSMER	Š.
	Š
Defendants.	§ DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
	§
	§
JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a	§
MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE,	§
SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP	<b>§</b>
T 4	<b>§</b>
Intervenors,	S IN THE PROBATE COURT  S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S
STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S.	8
WASSMER, and JPMORGAN CHASE	8
BANK, N.A.,	8 8
APA DA TADA A TAKAS	8
Defendants.	5 8
ABOTE TO BE THE SECTION TO THE TOTAL TO THE SECTION	8
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### NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

Please take notice that a hearing on Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration has been scheduled for April 24, 2018, at 9:00 a.m., before the Honorable Judge Brenda Hull Thompson in Probate Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ James E. Pennington
James E. Pennington

NOTICE OF HEARING - MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

Page 76

State Bar No. 15758510
LAW OFFICES OF JAMES E. PENNINGTON, P.C. 900 Jackson Street, Suite 440
Dallas, Texas 75202-4473
Telephone: (214) 741-3022
Facsimile: (214) 741-3055
jep@jeplawyer.com

Attorneys for Defendants Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 13<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2018, the foregoing *Notice of Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration* was filed using the e-filing system which will send notification of such filing to the following parties via email:

Brian P. Lauten Brian Lauten, P.C. 3811 Turtle Creek Boulevard, Ste. 1450 Dallas, Texas 75219 blauten@brianlauten.com Attorneys for Intervenor Fee Smith Sharp & Vitullo, LLP

John L. Malesovas Malesovas Law Firm State Bar No. 12857300 1801 South Mopac Expressway, Suite 320 Austin, TX 78746 john@malesovas.com Attorney for Intervenor, John Malesovas

Alan S. Loewinsohn
Jim L. Flegle
Kerry F. Schonwald
Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP
12377 Merit Dr., Suite 900
Dallas, Texas 75251
alanl@lfdslaw.com
jimf@lfdslaw.com
kerrys@lfdslaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Jo Hopper

2

Jeffrey S. Levinger
J. Carl Cecere Levinger PC
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500
Dallas, TX 75202
jlevinger@levingerpc.com
cecere@cecerepc.com
Attorneys for Defendants, Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

John C. Eichman Grayson L. Linyard Hunton & Williams, LLP 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700 Dallas, TX 75202 214-468-3599 Facsimile jeichman@hunton.com glinyard@hunton.com

Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, Deceased, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., in its Corporate Capacity

Van H. Beckwith
Jessica B. Pulliam
Baker Botts L.L.P.
2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700
Dallas, TX 75201
214-661-4677 Facsimile
van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com
jessica.pulliam@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Evan A. Young
Baker Botts L.L.P.
98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
Austin, TX 78701
512-322-8306 Facsimile
evan.young@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

s/James E. Pennington
James E. Pennington

NOTICE OF HEARING - MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

3

### CAUSE NO. PR-11-3238-1

JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a § MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP

IN THE PROBATE COURT

Intervenors.

٧.

*(2)* STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, individually and as Beneficiaries of the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, JPMORGAN CHASE

NO. 1

BANK, N.A., Defendants.

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

INTERVENORS' (LAWYERS) CONSOLIDATED OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSE TO HOPPER AND WASSMER'S (CLIENTS) MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION, AND BENCH BRIEF IN SUPPORT **OF TEMPORARY ORDERS & RELIEF** 

### l. **Summary of Argument**

The intervenors in this civil action, namely, John L. Malesovas d/b/a Malesovas Law Firm and Fee Smith Sharp & Vitullo, LLP (collectively, "Lawyers"), fully embrace the language and contractual obligations of the parties as set forth and articulated in that certain "Contingency Fee Contract of Representation" ("Contingency Agreement"), executed on or about November 19, 2015, between the Lawyers on the one hand and Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer (collectively, "Clients") on the other hand, including, specifically, its arbitration provision. Be that as it may, Clients' Motion to Compel Arbitration (the "Motion") wrongfully presupposes that, because there is an arbitration provision at play, this Court is allegedly divested of its jurisdiction to grant

temporary relief in the form of an order to deposit funds or a temporary injunction; on the contrary, the two concepts cannot be conflated and, indeed, they are <u>mutually exclusive</u>. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction and the inherent power (to grant temporary relief and to maintain continuous jurisdiction over the settlement proceeds), notwithstanding the arbitration provision, for three salient reasons:

- (1) By statute, the trial court retains jurisdiction before and during an arbitration to grant temporary relief. See Senter Investments v. Veerjee, 358 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 171.086(a)(2)-(3)(1) &(b)(3)(B) (Vernon 2014). To this end, Senter and its progeny are abundantly clear that the trial court's jurisdiction to grant temporary relief and its obligation to compel binding arbitration, if any, are mutually exclusive. Clients' Motion wrongfully presupposes the trial court can only do one or the other. Not so. Clients' position to the contrary advances an incorrect proposition of law. See Senter, 358 S.W.3d at 845; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 171.086(a)(2)-(3)(1) &(b)(3)(B).
- (2) Even assuming arguendo the narrow legal issue before this Court is subject to arbitration, and notwithstanding the fact that this Court retains continuing jurisdiction to grant temporary relief, the issue before this Court is not subject to the Contingency Agreement's arbitration clause. On the contrary, the sole issue before this Court is the Lawyers' fully vested and secured property and ownership rights in the disputed funds, which are being held by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("JPM"). The Lawyers have no agreement with JPM and the latter is not, obviously, a party to the Contingency Agreement executed between Lawyers and Clients. See Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd., 284 S.W.3d 385, 393-94 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no

- pet.) (reversible error to find that the holder of the settlement funds, who is a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement, is subject to binding arbitration award). JPM is the Independent Administrator of Max Hopper's Estate, it has possession of the disputed funds, and, therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to grant the Lawyers declaratory relief under TCPRC 37.005, given that this issue is "incident" to an Estate, upon which this Court maintains continuing and exclusive jurisdiction. See Tex. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.005 et seq. (Vernon 2014).
- (3) Finally, because the Lawyers fully performed and, because the Clients terminated Lawyers only after a settlement was reached, Clients are fully estopped; accordingly, there is nothing to arbitrate—at least in so far as Lawyers' vested and secured property and ownership rights are concerned. See Tillery & Tillery v. Zurich Ins. Co., 54 S.W.3d 356, 360-61 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied); Enochs. v. Brown, 872 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no writ), disapproved of on unrelated grounds, by Roberts v. Williamson, 111 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. 2003). Even assuming arguendo the Clients were not fully estopped from asserting a claim, and they undoubtedly are, they are certainly estopped from taking irreconcilable positions. On the one hand, Clients are contending that the Contingency Agreement is void and unenforceable. Only by arguing that the Contingency Agreement is void and unenforceable can Clients contend that Lawyers should not be compensated for their legal services. Yet, on the other hand. Clients are seeking to enforce the arbitration clause, which is embodied within the very Contingency Agreement they claim is void and unenforceable. The Clients cannot haphazardly pick and choose which provisions of the Contingency Agreement they like, while wholeheartedly ignoring and disregarding those provisions

which they dislike. Principles of estoppel prohibit Clients from being on three sides of a two-sided issue.

For these reasons, this Court should grant temporary relief and table, temporarily, deciding Clients' Motion to Compel Arbitration until the pleadings and the evidentiary record is more fully developed so that it can be fairly and reasonably determined which claims are and are not subject to arbitration, given the fact that the property and ownership issues germane to Lawyers' claims to the disputed funds—through JPM—are not subject to arbitration. The complex adjudication of the underlying lawsuit was never a *pro bono* project—Lawyers must be paid and without any unnecessary and undue delay.

### II. Standard(s) of Review

### A.

### An Order Directing Disputed Funds to be Deposited into the Registry is neither an Injunction nor an Appealable Order

A "trial court has the inherent authority to order a party to deposit disputed funds into the registry of the Court." See Diana River Assocs., P.C. v. Calvillo, 986 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied). To this end, an order simply directing a party to deposit disputed funds into the registry of the court is <u>not</u> a temporary injunction and is <u>not</u> appealable. See id. at 798; see also Alpha Petroleum Co. v. Dunn, 60 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1933, writ dism'd); accord Prodeco Exploration, Inc. v. Ware, 684 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).

## B. An Order Granting a Temporary Injunction is Subject to a Deferential Abuse of Discretion Standard

In contrast to an order that requires disputed funds to be deposited into the court's registry (which is neither an injunction nor appealable), a trial judge's decision to grant a temporary injunction is subject to a deferential abuse of discretion standard. See Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002); see also Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 57 (Tex. 1993). Under no circumstances can the reviewing court substitute its judgment for the trial court's decision to grant an injunction, unless the trial court's decision is so arbitrary that it exceeds the bounds of reasonable discretion. See Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204

### III. Brief Factual Predicate

Lawyers represented Clients pursuant to that certain signed and fully executed Contingency Agreement(s). See Exhibits "A" & "B." The Contingency Agreement specifies that Clients shall cause to be paid to Lawyers 45% of any anything of value recovered (should Lawyers represent Clients through trial, which they certainly did). See id. (p. 2, ¶ 3). The Contingency Agreement clearly and unambiguously specifies that Lawyers have a valid, readily enforceable First Party Attorneys' Fees Lien and secured interest in the settlement proceeds at issue. Id. (p. 5, ¶ 11). Literally within twenty-fours of a settlement having been reached. Clients terminated Lawyers. See Exhibit "C." Given that Lawyers were terminated only after their work was completed, Clients cannot deny that they accepted, used, and enjoyed the legal services, which contributed in whole or in part to the settlement at issue.

Clients have anticipatorily and materially breached the Contingency Agreement by, inter alia, refusing to pay Lawyers the just amounts due and owing under the contract. Id.

On April 10, 2018, this Court heard Lawyers' application for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and, consistent with that application, it entered findings, that:

(i) Lawyers have a valid and enforceable First Party Attorney's Fees Lien in the proceeds of the settlement; (ii) Lawyers fully performed, or, alternatively, substantially and materially performed all of their duties, responsibilities, and obligations under the Contingency Agreement; (iii) and Clients are estopped, quasi-estopped, or have waived all defenses, if any, that could otherwise be asserted had those defenses, if any, not been lodged *ex-post*. Accordingly, the Court granted the TRO to protect Lawyers' secured and fully vested ownership and property rights in the settlement proceeds.

At issue here is the Clients' Motion to Compel Arbitration. As noted *supra*, that requested relief is entirely independent of and wholly unrelated to Lawyers' application for an order to deposit disputed funds into the registry of the court and/or a temporary injunction. As Lawyers establish more fully below, this Court should grant a temporary order to protect the funds in dispute and it should temporarily carry Clients' Motion with the case until the evidentiary record is more fully developed so that a pragmatic decision can be made as to which claim or claims are truly covered by the arbitration provision in the Contingency Agreement and which ones are not. These matters are more fully briefed and articulated herein below.

### IV. Argument & Authorities

#### A.

### This Court has Jurisdiction to Grant Temporary Relief Regardless of whether the Claims are Subject to Arbitration

By statute, a trial court maintains jurisdiction to grant temporary relief protecting disputed funds *before* and even *during* the pendency of an arbitration. See Senter Investments v. Veerjee, 358 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 171.086(a)(2)-(3)(1)&(b)(3)(B) (Vernon 2014). Indeed, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, as codified in Chapter 171 of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code, is precisely on point and clearly states:

- (a) <u>Before arbitration proceedings begin</u>, in support of arbitration a party may file an application for a court order, including an order to:
- (2) <u>invoke the jurisdiction of the court over an ancillary proceeding in rem, including by attachment, garnishment, or sequestration, in the manner and subject to the conditions under which the proceeding may be instituted and conducted ancillary to a civil action in a district court;</u>

### (3) restrain or enjoin:

- (A) the destruction of all or an essential part of the subject matter of the controversy;
- (b) <u>During the period an arbitration is pending</u> before the arbitrators or at or after the conclusion of the arbitration, a party may file an application for a court order, including an order:
- (1) that was referred to or that would serve a purpose referred to in Subsection (a);

(B) in an ancillary proceeding in *rem*, including by attachment, garnishment, or sequestration, in the manner of and subject to the conditions under which the proceeding may be conducted ancillary to a civil action in a district court.

See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 171.086(a)(2)-(3)(1)&(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added).

To this end, Senter cites to, Manna v. Romero, 48 S.W.3d 247 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. dim'd w.o.j.), which is precisely on point. In Manna, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order granting a temporary injunction, but it reversed the trial court's order denying a motion to compel arbitration. See id. at 251. Thus, the trial court can, without error, grant temporary relief to protect disputed funds, while simultaneously granting a motion to compel arbitration. Id.; see also Structured Capital Resources Corp. v. Arctic Cold Storage, LLC, 237 S.W.3d 890, 894-95 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2007, orig. proceeding) ("it is entirely permissible for a trial court to order disputed funds paid into the registry of the court until its ownership is determined" and "a temporary injunction, or court order, to maintain the status quo, that is, keep the money from disappearing, was desirable whether it was going to trial or arbitration").

Clients' Motion wrongfully assumes the trial court can only do one or the other—that argument is rejected by the appellate courts and expressly rebuked by statute. 

<u>Compare Senter</u>, 358 S.W.3d at 845, Structured Capital Resources Corp., 237 S.W.3d at 894-95, <u>and</u>, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 171.086(a)(2)-(3)(1) &(b)(3)(B), <u>with</u>, Manna, 48 S.W.3d at 251.

#### В.

### Lawyers' Ownership and Property Dispute with JPM Is Not Subject to Any Arbitration Agreement Whatsoever

Where, as here, there is a <u>non-signatory</u> to an arbitration agreement, namely JPM in the case at bar, who holds funds that are claimed by competing parties who have in fact agreed to arbitrate—it is appropriate for the trial court to maintain jurisdiction over the dispute at hand. On point is, *Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd.*, 284 S.W.3d 385 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.), which in instructive. There, Echols had a structured settlement, which was funded by Transamerica, who was the annuity obligor. Echols sold his settlement to Rapid for a discounted lump sum. The agreement between Echols and Rapid contained an arbitration clause. Before payment of the lump sum matured, Echols revoked his consent to the agreement. *Id.* at 388.

Rapid filed a demand for arbitration and it ultimately prevailed in the proceeding against Echols. Subsequently, Rapid filed suit to enforce the arbitration award against Transamerica, albeit the latter was a non-party to the arbitration. Pursuant to the arbitration award, the trial court ordered Transamerica to deliver payment to Rapid. *Id.* Upon receiving notice of the judgment, Transamerica appealed. Reversing the trial court's judgment and holding that Transamerica was not bound by the arbitration award because it was a non-signatory to the agreement, *Transamerica* held:

Transamerica's role in the structured settlement transaction—one informed by state law—does not render it a party to the transfer agreement's arbitration clause or otherwise bind it as a non-signatory. Accordingly, we hold that the arbitration clause in the transfer agreement between Echols and Rapid Settlements does not bind Transamerica, and that neither the arbitration award nor the trial court's judgment confirming that award is enforceable against it.

Id. at 393-94 (emphasis added). Because Transamerica held the funds and because it was not bound by any arbitration agreement, the appropriate forum to adjudicate the dispute over ownership of the funds remained in the trial court.

Transamerica can be analogized to the present case; here, JPM, just like the annuity obligor in Transamerica, is the sole possessor of the disputed funds. But, as was the very situation in Transamerica, JPM is clearly a non-signatory to the Contingency Agreement between Lawyers and Clients. See Exhibits "A" & "B." In the case at bar, the sole issue before this Court—at this very preliminary stage of the proceeding—is the proper and just allocation of the proceeds held by JPM, who is undoubtedly a non-signatory to any arbitration agreement, jurisdiction, therefore, remains exclusively in this Court to resolve this narrow issue.

It should be duly noted that JPM remains the Independent Administrator of Max Hopper's Estate, and, as things currently stand, it alone has exclusive possession of the disputed funds; therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to grant Lawyers declaratory relief under Section 37.005, given that what is contested is property "incident" to an Estate, upon which this Court maintains continuing and exclusive jurisdiction. See Tex. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.005 et seq. (Vernon 2014). Because the narrow issue before this Court is not arbitrable in any event, this Court cannot compel binding arbitration—at least with respect to the limited ownership dispute regarding the settlement proceeds.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Texas law imposes a heavy burden upon the Clients to establish that JPM, as a non-signatory, can be compelled to binding arbitration. See In re Big 8 Food Stores, 166 S.W.3d 869, 876 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, orig. proceeding); Mohamed v. Auto Nation USA Corp., 89 S.W.3d 830, 836 (Tex. App.—Houston [1<sup>st</sup> Dist.] 2002, no pet.) ("the initial burden of the party seeking to compel arbitration—to establish the arbitration agreement's existence- includes the entity seeking to enforce the arbitration agreement was a party to it or had the right to enforce the agreement notwithstanding"). Clients have no evidence—liferally none—that JPM has agreed to litigate any portion of this dispute in a parallel arbitration proceeding.

### C. The Clients are Fully Estopped

Because the Lawyers fully performed and, because the Clients terminated Lawyers only *after* a settlement was reached, Clients are fully estopped; accordingly, there is <u>nothing</u> to arbitrate—at least in so far as Lawyers' vested and secured property and ownership rights are concerned. *See Tillery & Tillery v. Zurich Ins. Co.*, 54 S.W.3d 356, 360-61 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied); *Enochs v. Brown*, 872 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no writ), *disapproved of on unrelated grounds*, by *Roberts v. Williamson*, 111 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. 2003).

### Indeed, Enochs held:

The trial court made findings of fact that Whitehurst [Lawyer] provided valuable legal services to Justin [Client] by successfully handling his personal injury claim, and that Justin accepted, used, and enjoyed these services and the product of these services. These findings support the theory of quasi-estoppel. The principle of quasi-estoppel precludes a party from asserting, to another's disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position he has previously taken...it is unconscionable for Enochs, on Justin's behalf, to challenge the validity of the contingent fee contract when Justin has accepted the benefits of Whitehurst's services. We overrule Enochs' fifth point of error.

### 872 S.W.2d at 317 [citations omitted].

Even assuming arguendo the Clients were not fully estopped from asserting a claim, and they undoubtedly are, they are certainly estopped from taking irreconcilable positions. On the one hand, Clients are contending that the Contingency Agreement is void and unenforceable. Only by arguing that the Contingency Agreement is void and unenforceable can Clients contend that Lawyers should not be compensated for their legal services. Yet, on the other hand, Clients are arguing the arbitration clause, which is embodied within the very Contingency Agreement they claim is void, must

nevertheless be enforced. The Clients cannot haphazardly pick and choose which provisions of the Contingency Agreement they like, while wholeheartedly ignoring and disregarding those provisions which they dislike. Principles of estoppel prohibit Clients from being on three sides of a two-sided issue.

# D. This Court has Discretion to Escrow the Funds Without Reaching the Merits of the Injunction (and that Ruling is Non-Appealable)

This Court has discretion to escrow the disputed funds without granting a temporary injunction and without even reaching the merits. See, e.g., Prodeco Exploration, Inc. v. Ware, 684 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ); Diana Rivera & Assoc., P.C. v. Calvillo, 986 S.W.2d 795, 797-98 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied); accord Castilleja v. Camero, 414 S.W.2d 431, 433 (Tex. 1967). If the Court simply escrows the disputed funds, and retains jurisdiction over the funds, it has discretion to do that and such an order is neither a temporary injunction nor the type of ruling that is subject to appeal. See Diana Rivera & Assoc., P.C., 986 S.W.2d at 798.

### V. Conclusion

In conclusion, this Court should grant temporary relief and protect Lawyers' vested and secured property and ownership rights in the disputed funds. This Court should hold any ruling on compelling arbitration temporarily in abeyance until the record is more fully developed as to what claims, if any, are subject to the Contingency Agreement's arbitration clause.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Intervenors, John L. Malesovas d/b/a Malesovas Law Firm and Fee Smith Sharp & Vitullo, LLP, respectfully pray that this Honorable Court convert this Court's TRO into a temporary order protecting the settlement funds in dispute; that the Court hold any ruling on the motion to compel arbitration temporarily in abeyance; and further grant the Intervenors (Lawyers) all such further relief whether in law or in equity upon which they may show themselves justly entitled.

Respectfully Submitted,

**BRIAN LAUTEN, P.C.** 

**BRIAN P. LAUTEN** 

State Bar No. 24031603 blauten@brianlauten.com 3811 Turtle Creek Blvd, Ste. 1450

Dallas, Texas 75219 (214) 414-0996 telephone

ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENORS

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has been served on all counsel of record on April 20, 2018, in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to:

Alan S. Loewinsohn Jim L. Flegle Kerry F. Schonwald Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP 12377 Merlt Dr., Suite 900 Dallas, Texas 75251 214-572-1717 Facsimile alanl@lfdslaw.com jimf@lfdslaw.com kerrys@lfdslaw.com

Attorneys for Intervenor Jo Hopper

John C. Eichman Grayson L. Linyard Hunton & Williams, LLP 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700 Dallas, TX 75202 214-468-3599 Facsimile ieichman@hunton.com glinyard@hunton.com Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank. N.A.. as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, Deceased, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., in its Corporate Capacity

Evan A. Young Baker Botts L.L.P. 98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500 Austin, TX 78701 512-322-8306 Facsimile evan.young@bakerbotts.com Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Jeffrey S. Levinger J. Carl Cecere Levinger PC 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500 Dallas, TX 75202 214-855-6808 Facsimile jlevinger@levingerpc.com ccecere@cecerepc.com Attorneys for Defendants, Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

Van H. Beckwith Jessica B. Pulliam Baker Botts L.L.P. 2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700 Dallas, TX 75201 214-661-4677 Facsimile van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com jessica.pulliam@bakerbotts.com

Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

James E. Pennington Law Offices of James E. Pennington, P.C. 900 Jackson Street, Suite 440 Dallas, TX 75202 jep@jeplawyer.com Attorneys for Defendants Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

**BRIAN P. LAUTEN** ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENORS

### **CONTINGENCY FEE CONTRACT OF REPRESENTATION**

The undersigned **Stephen Hopper**, **and Laura Wassmer** referred to as "Client" or "Clients" employ and retain Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP, and Malesovas Law Firm, (herein "Attorneys") to represent Client as set forth herein.

1. <u>SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION:</u> Attorneys agree to investigate and evaluate and litigate Client's possible claim or claims of negligence, fraud, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty against JP MORGAN CHASE and persons and companies relating to JP MORGAN CHASE BANKs wrongful acts in acting as the independent administrator of the Estate of Max Hopper..

Client understands and agrees that the scope of representation herein does not include the filing of any claim against any state or federal entity or employee or filing or pursuing an appeal from disposition in the Trial Court. Client understands and agrees that the scope of representation herein does not include defending any claims or lawsuits filed against Client. Client is retaining separate counsel on a flat fee agreement or other fee arrangement to defend them against any claims filed by any parties.

Client understands and agrees that the scope of representation herein does not include representing Clients in the probate lawsuit or lawsuit involving Chase bank, and defending Client against Chase bank or any other party.

Client understands and agrees that Attorneys will not file suit against entities that are in a foreign jurisdiction or are international companies whom in attorney's opinion cannot be sued in a United States court. Client understands and agrees that Attorneys are not obligated to pursue entities that are defunct and/or bankrupt.

Client hereby agrees and understands that Attorneys retain the right to withdraw from representation of Client at any time, so long as said withdrawal would not unduly prejudice Client's right to bring suit or to seek or retain another attorney to represent Client. In such event, Client agrees to timely sign an appropriate Motion for Substitution of Counsel. If after disposition in the trial court, Client desires to appeal, a new and separate agreement shall be entered into by the parties as to services and fees for any appeal, or Client shall retain separate counsel to handle any appeal and Attorneys shall retain their interest in the case under this agreement applicable to any recovery obtained by settlement or otherwise.

2. <u>AUTHORITY OF ATTORNEYS:</u> Client empowers Attorneys to take all steps in this matter deemed by them to be advisable for the investigation and handling of Client's

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Claims, including hiring investigators, expert witnesses, and/or other attorneys and filing any legal action necessary. Client authorizes and empowers Attorneys to do any and all things necessary and proper in the enforcement, compromise, settlement, adjustment and collection of Client's Claim, and Client further authorizes and empowers them to sign any and all pleadings and all releases, checks, drafts, authorizations and other papers necessary and proper in connection with the prosecution or enforcement of Client's Claims and collection or settlement of the damages awarded or to be paid therefore, and to receive such funds or other property in Client's name and for Client on account of any judgment recovered or any settlement agreed upon in connection with Client's Claim. Full power and authority is given by Client to Attorneys to adjust, settle or compromise Client's Claim, but no final settlement shall be made and consummated by Attorneys without first submitting the offer, compromise, or adjustment to Client for approval, and Client agrees not to compromise or settle Client's Claim without the Attorneys' authority, agreement and consent. Should Client make a settlement in violation of this Agreement, Client agrees to pay Attorneys the full fee agreed upon under paragraph 3 "Attorneys' Fee", below.

3. ATTORNEYS' FEE: This Agreement is a contingency fee contract. Specifically, if Attorneys are successful in recovering money or anything of value for Client, by settlement prior to trial begins, Attorneys shall receive attorneys' fees in the amount of forty percent (40%) of the gross recovery. The attorney fee will be split amongst the attorneys as follows: FSSV 50% Malesovas Law Firm 50% If the matter is resolved after trial begins, Attorneys shall receive attorneys' fees in the amount of forty-five (45%) of the gross recovery. All attorneys' fees shall be a percentage of the gross recovery. Gross recovery means the gross amount of money or other value or property recovered for Client, before the deduction of expenses. Trial is considered to have commenced at 5:00 p.m. on the Friday closest to ten (10) days before jury selection begins or evidence is first presented to the trier of fact, whichever is the earlier of these two events. If Attorneys do not recover any money or other value or property for Client, Client will not owe any attorneys' fees. Client agrees that Attorneys may, in their discretion, employ associate counsel to assist in prosecuting Client's cause of action, and Client does not object to the participation of any lawyers Attorneys may choose to involve in this representation of Client. With the exceptions set forth below, payment of attorneys' fees to associate counsel is the responsibility of Attorneys. In the event that the case is settled by way of a structured settlement, Client approves and authorizes attorneys' fees to be based upon the present value benefit of the settlement and further authorizes Attorneys to take attorneys' fees either in cash or in structured payment, as Attorneys deem appropriate.

In some instances, it may be necessary for Attorneys to retain special outside counsel to assist on matters other than prosecuting Client's claims for damages. Examples of such instances include the following: a defendant may seek bankruptcy protection; or a defendant may attempt to fraudulently transfer some of its assets to

avoid paying the Client's claim; a defendant may transfer assets out of the country thereby necessitating the retention of foreign counsel, or a complex, multi-party settlement may require an ethics opinion from outside counsel; or special action in probate court may be necessary apart from the usual probate proceedings involved in an estate; or a separate lawsuit may need to be filed against a defendant's insurance company. Client agrees that Attorneys may retain such special outside counsel to represent Client when Attorneys deem such assistance to be reasonably necessary, and that the fees of such counsel will be deducted from Client's share of the recovery.

- 4. <u>COSTS AND OTHER EXPENSES:</u> Clients **WILL NOT BE** responsible to pay for costs and expenses as incurred. Such costs include filing fees, expert witness fees, court reporter and video fees, copy charges, postage, mailing, travel, witness fees, electronic document conversion fees, delivery fees, internal operating costs and other related charges incurred or paid as an expense on behalf of Client and paid to third-party vendors or incurred internally by Attorneys and charged to Client in connection with Attorneys' representation of Client.
- **DISBURSEMENT OF PROCEEDS TO CLIENT:** Client understands that Attorneys make no guarantee or assurance of any kind regarding the likelihood of success of Client's claims. Upon receipt by Attorneys of the proceeds of any settlement or judgment, Attorneys shall (1) retain either forty percent (40%) of the proceeds as their attorneys' fees if the matter is settled or resolved before trial begins or forty-five (45%) percent of the proceeds as their attorneys' fees if the matter is settled or resolved after trial begins, (2) deduct from Client's share of the proceeds any costs and expenses, including the fees of any special outside counsel that Attorneys may incur on Client's behalf, and (3) disburse the remainder of Client's share of the proceeds to Client. At the time of disbursement of any proceeds, Client will be provided with a disbursement sheet reflecting the attorneys' fees, the expenses deducted out of Client's share, and the remainder of Client's share.

Upon some circumstances, health insurers, workers compensation carriers, or others who have paid benefits or provided services on Client's behalf may claim a right to recover a portion of the proceeds of any action brought on behalf of the Client and may place Attorneys on notice of their claim. Except as may be required by law, Attorneys will not agree to protect any claim of a subrogation carrier or other creditor without Client's consent.

6. <u>POWER OF ATTORNEY:</u> Client gives Attorneys a power of attorney to execute and negotiate all reasonable and necessary documents connected with the handling of this cause of action, including pleadings, contracts, checks or drafts, settlement agreements, compromises and releases, verifications, dismissals and orders, proofs of claim, ballots, verified statements including those pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2019,

and all other documents that Client could properly execute. Client's claims will not be settled without obtaining Client's consent.

COOPERATION: ADDRESS CHANGE: RETURN OF DOCUMENTS: Client agrees to cooperate with Attorneys to permit Client's claims to be investigated and developed; to disclose to Attorneys all facts relevant to the claim; and to be reasonably available to attend any necessary meetings, depositions, preparation sessions, hearings and trial. Client shall appear on reasonable notice at any and all depositions and Court appearances and shall comply with all reasonable requests of Attorneys in connection with preparation and presentation of Client's claims. The Client acknowledges and agrees that all communications with Attorneys are privileged. The Client acknowledges that Attorneys may represent other individuals on the same or similar matters and therefore may communicate matters of common interest to all of Attorneys' clients. Therefore, Client agrees and understands that other individuals who are clients of Attorneys may also invoke the attorney client privilege as to Attorneys' communications with Client. The Client acknowledges and agrees not to provide attorney work product or attorney client communications to any other person.

Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any change of marital status or death of spouse. Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any bankruptcy proceedings involving Client or Client's spouse. Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any other legal proceedings to which Client or Client's spouse is a party.

Client agrees to notify Attorneys in writing of each change in Client's mailing address (work or home) or telephone number (work, home and cell) during the term of this representation within seven (7) days of each such change of address or telephone number. When the case is completed, and subject to any Court orders, Attorneys will provide Client the opportunity to retrieve any documents and/or materials that Client provided to Attorneys or that Attorneys have obtained from other sources in connection with the case. However, if Client has not retrieved those documents and/or materials within ninety (90) days after Attorneys have mailed to Client written notice that the case is completed and that those documents and/or material are available to Client, Attorneys may dispose of those documents and/or materials.

8. NO TAX ADVICE: Attorneys have advised Client that the pursuit of resolution of this claim may have various tax consequences. Client understands that Attorneys do not render tax advice and are not being retained to offer such advice to Client or to represent Client before the IRS. Moreover, Client accepts responsibility for making any payment or filings necessitated by the resolution of Client's claim.

Client understands that applicable State law may impose sales, service or other tax on any amount that Client may recover or the fees due Attorneys hereunder. Client also understands that applicable Federal income tax law may require that Client pay

income tax on the fees due Attorneys hereunder, separate and apart from and in addition to any taxes owed by Attorneys. Client agrees that any such taxes (other than Federal and/or State income taxes that Attorneys may owe on monies actually received by them) shall be paid out of my share of any recovery.

- 9. **DEATH OF CLIENT:** The provisions of this Agreement will not terminate upon the death of Client. In the event of the death of Client, any duly appointed Representative of Client's heirs and/or estate will be bound by this Agreement to the extent allowed by applicable law, including without limitation, the provisions of this Agreement relating to the recovery of attorneys' fees and costs and other expenses. Any such Representative shall, upon request by Attorneys, execute a new Agreement in the capacity as Representative for the heirs and/or estate of the Client.
- 10. OFFER OF SETTLEMENT: Client understands that applicable law may, under certain circumstances, allow a Defendant to make an offer of settlement to Client and if Client rejects or does not accept such an offer, such may result in any award, verdict or judgment in Client's favor being reduced as provided by such law. Client understands that Client has the final authority to accept or reject any offer of settlement. Client understands that if Client rejects or does not accept such an offer, and Client's recovery is subsequently reduced, the fees owed to Attorneys will be calculated on the amount of any award, verdict or judgment before reduction, and the reduction shall be out of Client's share of any recovery.
- Attorneys an amount equal to either forty percent (40%) of the proceeds if the matter is settled or resolved before trial begins or forty-five percent (45%) of the proceeds if the matter is resolved after trial begins, of any property, money or other value recovered by settlement, compromise, verdict or judgment of the claims described in this contract. Client does hereby give and grant to Attorneys an express security interest, in addition to any statutory lien, upon Client's claims and any and all judgments recovered, and any and all funds or property realized or paid by compromise or settlement, as security for the compensation and costs and expenses advanced or due to be paid or reimbursed to Attorneys hereunder. This security interest is to continue in the event Attorneys are discharged without good cause. If the claims are not assignable at law, Client expressly assigns to Attorneys, to the extent of attorneys' fees and disbursements, any sum realized by way of a settlement or any judgment obtained thereon.
- **12. BINDING EFFECT:** This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, legal representatives, successors and assigns.
- **13. TERMINATION OF REPRESENTATION:** Client understands that Client can terminate Attorneys' representation of Client at any time by providing written notice to

Attorneys. Should Client elect to terminate Attorneys' representation prior to the full conclusion of Attorneys' representation, Client understands and agrees that Attorneys have a claim for expenses of litigation and unpaid attorneys' fees which will become due upon receipt by Client or any successor attorney of Client or any proceeds for any remaining portion of Client's claim. Client understands that the obligation for unpaid attorneys' fees will be calculated based on the percentage of work completed on the case or claims at the time Client terminates Attorneys.

- **14. NO GUARANTEE OF RECOVERY:** Client understands that no guarantee or assurances of any kind have been made regarding the likelihood of success of Client's claim, but that Attorneys will use their skill and diligence, as well as their experience, to diligently pursue Client's action.
- 15. <u>MISCELLANEOUS:</u> In case any one or more of the provisions contained in this agreement shall, for any reason, be held to be invalid, illegal, or unenforceable in any respect, such invalidity, illegality, or unenforceability shall not affect any other provision thereof, and this agreement shall be construed as if such invalid, illegal, or unenforceable provision had never been contained herein.

This contract constitutes the sole and only agreement of the parties hereto and supersedes any prior understandings, or written or oral agreements between the parties respecting within the subject matter.

- 16. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: Client understands that an issue may exist as to whether the applicable statute of limitations has expired. This issue is raised in many lawsuits even if the Client's claims are not beyond the Statute of Limitations. Client understands that Attorneys must perform an evaluation of Client's claim prior to filing Client's lawsuit, and that this evaluation will first require Client to provide Attorneys with all relevant documents and other information requested. It is possible that the statute of limitations has already expired or may expire during the interim between the date of Client's signature below and the filing of Client's lawsuit. Client agrees to accept this risk.
- Attorneys may refer this matter to another lawyer or associate additional lawyers to assist in representing Client and prosecuting the Client's cause of action. Prior to the referral or association becoming effective, Client shall consent in writing to the terms of the arrangement after being advised of (1) the identity of the lawyer or law firm involved, (2) whether the fees will be divided based on the proportion of services rendered or by lawyers agreeing to assume joint responsibility for the representation, and (3) the share of the fee that each lawyer or law firm will receive or, if the division is based on the proportion of services performed, the basis on which the division will be

made. The referral or association of additional attorneys will not increase the total fee owed by the Client.

- 18. NOTICE TO CLIENTS: Attorneys are only licensed to practice law in the State of Texas. To the extent that Attorneys are required to appear in Court in other States, Attorneys will seek permission of the appropriate Court to appear pro hac vice. If pro hac vice admission is granted, Attorneys will be subject to the disciplinary rules of that particular jurisdiction. Attorneys are also subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar of Texas. The State Bar of Texas investigates and prosecutes professional misconduct committed by Texas attorneys. For more information call (800) 932-1900.
- 20. ARBITRATION: It is Attorney's goal to maintain at all times a constructive and positive relationship with Client on the matter described above and on future matters in which Attorney may perform services for Client. However, should a dispute arise between Attorney and Client, a prompt and fair resolution is in the interests of all concerned. To this end, if any controversy or claim arises out of is related to this agreement, any services provided by Attorneys to Client in connection with Client's Claims, or any other matter that may arise between Client and Attorney (including malpractice claims and fee disputes), Attorneys and Client both waive any right to bring a court action or have a jury trial and agree that the dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration to be conducted in Dallas, Texas before the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA with one arbitrator who must be an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Texas..

CLIENT HAS READ AND UNDERSTANDS THIS CONTRACT AND AGREES AS STATED ABOVE AS OF THE DATE NOTED BELOW.

Laura Wassmer

Stephen Hopper

Date: \_\_\_\_11/19/2015

Address: 3625 N Classen Blvd Oklahoma City, OK 7318

Telephone Numbers: 405-639-9186

ATTORNEYS:

Fee, Smith, Sharp &Vitullo, LLP

Malesovas Law Firm

#### **CONTINGENCY FEE CONTRACT OF REPRESENTATION**

The undersigned Stephen Hopper, and Laura Wassmer referred to as "Client" or "Clients" employ and retain Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitulio, LLP, and Malesovas Law Firm, (herein "Attorneys") to represent Client as set forth herein.

1. SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION: Attorneys agree to investigate and evaluate and litigate Client's possible claim or claims of negligence, fraud, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty against JP MORGAN CHASE and persons and companies relating to JP MORGAN CHASE BANKs wrongful acts in acting as the independent administrator of the Estate of Max Hopper...

Client understands and agrees that the scope of representation herein does not include the filing of any claim against any state or federal entity or employee or filing or pursuing an appeal from disposition in the Trial Court. Client understands and agrees that the scope of representation herein does not include defending any claims or lawsuits filed against Client. Client is retaining separate counsel on a flat fee agreement or other fee arrangement to defend them against any claims filed by any parties. Offer than Cheek.

Client understands and agrees that the scope of representation herein does not include representing Clients in the probate lawsuit or lawsuit involving Chase bank, and defending Client against Chase bank or any other party.

Client understands and agrees that Attorneys will not file suit against entities that are in a foreign jurisdiction or are international companies whom in attorney's opinion cannot be sued in a United States court. Client understands and agrees that Attorneys are not obligated to pursue entities that are defunct and/or bankrupt.

Client hereby agrees and understands that Attorneys retain the right to withdraw from representation of Client at any time, so long as said withdrawal would not unduly prejudice Client's right to bring suit or to seek or retain another attorney to represent Client. In such event, Client agrees to timely sign an appropriate Motion for Substitution of Counsel. If after disposition in the trial court, Client desires to appeal, a new and separate agreement shall be entered into by the parties as to services and fees for any appeal, or Client shall retain separate counsel to handle any appeal and Attorneys shall retain their interest in the case under this agreement applicable to any recovery obtained by settlement or otherwise.

- 2. AUTHORITY OF ATTORNEYS: Client empowers Attorneys to take all steps in this matter deemed by them to be advisable for the investigation and handling of Client's Claims, including hiring investigators, expert witnesses, and/or other attorneys and filing any legal action necessary. Client authorizes and empowers Attorneys to do any and all things necessary and proper in the enforcement, compromise, settlement, adjustment and collection of Client's Claim, and Client further authorizes and empowers them to sign any and all pleadings and all releases, checks, drafts, authorizations and other papers necessary and proper in connection with the prosecution or enforcement of Client's Claims and collection or settlement of the damages awarded or to be paid therefore, and to receive such funds or other property in Client's name and for Client on account of any judgment recovered or any settlement agreed upon in connection with Client's Claim. Full power and authority is given by Client to Attorneys to adjust, settle or compromise Client's Claim, but no final settlement shall be made and consummated by Attorneys without first submitting the offer, compromise, or adjustment to Client for approval, and Client agrees not to compromise or settle Client's Claim without the Attorneys' authority, agreement and consent. Should Client make a settlement in violation of this Agreement, Client agrees to pay Attorneys the full fee agreed upon under paragraph 3 "Attorneys' Fee", below.
- 3. ATTORNEYS' FEE: This Agreement is a contingency fee contract. Specifically, if Attorneys are successful in recovering money or anything of value for Client, by settlement prior to trial begins, Attorneys shall receive attorneys' fees in the amount of forty percent (40%) of the gross recovery. The attorney fee will be split amongst the attorneys as follows: FSSV 50% Malesovas Law Firm 50% If the matter is resolved after trial begins, Attorneys shall receive attorneys' fees in the amount of forty-five (45%) of the gross recovery. All attorneys' fees shall be a percentage of the gross recovery. Gross recovery means the gross amount of money or other value or property recovered for Client, before the deduction of expenses. Trial is considered to have commenced at 5:00 p.m. on the Friday closest to ten (10) days before jury selection begins or evidence is first presented to the trier of fact, whichever is the earlier of these two events. If Attorneys do not recover any money or other value or property for Client, Client will not owe any attorneys' fees. Client agrees that Attorneys may, in their discretion, employ associate counsel to assist in prosecuting Client's cause of action, and Client does not object to the participation of any lawyers Attorneys may choose to involve in this representation of Client. With the exceptions set forth below, payment of attorneys' fees to associate counsel is the responsibility of Attorneys. In the event that the case is settled by way of a structured settlement, Client approves and authorizes attorneys' fees to be based upon the present value benefit of the settlement and further authorizes Attorneys to take attorneys' fees either in cash or in structured payment, as Attorneys deem appropriate.

In some instances, it may be necessary for Attorneys to retain special outside counsel to assist on matters other than prosecuting Client's claims for damages. Examples of such instances include the following: a defendant may seek bankruptcy protection; or a defendant may attempt to fraudulently transfer some of its assets to avoid paying the Client's claim; a defendant may transfer assets out of the country thereby necessitating the retention of foreign counsel, or a complex, multi-party settlement may require an ethics opinion from outside counsel; or special action in probate court may be necessary apart from the usual probate proceedings involved in an estate; or a separate lawsuit may need to be filed against a defendant's insurance company. Client agrees that Attorneys may retain such special outside counsel to represent Client when Attorneys deem such assistance to be reasonably necessary, and that the fees of such counsel will be deducted from Client's share of the recovery.

- 4. <u>COSTS AND OTHER EXPENSES:</u> Clients WILL NOT BE responsible to pay for costs and expenses as incurred. Such costs include filing fees, expert witness fees, court reporter and video fees, copy charges, postage, mailing, travel, witness fees, electronic document conversion fees, delivery fees, internal operating costs and other related charges incurred or paid as an expense on behalf of Client and paid to third-party vendors or incurred internally by Attorneys and charged to Client in connection with Attorneys' representation of Client.
- 5. **DISBURSEMENT OF PROCEEDS TO CLIENT:** Client understands that Attorneys make no guarantee or assurance of any kind regarding the likelihood of success of Client's claims. Upon receipt by Attorneys of the proceeds of any settlement or judgment, Attorneys shall (1) retain either forty percent (40%) of the proceeds as their attorneys' fees if the matter is settled or resolved before trial begins or forty-five (45%) percent of the proceeds as their attorneys' fees if the matter is settled or resolved after trial begins, (2) deduct from Client's share of the proceeds any costs and expenses, including the fees of any special outside counsel that Attorneys may incur on Client's behalf, and (3) disburse the remainder of Client's share of the proceeds to Client. At the time of disbursement of any proceeds, Client will be provided with a disbursement sheet reflecting the attorneys' fees, the expenses deducted out of Client's share, and the remainder of Client's share.

Upon some circumstances, health insurers, workers compensation carriers, or others who have paid benefits or provided services on Client's behalf may claim a right to recover a portion of the proceeds of any action brought on behalf of the Client and may place Attorneys on notice of their claim. Except as may be required by law, Attorneys will not agree to protect any claim of a subrogation carrier or other creditor without Client's consent.

- 6. POWER OF ATTORNEY: Client gives Attorneys a power of attorney to execute and negotiate all reasonable and necessary documents connected with the handling of this cause of action, including pleadings, contracts, checks or drafts, settlement agreements, compromises and releases, verifications, dismissals and orders, proofs of claim, ballots, verified statements including those pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2019, and all other documents that Client could properly execute. Client's claims will not be settled without obtaining Client's consent.
- 7. COOPERATION: ADDRESS CHANGE: RETURN OF DOCUMENTS: Client agrees to cooperate with Attorneys to permit Client's claims to be investigated and developed; to disclose to Attorneys all facts relevant to the claim; and to be reasonably available to attend any necessary meetings, depositions, preparation sessions, hearings and trial. Client shall appear on reasonable notice at any and all depositions and Court appearances and shall comply with all reasonable requests of Attorneys in connection with preparation and presentation of Client's claims. The Client acknowledges and agrees that all communications with Attorneys are privileged. The Client acknowledges that Attorneys may represent other individuals on the same or similar matters and therefore may communicate matters of common interest to all of Attorneys' clients. Therefore, Client agrees and understands that other individuals who are clients of Attorneys may also invoke the attorney client privilege as to Attorneys' communications with Client. The Client acknowledges and agrees not to provide attorney work product or attorney client communications to any other person.

Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any change of marital status or death of spouse. Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any bankruptcy proceedings involving Client or Client's spouse. Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any other legal proceedings to which Client or Client's spouse is a party.

Client agrees to notify Attorneys in writing of each change in Client's mailing address (work or home) or telephone number (work, home and cell) during the term of this representation within seven (7) days of each such change of address or telephone number. When the case is completed, and subject to any Court orders, Attorneys will provide Client the opportunity to retrieve any documents and/or materials that Client provided to Attorneys or that Attorneys have obtained from other sources in connection with the case. However, if Client has not retrieved those documents and/or materials within ninety (90) days after Attorneys have mailed to Client written notice that the case is completed and that those documents and/or material are available to Client, Attorneys may dispose of those documents and/or materials.

8. NO TAX ADVICE: Attorneys have advised Client that the pursuit of resolution of this claim may have various tax consequences. Client understands that Attorneys do not render tax advice and are not being retained to offer such advice to Client or to represent Client before the IRS. Moreover, Client accepts responsibility for making any payment or filings necessitated by the resolution of Client's claim.

Client understands that applicable State law may impose sales, service or other tax on any amount that Client may recover or the fees due Attorneys hereunder. Client also understands that applicable Federal income tax law may require that Client pay income tax on the fees due Attorneys hereunder, separate and apart from and in addition to any taxes owed by Attorneys. Client agrees that any such taxes (other than Federal and/or State income taxes that Attorneys may owe on monies actually received by them) shall be paid out of my share of any recovery.

- 9. **DEATH OF CLIENT:** The provisions of this Agreement will not terminate upon the death of Client. In the event of the death of Client, any duly appointed Representative of Client's heirs and/or estate will be bound by this Agreement to the extent allowed by applicable law, including without limitation, the provisions of this Agreement relating to the recovery of attorneys' fees and costs and other expenses. Any such Representative shall, upon request by Attorneys, execute a new Agreement in the capacity as Representative for the heirs and/or estate of the Client.
- 10. OFFER OF SETTLEMENT: Client understands that applicable law may, under certain circumstances, allow a Defendant to make an offer of settlement to Client and if Client rejects or does not accept such an offer, such may result in any award, verdict or judgment in Client's favor being reduced as provided by such law. Client understands that Client has the final authority to accept or reject any offer of settlement. Client understands that if Client rejects or does not accept such an offer, and Client's recovery is subsequently reduced, the fees owed to Attorneys will be calculated on the amount of any award, verdict or judgment before reduction, and the reduction shall be out of Client's share of any recovery.

- 11. SECURITY INTEREST: Client hereby assigns, transfers and conveys over to Attorneys an amount equal to either forty percent (40%) of the proceeds if the matter is settled or resolved before trial begins or forty-five percent (45%) of the proceeds if the matter is resolved after trial begins, of any property, money or other value recovered by settlement, compromise, verdict or judgment of the claims described in this contract. Client does hereby give and grant to Attorneys an express security interest, in addition to any statutory lien, upon Client's claims and any and all judgments recovered, and any and all funds or property realized or paid by compromise or settlement, as security for the compensation and costs and expenses advanced or due to be paid or reimbursed to Attorneys hereunder. This security interest is to continue in the event Attorneys are discharged without good cause. If the claims are not assignable at law, Client expressly assigns to Attorneys, to the extent of attorneys' fees and disbursements, any sum realized by way of a settlement or any judgment obtained thereon.
- 12. <u>BINDING EFFECT:</u> This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, legal representatives, successors and assigns.
- 13. TERMINATION OF REPRESENTATION: Client understands that Client can terminate Attorneys' representation of Client at any time by providing written notice to Attorneys. Should Client elect to terminate Attorneys' representation prior to the full conclusion of Attorneys' representation, Client understands and agrees that Attorneys have a claim for expenses of litigation and unpaid attorneys' fees which will become due upon receipt by Client or any successor attorney of Client or any proceeds for any remaining portion of Client's claim. Client understands that the obligation for unpaid attorneys' fees will be calculated based on the percentage of work completed on the case or claims at the time Client terminates Attorneys.
- 14. <u>NO GUARANTEE OF RECOVERY:</u> Client understands that no guarantee or assurances of any kind have been made regarding the likelihood of success of Client's claim, but that Attorneys will use their skill and diligence, as well as their experience, to diligently pursue Client's action.
- 15. <u>MISCELLANEOUS:</u> In case any one or more of the provisions contained in this agreement shall, for any reason, be held to be invalid, illegal, or unenforceable in any respect, such invalidity, illegality, or unenforceability shall not affect any other provision thereof, and this agreement shall be construed as if such invalid, illegal, or unenforceable provision had never been contained herein.

This contract constitutes the sole and only agreement of the parties hereto and supersedes any prior understandings, or written or oral agreements between the parties respecting within the subject matter.

16. <u>STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS:</u> Client understands that an issue may exist as to whether the applicable statute of limitations has expired. This issue is raised in many lawsuits

even if the Client's claims are not beyond the Statute of Limitations. Client understands that Attorneys must perform an evaluation of Client's claim prior to filing Client's lawsuit, and that this evaluation will first require Client to provide Attorneys with all relevant documents and other information requested. It is possible that the statute of limitations has already expired or may expire during the interim between the date of Client's signature below and the filing of Client's lawsuit. Client agrees to accept this risk.

- 17. REFERRAL OR ASSOCIATION OF ADDITIONAL COUNSEL: Client agrees that Attorneys may refer this matter to another lawyer or associate additional lawyers to assist in representing Client and prosecuting the Client's cause of action. Prior to the referral or association becoming effective, Client shall consent in writing to the terms of the arrangement after being advised of (1) the identity of the lawyer or law firm involved, (2) whether the fees will be divided based on the proportion of services rendered or by lawyers agreeing to assume joint responsibility for the representation, and (3) the share of the fee that each lawyer or law firm will receive or, if the division is based on the proportion of services performed, the basis on which the division will be made. The referral or association of additional attorneys will not increase the total fee owed by the Client.
- 18. NOTICE TO CLIENTS: Attorneys are only licensed to practice law in the State of Texas. To the extent that Attorneys are required to appear in Court in other States, Attorneys will seek permission of the appropriate Court to appear pro hac vice. If pro hac vice admission is granted, Attorneys will be subject to the disciplinary rules of that particular jurisdiction. Attorneys are also subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar of Texas. The State Bar of Texas investigates and prosecutes professional misconduct committed by Texas attorneys. For more information call (800) 932-1900.
- 20. ARBITRATION: It is Attorney's goal to maintain at all times a constructive and positive relationship with Client on the matter described above and on future matters in which Attorney may perform services for Client. However, should a dispute arise between Attorney and Client, a prompt and fair resolution is in the interests of all concerned. To this end, if any controversy or claim arises out of is related to this agreement, any services provided by Attorneys to Client in connection with Client's Claims, or any other matter that may arise between Client and Attorney (including malpractice claims and fee disputes), Attorneys and Client both waive any right to bring a court action or have a jury trial and agree that the dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration to be conducted in Dallas, Texas before the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA with one arbitrator who must be an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Texas.

CLIENT HAS READ AND UNDERSTANDS THIS CONTRACT AND AGREES AS STATED ABOVE AS OF THE DATE NOTED BELOW.

Laura Wassmer

Stephen Hopper
Date:
Address:
Telephone Numbers:
ATTORNEYS:
Fee, Smith, Sharp &Vitullo, LLP
Q-1.M-

Malesovas Law Firm



#### CAUSE NO. PR-11-3238-1

IN RE: ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED,	_	IN THE PROBATE COURT
JO N. HOPPER,	തതതതതതതത	
Intervenor,	9 9 9	
V.	8 8 8	NO. 1
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., STEPHEN B. HOPPER, and LAURA S. WASSMER,	n en en en en	
Defendants.	8	OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP Intervenors, v. STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, individually and as Beneficiaries of the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendants.	<i>തയന്തയന്തയന്തയന്തയന്തയന്തയന്ത</i>	

## **TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER**

Came to be heard on the 9<sup>TH</sup> day of April 2018, the minimum amount of notice having been duly provided pursuant to Local Rule 2.02(a) of Dallas County, Fee Smith Sharp & Vitullo, LLP and John L. Malesovas d/b/a Malesovas Law Firm's (collectively, "Intervenors") *Verified Petition(s) in Intervention, Application for Temporary Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction, and Application for Declaratory Relief* against, *inter alia*,

EXHIBIT B



Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer, individually and as beneficiaries of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, deceased, (hereinafter jointly "Clients") and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (hereinafter "JPM") (Clients and JPM hereinafter jointly, "Defendants" with respect to the claims now pending in this Intervention).

The Court, after considering the *Intervenors' Collective Verified Original Petition* in *Intervention, Application for Temporary Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction, and Application for Declaratory Relief*, the evidence submitted by Intervenors in camera, the relevant exhibits, the arguments of counsel, concludes that—unless immediately restrained, Defendants will irreparably injure Intervenors.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute brought before it under both, Tex. Estates Code Ann. § 32,007 et seq. (Vernon 2014), and, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37,005 et seq. (Vernon 2014) (authorizing declaratory judgment actions in probate court when such relief is germane to an Estate):

Intervenors respective Pleas and application for TRO are timely filed, given that this Court has yet to sign a judgment; and, therefore, retains plenary power over this proceeding. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 60 et seq.

This Court has, preliminarily, taken judicial notice, pursuant to Rule 201 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, of the following facts that, in reasonable probability, appear to be true at this preliminary stage of the proceeding:

- 1.) In, around, or about November of 2015, Clients executed a valid and enforceable contingency agreement ("CA") with Intervenors;
- 2.) On or about April 5, 2018, attorneys for Clients and JPM appeared before this Court and announced, without revealing any of the substantive terms, that a confidential settlement had been reached between them in the underlying dispute pending in this Court (hereinafter "Settlement");
- 3.) On or about the same day, April 5, 2018, but—literally what appears to have been within minutes after the Court was informed that a settlement had been reached by the parties in this underlying dispute—Clients terminated their CA with Intervenors by and through their attorney, James Pennington;

- Intervenors have filed what, by all accounts, appears to be a valid and enforceable First Party Attorney's Fees Lien in the proceeds of the Settlement;
- 5.) Intervenors fully performed; or, at the very least, substantially and materially performed all of their duties, responsibilities, and obligations under the CA at or before the time Clients terminated the CA—as those legal terms are meant in, *Tillery & Tillery v. Zurich Ins. Co.*, 54 S.W.3d 356, 360-61 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, no pet.), *Enochs v. Brown*, 872 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no writ), *disapproved of on unrelated grounds*, by *Roberts v. Williamson*, 111 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. 2003), and *Mandell & Wright*, 441 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. 1969); and
- 6.) Given the timing of the termination of Intervenors, Clients are estopped, quasi-estopped, and/or have waived any and all defenses, if any, that could or would be lodged to the CA or the quality of the legal services performed by Intervenors.

Based upon these preliminary findings, this Court is of the opinion that intervenors have established a probability of success on the merits on their application for, *inter alia*, declaratory relief. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.004 et seq. (Vernon 2014). This Court is of the opinion that, unless restrained, one or more Defendants are likely to cause permanent damage to Intervenors, should they be allowed to transfer, hypothecate, assign, or take title to Intervenors' interest in the settlement proceeds before the pleas in Intervention are adjudicated on the merits. Such harm would be irreparable because this Court is of the opinion that there is no showing; or, in the alternative, an inadequate showing that Defendants could timely and immediately pay the disputed funds to Intervenors, should Intervenors ultimately prevail in this proceeding, and because Intervenors have a security interest in and lien upon a portion of the settlement proceeds which would be eviscerated by allowing Clients to dispose of 100% of the settlement proceeds as they saw fit. Moreover, given the

Court's preliminary findings set forth above in (i)-(vi), Intervenors have established a property right and secured interest in the proceeds at issue.

The Court is, **THEREFORE**, of the opinion that Intervenors are entitled to the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and that such an Order is necessary to protect Intervenors' rights. This **ORDER** is necessary because of the immediate need to enforce the security interest and lien which Intervenors have in a portion of the settlement proceeds and to stop the wrongful flow of funds in the near future from being disseminated to either Clients or their attorneys, or some other third party subject to Clients' direction and control, upon which Intervenors would have no adequate remedy at law. Without intervention by this Court, Intervenors' property right, that is Intervenors' security interest in and lien upon the settlement proceeds, would be destroyed and there would be no way to restore that property right in the Settlement proceeds themselves.

This Court is further of the opinion that Intervenors are entitled to an **EXPEDITED DISCOVERY ORDER**. Therefore, Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer shall be made available for deposition on and certainly no later than **Tuesday**, **April 17**, **2018**. If the parties cannot agree on a suitable location for these depositions, they shall be taken in this Court's jury room. The depositions are limited solely to the matters in dispute in the pled Intervention filings and shall last no longer than two hours per deponent (per side). In addition, Intervenors may serve a *duces tecum* with the deposition notices, which shall be limited to no more than seven (7) discovery requests. The deposition notice shall provide two business days notice to the deponent.

It is further **ORDERED** that Intervenors may move this Court for a dispositive summary judgment on 14 days notice of any hearing; and any response shall be due to be filed within 5 days of the hearing; and any reply shall be due to be filed within 2 days of the hearing.

It is therefore **ORDERED**, **ADJUDGED**, and **DECREED** that Defendants, Stephen Hopper, Laura Wassmer, and JPMorgan Chase, N.A., and any of his, her, their, or its agents, servants, employees, successors, assigns and those persons in active concert or participation therewith, must:

- Deposit all of the settlement proceeds due to Stephen B. Hopper and Laura s. Wassmer, individually and as beneficiaries of the Estate of Max Hopper, Deceased, into a safekeeping account with JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, to be held in trust until further Order of this Court. Funds in the safekeeping account shall be withdrawn <u>only</u> upon Order of this Court;
- 2) The parties are ORDERED to preserve and prevent the destruction of all documents, including electronic data, emails, and notes, that relate in any way to the matters and claims set forth in the Intervenors' respective Pleas on file—and, moreover, all electronic storage devices must be imaged and preserved.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this order is effective immediately upon Corporate Surety on as Intervenors' deposit with the appropriate clerk of this Court appoind in the amount of books 10,000 (U.S. dollars).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Intervenors' application for a temporary injunction is set for an evidentiary hearing and will be heard before this Court on will be heard before this Court on o'clock a.m., and that Stephen Hopper, Laura Wassmer, and JPMorgan Chase, N.A. appear and show cause, if any, why this Temporary Restraining Order should not be continued and converted into a Temporary Injunction until final hearing and trial heregn.

Signed and issued this the 10 day of April 2018, at 4:00 o'clock p.m.

JUDGE PRESIDING

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# LAW OFFICES OF JAMES E. PENNINGTON

A Professional Corporation 900 Jackson Street, Suite 440 Dallas, Texas 75202-4473

JAMES E. PENNINGTON LICENSED IN TEXAS AND COLORADO

PHONE (214) 741-3022 FAX (214) 741-3055 B-MAII. Jep@Jeplawyer.com

April 5, 2018

VIA EMAIL: blauten@brianlauten.com

Brian P. Lauten Brian Lauten, P.C. 3811 Turtle Creek Blvd. Suite 1450 Dallas, Texas 75219

Re: Case No. PR-11-3238-1; In re: Estate of Max Hopper, Deceased, Jo N. Hopper v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al., in the Probate Court of Dallas County, Texas.

Brian:

As you know, I represent Dr. Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer in connection with a dispute that has developed involving your clients, Anthony Vitullo and Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP. Please be advised that my clients have decided to terminate their relationship with Mr. Vitullo, Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP and John Malesovas. Their decision to terminate this relationship is based on a number of factors, which are too numerous to set forth herein. However, I provided you with a brief summary of those reasons yesterday during our call and suggested we meet in person to discuss this in more detail. Ultimately, as a result of several issues that were discovered by Jeff Levinger, the appellate lawyer retained to handle the appeal of the jury's verdict, my clients decided to settle the case with JP Morgan Chase. Most, if not all of these issues, were caused by your clients' omissions before and during trial, such as failing to present expert testimony and several jury charge issues which would have made an appeal very difficult for my clients. Additionally, I discovered a number of facts, some of which I outlined during our call, which indicate that the contingency fee agreement is probably not enforceable and which show that - even if it is enforceable - your clients breached the agreement. As a result, I am notifying you that my clients are - effective immediately -- terminating their relationship with Mr. Vitullo, Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP and Mr. Malesovas and his firm. It is unclear to me whether you are representing Mr. Malesovas or his firm. Please advise, so that I can notify Mr. Malesovas if needed.

At this time, I am requesting your clients to provide me with their entire file regarding their representation of my clients. Although your clients have previously provided me with

**EXHIBIT** 

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Brian Lauten April 5, 2018 Page 2

portions of the file, the files which were provided are not complete and were not provided in the manner in which they were originally maintained by the firm. I am not suggesting anything improper about the manner in which the files were previously produced. However, I am pointing this out to emphasize the importance of making sure that I receive the complete file in the same manner that it was maintained by your clients. You may provide the electronic files on a portable hard drive and have this device, along with the physical files, delivered to my office.

Finally, as I indicated during our call, my clients are willing to discuss a resolution of the attorney's fees related to your clients' representation, so give this some more thought and let me know if you have a proposal. In the meantime, I will instruct Mr. Levinger to retain a percentage of the settlement in his trust account until this matter is resolved. Thank you for your anticipated cooperation. If you have any questions, please feel free to give me a call.

Sincerel

James E. Pennington

#### CAUSE NO, PR-11-03238-1

IN RE; ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, IN THE PROBATE COURT DECEASED § JO N. HOPPER Plaintiff, ٧. JP MORGAN CHASE, N.A., STEPHEN B. HOPPER and LAURA S. WASSMER Defendants. NO. 1 JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP Intervenors, ٧. STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, and JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS Defendants.

### SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

Defendants Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer ("the Clients") file this Supplement to their Motion to Compel Arbitration, filed April 11, 2018 (the "Motion"). The Motion requests that this Court order the parties to arbitrate Intervenors' claims pursuant to the mandatory arbitration provision in two separate "Contingency Fee Contract[s] of Representation" between Intervenors and the Clients (the "Fee Agreements"). The Motion is set

SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

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for hearing on April 24, 2018, at 9:00 am. The Clients submit the following additional points in support of the Motion:

#### A. The Court should rule on the Motion to Compel Arbitration immediately.

As a preliminary matter, the Clients reiterate their request for an immediate ruling on the Motion. The Court has no discretion to defer a ruling on the Motion in favor of further litigation on the merits. (Motion at 4.) In particular, the Court may not issue injunctive relief without first ruling on the Motion. *See In re MetroPCS Comms., Inc.*, 391 S.W.3d 329, 340 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, orig. proceeding). In *MetroPCS*, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a trial court abused its discretion in granting injunctive relief without first ruling on a motion to dismiss under a forum-selection clause. *Id.* The Texas Supreme Court has held that forum-selection law is analogous to arbitration law because arbitration clauses are simply a "specialized kind of forum-selection clause." *Pinto Tech. Ventures, L.P. v. Sheldon,* 526 S.W.3d 428, 437 (Tex. 2017) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, the Court must rule on the Motion prior to issuing further injunctive relief or permitting any further proceedings in the intervention litigation, including discovery.

#### B. Arbitration of Intervenors' claims is required under both the TAA and the FAA.

In addition to the arguments and authorities cited in the Motion, the Court should compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4. The FAA applies to this dispute because the Fee Agreements concern interstate commerce—the provision of legal services by Texas lawyers, in Texas litigation, to clients that reside in Oklahoma and Kansas respectively. See In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220, 223 (Tex. 2011) ("The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) generally governs arbitration provisions in contracts involving interstate commerce.");

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Clients appeared for deposition on April 16, 2018, pursuant to this Court's expedited discovery order in the TRO, but did so while maintaining their objections that discovery is inappropriate while the Motion is pending.

see also In re Touchstone Home Health LLC, 572 B.R. 255, 268 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2017) (holding that "many attorney-client engagement agreements" affect interstate commerce, including those where client engages a law firm in a different state or the law firm performs services in a different state, and citing cases to that effect). The FAA and the corresponding provisions of the Texas Arbitration Act ("TAA")—which were cited in the Motion—are not mutually exclusive. In re D. Wilson Const. Co., 196 S.W.3d 774, 779-80 (Tex. 2006). Both laws apply unless there is a conflict. See id.

To compel arbitration under the FAA, like the TAA, the movant need only show: (1) a valid arbitration clause; and (2) that the claims in dispute fall within the agreement's scope. *Rubiola*, 334 S.W.3d at 223. Where these two elements are satisfied, the court must issue an order compelling arbitration and must dismiss or stay the underlying proceedings. *See id.*; *see also In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co. FSB*, 235 S.W.3d 185, 195 (Tex. 2007). Both elements are satisfied here for the reasons discussed in the Motion. (Motion at 2-4.)

First, the Fee Agreements contain a valid and enforceable arbitration provision. (Ex. A-1 § 20; Ex. B-1 § 20.)<sup>2</sup> Intervenors themselves have sworn that the Fee Agreements are "valid and enforceable." (First Amended Joint Petition in Intervention at 3.) Although the Clients dispute the enforceability of the contingency fee agreement, the validity of the contract itself must be decided by the arbitrator, not the Court. See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2006). (See also Motion at 3-4.) The law is well-settled that arbitration provisions are severable from the remainder of the contract; so unless there is some question about the enforceability of the arbitration provision itself—and there is not—any other questions

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> True and correct copies of the Fee Agreements are attached hereto. See Exhibit A (Declaration of Stephen B. Hopper); Exhibit B (Declaration of Laura S. Wassmer). These agreements were attached to Intervenors' pleadings, sworn by Mr. Vitullo to be "valid and enforceable contingency fee agreement[s]," and admitted into evidence at the hearing on the Temporary Restraining Order. (See Motion at 2; First Amended Joint Petition in Intervention at 3.) Thus, there can be no dispute about the authenticity or the execution of the Fee Agreements.

of contract validity must be considered by the arbitrator in the first instance. *Id.*; see also In re Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 235 S.W.3d 206, 210 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding). The Fee Agreements also contain an explicit severability provision (in Section 15), such that the arbitration clause is enforceable even though other parts of the contract fail.

Second, there is no question that Intervenors' claims fall within the scope of the arbitration clause because their claims arise out of, and are related to, the Fee Agreements. (Ex. A-1 § 20; Ex. B-1 § 20; see also Motion at 2.) By its terms, the arbitration clause encompasses "any other matter that may arise between Client and Attorney (including malpractice claims and fee disputes)," (Ex. A-1 § 20; Ex. B-1 § 20) (emphasis added).

As a result, the Court should immediately issue an order compelling arbitration under both the FAA and the TAA, and should dismiss or stay the intervention proceedings. (See Motion at 2-4.) See also Merrill Lynch, 235 S.W.3d at 195 ("Both the Federal and Texas Arbitration Acts require courts to stay litigation of issues that are subject to arbitration. Without such a stay, arbitration would no longer be the 'rapid, inexpensive alternative to traditional litigation' it was intended to be, so long as one could find a trial judge willing to let the litigation proceed for a while.") (internal citations and quotations omitted); 9 U.S.C. § 3 (mandatory stay of litigation with respect to "any issue referable to arbitration"); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 171.021(c) ("An order compelling arbitration must include a stay of any proceeding subject to Section 171.025."); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 171.025(a) ("The court shall stay a proceeding that involves an issue subject to arbitration if an order for arbitration or an application for that order is made under this subchapter.").

#### CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

The Clients respectfully request that the Court compel the Intervenors to pursue their claims in arbitration; stay or dismiss the Intervenors' claims; and grant the Clients all other relief, at law or in equity, to which they may be entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ James E. Pennington
James E. Pennington
State Bar No. 15758510
LAW OFFICES OF JAMES E. PENNINGTON, P.C.
900 Jackson Street, Suite 440
Dallas, Texas 75202-4473
Telephone: (214) 741-3022
Facsimile: (214) 741-3055
jep@jeplawyer.com

Anne M. Johnson
State Bar No. 00794271
Andrew W. Guthrie
State Bar No. 24078606
HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP
2323 Victory Avenue, Suite 700
Dallas, Texas 75219
Telephone: (214) 651-5376
Facsimile: (214) 200-0487
anne.johnson@haynesboone.com
andrew.guthrie@haynesboone.com

Attorneys for Defendants Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 20th day of April, 2018, the foregoing Supplement to Motion to Compel Arbitration was filed using the e-filing system which will send notification of such filing to the following parties via email:

Brian P. Lauten BRIAN LAUTEN, P.C. 3811 Turtle Creek Boulevard, Ste. 1450 Dallas, Texas 75219 blauten@brianlauten.com

#### Attorney for Intervenor Fee Smith Sharp & Vitullo, LLP

John L. Malesovas MALESOVAS LAW FIRM State Bar No. 12857300 1801 South Mopac Expressway, Suite 320 Austin, TX 78746 john@malesovas.com

#### Attorney for Intervenor, John Malesovas

Alan S. Loewinsohn
Jim L. Flegle
Kerry F. Schonwald
LOEWINSOHN FLEGLE DEARY SIMON LLP
12377 Merit Dr., Suite 900
Dallas, Texas 75251
alanl@lfdslaw.com
jimf@lfdslaw.com
kerrys@lfdslaw.com

#### Attorneys for Plaintiff Jo Hopper

Jeffrey S. Levinger
J. Carl Cecere
Levinger PC
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500
Dailas, TX 75202
jlevinger@levingerpc.com
ceecere@cecerepc.com

Attorneys for Defendants, Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

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John C. Eichman Grayson L. Linyard HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LLP 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700 Dallas, TX 75202 214-468-3599 Facsimile jeichman@hunton.com glinyard@hunton.com

Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, Deceased, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., in its Corporate Capacity

Van H. Beckwith
Jessica B. Pulliam
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700
Dallas, TX 75201
214-661-4677 Facsimile
van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com
jessica.pulliam@bakerbotts.com

Evan A. Young
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
Austin, TX 78701
512-322-8306 Facsimile
evan.young@bakerbotts.com

SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

/s/ James E. Pennington
James E. Pennington

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MR:121

# Exhibit A

#### CAUSE NO. PR-11-03238-1

IN RE: ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, IN THE PROBATE COURT **DECEASED** 8 \$\text{\tin}\text{\tetx}\\ \text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texict{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texit}\text{\texitint{\text{\texit}\text{\text{\texitile\tinz}\text{\texititt{ JO N. HOPPER Plaintiff, ٧, JP MORGAN CHASE, N.A., STEPHEN B. HOPPER and LAURA S. WASSMER NO. 1 Defendants. JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP Intervenors, STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, and JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS Defendants.

### **DECLARATION OF STEPHEN B. HOPPER**

- I, Stephen B. Hopper, hereby declare that the following facts are true and correct:
- 1. My name is Stephen B. Hopper. I am over twenty-one years of age, have never been convicted of a felony or other crime involving moral turpitude, and suffer from no mental or physical disability that would render me incompetent to make this Declaration.
- 2. I am a resident of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and a Defendant in the abovereferenced action. I am able to declare, and I hereby do declare, that all of the facts stated in this Declaration are true and correct and are within my personal knowledge.

3. On November 19, 2015, I executed a "Contingency Fee Contract of Representation" that had already been signed by attorneys from Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP, and Malesovas Law Firm. A true and correct copy of the contract that I executed is attached hereto as Exhibit A-1.

Stephen J. Hopper

**JURAT** 

My name is Stephen B. Hopper, my date of birth is 11/21/1956, and my address is 3625 N. Classen Blvd., Oklahoma City, OK, 73118. I declare under penalty of perjury that every statement in the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed in Oklahoma County, State of Oklahoma, on the 19 day of April, 2018.

stephen/B. Hopper

# Exhibit A-1

#### CONTINGENCY FEE CONTRACT OF REPRESENTATION

The undersigned **Stephen Hopper**, and Laura Wassmer referred to as "Client" or "Clients" employ and retain Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP, and Malesovas Law Firm, (herein "Attorneys") to represent Client as set forth herein.

1. SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION: Attorneys agree to investigate and evaluate and litigate Client's possible claim or claims of negligence, fraud, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty against JP MORGAN CHASE and persons and companies relating to JP MORGAN CHASE BANKs wrongful acts in acting as the independent administrator of the Estate of Max Hopper..

Client understands and agrees that the scope of representation herein does not include the filing of any claim against any state or federal entity or employee or filing or pursuing an appeal from disposition in the Trial Court. Client understands and agrees that the scope of representation herein does not include defending any claims or lawsuits filed against Client. Client is retaining separate counsel on a flat fee agreement or other fee arrangement to defend them against any claims filed by any parties.

Client understands and agrees that the scope of representation herein does not include representing Clients in the probate lawsuit or lawsuit involving Chase bank, and defending Client against Chase bank or any other party.

Client understands and agrees that Attorneys will not file suit against entities that are in a foreign jurisdiction or are international companies whom in attorney's opinion cannot be sued in a United States court. Client understands and agrees that Attorneys are not obligated to pursue entities that are defunct and/or bankrupt.

Client hereby agrees and understands that Attorneys retain the right to withdraw from representation of Client at any time, so long as said withdrawal would not unduly prejudice Client's right to bring suit or to seek or retain another attorney to represent Client. In such event, Client agrees to timely sign an appropriate Motion for Substitution of Counsel. If after disposition in the trial court, Client desires to appeal, a new and separate agreement shall be entered into by the parties as to services and fees for any appeal, or Client shall retain separate counsel to handle any appeal and Attorneys shall retain their interest in the case under this agreement applicable to any recovery obtained by settlement or otherwise.

2. **AUTHORITY OF ATTORNEYS:** Client empowers Attorneys to take all steps in this matter deemed by them to be advisable for the investigation and handling of Client's

Claims, including hiring investigators, expert witnesses, and/or other attorneys and filing any legal action necessary. Client authorizes and empowers Attorneys to do any and all things necessary and proper in the enforcement, compromise, settlement, adjustment and collection of Client's Claim, and Client further authorizes and empowers them to sign any and all pleadings and all releases, checks, drafts, authorizations and other papers necessary and proper in connection with the prosecution or enforcement of Client's Claims and collection or settlement of the damages awarded or to be paid therefore, and to receive such funds or other property in Client's name and for Client on account of any judgment recovered or any settlement agreed upon in connection with Client's Claim. Full power and authority is given by Client to Attorneys to adjust, settle or compromise Client's Claim, but no final settlement shall be made and consummated by Attorneys without first submitting the offer, compromise, or adjustment to Client for approval, and Client agrees not to compromise or settle Client's Claim without the Attorneys' authority, agreement and consent. Should Client make a settlement in violation of this Agreement, Client agrees to pay Attorneys the full fee agreed upon under paragraph 3 "Attorneys' Fee", below.

3. ATTORNEYS' FEE: This Agreement is a contingency fee contract. Specifically, if Attorneys are successful in recovering money or anything of value for Client, by settlement prior to trial begins, Attorneys shall receive attorneys' fees in the amount of forty percent (40%) of the gross recovery. The attorney fee will be split amongst the attorneys as follows: FSSV 50% Malesovas Law Firm 50% If the matter is resolved after trial begins, Attorneys shall receive attorneys' fees in the amount of forty-five (45%) of the gross recovery. All attorneys' fees shall be a percentage of the gross recovery. Gross recovery means the gross amount of money or other value or property recovered for Client, before the deduction of expenses. Trial is considered to have commenced at 5:00 p.m. on the Friday closest to ten (10) days before jury selection begins or evidence is first presented to the trier of fact, whichever is the earlier of these two events. If Attorneys do not recover any money or other value or property for Client, Client will not owe any attorneys' fees. Client agrees that Attorneys may, in their discretion, employ associate counsel to assist in prosecuting Client's cause of action, and Client does not object to the participation of any lawyers Attorneys may choose to involve in this representation of Client. With the exceptions set forth below, payment of attorneys' fees to associate counsel is the responsibility of Attorneys. In the event that the case is settled by way of a structured settlement, Client approves and authorizes attorneys' fees to be based upon the present value benefit of the settlement and further authorizes Attorneys to take attorneys' fees either in cash or in structured payment, as Attorneys deem appropriate.

In some instances, it may be necessary for Attorneys to retain special outside counsel to assist on matters other than prosecuting Client's claims for damages. Examples of such instances include the following: a defendant may seek bankruptcy protection; or a defendant may attempt to fraudulently transfer some of its assets to

avoid paying the Client's claim; a defendant may transfer assets out of the country thereby necessitating the retention of foreign counsel, or a complex, multi-party settlement may require an ethics opinion from outside counsel; or special action in probate court may be necessary apart from the usual probate proceedings involved in an estate; or a separate lawsuit may need to be filed against a defendant's insurance company. Client agrees that Attorneys may retain such special outside counsel to represent Client when Attorneys deem such assistance to be reasonably necessary, and that the fees of such counsel will be deducted from Client's share of the recovery.

- 4. <u>COSTS AND OTHER EXPENSES:</u> Clients **WILL NOT BE** responsible to pay for costs and expenses as incurred. Such costs include filing fees, expert witness fees, court reporter and video fees, copy charges, postage, mailing, travel, witness fees, electronic document conversion fees, delivery fees, internal operating costs and other related charges incurred or paid as an expense on behalf of Client and paid to third-party vendors or incurred internally by Attorneys and charged to Client in connection with Attorneys' representation of Client.
- 5. DISBURSEMENT OF PROCEEDS TO CLIENT: Client understands that Attorneys make no guarantee or assurance of any kind regarding the likelihood of success of Client's claims. Upon receipt by Attorneys of the proceeds of any settlement or judgment, Attorneys shall (1) retain either forty percent (40%) of the proceeds as their attorneys' fees if the matter is settled or resolved before trial begins or forty-five (45%) percent of the proceeds as their attorneys' fees if the matter is settled or resolved after trial begins, (2) deduct from Client's share of the proceeds any costs and expenses, including the fees of any special outside counsel that Attorneys may incur on Client's behalf, and (3) disburse the remainder of Client's share of the proceeds to Client. At the time of disbursement of any proceeds, Client will be provided with a disbursement sheet reflecting the attorneys' fees, the expenses deducted out of Client's share, and the remainder of Client's share.

Upon some circumstances, health insurers, workers compensation carriers, or others who have paid benefits or provided services on Client's behalf may claim a right to recover a portion of the proceeds of any action brought on behalf of the Client and may place Attorneys on notice of their claim. Except as may be required by law, Attorneys will not agree to protect any claim of a subrogation carrier or other creditor without Client's consent.

6. <u>POWER OF ATTORNEY:</u> Client gives Attorneys a power of attorney to execute and negotiate all reasonable and necessary documents connected with the handling of this cause of action, including pleadings, contracts, checks or drafts, settlement agreements, compromises and releases, verifications, dismissals and orders, proofs of claim, ballots, verified statements including those pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2019,

and all other documents that Client could properly execute. Client's claims will not be settled without obtaining Client's consent.

cooperate with Attorneys to permit Client's claims to be investigated and developed; to disclose to Attorneys all facts relevant to the claim; and to be reasonably available to attend any necessary meetings, depositions, preparation sessions, hearings and trial. Client shall appear on reasonable notice at any and all depositions and Court appearances and shall comply with all reasonable requests of Attorneys in connection with preparation and presentation of Client's claims. The Client acknowledges and agrees that all communications with Attorneys are privileged. The Client acknowledges that Attorneys may represent other individuals on the same or similar matters and therefore may communicate matters of common interest to all of Attorneys' clients. Therefore, Client agrees and understands that other individuals who are clients of Attorneys may also invoke the attorney client privilege as to Attorneys' communications with Client. The Client acknowledges and agrees not to provide attorney work product or attorney client communications to any other person.

Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any change of marital status or death of spouse. Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any bankruptcy proceedings involving Client or Client's spouse. Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any other legal proceedings to which Client or Client's spouse is a party.

Client agrees to notify Attorneys in writing of each change in Client's mailing address (work or home) or telephone number (work, home and cell) during the term of this representation within seven (7) days of each such change of address or telephone number. When the case is completed, and subject to any Court orders, Attorneys will provide Client the opportunity to retrieve any documents and/or materials that Client provided to Attorneys or that Attorneys have obtained from other sources in connection with the case. However, if Client has not retrieved those documents and/or materials within ninety (90) days after Attorneys have mailed to Client written notice that the case is completed and that those documents and/or material are available to Client, Attorneys may dispose of those documents and/or materials.

**8. NO TAX ADVICE:** Attorneys have advised Client that the pursuit of resolution of this claim may have various tax consequences. Client understands that Attorneys do not render tax advice and are not being retained to offer such advice to Client or to represent Client before the IRS. Moreover, Client accepts responsibility for making any payment or filings necessitated by the resolution of Client's claim.

Client understands that applicable State law may impose sales, service or other tax on any amount that Client may recover or the fees due Attorneys hereunder. Client also understands that applicable Federal income tax law may require that Client pay

income tax on the fees due Attorneys hereunder, separate and apart from and in addition to any taxes owed by Attorneys. Client agrees that any such taxes (other than Federal and/or State income taxes that Attorneys may owe on monies actually received by them) shall be paid out of my share of any recovery.

- **DEATH OF CLIENT:** The provisions of this Agreement will not terminate upon the death of Client. In the event of the death of Client, any duly appointed Representative of Client's heirs and/or estate will be bound by this Agreement to the extent allowed by applicable law, including without limitation, the provisions of this Agreement relating to the recovery of attorneys' fees and costs and other expenses. Any such Representative shall, upon request by Attorneys, execute a new Agreement in the capacity as Representative for the heirs and/or estate of the Client.
- 10. OFFER OF SETTLEMENT: Client understands that applicable law may, under certain circumstances, allow a Defendant to make an offer of settlement to Client and if Client rejects or does not accept such an offer, such may result in any award, verdict or judgment in Client's favor being reduced as provided by such law. Client understands that Client has the final authority to accept or reject any offer of settlement. Client understands that if Client rejects or does not accept such an offer, and Client's recovery is subsequently reduced, the fees owed to Attorneys will be calculated on the amount of any award, verdict or judgment before reduction, and the reduction shall be out of Client's share of any recovery.
- Attorneys an amount equal to either forty percent (40%) of the proceeds if the matter is settled or resolved before trial begins or forty-five percent (45%) of the proceeds if the matter is resolved after trial begins, of any property, money or other value recovered by settlement, compromise, verdict or judgment of the claims described in this contract. Client does hereby give and grant to Attorneys an express security interest, in addition to any statutory lien, upon Client's claims and any and all judgments recovered, and any and all funds or property realized or paid by compromise or settlement, as security for the compensation and costs and expenses advanced or due to be paid or reimbursed to Attorneys hereunder. This security interest is to continue in the event Attorneys are discharged without good cause. If the claims are not assignable at law, Client expressly assigns to Attorneys, to the extent of attorneys' fees and disbursements, any sum realized by way of a settlement or any judgment obtained thereon.
- **12. BINDING EFFECT:** This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, legal representatives, successors and assigns.
- **13. TERMINATION OF REPRESENTATION:** Client understands that Client can terminate Attorneys' representation of Client at any time by providing written notice to

Attorneys. Should Client elect to terminate Attorneys' representation prior to the full conclusion of Attorneys' representation, Client understands and agrees that Attorneys have a claim for expenses of litigation and unpaid attorneys' fees which will become due upon-receipt by Client or any successor attorney of Client or any proceeds for any remaining portion of Client's claim. Client understands that the obligation for unpaid attorneys' fees will be calculated based on the percentage of work completed on the case or claims at the time Client terminates Attorneys.

- **14. NO GUARANTEE OF RECOVERY:** Client understands that no guarantee or assurances of any kind have been made regarding the likelihood of success of Client's claim, but that Attorneys will use their skill and diligence, as well as their experience, to diligently pursue Client's action.
- 15. <u>MISCELLANEOUS</u>: In case any one or more of the provisions contained in this agreement shall, for any reason, be held to be invalid, illegal, or unenforceable in any respect, such invalidity, illegality, or unenforceability shall not affect any other provision thereof, and this agreement shall be construed as if such invalid, illegal, or unenforceable provision had never been contained herein.

This contract constitutes the sole and only agreement of the parties hereto and supersedes any prior understandings, or written or oral agreements between the parties respecting within the subject matter.

- 16. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: Client understands that an issue may exist as to whether the applicable statute of limitations has expired. This issue is raised in many lawsuits even if the Client's claims are not beyond the Statute of Limitations. Client understands that Attorneys must perform an evaluation of Client's claim prior to filing Client's lawsuit, and that this evaluation will first require Client to provide Attorneys with all relevant documents and other information requested. It is possible that the statute of limitations has already expired or may expire during the interim between the date of Client's signature below and the filing of Client's lawsuit. Client agrees to accept this risk.
- Attorneys may refer this matter to another lawyer or associate additional lawyers to assist in representing Client and prosecuting the Client's cause of action. Prior to the referral or association becoming effective, Client shall consent in writing to the terms of the arrangement after being advised of (1) the identity of the lawyer or law firm involved, (2) whether the fees will be divided based on the proportion of services rendered or by lawyers agreeing to assume joint responsibility for the representation, and (3) the share of the fee that each lawyer or law firm will receive or, if the division is based on the proportion of services performed, the basis on which the division will be

made. The referral or association of additional attorneys will not increase the total fee owed by the Client.

- 18. <u>NOTICE TO CLIENTS</u>: Attorneys are only licensed to practice law in the State of Texas. To the extent that Attorneys are required to appear in Court in other States, Attorneys will seek permission of the appropriate Court to appear pro hac vice. If pro hac vice admission is granted, Attorneys will be subject to the disciplinary rules of that particular jurisdiction. Attorneys are also subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar of Texas. The State Bar of Texas investigates and prosecutes professional misconduct committed by Texas attorneys. For more information call (800) 932-1900.
- 20. ARBITRATION: It is Attorney's goal to maintain at all times a constructive and positive relationship with Client on the matter described above and on future matters in which Attorney may perform services for Client. However, should a dispute arise between Attorney and Client, a prompt and fair resolution is in the interests of all concerned. To this end, if any controversy or claim arises out of is related to this agreement, any services provided by Attorneys to Client in connection with Client's Claims, or any other matter that may arise between Client and Attorney (including malpractice claims and fee disputes), Attorneys and Client both waive any right to bring a court action or have a jury trial and agree that the dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration to be conducted in Dallas, Texas before the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA with one arbitrator who must be an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Texas..

CLIENT HAS READ AND UNDERSTANDS THIS CONTRACT AND AGREES AS STATED ABOVE AS OF THE DATE NOTED BELOW.

Laura Wassmer

Stephen Hopper

Date: 11/19/2015

Address: 3625 N Classen Blvd Oklahoma City, OK 7318

Telephone Numbers: 405-639-9186

ATTORNĖYS:

Fee. Smith. Sharn & Vitullo. LLP

Malesovas Law Firm

# Exhibit B

#### CAUSE NO. PR-11-03238-1

IN RE: ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED	con con con	IN THE PROBATE COURT
JO N. HOPPER		
Plaintiff,	89 89	
v.	§ 8	
JP MORGAN CHASE, N.A.,	ş Ş	
STEPHEN B. HOPPER and LAURAS.	§	
WASSMER	§	
	§	NO. 1
Defendants.	600 G	
	\$ \$	
JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a	ş	
MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE,	§	
SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP	Š	
	§	
Intervenors,	Ş	
	§	
STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S.	§	
WASSMER, and JPMORGAN CHASE	§	
BANK, N.A.,	& &	
Defendants.	§	DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

## **DECLARATION OF LAURAS. WASSMER**

I, Laura S. Wassmer, hereby declare that the following facts are true and correct:

1. My name is Laura S. Wassmer. 1 am over twenty-one years of age, have never been convicted of a felony or other crime involving moral turpitude, and suffer from no mental or physical disability that would render me incompetent to make this Declaration.

- 2. I am a resident of Prairie Village, Kansas, and a Defendant in the abovereferenced action. I am able to declare, and I hereby do declare, that all of the facts stated in this Declaration are true and correct and are within my personal knowledge.
- 3. On or before November 20, 2015, I executed a "Contingency Fee Contract of Representation" that had already been signed by attorneys from Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP, and Malesovas Law Firm. A true and correct copy of the contract that I executed is attached hereto as Exhibit B-1.

### **JURAT**

My name is Laura S. Wassmer, my date of birth is  $\frac{1/21/bZ}{2}$ , and my address is 7700 Mission Road, Prairie Village, Kansas 66208. I declare under penalty of perjury that every statement in the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed in Johnson County, Kansas, on the 20day of April, 2018.

# Exhibit B-1

### **CONTINGENCY FEE CONTRACT OF REPRESENTATION**

The undersigned Stephen Hopper, and Laura Wassmer referred to as "Client" or "Clients" employ and retain Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP, and Malesovas Law Firm, (herein "Attorneys") to represent Client as set forth herein.

1. SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION: Attorneys agree to investigate and evaluate and litigate Client's possible claim or claims of negligence, fraud, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty against JP MORGAN CHASE and persons and companies relating to JP MORGAN CHASE BANKs wrongful acts in acting as the independent administrator of the Estate of Max Hopper...

Client understands and agrees that the scope of representation herein does not include the filing of any claim against any state or federal entity or employee or filing or pursuing an appeal from disposition in the Trial Court. Client understands and agrees that the scope of representation herein does not include defending any claims or lawsuity filed against Client. Client is retaining separate counsel on a flat fee agreement or other fee arrangement to defend them against any claims filed by any parties. Then there is no change to the state of the state of

Client understands and agrees that the scope of representation herein does not include representing Clients in the probate lawsuit or lawsuit involving Chase bank, and defending Client against Chase bank or any other party.

Client understands and agrees that Attorneys will not file suit against entities that are in a foreign jurisdiction or are international companies whom in attorney's opinion cannot be sued in a United States court. Client understands and agrees that Attorneys are not obligated to pursue entities that are defunct and/or bankrupt.

Client hereby agrees and understands that Attorneys retain the right to withdraw from representation of Client at any time, so long as said withdrawal would not unduly prejudice Client's right to bring suit or to seek or retain another attorney to represent Client. In such event, Client agrees to timely sign an appropriate Motion for Substitution of Counsel. If after disposition in the trial court, Client desires to appeal, a new and separate agreement shall be entered into by the parties as to services and fees for any appeal, or Client shall retain separate counsel to handle any appeal and Attorneys shall retain their interest in the case under this agreement applicable to any recovery obtained by settlement or otherwise.

- **AUTHORITY OF ATTORNEYS:** Client empowers Attorneys to take all steps in this matter deemed by them to be advisable for the investigation and handling of Client's Claims, including hiring investigators, expert witnesses, and/or other attorneys and filing any legal action necessary. Client authorizes and empowers Attorneys to do any and all things necessary and proper in the enforcement, compromise, settlement, adjustment and collection of Client's Claim, and Client further authorizes and empowers them to sign any and all pleadings and all releases, checks, drafts, authorizations and other papers necessary and proper in connection with the prosecution or enforcement of Client's Claims and collection or settlement of the damages awarded or to be paid therefore, and to receive such funds or other property in Client's name and for Client on account of any judgment recovered or any settlement agreed upon in connection with Client's Claim. Full power and authority is given by Client to Attorneys to adjust, settle or compromise Client's Claim, but no final settlement shall be made and consummated by Attorneys without first submitting the offer, compromise, or adjustment to Client for approval, and Client agrees not to compromise or settle Client's Claim without the Attorneys' authority, agreement and consent. Should Client make a settlement in violation of this Agreement, Client agrees to pay Attorneys the full fee agreed upon under paragraph 3 "Attorneys' Fee", below.
- ATTORNEYS' FEE: This Agreement is a contingency fee contract. Specifically, if Attorneys are successful in recovering money or anything of value for Client, by settlement prior to trial begins, Attorneys shall receive attorneys' fees in the amount of forty percent (40%) of the gross recovery. The attorney fee will be split amongst the attorneys as follows: FSSV 50% Malesovas Law Firm 50% If the matter is resolved after trial begins, Attorneys shall receive attorneys' fees in the amount of forty-five (45%) of the gross recovery. All attorneys' fees shall be a percentage of the gross recovery. Gross recovery means the gross amount of money or other value or property recovered for Client, before the deduction of expenses. Trial is considered to have commenced at 5:00 p.m. on the Friday closest to ten (10) days before jury selection begins or evidence is first presented to the trier of fact, whichever is the earlier of these two events. If Attorneys do not recover any money or other value or property for Client, Client will not owe any attorneys' fees. Client agrees that Attorneys may, in their discretion, employ associate counsel to assist in prosecuting Client's cause of action, and Client does not object to the participation of any lawyers Attorneys may choose to involve in this representation of Client. With the exceptions set forth below, payment of attorneys' fees to associate counsel is the responsibility of Attorneys. In the event that the case is settled by way of a structured settlement, Client approves and authorizes attorneys' fees to be based upon the present value benefit of the settlement and further authorizes Attorneys to take attorneys' fees either in cash or in structured payment, as Attorneys deem appropriate.

In some instances, it may be necessary for Attorneys to retain special outside counsel to assist on matters other than prosecuting Client's claims for damages. Examples of such instances include the following: a defendant may seek bankruptcy protection; or a defendant may attempt to fraudulently transfer some of its assets to avoid paying the Client's claim; a defendant may transfer assets out of the country thereby necessitating the retention of foreign counsel, or a complex, multi-party settlement may require an ethics opinion from outside counsel; or special action in probate court may be necessary apart from the usual probate proceedings involved in an estate; or a separate lawsuit may need to be filed against a defendant's insurance company. Client agrees that Attorneys may retain such special outside counsel to represent Client when Attorneys deem such assistance to be reasonably necessary, and that the fees of such counsel will be deducted from Client's share of the recovery.

- 4. COSTS AND OTHER EXPENSES: Clients WILL NOT BE responsible to pay for costs and expenses as incurred. Such costs include filing fees, expert witness fees, court reporter and video fees, copy charges, postage, mailing, travel, witness fees, electronic document conversion fees, delivery fees, internal operating costs and other related charges incurred or paid as an expense on behalf of Client and paid to third-party vendors or incurred internally by Attorneys and charged to Client in connection with Attorneys' representation of Client.
- 5. **DISBURSEMENT OF PROCEEDS TO CLIENT:** Client understands that Attorneys make no guarantee or assurance of any kind regarding the likelihood of success of Client's claims. Upon receipt by Attorneys of the proceeds of any settlement or judgment, Attorneys shall (1) retain either forty percent (40%) of the proceeds as their attorneys' fees if the matter is settled or resolved before trial begins or forty-five (45%) percent of the proceeds as their attorneys' fees if the matter is settled or resolved after trial begins, (2) deduct from Client's share of the proceeds any costs and expenses, including the fees of any special outside counsel that Attorneys may incur on Client's behalf, and (3) disburse the remainder of Client's share of the proceeds to Client. At the time of disbursement of any proceeds, Client will be provided with a disbursement sheet reflecting the attorneys' fees, the expenses deducted out of Client's share, and the remainder of Client's share.

Upon some circumstances, health insurers, workers compensation carriers, or others who have paid benefits or provided services on Client's behalf may claim a right to recover a portion of the proceeds of any action brought on behalf of the Client and may place Attorneys on notice of their claim. Except as may be required by law, Attorneys will not agree to protect any claim of a subrogation carrier or other creditor without Client's consent.

- 6. POWER OF ATTORNEY: Client gives Attorneys a power of attorney to execute and negotiate all reasonable and necessary documents connected with the handling of this cause of action, including pleadings, contracts, checks or drafts, settlement agreements, compromises and releases, verifications, dismissals and orders, proofs of claim, ballots, verified statements including those pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2019, and all other documents that Client could properly execute. Client's claims will not be settled without obtaining Client's consent.
- 7. COOPERATION: ADDRESS CHANGE: RETURN OF DOCUMENTS: Client agrees to cooperate with Attorneys to permit Client's claims to be investigated and developed; to disclose to Attorneys all facts relevant to the claim; and to be reasonably available to attend any necessary meetings, depositions, preparation sessions, hearings and trial. Client shall appear on reasonable notice at any and all depositions and Court appearances and shall comply with all reasonable requests of Attorneys in connection with preparation and presentation of Client's claims. The Client acknowledges and agrees that all communications with Attorneys are privileged. The Client acknowledges that Attorneys may represent other individuals on the same or similar matters and therefore may communicate matters of common interest to all of Attorneys' clients. Therefore, Client agrees and understands that other individuals who are clients of Attorneys may also invoke the attorney client privilege as to Attorneys' communications with Client. The Client acknowledges and agrees not to provide attorney work product or attorney client communications to any other person.

Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any change of marital status or death of spouse. Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any bankruptcy proceedings involving Client or Client's spouse. Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any other legal proceedings to which Client or Client's spouse is a party.

Client agrees to notify Attorneys in writing of each change in Client's mailing address (work or home) or telephone number (work, home and cell) during the term of this representation within seven (7) days of each such change of address or telephone number. When the case is completed, and subject to any Court orders, Attorneys will provide Client the opportunity to retrieve any documents and/or materials that Client provided to Attorneys or that Attorneys have obtained from other sources in connection with the case. However, if Client has not retrieved those documents and/or materials within ninety (90) days after Attorneys have mailed to Client written notice that the case is completed and that those documents and/or materials are available to Client, Attorneys may dispose of those documents and/or materials.

8. NO TAX ADVICE: Attorneys have advised Client that the pursuit of resolution of this claim may have various tax consequences. Client understands that Attorneys do not render tax advice and are not being retained to offer such advice to Client or to represent Client before the IRS. Moreover, Client accepts responsibility for making any payment or filings necessitated by the resolution of Client's claim.

Client understands that applicable State law may impose sales, service or other tax on any amount that Client may recover or the fees due Attorneys hereunder. Client also understands that applicable Federal income tax law may require that Client pay income tax on the fees due Attorneys hereunder, separate and apart from and in addition to any taxes owed by Attorneys. Client agrees that any such taxes (other than Federal and/or State income taxes that Attorneys may owe on monies actually received by them) shall be paid out of my share of any recovery.

- 9. **DEATH OF CLIENT:** The provisions of this Agreement will not terminate upon the death of Client. In the event of the death of Client, any duly appointed Representative of Client's heirs and/or estate will be bound by this Agreement to the extent allowed by applicable law, including without limitation, the provisions of this Agreement relating to the recovery of attorneys' fees and costs and other expenses. Any such Representative shall, upon request by Attorneys, execute a new Agreement in the capacity as Representative for the heirs and/or estate of the Client.
- 10. OFFER OF SETTLEMENT: Client understands that applicable law may, under certain circumstances, allow a Defendant to make an offer of settlement to Client and if Client rejects or does not accept such an offer, such may result in any award, verdict or judgment in Client's favor being reduced as provided by such law. Client understands that Client has the final authority to accept or reject any offer of settlement. Client understands that if Client rejects or does not accept such an offer, and Client's recovery is subsequently reduced, the fees owed to Attorneys will be calculated on the amount of any award, verdict or judgment before reduction, and the reduction shall be out of Client's share of any recovery.

- 11. SECURITY INTEREST: Client hereby assigns, transfers and conveys over to Attorneys an amount equal to either forty percent (40%) of the proceeds if the matter is settled or resolved before trial begins or forty-five percent (45%) of the proceeds if the matter is resolved after trial begins, of any property, money or other value recovered by settlement, compromise, verdict or judgment of the claims described in this contract. Client does hereby give and grant to Attorneys an express security interest, in addition to any statutory lien, upon Client's claims and any and all judgments recovered, and any and all funds or property realized or paid by compromise or settlement, as security for the compensation and costs and expenses advanced or due to be paid or reimbursed to Attorneys hereunder. This security interest is to continue in the event Attorneys are discharged without good cause. If the claims are not assignable at law, Client expressly assigns to Attorneys, to the extent of attorneys' fees and disbursements, any sum realized by way of a settlement or any judgment obtained thereon.
- 12. <u>BINDING EFFECT:</u> This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, legal representatives, successors and assigns.
- 13. TERMINATION OF REPRESENTATION: Client understands that Client can terminate Attorneys' representation of Client at any time by providing written notice to Attorneys. Should Client elect to terminate Attorneys' representation prior to the full conclusion of Attorneys' representation, Client understands and agrees that Attorneys have a claim for expenses of litigation and unpaid attorneys' fees which will become due upon receipt by Client or any successor attorney of Client or any proceeds for any remaining portion of Client's claim. Client understands that the obligation for unpaid attorneys' fees will be calculated based on the percentage of work completed on the case or claims at the time Client terminates Attorneys.
- 14. NO GUARANTEE OF RECOVERY: Client understands that no guarantee or assurances of any kind have been made regarding the likelihood of success of Client's claim, but that Attorneys will use their skill and diligence, as well as their experience, to diligently pursue Client's action.
- 15. MISCELLANEOUS: In case any one or more of the provisions contained in this agreement shall, for any reason, be held to be invalid, illegal, or unenforceable in any respect, such invalidity, illegality, or unenforceability shall not affect any other provision thereof, and this agreement shall be construed as if such invalid, illegal, or unenforceable provision had never been contained herein.

This contract constitutes the sole and only agreement of the parties hereto and supersedes any prior understandings, or written or oral agreements between the parties respecting within the subject matter.

16. <u>STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS:</u> Client understands that an issue may exist as to whether the applicable statute of limitations has expired. This issue is raised in many lawsuits

even if the Client's claims are not beyond the Statute of Limitations. Client understands that Attorneys must perform an evaluation of Client's claim prior to filing Client's lawsuit, and that this evaluation will first require Client to provide Attorneys with all relevant documents and other information requested. It is possible that the statute of limitations has already expired or may expire during the interim between the date of Client's signature below and the filing of Client's lawsuit. Client agrees to accept this risk.

- 17. REFERRAL OR ASSOCIATION OF ADDITIONAL COUNSEL: Client agrees that Attorneys may refer this matter to another lawyer or associate additional lawyers to assist in representing Client and prosecuting the Client's cause of action. Prior to the referral or association becoming effective, Client shall consent in writing to the terms of the arrangement after being advised of (1) the identity of the lawyer or law firm involved, (2) whether the fees will be divided based on the proportion of services rendered or by lawyers agreeing to assume joint responsibility for the representation, and (3) the share of the fee that each lawyer or law firm will receive or, if the division is based on the proportion of services performed, the basis on which the division will be made. The referral or association of additional attorneys will not increase the total fee owed by the Client.
- 18. NOTICE TO CLIENTS: Attorneys are only licensed to practice law in the State of Texas. To the extent that Attorneys are required to appear in Court in other States, Attorneys will seek permission of the appropriate Court to appear pro hac vice. If pro hac vice admission is granted, Attorneys will be subject to the disciplinary rules of that particular jurisdiction. Attorneys are also subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar of Texas. The State Bar of Texas investigates and prosecutes professional misconduct committed by Texas attorneys. For more information call (800) 932-1900.
- 20. ARBITRATION: It is Attorney's goal to maintain at all times a constructive and positive relationship with Client on the matter described above and on future matters in which Attorney may perform services for Client. However, should a dispute arise between Attorney and Client, a prompt and fair resolution is in the interests of all concerned. To this end, if any controversy or claim arises out of is related to this agreement, any services provided by Attorneys to Client in connection with Client's Claims, or any other matter that may arise between Client and Attorney (including malpractice claims and fee disputes), Attorneys and Client both waive any right to bring a court action or have a jury trial and agree that the dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration to be conducted in Dallas, Texas before the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA with one arbitrator who must be an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Texas..

CLIENT HAS READ AND UNDERSTANDS THIS CONTRACT AND AGREES AS STATED ABOVE AS OF THE DATE NOTED BELOW.

Tourn Wassmar

Stephen Hopper
Date:
Address:
Telephone Numbers:
ATTORNEYS:
Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP

Page 1

Malesovas Law Firm

#### CAUSE NO. PR-11-3238-1

JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a § MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP  IN THE PROBATE COURT

Intervenors.

٧.

NO. 1

STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, individually and as Beneficiaries of the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,

Defendants.

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

### INTERVENORS' (LAWYERS) CONSOLIDATED TRADITIONAL RULE 166a(c) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (MSJ) ON THEIR SECURED AND FULLY VESTED PROPERTY AND OWNERSHIP RIGHTS TO THE DISPUTED FUNDS, APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT

### 1. **Summary of Argument**

On or about November 19, 2015, the intervenors in this civil action, John L. Malesovas d/b/a Malesovas Law Firm and Fee Smith Sharp & Vitullo, LLP (collectively, "Lawyers"), executed that certain "Contingency Fee Contract of Representation" ("Contingency Agreement"), with Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer (collectively, "Clients"). Lawyers represented Clients pre-trial, at trial, and through settlement. Under the Contingency Agreement, Lawyers have a fully vested, perfected, and secured property and ownership interest in the settlement proceeds (45% of the recovery and value created). Because Clients terminated Lawyers after the latter fully performed. Clients are fully estopped. It would be unconscionable to hold otherwise. Therefore,

Lawyers are entitled to a declaration that they are entitled to the full amount of their fully vested, contingency interest without any further delay. See Tillery & Tillery v. Zurich Ins. Co., 54 S.W.3d 356, 360-61 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied); Enochs v. Brown, 872 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no writ), disapproved of on unrelated grounds, by Roberts v. Williamson, 111 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. 2003).

Lawyers are entitled to traditional summary judgment and this Court should, pursuant to Section 37.005 et seq. of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code, immediately declare the following: (i) Clients are fully estopped from contesting the enforceability of the Contingency Agreement; (ii) Lawyers have a secured, perfected, and fully vested property and ownership right in the settlement proceeds (up to the very limit of their contingency interest); (iii) and Lawyers are entitled to immediate possession of their property and ownership rights in the settlement proceeds. Because there is no genuine issue of any material fact, Lawyers are entitled to the declaratory relief requested as a matter of law.

### II. Exhibits & Competent Evidence

Exhibit "A" -- Contingency Fee Contract

Exhibit "B" — Termination Letter

**Exhibit "C"** -- Deposition Excerpt of Stephen Hopper **Exhibit "D"** -- Deposition Excerpt of Laura Wassmer

Exhibit "E" - Verified Application for TRO

Exhibit "F" -- TRO

**Exhibit "G"** - Court's Charge/Verdict Form

Exhibit "H" -- Rule 11 Settlement

### III. Brief Factual Predicate

Lawyers represented Clients pursuant to a valid and enforceable Contingency Agreement pre-trial, at trial, and when the underlying case settled. See Exhibits "A" & "G." The underlying lawsuit was tried in September 2017 and, as the Court well knows, a substantial verdict was returned in Clients' favor. This Court can take judicial notice1 of the Court's Charge and the Jury's Verdict Form. See Exhibit "G."

On or about April 3rd or 4th, 2018, Clients' freshly retained appellate counsel, Jeff Levinger, settled Clients' claims against JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("JPM") and, on April 4, 2018, the parties caused to be filed a Rule 11 agreement notifying the Court that there was a settlement between Clients and JPM ("Settlement"). This Court can take judicial notice of the Rule 11 Settlement Agreement filed of record. See Exhibit "H."

At approximately 9:05 a.m. on April 5, 2018, Anthony L. Vitullo, Esq. appeared before the Court on Clients' behalf and announced in open court that a confidential settlement had been reached between Clients and JPM. The Court can take judicial notice of this fact from the record of the proceedings before the Court that day.

Approximately one hour later, 10:10 a.m. on April 5, 2018 to be exact, Clients' separately retained attorney, Jim Pennington, terminated Lawyers without cause, and advised Lawyers that Clients would not pay the fees that are due and owing under the Contingency Agreement. See Exhibit "B."

On April 6, 2018, and in light of the irreconcilable conflict of interest created by Clients' termination letter(s), Lawyers immediately withdrew from representing Clients;

<sup>1</sup> See TEX, R. EVID. 201.

and, subsequently, Lawyers intervened to assert and enforce their secured, perfected, and fully vested ownership and property rights in the Settlement proceeds.

On April 9, 2018, this Court heard Lawyers' Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and, on April 10, 2018, the Court entered a TRO preventing the disbursement of the disputed funds. See Exhibit "F." This Court granted Lawyers' parallel request for an expedited discovery order. See id. (p. 4, ¶ 2).

On April 16, 2018, Clients were deposed under the Court's expedited discovery order, wherein Clients admitted that they received, enjoyed, and accepted legal services provided by Lawyers (under the Contingency Agreement), that such legal services had been and were fully performed, and that Clients terminated the Contingency Agreement only after they reached a settlement. Because those depositions were taken under the auspices of an agreed upon protective and confidentiality order, the relevant testimony is being submitted to the Court *in camera* under a sealed envelope. The relevant citations that support this MSJ are tendered *in camera* as follows: Exhibit "C" (54-55; 83; 96), and, Exhibit "D" (96-99).

### IV. <u>Argument & Authorities</u>

# A. Because Clients Terminated Lawyers After Full Performance, Clients Are Estopped

Because Lawyers fully performed and, because Clients terminated Lawyers only after a settlement was reached, Clients are fully estopped; accordingly, the Lawyers have a fully vested and secured property and ownership right, 2 upon which this Court

An attorney's right to compensation pursuant to a contingency fee agreement "**is a property** right determined under applicable state law." See *Marre v. United States*, 117 F.3d 297, 307 (5th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added). Under Texas law, a contingency fee contract "is generally considered to be

should grant summary judgment. See Tillery & Tillery v. Zurich Ins. Co., 54 S.W.3d 356, 360-61 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied); Enochs v. Brown, 872 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no writ), disapproved of on unrelated grounds, by Roberts v. Williamson, 111 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. 2003).

Indeed, Enochs held:

The trial court made findings of fact that Whitehurst [Lawyer] provided valuable legal services to Justin [Client] by successfully handling his personal injury claim, and that Justin accepted, used, and enjoyed these services and the product of these services. These findings support the theory of quasi-estoppel. The principle of quasi-estoppel precludes a party from asserting, to another's disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position he has previously taken...it is unconscionable for Enochs, on Justin's behalf, to challenge the validity of the contingent fee contract when Justin has accepted the benefits of Whitehurst's services. We overrule Enochs' fifth point of error.

872 S.W.2d at 317 [citations omitted].

In the case at bar, Clients admitted that they accepted, received, and enjoyed the benefits of Lawyers' legal services; and, furthermore, Clients admitted that Lawyers fully performed under the Contingency Agreement and that they did not terminate Lawyers

an executory contract." *Id.*, at 307-308 (citing Lee v. Cherry, 812 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied); *Brenan v. LaMotte*, 441 S.W.2d 626, 630 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1969, no writ); *White v. Brookline Trust Co.*, 371 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.); *Carroll v. Hunt*, 168 S.W.2d 238, 240 (Tex. Com. App. 1943, opinion adopted)).

Once the contingency occurs, however, the agreed upon contingency fee is no longer executory, and it is beyond question that an attorney has a lien on any judgment or settlement securing his or her services. Indeed, such a lien "is paramount to the rights of the parties in the suit, and is superior to other liens on the money or property involved, subsequent in point of time." See *Marre*, 117 F.3d at 308 (quoting In re Willis, 143 B.R. 428, 432 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1992)).

Here, the Contingency Agreement expressly provides in pertinent part:

[I]f Attorneys are successful in recovering money or anything of value for Client, by settlement prior to trial begins, Attorneys shall receive attorneys' fees in the amount of forty percent (40%) of the gross recovery.... If the matter is resolved after trial begins, Attorneys shall receive attorneys' fees in the amount of forty-five (45%) of the gross recovery.

See Exhibit "A" (p. 2, ¶ 3).

until the case was concluded by the Settlement. The relevant pages of testimony that establish those admissions are submitted to this Court *in camera* under a sealed envelope as Exhibit "C" (54-55; 83; 96), *and*, Exhibit "D" (96-99).

B.

### Because Clients are Estopped, Lawyers have a Fully Vested Security Interest and Property Right, that is Ripe for Summary Judgment

Under Texas law, "a contract may establish an attorney's lien for money received in judgment or settlement of a matter." *See Norem v. Norem*, Civil Action No. 3:07–CV–0051, 2008 WL 2245821, at \*6 (N.D. Tex. June 2, 2008) (Stickney, J.) [citations omitted]. Here, the Contingency Agreement does exactly that; it *expressly* grants Lawyers a security interest in and first party lien upon any settlement proceeds (including anything of "*value*" which would encompass a reverse contingency on the successful defense of the counter-claims) as follows:

Client hereby assigns, transfers and conveys over to Attorneys an amount equal to either forty percent (40%) of the proceeds if the matter is settled or resolved before trial begins or forty-five percent (45%) of the proceeds if the matter is resolved after trial begins, of any property, money or other value recovered by settlement, compromise, verdict or judgment of the claims described in this contract. Client does hereby give and grant to Attorneys an express security interest, in addition to any statutory lien, upon Client's claims and any and all judgments recovered, and any and all funds or property realized or paid by compromise or settlement, as security for the compensation and costs and expenses advanced or due to be paid or reimbursed to Attorneys hereunder. This security interest is to continue in the event Attorneys are discharged without good cause. If the claims are not assignable at law, Client expressly assigns to Attorneys, to the extent of attorneys' fees and disbursements, any sum realized by way of a settlement or any judgment obtained thereon.

See Exhibit "A" (p. 5, ¶ 11).

Bottom Line: A contractual attorneys' lien is fully enforceable in Texas. See Norem, 2008 WL 2245821, at \*6; see also United States v. Betancourt, No. CRIM. B-

03-090-S1, 2005 WL 3348908, at \*3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2005) (Tagle, J.). Upon full performance, as here, Lawyers' interest in the settlement proceeds is undeniably a "property right." See Marre v. United States, 117 F.3d 297, 307 (5th Cir. 1997).

By the very language of the Contingency Agreement itself, a lien applies to any "property, money or other value recovered" when the "matter is resolved after trial begins ... [or] by settlement." See Exhibit "A" (p. 5, ¶ 11). This Court can take judicial notice of the following: (i) the Contingency Agreement, a copy of which has already been admitted into evidence at the TRO hearing; (ii) jury charge and verdict form (Exhibit "G"); (iii) the announcement of the settlement in open court on April 5, 2018 and the Rule 11 Settlement Agreement filed with the Court on April 4, 2017 (Exhibit "H"); and (iv) Clients' termination of Lawyers on April 5, 2018, a copy of which has already been admitted into evidence at the TRO hearing (Exhibit "B").

## Lawyers are Entitled to their Attorney's Fees Under Section 37.009

Given Clients' underhanded actions in terminating Lawyers and trying to avoid paying a fee within hours of settling this case, an award of attorney's fees in the Lawyers' favor is particularly apropos. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.009 (Vernon 2014). Lawyers respectfully request that the Court award them their reasonable and necessary attorney's fees (which can be done by fee application after summary judgment is granted), which would be "just" and "equitable." Id. at § 37.009.

### V. Conclusion

In conclusion, because there is no genuine issue of any material fact, Lawyers are entitled to the declaratory relief requested herein.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Intervenors (Lawyers) respectfully pray that this Honorable Court grant their summary judgment; grant the declaratory relief requested; award attorney's fees; and fully grant Lawyers all such further relief whether in law or in equity upon which they may show themselves justly entitled.

Respectfully Submitted,

**BRIAN LAUTEN, P.C.** 

**BRIAN P. LAUTEN** 

State Bar No. 24031603 blauten@brianlauten.com 3811 Turtle Creek Blvd. Ste. 1450 Dallas, Texas 75219

(214) 414-0996 telephone

ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENORS

### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has been served on all counsel of record on April 20, 2018, in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to:

Alan S. Loewinsohn
Jim L. Flegle
Kerry F. Schonwald
Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP
12377 Merit Dr., Suite 900
Dallas, Texas 75251
214-572-1717 Facsimile
alani@lfdslaw.com
jimf@lfdslaw.com
kerrys@lfdslaw.com
Attorneys for Intervenor Jo Hopper

John C. Eichman
Grayson L. Linyard
Hunton & Williams, LLP
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700
Dallas, TX 75202
214-468-3599 Facsimile
jeichman@hunton.com
glinyard@hunton.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A.,
as Independent Administrator of the Estate
of Max D. Hopper, Deceased,
and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., in its

Evan A. Young
Baker Botts L.L.P.
98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
Austin, TX 78701
512-322-8306 Facsimile
evan.young@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant,
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Corporate Capacity

Jeffrey S. Levinger
J. Carl Cecere
Levinger PC
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500
Dallas, TX 75202
214-855-6808 Facsimile
ilevinger@levingerpc.com
ccecere@cecerepc.com
Attorneys for Defendants, Stephen B.
Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

Van H. Beckwith
Jessica B. Pulliam
Baker Botts L.L.P.
2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700
Dallas, TX 75201
214-661-4677 Facsimile
van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com
jessica.pulliam@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A.

James E. Pennington Law Offices of James E. Pennington, P.C. 900 Jackson Street, Suite 440 Dallas, TX 75202 jep@jeplawyer.com Attorneys for Defendants Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

BRIAN P. LAUTEN
ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENORS

### **CONTINGENCY FEE CONTRACT OF REPRESENTATION**

The undersigned **Stephen Hopper**, **and Laura Wassmer** referred to as "Client" or "Clients" employ and retain Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP, and Malesovas Law Firm, (herein "Attorneys") to represent Client as set forth herein.

1. SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION: Attorneys agree to investigate and evaluate and litigate Client's possible claim or claims of negligence, fraud, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty against JP MORGAN CHASE and persons and companies relating to JP MORGAN CHASE BANKs wrongful acts in acting as the independent administrator of the Estate of Max Hopper..

Client understands and agrees that the scope of representation herein does not include the filing of any claim against any state or federal entity or employee or filing or pursuing an appeal from disposition in the Trial Court. Client understands and agrees that the scope of representation herein does not include defending any claims or lawsuits filed against Client. Client is retaining separate counsel on a flat fee agreement or other fee arrangement to defend them against any claims filed by any parties.

Client understands and agrees that the scope of representation herein does not include representing Clients in the probate lawsuit or lawsuit involving Chase bank, and defending Client against Chase bank or any other party.

Client understands and agrees that Attorneys will not file suit against entities that are in a foreign jurisdiction or are international companies whom in attorney's opinion cannot be sued in a United States court. Client understands and agrees that Attorneys are not obligated to pursue entities that are defunct and/or bankrupt.

Client hereby agrees and understands that Attorneys retain the right to withdraw from representation of Client at any time, so long as said withdrawal would not unduly prejudice Client's right to bring suit or to seek or retain another attorney to represent Client. In such event, Client agrees to timely sign an appropriate Motion for Substitution of Counsel. If after disposition in the trial court, Client desires to appeal, a new and separate agreement shall be entered into by the parties as to services and fees for any appeal, or Client shall retain separate counsel to handle any appeal and Attorneys shall retain their interest in the case under this agreement applicable to any recovery obtained by settlement or otherwise.

2. <u>AUTHORITY OF ATTORNEYS:</u> Client empowers Attorneys to take all steps in this matter deemed by them to be advisable for the investigation and handling of Client's

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Claims, including hiring investigators, expert witnesses, and/or other attorneys and filing any legal action necessary. Client authorizes and empowers Attorneys to do any and all things necessary and proper in the enforcement, compromise, settlement, adjustment and collection of Client's Claim, and Client further authorizes and empowers them to sign any and all pleadings and all releases, checks, drafts, authorizations and other papers necessary and proper in connection with the prosecution or enforcement of Client's Claims and collection or settlement of the damages awarded or to be paid therefore, and to receive such funds or other property in Client's name and for Client on account of any judgment recovered or any settlement agreed upon in connection with Client's Claim. Full power and authority is given by Client to Attorneys to adjust, settle or compromise Client's Claim, but no final settlement shall be made and consummated by Attorneys without first submitting the offer, compromise, or adjustment to Client for approval, and Client agrees not to compromise or settle Client's Claim without the Attorneys' authority, agreement and consent. Should Client make a settlement in violation of this Agreement, Client agrees to pay Attorneys the full fee agreed upon under paragraph 3 "Attorneys' Fee", below.

3. ATTORNEYS' FEE: This Agreement is a contingency fee contract. Specifically, if Attorneys are successful in recovering money or anything of value for Client, by settlement prior to trial begins, Attorneys shall receive attorneys' fees in the amount of forty percent (40%) of the gross recovery. The attorney fee will be split amongst the attorneys as follows: FSSV 50% Malesovas Law Firm 50% If the matter is resolved after trial begins, Attorneys shall receive attorneys' fees in the amount of forty-five (45%) of the gross recovery. All attorneys' fees shall be a percentage of the gross recovery. Gross recovery means the gross amount of money or other value or property recovered for Client, before the deduction of expenses. Trial is considered to have commenced at 5:00 p.m. on the Friday closest to ten (10) days before jury selection begins or evidence is first presented to the trier of fact, whichever is the earlier of these two events. If Attorneys do not recover any money or other value or property for Client, Client will not owe any attorneys' fees. Client agrees that Attorneys may, in their discretion, employ associate counsel to assist in prosecuting Client's cause of action, and Client does not object to the participation of any lawyers Attorneys may choose to involve in this representation of Client. With the exceptions set forth below, payment of attorneys' fees to associate counsel is the responsibility of Attorneys. In the event that the case is settled by way of a structured settlement, Client approves and authorizes attorneys' fees to be based upon the present value benefit of the settlement and further authorizes Attorneys to take attorneys' fees either in cash or in structured payment, as Attorneys deem appropriate.

In some instances, it may be necessary for Attorneys to retain special outside counsel to assist on matters other than prosecuting Client's claims for damages. Examples of such instances include the following: a defendant may seek bankruptcy protection; or a defendant may attempt to fraudulently transfer some of its assets to

avoid paying the Client's claim; a defendant may transfer assets out of the country thereby necessitating the retention of foreign counsel, or a complex, multi-party settlement may require an ethics opinion from outside counsel; or special action in probate court may be necessary apart from the usual probate proceedings involved in an estate; or a separate lawsuit may need to be filed against a defendant's insurance company. Client agrees that Attorneys may retain such special outside counsel to represent Client when Attorneys deem such assistance to be reasonably necessary, and that the fees of such counsel will be deducted from Client's share of the recovery.

- 4. <u>COSTS AND OTHER EXPENSES:</u> Clients **WILL NOT BE** responsible to pay for costs and expenses as incurred. Such costs include filing fees, expert witness fees, court reporter and video fees, copy charges, postage, mailing, travel, witness fees, electronic document conversion fees, delivery fees, internal operating costs and other related charges incurred or paid as an expense on behalf of Client and paid to third-party vendors or incurred internally by Attorneys and charged to Client in connection with Attorneys' representation of Client.
- 5. DISBURSEMENT OF PROCEEDS TO CLIENT: Client understands that Attorneys make no guarantee or assurance of any kind regarding the likelihood of success of Client's claims. Upon receipt by Attorneys of the proceeds of any settlement or judgment, Attorneys shall (1) retain either forty percent (40%) of the proceeds as their attorneys' fees if the matter is settled or resolved before trial begins or forty-five (45%) percent of the proceeds as their attorneys' fees if the matter is settled or resolved after trial begins, (2) deduct from Client's share of the proceeds any costs and expenses, including the fees of any special outside counsel that Attorneys may incur on Client's behalf, and (3) disburse the remainder of Client's share of the proceeds to Client. At the time of disbursement of any proceeds, Client will be provided with a disbursement sheet reflecting the attorneys' fees, the expenses deducted out of Client's share, and the remainder of Client's share.

Upon some circumstances, health insurers, workers compensation carriers, or others who have paid benefits or provided services on Client's behalf may claim a right to recover a portion of the proceeds of any action brought on behalf of the Client and may place Attorneys on notice of their claim. Except as may be required by law, Attorneys will not agree to protect any claim of a subrogation carrier or other creditor without Client's consent.

6. <u>POWER OF ATTORNEY:</u> Client gives Attorneys a power of attorney to execute and negotiate all reasonable and necessary documents connected with the handling of this cause of action, including pleadings, contracts, checks or drafts, settlement agreements, compromises and releases, verifications, dismissals and orders, proofs of claim, ballots, verified statements including those pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2019,

and all other documents that Client could properly execute. Client's claims will not be settled without obtaining Client's consent.

COOPERATION: ADDRESS CHANGE: RETURN OF DOCUMENTS: Client agrees to cooperate with Attorneys to permit Client's claims to be investigated and developed; to disclose to Attorneys all facts relevant to the claim; and to be reasonably available to attend any necessary meetings, depositions, preparation sessions, hearings and trial. Client shall 'appear on reasonable notice at any and all depositions and Court appearances and shall comply with all reasonable requests of Attorneys in connection with preparation and presentation of Client's claims. The Client acknowledges and agrees that all communications with Attorneys are privileged. The Client acknowledges that Attorneys may represent other individuals on the same or similar matters and therefore may communicate matters of common interest to all of Attorneys' clients. Therefore, Client agrees and understands that other individuals who are clients of Attorneys may also invoke the attorney client privilege as to Attorneys' communications with Client. The Client acknowledges and agrees not to provide attorney work product or attorney client communications to any other person.

Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any change of marital status or death of spouse. Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any bankruptcy proceedings involving Client or Client's spouse. Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any other legal proceedings to which Client or Client's spouse is a party.

Client agrees to notify Attorneys in writing of each change in Client's mailing address (work or home) or telephone number (work, home and cell) during the term of this representation within seven (7) days of each such change of address or telephone number. When the case is completed, and subject to any Court orders, Attorneys will provide Client the opportunity to retrieve any documents and/or materials that Client provided to Attorneys or that Attorneys have obtained from other sources in connection with the case. However, if Client has not retrieved those documents and/or materials within ninety (90) days after Attorneys have mailed to Client written notice that the case is completed and that those documents and/or material are available to Client, Attorneys may dispose of those documents and/or materials.

8. <u>NO TAX ADVICE:</u> Attorneys have advised Client that the pursuit of resolution of this claim may have various tax consequences. Client understands that <u>Attorneys do not render tax advice</u> and are not being retained to offer such advice to Client or to represent Client before the IRS. Moreover, Client accepts responsibility for making any payment or filings necessitated by the resolution of Client's claim.

Client understands that applicable State law may impose sales, service or other tax on any amount that Client may recover or the fees due Attorneys hereunder. Client also understands that applicable Federal income tax law may require that Client pay

income tax on the fees due Attorneys hereunder, separate and apart from and in addition to any taxes owed by Attorneys. Client agrees that any such taxes (other than Federal and/or State income taxes that Attorneys may owe on monies actually received by them) shall be paid out of my share of any recovery.

- 9. **DEATH OF CLIENT:** The provisions of this Agreement will not terminate upon the death of Client. In the event of the death of Client, any duly appointed Representative of Client's heirs and/or estate will be bound by this Agreement to the extent allowed by applicable law, including without limitation, the provisions of this Agreement relating to the recovery of attorneys' fees and costs and other expenses. Any such Representative shall, upon request by Attorneys, execute a new Agreement in the capacity as Representative for the heirs and/or estate of the Client.
- 10. OFFER OF SETTLEMENT: Client understands that applicable law may, under certain circumstances, allow a Defendant to make an offer of settlement to Client and if Client rejects or does not accept such an offer, such may result in any award, verdict or judgment in Client's favor being reduced as provided by such law. Client understands that Client has the final authority to accept or reject any offer of settlement. Client understands that if Client rejects or does not accept such an offer, and Client's recovery is subsequently reduced, the fees owed to Attorneys will be calculated on the amount of any award, verdict or judgment before reduction, and the reduction shall be out of Client's share of any recovery.
- Attorneys an amount equal to either forty percent (40%) of the proceeds if the matter is settled or resolved before trial begins or forty-five percent (45%) of the proceeds if the matter is resolved after trial begins, of any property, money or other value recovered by settlement, compromise, verdict or judgment of the claims described in this contract. Client does hereby give and grant to Attorneys an express security interest, in addition to any statutory lien, upon Client's claims and any and all judgments recovered, and any and all funds or property realized or paid by compromise or settlement, as security for the compensation and costs and expenses advanced or due to be paid or reimbursed to Attorneys hereunder. This security interest is to continue in the event Attorneys are discharged without good cause. If the claims are not assignable at law, Client expressly assigns to Attorneys, to the extent of attorneys' fees and disbursements, any sum realized by way of a settlement or any judgment obtained thereon.
- 12. <u>BINDING EFFECT:</u> This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, legal representatives, successors and assigns.
- 13. <u>TERMINATION OF REPRESENTATION:</u> Client understands that Client can terminate Attorneys' representation of Client at any time by providing written notice to

Attorneys. Should Client elect to terminate Attorneys' representation prior to the full conclusion of Attorneys' representation, Client understands and agrees that Attorneys have a claim for expenses of litigation and unpaid attorneys' fees which will become due upon receipt by Client or any successor attorney of Client or any proceeds for any remaining portion of Client's claim. Client understands that the obligation for unpaid attorneys' fees will be calculated based on the percentage of work completed on the case or claims at the time Client terminates Attorneys.

- 14. <u>NO GUARANTEE OF RECOVERY:</u> Client understands that no guarantee or assurances of any kind have been made regarding the likelihood of success of Client's claim, but that Attorneys will use their skill and diligence, as well as their experience, to diligently pursue Client's action.
- **MISCELLANEOUS:** In case any one or more of the provisions contained in this agreement shall, for any reason, be held to be invalid, illegal, or unenforceable in any respect, such invalidity, illegality, or unenforceability shall not affect any other provision thereof, and this agreement shall be construed as if such invalid, illegal, or unenforceable provision had never been contained herein.

This contract constitutes the sole and only agreement of the parties hereto and supersedes any prior understandings, or written or oral agreements between the parties respecting within the subject matter.

- 16. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: Client understands that an issue may exist as to whether the applicable statute of limitations has expired. This issue is raised in many lawsuits even if the Client's claims are not beyond the Statute of Limitations. Client understands that Attorneys must perform an evaluation of Client's claim prior to filing Client's lawsuit, and that this evaluation will first require Client to provide Attorneys with all relevant documents and other information requested. It is possible that the statute of limitations has already expired or may expire during the interim between the date of Client's signature below and the filing of Client's lawsuit. Client agrees to accept this risk.
- Attorneys may refer this matter to another lawyer or associate additional lawyers to assist in representing Client and prosecuting the Client's cause of action. Prior to the referral or association becoming effective, Client shall consent in writing to the terms of the arrangement after being advised of (1) the identity of the lawyer or law firm involved, (2) whether the fees will be divided based on the proportion of services rendered or by lawyers agreeing to assume joint responsibility for the representation, and (3) the share of the fee that each lawyer or law firm will receive or, if the division is based on the proportion of services performed, the basis on which the division will be

made. The referral or association of additional attorneys will not increase the total fee owed by the Client.

- 18. <u>NOTICE TO CLIENTS</u>: Attorneys are only licensed to practice law in the State of Texas. To the extent that Attorneys are required to appear in Court in other States, Attorneys will seek permission of the appropriate Court to appear pro hac vice. If pro hac vice admission is granted, Attorneys will be subject to the disciplinary rules of that particular jurisdiction. Attorneys are also subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar of Texas. The State Bar of Texas investigates and prosecutes professional misconduct committed by Texas attorneys. For more information call (800) 932-1900.
- 20. <u>ARBITRATION</u>: It is Attorney's goal to maintain at all times a constructive and positive relationship with Client on the matter described above and on future matters in which Attorney may perform services for Client. However, should a dispute arise between Attorney and Client, a prompt and fair resolution is in the interests of all concerned. To this end, if any controversy or claim arises out of is related to this agreement, any services provided by Attorneys to Client in connection with Client's Claims, or any other matter that may arise between Client and Attorney (including malpractice claims and fee disputes), Attorneys and Client both waive any right to bring a court action or have a jury trial and agree that the dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration to be conducted in Dallas, Texas before the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA with one arbitrator who must be an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Texas..

CLIENT HAS READ AND UNDERSTANDS THIS CONTRACT AND AGREES AS STATED ABOVE AS OF THE DATE NOTED BELOW.

Laura Wassmer

Stephen Hopper

Date: 11/19/2015

Address: 3625 N Classen Blvd Oklahoma City, OK 7318

Telephone Numbers: 405-639-9186

ATTORNEYS:

Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP

Malesovas Law Firm

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- 6. POWER OF ATTORNEY: Client gives Attorneys a power of attorney to execute and negotiate all reasonable and necessary documents connected with the handling of this cause of action, including pleadings, contracts, checks or drafts, settlement agreements, compromises and releases, verifications, dismissals and orders, proofs of claim, ballots, verified statements including those pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2019, and all other documents that Client could properly execute. Client's claims will not be settled without obtaining Client's consent.
- 7. COOPERATION: ADDRESS CHANGE: RETURN OF DOCUMENTS: Client agrees to cooperate with Attorneys to permit Client's claims to be investigated and developed; to disclose to Attorneys all facts relevant to the claim; and to be reasonably available to attend any necessary meetings, depositions, preparation sessions, hearings and trial. Client shall appear on reasonable notice at any and all depositions and Court appearances and shall comply with all reasonable requests of Attorneys in connection with preparation and presentation of Client's claims. The Client acknowledges and agrees that all communications with Attorneys are privileged. The Client acknowledges that Attorneys may represent other individuals on the same or similar matters and therefore may communicate matters of common interest to all of Attorneys' clients. Therefore, Client agrees and understands that other individuals who are clients of Attorneys may also invoke the attorney client privilege as to Attorneys' communications with Client. The Client acknowledges and agrees not to provide attorney work product or attorney client communications to any other person.

Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any change of marital status or death of spouse. Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any bankruptcy proceedings involving Client or Client's spouse. Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any other legal proceedings to which Client or Client's spouse is a party.

Client agrees to notify Attorneys in writing of each change in Client's mailing address (work or home) or telephone number (work, home and cell) during the term of this representation within seven (7) days of each such change of address or telephone number. When the case is completed, and subject to any Court orders, Attorneys will provide Client the opportunity to retrieve any documents and/or materials that Client provided to Attorneys or that Attorneys have obtained from other sources in connection with the case. However, if Client has not retrieved those documents and/or materials within ninety (90) days after Attorneys have mailed to Client written notice that the case is completed and that those documents and/or material are available to Client, Attorneys may dispose of those documents and/or materials.

8. NO TAX ADVICE: Attorneys have advised Client that the pursuit of resolution of this claim may have various tax consequences. Client understands that Attorneys do not render tax advice and are not being retained to offer such advice to Client or to represent Client before the IRS. Moreover, Client accepts responsibility for making any payment or filings necessitated by the resolution of Client's claim.

Client understands that applicable State law may impose sales, service or other tax on any amount that Client may recover or the fees due Attorneys hereunder. Client also understands that applicable Federal income tax law may require that Client pay income tax on the fees due Attorneys hereunder, separate and apart from and in addition to any taxes owed by Attorneys. Client agrees that any such taxes (other than Federal and/or State income taxes that Attorneys may owe on monies actually received by them) shall be paid out of my share of any recovery.

- 9. **DEATH OF CLIENT:** The provisions of this Agreement will not terminate upon the death of Client. In the event of the death of Client, any duly appointed Representative of Client's heirs and/or estate will be bound by this Agreement to the extent allowed by applicable law, including without limitation, the provisions of this Agreement relating to the recovery of attorneys' fees and costs and other expenses. Any such Representative shall, upon request by Attorneys, execute a new Agreement in the capacity as Representative for the heirs and/or estate of the Client.
- 10. OFFER OF SETTLEMENT: Client understands that applicable law may, under certain circumstances, allow a Defendant to make an offer of settlement to Client and if Client rejects or does not accept such an offer, such may result in any award, verdict or judgment in Client's favor being reduced as provided by such law. Client understands that Client has the final authority to accept or reject any offer of settlement. Client understands that if Client rejects or does not accept such an offer, and Client's recovery is subsequently reduced, the fees owed to Attorneys will be calculated on the amount of any award, verdict or judgment before reduction, and the reduction shall be out of Client's share of any recovery.

- 11. SECURITY INTEREST: Client hereby assigns, transfers and conveys over to Attorneys an amount equal to either forty percent (40%) of the proceeds if the matter is settled or resolved before trial begins or forty-five percent (45%) of the proceeds if the matter is resolved after trial begins, of any property, money or other value recovered by settlement, compromise, verdict or judgment of the claims described in this contract. Client does hereby give and grant to Attorneys an express security interest, in addition to any statutory lien, upon Client's claims and any and all judgments recovered, and any and all funds or property realized or paid by compromise or settlement, as security for the compensation and costs and expenses advanced or due to be paid or reimbursed to Attorneys hereunder. This security interest is to continue in the event Attorneys are discharged without good cause. If the claims are not assignable at law, Client expressly assigns to Attorneys, to the extent of attorneys' fees and disbursements, any sum realized by way of a settlement or any judgment obtained thereon.
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- 13. TERMINATION OF REPRESENTATION: Client understands that Client can terminate Attorneys' representation of Client at any time by providing written notice to Attorneys. Should Client elect to terminate Attorneys' representation prior to the full conclusion of Attorneys' representation, Client understands and agrees that Attorneys have a claim for expenses of litigation and unpaid attorneys' fees which will become due upon receipt by Client or any successor attorney of Client or any proceeds for any remaining portion of Client's claim. Client understands that the obligation for unpaid attorneys' fees will be calculated based on the percentage of work completed on the case or claims at the time Client terminates Attorneys.
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- 15. <u>MISCELLANEOUS</u>: In case any one or more of the provisions contained in this agreement shall, for any reason, be held to be invalid, illegal, or unenforceable in any respect, such invalidity, illegality, or unenforceability shall not affect any other provision thereof, and this agreement shall be construed as if such invalid, illegal, or unenforceable provision had never been contained herein.

This contract constitutes the sole and only agreement of the parties hereto and supersedes any prior understandings, or written or oral agreements between the parties respecting within the subject matter.

16. <u>STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS:</u> Client understands that an issue may exist as to whether the applicable statute of limitations has expired. This issue is raised in many lawsuits

even if the Client's claims are not beyond the Statute of Limitations. Client understands that Attorneys must perform an evaluation of Client's claim prior to filing Client's lawsuit, and that this evaluation will first require Client to provide Attorneys with all relevant documents and other information requested. It is possible that the statute of limitations has already expired or may expire during the interim between the date of Client's signature below and the filing of Client's lawsuit. Client agrees to accept this risk.

- 17. REFERRAL OR ASSOCIATION OF ADDITIONAL COUNSEL: Client agrees that Attorneys may refer this matter to another lawyer or associate additional lawyers to assist in representing Client and prosecuting the Client's cause of action. Prior to the referral or association becoming effective, Client shall consent in writing to the terms of the arrangement after being advised of (1) the identity of the lawyer or law firm involved, (2) whether the fees will be divided based on the proportion of services rendered or by lawyers agreeing to assume joint responsibility for the representation, and (3) the share of the fee that each lawyer or law firm will receive or, if the division is based on the proportion of services performed, the basis on which the division will be made. The referral or association of additional attorneys will not increase the total fee owed by the Client.
- 18. NOTICE TO CLIENTS: Attorneys are only licensed to practice law in the State of Texas. To the extent that Attorneys are required to appear in Court in other States, Attorneys will seek permission of the appropriate Court to appear pro hac vice. If pro hac vice admission is granted, Attorneys will be subject to the disciplinary rules of that particular jurisdiction. Attorneys are also subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar of Texas. The State Bar of Texas investigates and prosecutes professional misconduct committed by Texas attorneys. For more information call (800) 932-1900.
- 20. ARBITRATION: It is Attorney's goal to maintain at all times a constructive and positive relationship with Client on the matter described above and on future matters in which Attorney may perform services for Client. However, should a dispute arise between Attorney and Client, a prompt and fair resolution is in the interests of all concerned. To this end, if any controversy or claim arises out of is related to this agreement, any services provided by Attorneys to Client in connection with Client's Claims, or any other matter that may arise between Client and Attorney (including malpractice claims and fee disputes), Attorneys and Client both waive any right to bring a court action or have a jury trial and agree that the dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration to be conducted in Dallas, Texas before the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA with one arbitrator who must be an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Texas.

CLIENT HAS READ AND UNDERSTANDS THIS CONTRACT AND AGREES AS STATED ABOVE AS OF THE DATE NOTED BELOW.

Tours Wassman

Stephen Hopper
Date:
Address:
Telephone Numbers:
ATTORNEYS:
Fee, Smith, Sharp &Vitullo, LLP
9-1-M-
(

Malesovas Law Firm

### LAW OFFICES OF JAMES E. PENNINGTON

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 900 JACKSON STREET, SUITE 440 DALLAS, TEXAS 75202-4473

JAMES E. PENNINGTON LICENSED IN TEXAS AND COLORADO

PHONE (214) 741-3022 FAX (214) 741-3055 E-MAII. <u>Jep@Jeplawyer.com</u>

April 5, 2018

VIA EMAIL: blauten@brianlauten.com

Brian P. Lauten Brian Lauten, P.C. 3811 Turtle Creek Blvd. Suite 1450 Dallas, Texas 75219

Re: Case No. PR-11-3238-1; In re: Estate of Max Hopper, Deceased, Jo N. Hopper v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al., in the Probate Court of Dallas County, Texas.

Brian: .

As you know, I represent Dr. Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer in connection with a dispute that has developed involving your clients, Anthony Vitullo and Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP. Please be advised that my clients have decided to terminate their relationship with Mr. Vitullo, Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP and John Malesovas. Their decision to terminate this relationship is based on a number of factors, which are too numerous to set forth herein. However, I provided you with a brief summary of those reasons yesterday during our call and suggested we meet in person to discuss this in more detail. Ultimately, as a result of several issues that were discovered by Jeff Levinger, the appellate lawyer retained to handle the appeal of the jury's verdict, my clients decided to settle the case with JP Morgan Chase. Most, if not all of these issues, were caused by your clients' omissions before and during trial, such as failing to present expert testimony and several jury charge issues which would have made an appeal very difficult for my clients. Additionally, I discovered a number of facts, some of which I outlined during our call, which indicate that the contingency fee agreement is probably not enforceable and which show that - even if it is enforceable - your clients breached the agreement. As a result, I am notifying you that my clients are - effective immediately -- terminating their relationship with Mr. Vitullo, Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP and Mr. Malesovas and his firm. It is unclear to me whether you are representing Mr. Malesovas or his firm. Please advise, so that I can notify Mr. Malesovas if needed.

At this time, I am requesting your clients to provide me with their entire file regarding their representation of my clients. Although your clients have previously provided me with

**EXHIBIT** 

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Brian Lauten April 5, 2018 Page 2

portions of the file, the files which were provided are not complete and were not provided in the manner in which they were originally maintained by the firm. I am not suggesting anything improper about the manner in which the files were previously produced. However, I am pointing this out to emphasize the importance of making sure that I receive the complete file in the same manner that it was maintained by your clients. You may provide the electronic files on a portable hard drive and have this device, along with the physical files, delivered to my office.

Finally, as I indicated during our call, my clients are willing to discuss a resolution of the attorney's fees related to your clients' representation, so give this some more thought and let me know if you have a proposal. In the meantime, I will instruct Mr. Levinger to retain a percentage of the settlement in his trust account until this matter is resolved. Thank you for your anticipated cooperation. If you have any questions, please feel free to give me a call.

X/ /Tulunya

### LAW OFFICES OF JAMES E. PENNINGTON

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 900 JACKSON STREET, SUITE 440 DALLAS, TEXAS 75202-4473

JAMES E. PENNINGTON LICENSED IN TEXAS AND COLORADO

FAX (214) 741-3022 FAX (214) 741-3055 E-MAII. Jep@jeplawyer.com

April 5, 2018

VIA EMAIL: john@malesovas.com jmalesovas@gmail.com

John Malesovas 1801 S. MoPac Expressway Suite 320 Austin, Texas 78746

Re: Case No. PR-11-3238-1; In re: Estate of Max Hopper, Deceased, Jo N. Hopper v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al., in the Probate Court of Dallas County, Texas.

Mr. Malesovas:

In the event you have not previously been advised, I have been retained to represent Dr. Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer in connection with a dispute that has developed involving your representation in the above-referenced matter. Please be advised that my clients have decided to terminate their relationship with you and Mr. Vitullo, and your respective law firms. Mr Vitullo was advised of this decision earlier today. The clients' decision to terminate this relationship is based on a number of factors, which are too numerous to set forth herein. Yesterday, I spoke with Mr. Vitullo's attorney, Brian Lauten, and provided him with a brief summary of those reasons and I offered to meet in person to discuss this in more detail. Ultimately, as a result of several issues that were discovered by Jeff Levinger, the appellate lawyer retained to handle the appeal of the jury's verdict, my clients decided to settle the case with JP Morgan Chase. Most, if not all of these issues, were caused by the attorneys' omissions before and during trial, such as failing to present expert testimony and several jury charge issues which would have made an appeal very difficult for my clients. Additionally, I discovered a number of facts, some of which I outlined during my call yesterday with Mr. Lauten, which indicate that the contingency fee agreement is probably not enforceable and which show that even if it is enforceable - you and/or Mr. Vitullo breached the agreement. As a result, I am notifying you that my clients are - effective immediately -- terminating their relationship with you and your law firm.

At this time, I am requesting you to provide me with your entire file regarding your representation of my clients. Please make sure that I receive the complete file in the same

John Malesovas April 5, 2018 Page 2

manner that it was maintained by you and/or your law firm. You may provide the electronic files on a portable hard drive and have this device, along with the physical files, delivered to my office.

Finally, as I indicated to Mr. Lauten during our call, my clients are willing to discuss a resolution of the attorney's fees related to your representation, so please discuss this with Mr. Vitullo and let me know if you have a proposal. In the meantime, I will instruct Mr. Levinger to retain a percentage of the settlement in his trust account until this matter is resolved. Thank you for your anticipated cooperation. If you have any questions, please feel free to give me a call.

Sincerel

James E. Pennington

IN RE: ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED,	4.2	IN THE PROBATE COURT
JO N. HOPPER,	\$\text{con} \$\text	
Intervenor,	§	
<b>v.</b>	9 8 8	NO. 1
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., STEPHEN B. HOPPER, and LAURA	\$ \$ \$	
S. WASSMER,	§ &	
Defendants.	§	OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP Attorneys,  v.  STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, individually and as Beneficiaries of the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendants.	w	

# INTERVENORS' EXHIBIT "C"

# IN CAMERA INSPECTION

IN RE: ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED,	§ IN THE PROBATE COURT §
JO N. HOPPER,	
Intervenor,	§ § §
y.	§ NO. 1
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., STEPHEN B. HOPPER, and LAURA S. WASSMER,	§ NO. 1 § § § § §
Defendants.	§ § OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP Attorneys, v. STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, individually and as Beneficiaries of the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendants.	~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

# INTERVENORS' EXHIBIT "D"

# IN CAMERA INSPECTION

IN RE: ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED,	8	IN THE PROBATE COURT
JO N. HOPPER,	<i>©</i> © © © © © © © © © © © © © © © © © ©	
Intervenor,	9 §	
V.	9 8 8	NO. 1
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., STEPHEN B. HOPPER, and LAURA S. WASSMER,	20 00 00 00 00	
Defendants.	§ §	OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP	60 co co	
Attorneys,	60 e0	
v,	9 9	
STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, individually and as Beneficiaries of the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,	<i>๛๛๛๛๛๛๛๛๛๛๛๛๛๛๛๛๛๛</i>	
Defendants.	8	

JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM AND FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULO, LLP'S CONSOLIDATED FIRST AMENDED JOINT PETITION IN INTERVENTION AND PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION, AND MOTION TO DEPOSIT FUNDS IN THE REGISTRY

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW Attorneys, John L. Malesovas, d/b/a Malesovas Law Firm ("MLF") and Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP ("FSSV") (MLF and FSSV hereinafter jointly

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referred to as "Attorneys"), and files this Petition in Intervention and Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and for Temporary Injunction complaining of Defendants, STEPHEN B. HOPPER ("Hopper"), LAURA S. WASSMER ("Wassmer"), individually and as beneficiaries of the Estate of Max D. Hopper (hereinafter collectively "Clients" and/or "Defendants"), the Estate of Max D. Hopper, deceased and JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. ("JPM"), and for cause would show the following:

# I. DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN

1.01 Intervenor requests this lawsuit proceed under a Level 3 Discovery Control Plan pursuant to Rule 190.4 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

## II. <u>PARTIES</u>

- 2.01 John L. Malesovas is an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Texas and doing business as Malesovas Law Firm.
- 2.02 FSSV is a limited liability partnership and law firm and doing business as Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP.
- 2.03 Defendant, Stephen B. Hopper ("Hopper"), individually and as a beneficiary of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, deceased, was a former client of Attorneys and is being served herewith pursuant to TRCP 21a.
- 2.04 Defendant, Laura S. Wassmer ("Wassmer"), individually and as a beneficiary of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, deceased, was a former client of Attorneys and is being served herewith pursuant to TRCP 21a. Hopper and Wassmer are hereinafter jointly referred to as "Clients".

- 2.05 The Estate of Max D. Hopper is an estate in administration under the jurisdiction of this Court, and Clients have asserted claims herein on behalf of the Estate as the beneficiaries of the Estate.
- 2.06 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("JPM"), is a Defendant in the underlying case and an interested party to this Petition in Intervention and is being served herewith pursuant to TRCP 21a.

# III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3.01 Venue is proper in Dallas County, Texas pursuant to §15.002(a)(1), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code, as Dallas County is the county in which all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred and because venue is proper in the underlying action. This Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear this claim because Intervenor has an interest in the matter in controversy that involves the Defendants and The Estate of Max D. Hopper. See Tex. Estates Code Ann. § 32.007 et seq. (Vernon 2014), and, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.005 et seq. (Vernon 2014) (authorizing declaratory judgment actions in probate court when such relief is germane to an Estate). To the extent that The Estate of Max D. Hopper is a party to the settlement with JPM or to the extent that beneficiaries of The Estate of Max D. Hopper are parties to the settlement with JPM then this Court and only this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over this matter.

## IV. FACTS

4.01 MLF and FSSV, (jointly "Attorneys"), represented Defendants pursuant to a valid and enforceable contingency fee agreement in the underlying lawsuit pending in

this Court. A true and correct copy of the contingent fee agreement will be tendered to the Court for in camera inspection at the hearing (hereinafter "Agreement"). Intervenors have fully performed under the terms of the Agreement. On April 3, 2018 and April 4, 2018, Clients' Appellate Counsel, Jeff Levinger, settled Clients' claims against JPM and on April 4, 2018 PM filed a Rule 11 agreement with the Court notifying the Court that there was a settlement between Clients and JPM ("Settlement"). At approximately 9:05 am on April 5, 2018, Anthony L. Vitullo appeared before this Court on behalf of Clients and announced in open court and on the record the confidential settlement between Clients and JPM. At approximately 10:10am on April 5, 2018, Clients' attorney, Jim Pennington, terminated Attorneys without cause and advised Attorneys that they were not going to pay the fee due under the Agreement. Mr. Pennington also advised Attorneys that he was going to instruct Mr. Levinger to retain an unspecified percentage of the Settlement proceeds in his trust account. On April 6, 2018, FSSV withdrew from representing Clients in the underlying lawsuit. Attorneys own a property right in the Settlement proceeds. Attorneys file this Petition in Intervention and Declaratory Judgment and Request for TRO and Temporary Injunction to enforce their property rights in the Settlement proceeds.

4.02 Attorneys have a justiciable interest and property interest in the pending suit in that Attorneys have a lien on and interest in the Settlement proceeds. This lawsuit is a simple declaratory judgment action to enforce Attorneys property rights. As such, pursuant to *Texas Mut. Ins. Co, v. Ledbetter*, 251 S.W.3d 31 (2008), Attorneys are lienholders in the Settlement proceeds of this case, and have an absolute right to intervene. Further, as stated by the Supreme Court in *Ledbetter*, to the extent that

Clients, JPM and/or their attorneys settle a case without reimbursing a lienholder, "everyone involved is liable ... for conversion." Thus, Attorneys seek a declaration from this Court pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code § 37.001 et. seq. confirming Attorneys' security interest in the Settlement proceeds and directing JPM and Clients to pay such interest directly to Attorneys. This lawsuit is a simple declaratory judgment action to enforce Attorneys' property rights.

4.03 Attorneys fully performed under the Agreement with no complaint from Clients and secured a very favorable jury verdict. As a result of this favorable jury verdict. Clients were able to secure a confidential settlement with JPM. Only after Clients, through their appellate attorney Jeff Levinger, unilaterally settled with JPM did Clients terminate Attorneys. Clients accepted, used and enjoyed the services of Attorneys which resulted in the Settlement. In accordance with the Courts' holdings in Tillery & Tillery v. Zurich Ins. Co., 54 S.W.3d 356 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2018, no pet.) and Enochs v. Brown, 872 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. App. – Austin 1994, no writ), Clients are estopped and quasi-estopped from challenging the validity of the Agreement and the fee due Attorneys thereunder and the property rights Attorneys have to the Settlement proceeds. Further, it would be unconscionable for Clients to challenge the property rights of Attorneys under the Agreement after having already accepted the benefits from Attorneys under the Agreement. Further, by accepting the benefits under the Agreement without complaint, Clients have waived any right to complain about the Agreement. Accordingly, Attorneys move the Court to declare that Attorneys own a property right in the Settlement proceeds" and that the Agreement is valid and

enforceable and to further order Clients and JPM to pay all fees and expenses due Attorneys under the Agreement directly to Attorneys from the Settlement proceeds.

4.04 In addition, Attorneys seek their attorneys' fees from Clients pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code §§ 37.009, 38.001 (Vernon 2014). All conditions precedent to Attorneys' claim for relief have been performed or have occurred.

# V. SUIT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF

- 5.01 Attorneys incorporate all of the preceding paragraphs as if they were set forth in their entirety herein.
- 5.02 Attorneys' seek a declaratory judgment pursuant to the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act ("UDJA"), Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code Section 37.001 et seq. An actual and justiciable controversy exists and has arisen between Attorneys and Clients. Attorneys seek judgment against Defendants pursuant to the UDJA declaring the rights, status and other legal relations of Attorneys and Clients regarding the payment of Attorneys interest in the Settlement proceeds. Because the Estate is a party to the Settlement, this Honorable Court has exclusive jurisdiction to declare Attorneys legal interests in the Settlement proceeds.
- 5.03 Attorneys are entitled to a declaration from this Honorable Court to the following:
  - a. Attorneys own a property right in the Settlement proceeds;
  - Attorneys are entitled to immediate possession of their property right in the Settlement proceeds;
  - This Honorable Court has exclusive jurisdiction to declare the rights of the parties to the Settlement proceeds;

- d. Attorneys are entitled to the full and exclusive use, possession and enjoyment of their interest in the Settlement proceeds;
- e. That it is in the best interest of the Estate to pay Attorneys their interest in the Settlement proceeds; and
- f. That the Clients and JPM be directed to pay Attorneys interest in the Settlement proceeds directly to Attorneys.
- 5.04 Attorneys also seek all legal fees and expenses from Clients as allowed under the UDJA as this would be fair and equitable given the facts and circumstances of this dispute.

# VI. ATTORNEY'S FEES

- 6.01 Pursuant to 37.009 and/or 38.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Attorneys seek all reasonable and necessary attorney's fees in this case which include the following:
  - a. Preparation and trial of this lawsuit;
  - b. Post-Trial, pre-appeal legal services;
  - c. An appeal to the court of appeals;
  - d. Making or responding to an application for writ of error to the Supreme Court of Texas;
  - e. An appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas in the event application for writ of error is granted; and
  - f. Post-judgment discovery and collection in the event execution on the judgment is necessary.

VII.

### **ELEMENTS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF**

Attorneys have a probable right to relief they seek on final hearing. On final hearing Attorneys are likely to prove each and every element of all claims asserted against Clients as foregoing shows that Attorneys fully performed under the Agreement. Attorneys have a security interest in the Settlement proceeds and Clients have informed Attorneys that they do not intend to pay or honor Attorneys interest in the Settlement proceeds.

To 2 Unless this Honorable Court immediately restrains Clients form diverting the Settlement proceeds to their own attorneys, the Attorneys will suffer immediate and irreparable injury, for which there is no adequate remedy at law, because in effect, Attorneys will have lost the protection of their security interest in the Settlement proceeds. Attorneys have a lien on and security interest in the Settlement proceeds, the purpose of which is to prevent Clients from taking all of the Settlement proceeds and unilaterally controlling their use and disposition. The Clients simply saying that they will instruct their attorney to keep some unspecified portion of the Settlement proceeds in his trust account eviscerates Attorneys' security interest in the Settlement Proceeds. Attorneys will show the court the following:

- a) The harm to Attorneys is imminent because Clients have started to finalize the Settlement and are attempting to have Attorneys' interest in the Settlement proceeds paid to Clients' attorney, Jeff Levinger.
- b) This imminent harm will cause Attorneys irreparable injury in that once Defendants pay the Settlement proceeds to Jeff Levinger, Attorneys will not

be able to enforce their lien and security interest because Levinger will claim that he is obligated to hold the funds in his trust account, interest free, until the ownership of the fees is resolved. But Rules 1.14 of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct do not require, nor do they even allow, Clients attorney to even take possession of the Settlement proceeds. Instead, Attorneys' lien and security interest allow them to take possession of their interest in the Settlement proceeds. Thus, unless a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction are issued, Attorney's lien and security interest in the Settlement proceeds will be eviscerated. In addition, Attorneys' interest in the Settlement proceeds will not be protected from unauthorized distributions, conversion, or bank failure.

c) There is no adequate remedy at law which will enforce Attorneys' lien and security interest absent action from this Court. Further, Clients will not be financially able to respond in damages upon final trial from this intervention unless Attorney's interest in the Settlement proceeds is protected by this Court.

# VIII. BOND

8.01 Attorneys are willing to post a reasonable temporary restraining order bond and request the court to set such bond.

## IX. TRO REMEDY

9.01 Attorneys have met Attorneys' burden by establishing each element which must be present before injunctive relief can be granted by this court, therefore Attorneys

are entitled to the requested temporary restraining order.

9.02 Attorneys request the court to issue an Order:

- a. Restraining Clients from taking any action to transfer, liquidate, convert, encumber, pledge, loan, share, sale, market for sale, conceal, hide, secret, dissipate, deplete, neglect, misuse, damage and/or destroy, lease, assign, granting a lien, security interest, or other interest in, allow the use of, or otherwise dispose of any and all part of Attorneys' interest in the Settlement proceeds;
- b. Ordering that Defendants and any of his, her, their, or its agents, servants, employees, successors, assigns and those persons in active concert or participation therewith, must:
  - 1. Deposit into the registry of this Court the portion of Attorneys' interest in the Settlement proceeds which Clients contend they do not owe Attorneys under the Agreement, which shall remain on deposit in the registry until further Order of the Court, when such funds become available and are ripe for distribution from JPMorgan Chase, N.A. to the underlying Plaintiffs in satisfaction of the confidential settlement agreement reached herein:
  - 2. Pay directly to Attorneys the portion of Attorneys' interest in the Settlement proceeds which Clients do not dispute to be due and owing from the Settlement proceeds immediately when those funds become available under the terms of the Settlement.
- 9.03 It is essential that grant a temporary restraining order as requested herein in order to preserve the status quo during the pendency of this action.
- 9.04 That after notice and hearing the Court convert the temporary restraining order into a temporary injunction, and that on final trial on the merits, that the Court disburse to Attorneys all funds deposited into the registry of the Court pursuant to the

temporary restraining order and temporary injunction.

# X. MOTION TO REQUIRE DEPOSIT OF FUNDS (WHICH IS A NON-APPEALABLE ORDER THAT IS NOT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF—AS A MATTER OF LAW)

deposited in the registry of the court. See Prodeco Exploration, Inc. v. Ware, 684 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ) ("The trial court has the inherent authority to direct [a party] to deposit disputed funds into the registry of the court pending the outcome of the litigation."); see also Castilleja v. Camero, 414 S.W.2d 431, 433 (Tex. 1967). In addition, in order to secure an order directing a party to deposit disputed funds in the registry of the Court, a party does not have to satisfy the prerequisite for securing a temporary restraining order or temporary injunction. Diana River & Assocs., P.C. v. Calvillo, 986 S.W.2d 795, 797-798 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.) (citing McQuadev. E.D. Sys. Corp., 570 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1978, no writ)). Orders to deposit money into the registry of the court cannot be characterized as temporary injunctions and are non-appealable. Prodeco, 684 S.W.2d at 201; Alpha Petroleum Co. v. Dunn, 60 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1933, writ dism'd).

10.02 Clients have filed a pleading in response to Attorneys' intervention wherein Clients admit that there are disputed funds from the Settlement proceeds. But Clients do not identify the amount of the disputed portion of the Settlement proceeds. Clients suggest that this unidentified amount of funds be kept in their possession, through their attorney, Jeff Levinger, pending the outcome of this dispute. In essence, Clients want to continue to control all disputed funds without oversight from this Court

and without even identifying the amount they dispute. That is obviously unacceptable to Attorneys to let the fox guard the hen house pending the outcome of this matter.

10.03 Accordingly, pursuant to this Court's inherent power, Attorneys move this Court to order that all of the Settlement proceeds be deposited into the registry of this Court pending further order of this Court so that the Settlement can be funded, JPM can be dismissed, and all parties with any interest in the Settlement proceeds can assert their claims and they can be resolved without any fear that one party or the other will dissipate the funds or secure an advantage over the other through possession of the funds pending the outcome of this dispute. The Court can then determine. What amount is in dispute, who is making a claim to the disputed amount, the basis for any such claim, and ultimately to whom the funds should be distributed.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Attorneys respectfully request for all relief requested herein, as well as such other and further relief, in law or in equity, to which they may show themselves justly entitled.

Respectfully Submitted,

**BRIAN LAUTEN, P.C.** 

**BRIAN P. LAUTEN** 

State Bar No. 24031603 blauten@brianlauten.com

3811 Turtle Creek Boulevard

Ste. 1450

Dallas, Texas 75219

(214) 414-0996 telephone

ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENORS

## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

In accordance with Rule 21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has been served upon all counsel of record via the ECF case manager system and by electronic filing on April 9, 2018,

Alan S. Loewinsohn Jim L. Flegle Kerry F. Schonwald Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP 12377 Merit Dr., Suite 900 Dallas, Texas 75251 214-572-1717 Facsimile alani@lfdslaw.com jimf@lfdslaw.com kerrys@lfdslaw.com

Attorneys for Intervenor Jo Hopper

Jeffrey S. Levinger J. Carl Cecere Levinger PC 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500 Dallas, TX 75202 214-855-6808 Facsimile ilevinger@levingerpc.com ccecere@cecerepc.com

Attorneys for Defendants, Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

John C. Eichman Grayson L. Linyard Hunton & Williams, LLP 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700 Dallas, TX 75202 214-468-3599 Facsimile jeichman@hunton.com glinvard@hunton.com

Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, Deceased, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., in its Corporate Capacity

Van H. Beckwith
Jessica B. Pulllam
Baker Botts L.L.P.
2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700
Dallas, TX 75201
214-661-4677 Facsimile
van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com
jessica.pulliam@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Evan A. Young
Baker Botts L.L.P.
98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
Austin, TX 78701
512-322-8306 Facsimile
evan.young@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant,
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

BRIAN P. LAUTEN ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENORS

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IN RE: ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED,	,	IN THE PROBATE COURT			
JO N. HOPPER,					
Intervenor,					
v.	NO. 1	4			
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., STEPHEN B. HOPPER, and LAURA S. WASSMER,					
Defendants.	OF DALLAS COUNTY	, TEXAS			
JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP Intervenors,  v.  STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, individually and as Beneficiaries of the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,  Defendants.					
VERIFICATION					
STATE OF TEXAS )					
COUNTY OF DALLAS )					

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BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared ANTHONY L. VITULLO, who, being by me duly sworn on oath, deposed and stated that he is a Senior Partner at Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP, named as Intervenor in the above-entitled and numbered cause; that he has read JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM AND FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP'S CONSOLIDATED FIRST AMENDED JOINT PETITION IN INTERVENTION AND PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION AND REQUESTS FOR DISCLOSURES; and that every statement contained therein is within his personal knowledge and is true and correct, and that he is authorized to sign on behalf of Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP.

ANTHONY L. VITULLO

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this gradual day of day.

MELINDA SPURGEON Notary Public, State of Texas My Commission Expires September 19, 2019 Melinde K. Your NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR

THE STATE OF TEXAS

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 9-19-2019



IN RE: ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, § IN THE PROBATE COURT DECEASED, JO N. HOPPER, Intervenor. ٧. NO. 1 JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., STEPHEN B. HOPPER, and LAURA S. WASSMER, 888 Defendants. OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP ののののののののののののののののの Intervenors, ٧. STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, individually and as Beneficiaries of the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendants.

## TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

Came to be heard on the 9<sup>TH</sup> day of April 2018, the minimum amount of notice having been duly provided pursuant to Local Rule 2.02(a) of Dallas County, Fee Smith Sharp & Vitullo, LLP and John L. Malesovas d/b/a Malesovas Law Firm's (collectively, "Intervenors") *Verified Petition(s) in Intervention, Application for Temporary Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction, and Application for Declaratory Relief* against, *inter alia*,

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Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer, individually and as beneficiaries of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, deceased, (hereinafter jointly "Clients") and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (hereinafter "JPM") (Clients and JPM hereinafter jointly, "Defendants" with respect to the claims now pending in this Intervention).

The Court, after considering the *Intervenors' Collective Verified Original Petition* in *Intervention, Application for Temporary Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction, and Application for Declaratory Relief,* the evidence submitted by Intervenors in camera, the relevant exhibits, the arguments of counsel, concludes that—unless immediately restrained, Defendants will irreparably injure Intervenors.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute brought before it under both, Tex. Estates Code Ann. § 32.007 et seq. (Vernon 2014), and, Tex. Civ. PRAC. & REM. Code § 37.005 et seq. (Vernon 2014) (authorizing declaratory judgment actions in probate court when such relief is germane to an Estate):

Intervenors respective Pleas and application for TRO are timely filed, given that this Court has yet to sign a judgment; and, therefore, retains plenary power over this proceeding. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 60 et seq.

This Court has, preliminarily, taken judicial notice, pursuant to Rule 201 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, of the following facts that, in reasonable probability, appear to be true at this preliminary stage of the proceeding:

- In, around, or about November of 2015, Clients executed a valid and enforceable contingency agreement ("CA") with Intervenors;
- 2.) On or about April 5, 2018, attorneys for Clients and JPM appeared before this Court and announced, without revealing any of the substantive terms, that a confidential settlement had been reached between them in the underlying dispute pending in this Court (hereinafter "Settlement");
- 3.) On or about the same day, April 5, 2018, but—literally what appears to have been within minutes after the Court was informed that a settlement had been reached by the parties in this underlying dispute—Clients terminated their CA with Intervenors by and through their attorney, James Pennington;

- Intervenors have filed what, by all accounts, appears to be a valid and enforceable First Party Attorney's Fees Lien in the proceeds of the Settlement;
- 5.) Intervenors fully performed; or, at the very least, substantially and materially performed all of their duties, responsibilities, and obligations under the CA at or before the time Clients terminated the CA—as those legal terms are meant in, *Tillery & Tillery v. Zurich Ins. Co.*, 54 S.W.3d 356, 360-61 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, no pet.), *Enochs v. Brown*, 872 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no writ), *disapproved of on unrelated grounds*, by *Roberts v. Williamson*, 111 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. 2003), and *Mandell & Wright*, 441 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. 1969); and
- 6.) Given the timing of the termination of Intervenors, Clients are estopped, quasi-estopped, and/or have waived any and all defenses, if any, that could or would be lodged to the CA or the quality of the legal services performed by Intervenors.

Based upon these preliminary findings, this Court is of the opinion that Intervenors have established a probability of success on the merits on their application for, *inter alia*, declaratory relief. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.004 et seq. (Vernon 2014). This Court is of the opinion that, unless restrained, one or more Defendants are likely to cause permanent damage to Intervenors, should they be allowed to transfer, hypothecate, assign, or take title to Intervenors' interest in the settlement proceeds before the pleas in Intervention are adjudicated on the merits. Such harm would be irreparable because this Court is of the opinion that there is no showing; or, in the alternative, an inadequate showing that Defendants could timely and immediately pay the disputed funds to Intervenors, should Intervenors ultimately prevail in this proceeding, and because Intervenors have a security interest in and lien upon a portion of the settlement proceeds which would be eviscerated by allowing Clients to dispose of 100% of the settlement proceeds as they saw fit. Moreover, given the

Court's preliminary findings set forth above in (i)-(vi), Intervenors have established a property right and secured interest in the proceeds at issue.

The Court is, THEREFORE, of the opinion that Intervenors are entitled to the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and that such an Order is necessary to protect Intervenors' rights. This ORDER is necessary because of the immediate need to enforce the security interest and lien which Intervenors have in a portion of the settlement proceeds and to stop the wrongful flow of funds in the near future from being disseminated to either Clients or their attorneys, or some other third party subject to Clients' direction and control, upon which Intervenors would have no adequate remedy at law. Without intervention by this Court, Intervenors' property right, that is Intervenors' security interest in and lien upon the settlement proceeds, would be destroyed and there would be no way to restore that property right in the Settlement proceeds themselves.

This Court is further of the opinion that Intervenors are entitled to an **EXPEDITED DISCOVERY ORDER**. Therefore, Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer shall be made available for deposition on and certainly no later than **Tuesday**, **April 17**, **2018**. If the parties cannot agree on a suitable location for these depositions, they shall be taken in this Court's jury room. The depositions are limited solely to the matters in dispute in the pled Intervention filings and shall last no longer than two hours per deponent (per side). In addition, Intervenors may serve a *duces tecum* with the deposition notices, which shall be limited to no more than seven (7) discovery requests. The deposition notice shall provide two business days notice to the deponent.

It is further **ORDERED** that Intervenors may move this Court for a dispositive summary judgment on 14 days notice of any hearing; and any response shall be due to be filed within 5 days of the hearing; and any reply shall be due to be filed within 2 days of the hearing.

It is therefore **ORDERED**, **ADJUDGED**, and **DECREED** that Defendants, Stephen Hopper, Laura Wassmer, and JPMorgan Chase, N.A., and any of his, her, their, or its agents, servants, employees, successors, assigns and those persons in active concert or participation therewith, must:

- 1) Deposit all of the settlement proceeds due to Stephen B. Hopper and Laura s. Wassmer, individually and as beneficiaries of the Estate of Max Hopper, Deceased, into a safekeeping account with JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, to be held in trust until further Order of this Court. Funds in the safekeeping account shall be withdrawn only upon Order of this Court;
- 2) The parties are ORDERED to preserve and prevent the destruction of all documents, including electronic data, emails, and notes, that relate in any way to the matters and claims set forth in the Intervenors' respective Pleas on file—and, moreover, all electronic storage devices must be imaged and preserved.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this order is effective immediately upon Intervenors' deposit with the appropriate clerk of this Court a bond in the amount of \$ 10,100 XX.00 (U.S. dollars).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Intervenors' application for a temporary injunction is set for an evidentiary hearing and will be heard before this Court on 34,30 /B at 9 o'clock 9.m., and that Stephen Hopper, Laura Wassmer, and JPMorgan Chase, N.A. appear and show cause, if any, why this Temporary Restraining Order should not be continued and converted into a Temporary Injunction until final hearing and trial heregn. Signed and issued this the  $10^{-6}$  day of April 2018, at 4:50 o'clock 6 m.

PR 11-39036-1

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IN THE PROBATE COURT

JOHN F. WARREN COUNTY CLERK DALLAS COUNTY

JO N. HOPPER

DECEASED

Plaintiff,

IN RE: ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER!

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER,

Defendants.

NO. 1

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

### **CHARGE OF THE COURT**

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MEMBERS OF THE JURY:

After the closing arguments, you<sup>1</sup> will go to the jury room to decide the case, answer the questions that are attached, and reach a verdict. You may discuss the case with other jurors only when you are all together in the jury room.

Remember my previous instructions: Do not discuss the case with anyone else, either in person or by any other means. Do not do any independent investigation about the case or conduct any research. Do not look up any words in dictionaries or on the Internet. Do not post information about the case on the Internet. Do not share any special knowledge or experiences with the other jurors. Do not use your phone or any other electronic device during your deliberations for any reason.

Any notes you have taken are for your own personal use. You may take your notes back into the jury room and consult them during deliberations, but do not show or read your notes to your fellow jurors during your deliberations. Your notes are not evidence. Each of you should rely on your independent recollection of the evidence and not be influenced by the fact that another juror has or has not taken notes.

You must leave your notes with the bailiff when you are not deliberating. The bailiff will give your notes to me promptly after collecting them from you. I will make sure your notes are kept in a safe, secure location and not disclosed to anyone. After you complete your deliberations, the bailiff will collect your notes. When you are released from jury duty, the bailiff will promptly destroy your notes so that nobody can read what you wrote.

EXHIBIT

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Here are the instructions for answering the questions.

- 1. Do not let bias, prejudice, or sympathy play any part in your decision.
- 2. Base your answers only on the evidence admitted in court and on the law that is in these instructions and questions. Do not consider or discuss any evidence that was not admitted in the courtroom.
- 3. You are to make up your own minds about the facts. You are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony. But on matters of law, you must follow all of my instructions.
- 4. If my instructions use a word in a way that is different from its ordinary meaning, use the meaning I give you, which will be a proper legal definition.
- 5. All the questions and answers are important. No one should say that any question or answer is not important.
- 6. Answer "yes" or "no" to all questions unless you are told otherwise. A "yes" answer must be based on a preponderance of the evidence unless you are told otherwise. Whenever a question requires an answer other than "yes" or "no," your answer must be based on a preponderance of the evidence unless you are told otherwise.

The term "preponderance of the evidence" means the greater weight of credible evidence presented in this case. If you do not find that a preponderance of the evidence supports a "yes" answer, then answer "no." A preponderance of the evidence is not measured by the number of witnesses or by the number of documents admitted in evidence. For a fact to be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, you must find that the fact is more likely true than not true.

A fact may be established by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or both. A fact is established by direct evidence when proved by documentary evidence or by witnesses who saw the act done or heard the words spoken. A fact is established by circumstantial evidence when it may be fairly and reasonably inferred from the other facts proved.

7. A party's conduct includes the conduct of another who acts with the party's authority or apparent authority. Authority for another to act for a party must arise from the party's agreement that the other act on behalf and for the benefit of the party. If a party so authorizes another to perform an act, that other party is also authorized to do whatever else is proper, usual, and necessary to perform the act expressly authorized. Apparent authority exists if a party (1) knowingly permits

another to hold himself out as having authority or, (2) through lack of ordinary care, bestows on another such indications of authority that lead a reasonably prudent person to rely on the apparent existence of authority to his detriment. Only the acts of the party sought to be charged with responsibility for the conduct of another may be considered in determining whether apparent authority exists.

- 8. Do not decide who you think should win before you answer the questions and then just answer the questions to match your decision. Answer each question carefully without considering who will win. Do not discuss or consider the effect your answers will have.
  - 9. Do not answer questions by drawing straws or by any method of chance.
- 10. Some questions might ask you for a dollar amount. Do not agree in advance to decide on a dollar amount by adding up each juror's amount and then figuring the average.
- 11. Do not trade your answers. For example, do not say, "I will answer this question your way if you answer another question my way."
- 12. Unless otherwise instructed, the answers to the questions must be based on the decision of at least five of the six jurors. The same five jurors must agree on every answer. Do not agree to be bound by a vote of anything less than five jurors, even if it would be a majority.
- 13. In answering questions about damages, answer each question separately. Do not increase or reduce the amount in one answer because of your answer to any other question about damages. Do not speculate about what a party's ultimate recovery may or may not be. Any recovery will be determined by the court when it applies the law to your answers at the time of the judgment. Do not add any amount for interest on damages, if any.

As I have said before, if you do not follow these instructions, you will be guilty of juror misconduct, and I might have to order a new trial and start this process over again. This would waste your time and the parties' money, and would require the taxpayers of this county to pay for another trial. If a juror breaks any of these rules, tell that person to stop and report it to me immediately.

# DEFINITIONS

"JPMorgan" means JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

"Fee Agreement" means Plaintiff's Exhibit 7.

"The Estate" means the Estate of Max D. Hopper,

### Question No. 1

After JPMorgan was appointed Independent Administrator on June 30, 2010, did JPMorgan fail to comply with one or more of the following fiduciary duties:

a. JPMorgan's duty to act toward Jo Hopper in the utmost good faith and exercise the most scrupulous honesty; (

Answer "Yes" or "No": VCS

b. JPMorgan's duty to place the interests of Jo Hopper above its own and to not use the advantage of its position to gain any benefit for itself at the expense of Jo Hopper;

Answer "Yes" or "No": \u221365

c. JPMorgan's duty to fully and fairly disclose to Jo Hopper all material facts known to JPMorgan that might affect her rights.

Answer "Yes" or "No": YES

If you answered "Yes" to any subpart of Question No. 1, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

### Question No. 2

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate Jo Hopper for her damages, if any, that were proximately caused by such conduct?

"Proximate cause" means a cause that was a substantial factor in bringing about an event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using the degree of care required of him or her would have foreseen that the event, or some similar event might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.

Consider the following element of damages, if any, and none other.

Do not add any amount for interest on damages, if any.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any.

Jo Hopper's mental anguish sustained in the past.

"Mental anguish" means a relatively high degree of mental pain and distress that is more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger.

Answer: \$ 500,000,00

b. Attorneys' fees paid by Jo Hopper before this lawsuit to address JPMorgan's breaches of its fiduciary duties.

Answer: \$ 222, 780,95

Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "yes" to Question No. 1 and with an amount greater than \$0 to any part of Question No. 2. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

To answer "yes" to the following question, your answer must be unanimous. You may answer "No" to the following question only upon a vote of five or more jurors. Otherwise, you must not answer the following question.

## Question No. 3

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the harm to Jo Hopper from JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty resulted from malice?

"Clear and convincing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof that produces a firm belief or conviction of the truth of the allegation sought to be established.

"Malice" means a specific intent by JPMorgan to cause substantial injury or harm to Jo Hopper.

Answer "Yes" or "No": VES

Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "Yes" to Question No. 3. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

You must unanimously agree on the amount of any award of exemplary damages.

### Question No. 4

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, should be assessed against JPMorgan and awarded to Jo Hopper as exemplary damages, if any, for the conduct found in response to Question No. 3?

"Exemplary damages" means an amount that you may in your discretion award as a penalty or by way of punishment.

Factors to consider in awarding exemplary damages, if any, are-

- 1. The nature of the wrong;
- 2. The character of the conduct involved;
- 3. The degree of culpability of JPMorgan;
- 4. The situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned;
- 5. The extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice and propriety; and
- 6. The net worth of JPMorgan.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any.

Answer: \$ 2,000,000,000,00

If you answered with an amount greater than \$0 to any subpart of Question 2, then answer the following question. Otherwise do not answer the following question.

### Question No. 5

Did the negligence, if any, or knowing participation in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty, if any, of those named below proximately cause Jo Hopper's damages?

"Negligence" means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which a person of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.

"Ordinary care" means that degree of care that would be used by a person of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances.

"Proximate cause" means a cause that was a substantial factor in bringing about an event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using the degree of care required of him or her would have foreseen that the event, or some similar event might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.

"Knowing participation in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty" requires that (1) the person or entity knowingly participated in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty, and (2) that person or entity knew of the fiduciary relationship and was aware of his participation in JPMorgan's breach of its duty.

a.	Answer "Yes"	or "No" w	ith regard	to the	negligence,	if any, c	of the following:
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Jo Hopper

NO

b. Answer "Yes" or "No" with regard to knowing participation in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty, if any, of each of the following:

Stephen Hopper Laura Wassmer Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray NO NO NO If you answered "Yes" to Question 5 for more than one of those named below, then answer the following question. Otherwise do not answer the following question.

Assign percentages of responsibility only to those you found caused or contributed to cause the injury you found in question 2. The percentages you find must total 100 percent. The percentages must be expressed in whole numbers. The percentage of responsibility attributable to any one is not necessarily measured by the number of acts or omissions found. The percentage attributable to any one need not be the same percentage attributed to that one in answering another question.

## Question No. 6

For each person or entity you found caused or contributed to cause the injury, find the percentage of responsibility attributable to each for the conduct you have found:

JPMorgan	
Jo Hopper	
Stephen Hopper	<del></del>
Laura Wassmer	
Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray	/
	***************************************
Total	100%

Question No. 7

Did JPMorgan fail to comply with the Fee Agreement with regard to Jo Hopper?

Answer "Yes" or "No": YES

If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 7, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

# Question No. 8

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate Jo Hopper for her damages, if any, that resulted from such failure to comply?

Consider the following elements of damages, if any, and none other.

Do not add any amount for interest on damages, if any.

Answer separately in dollars and cents for damages, if any, with respect to each of the following:

Attorney's fees paid by Jo Hopper before this lawsuit to address JPMorgan's failure to perform its responsibilities under the Fee Agreement.

Money owed to Jo Hopper for reimbursement of expenses.

Answer: \$ 58,051,47

If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 7, then answer the following question. Otherwise do not answer the following question.

#### Question No. 9

What is a reasonable fee for the necessary services of Jo Hopper's attorneys regarding her claim for breach of contract, stated in dollars and cents?

Factors to consider in determining a reasonable fee include:

- 1. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal services properly.
- 2. The likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
- 3. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
- 4. The amount involved and the results obtained.
- 5. The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
- 6. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
- 7. The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
- 8. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered.

Answer with an amount for each of the following:

1. For representation through this trial.

Answer: \$4,061,518.00

2. For representation through appeal to the court of appeals.

Answer: \$ 200,000,00

3. For representation at the petition for review stage in the Supreme Court of Texas.

Answer: \$ 50,000,000

4. For representation at the merits briefing stage in the Supreme Court of Texas.

Answer: \$ 75,000,00

5. For representation through oral argument and the completion of proceedings in the Supreme Court of Texas.

Answer: \$ 50,000.00

Does JPMorgan as Independent Administrator hold money that in equity and good conscience belongs to Jo Hopper?

Answer "Yes" or "No": 18

If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 10, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

## Question No. 11

What is the amount of money held by JPMorgan as Independent Administrator that in equity and good conscience belongs to Jo Hopper?

Answer: \$ 58,682.00

What is a reasonable fee for the necessary services of Jo Hopper's attorneys regarding the Robledo claims, stated in dollars and cents?

"Robledo claims" mean all the declaratory judgment claims that regarding the house and lot located at 9 Robledo Drive, Dallas, Texas and other issues addressed in the court of appeals opinion issued in December 2014.

Factors to consider in determining a reasonable fee include:

- 1. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal services properly.
- 2. The likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
- 3. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
- 4. The amount involved and the results obtained.
- 5. The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
- 6. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
- 7. The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
- 8. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered.

Answer with an amount for each of the following:

1. For representation through this trial.

Answer: \$ 4,052,035,00

2. For representation in a future appeal through appeal to the court of appeals.

Answer: \$ 200,000.00

3. For representation in a future appeal at the petition for review stage in the Supreme Court of Texas.

Answer: \$56,000.00

4. For representation in a future appeal at the merits briefing stage in the Supreme Court of Texas.

Answer: \$ 75,000.00

5. For representation in a future appeal through oral argument and the completion of proceedings in the Supreme Court of Texas.

Answer: \$ 50,000,00

What is a reasonable fee for the necessary services of Jo Hopper's attorneys in obtaining a ruling that Jo Hopper does not owe the Estate any money for attorneys' fees, stated in dollars and cents?

Factors to consider in determining a reasonable fee include:

- 1. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal services properly.
- 2. The likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
- 3. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
- 4. The amount involved and the results obtained.
- 5. The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
- 6. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
- 7. The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
- 8. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered.

Answer with an amount for each of the following:

1. For representation through this trial.

Answer: \$1469,828,00

2. For representation through appeal to the court of appeals.

Answer: \$ 200,000.00

3. For representation at the petition for review stage in the Supreme Court of Texas.

Answer: \$ 30,000.00

4. For representation at the merits briefing stage in the Supreme Court of Texas.

Answer: \$ 75,000.00

5. For representation through oral argument and the completion of proceedings in the Supreme Court of Texas.

Answer: \$ 50.000, 00

Did JPMorgan fail to comply with the Fee Agreement with respect to Stephen Hopper and/or Laura Wassmer?

Answer "Yes" or "No" for each of the following:

Stephen B. Hopper: YAS

If you answered Question Number 14 "Yes," Answer this Question. Otherwise do not answer the following question.

#### Question No. 15

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate Stephen B. Hopper and/or Laura S. Wassmer for their damages, if any, that resulted from JPMorgan's failure to comply with the Fee Agreement?

Consider the following elements of damages, if any, and none other.

1. The amount of legal fees Stephen Hopper paid to his attorneys prior to the inception of the litigation that were the natural, probable and forseeable consequence of JPMorgan's failure to comply with the Fee Agreement.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any, for the following:

Stephen B. Hopper: \$ <u>84 500.00</u>

2. The amount of legal fees Laura Wassmer paid her attorneys prior to the inception of the litigation that were the natural, probable and forseeable consequence of JPMorgan's failure to comply with the Fee Agreement.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any, for the following:

Laura S. Wassmer: \$ 78,000,00

3. The loss of potential inheritance to Stephen B. Hopper that was a natural, probable and forseeable consequence of JP Morgan's failure to comply with the Fee Agreement.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any, for the following:

Stephen B. Hopper: \$1,847,500,06

4. The loss of potential inheritance to Laura S. Wassmer that was a natural, probable and forseeable consequence of JP Morgan's failure to comply with the Fee Agreement.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any, for the following:

Laura S. Wassmer: \$ 1,847,500,00

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After JPMorgan was appointed Independent Administrator on June 30, 2010, did JPMorgan fail to comply with one or more of the following fiduciary duties, which it owed Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer as beneficiaries of the Estate?

a. JPMorgan's duty to act toward Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer in the utmost good faith and exercise the most scrupulous'honesty;

Answer "Yes" or "No": VES

b. JPMorgan's duty to place the interests of Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer above its own and to not use the advantage of its position to gain any benefit for itself at the expense of Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer;

Answer "Yes" or "No": YES

c. JPMorgan's duty to fully and fairly disclose to Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer all material facts known to JPMorgan that might affect their rights.

Answer "Yes" or "No": YES

If you answered "Yes" to Question 20, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

### Question No. 21

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate the Estate for damages, if any, resulting from the conduct complained about in Question 20?

Consider the following elements of damages, if any, and none other.

Any reduction in the value of the Estate.

Do not add any amount for interest on damages, if any.

Answer in dollars and cents for damages, if any.

Answer: \$ 3,695,000.00

If you answered "Yes" to any subpart of Question 20, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

#### Question No. 22

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate the Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer for damages, if any, that were proximately caused by the conduct inquired about in Question 20?

"Proximate cause" means a cause that was a substantial factor in bringing about an event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using the degree of care required of him would have fore- seen that the event, or some similar event, might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.

Consider the following elements of damages, if any, and none other.

Any reduction in the value of the Estate.

Consider each element separately. Do not add any amount for interest on damages, if any.

Answer separately in dollars and cents for damages, if any.

For Stephen Hopper, in dollars and cents:

Answer: \$1,847,500.00

For Laura Wassmer, in dollars and cents:

Answer: \$ 1,847,500,00

If you answered with an amount greater than \$0 to any subpart of Question 21 or 22, then answer the following question. Otherwise do not answer the following question.

#### Question No. 23

Did the negligence, if any, or knowing participation in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty, if any, of those named below proximately cause Stephen Hopper's, Laura Wassmer's, or the Estate's damages?

"Negligence" when used with respect to Jo Hopper, Stephen Hopper, and Laura Wassmer means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which a person of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.

"Negligence" when used with respect to the conduct of Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray, means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which an attorney would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which an attorney would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.

"Ordinary care" means that degree of care that would be used by a person of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances.

"Proximate cause" means a cause that was a substantial factor in bringing about an event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using the degree of care required of him or her would have foreseen that the event, or some similar event might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.

"Knowing participation in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty" requires that (1) the person or entity knowingly participated in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty, and (2) that person or entity knew of the fiduciary relationship and was aware of his participation in JPMorgan's breach of its duty.

a. Answer "Yes" or "No" with regard to the negligence, if any, of the following:

Jo Hopper
Stephen Hopper
Laura Wassmer
Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray

VES

b. Answer "Yes" or "No" with regard to knowing participation in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty, if any; of each of the following:

Jo Hopper | NO Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray | NO NO

If you answered "Yes" to Question 23 for more than one of those named below, then answer the following question. Otherwise do not answer the following question.

Assign percentages of responsibility only to those you found caused or contributed to cause the injury you found in question 21. The percentages you find must total 100 percent. The percentages must be expressed in whole numbers. The percentage of responsibility attributable to any one is not necessarily measured by the number of acts or omissions found. The percentage attributable to any one need not be the same percentage attributed to that one in answering another question.

#### Question No. 24

For each person or entity you found caused or contributed to cause the injury, find the percentage of responsibility attributable to each for the conduct you have found:

JPMorgan
Jo Hopper (negligence)
Jo Hopper (knowing participation)
Stephen Hopper
Laura Wassmer (negligence)
Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray (negligence)
Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray (knowing participation)

90

Total

100%

Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "Yes" to any subpart of Question No. 20. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

To answer "yes" to the following question, your answer must be unanimous. You may answer "No" to the following question only upon a vote of five or more jurors. Otherwise, you must not answer the following question.

#### Question No. 25

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the harm to the Estate from JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty resulted from malice?

"Clear and convincing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof that produces a firm belief or conviction of the truth of the allegation sought to be established.

"Malice" means a specific intent by JPMorgan to cause substantial injury or harm to the Estate.

Answer "Yes" or "No": 16

Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "Yes" to Question Number 25. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

You must unanimously agree on the amount of any award of exemplary damages.

#### Question No. 26

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, should be assessed against JPMorgan and awarded to Estate as exemplary damages, if any, for the conduct found in response to Question No. 25?

"Exemplary damages" means an amount that you may in your discretion award as a penalty or by way of punishment.

Factors to consider in awarding exemplary damages, if any, are-

- 1. The nature of the wrong;
- 2. The character of the conduct involved;
- 3. The degree of culpability of JPMorgan;
- 4. The situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned;
- 5. The extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice and propriety; and
- 6. The net worth of JPMorgan.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any.

Answer: \$ 2,000,000,000.00

Did JPMorgan commit fraud against Stephen B. Hopper and/or Laura S. Wassmer?

Fraud occurs when-

- 1. A party makes a material misrepresentation; and
- 2. The misrepresentation is made with knowledge of its falsity or made recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as a positive assertion, and
- 3. The misrepresentation is made with the intention that it should be acted on by the other party, and
- 4. The other party relies on the misrepresentation and thereby suffers injury.

Fraud also occurs when-

- 1. A party fails to disclose a material fact within the knowledge of that party; and
- 2. The party knows that the other party is ignorant of the fact and does not have an equal opportunity to discovery the truth; and
- 3. The party intends to induce the other party to take some action by failing to disclose the fact; and
- The other party suffers injury as a result of acting without knowledge of the undisclosed fact.

"Misrepresentation" means-

- 1. A statement of opinion based on a false statement of fact; or
- 2. A statement of opinion that the maker knows to be false; or
- 3. An expression of opinion that is false, made by one who has, or purports to have, special knowledge of the subject matter of the opinion.

Answer "Yes" or "No" with for each of the following:

Stephen B. Hopper:

¥85\_

Laura S. Wassmer:

108

Answer the following question only if you answered "Yes" to Question Number 27 Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

#### Question No. 28

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer for their damages, if any, that were proximately caused by such fraud?

"Proximate cause" means a cause that was a substantial factor in bringing about an event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using the degree of care required of him would have foreseen that the event, or some similar event, might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.

Consider the following elements of damages, if any, and none other.

1. The amount of legal fees Stephen Hopper paid to his attorneys prior to the inception of the litigation that were the natural, probable and forseeable consequence of JPMorgan's fraud.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any, for the following:

Stephen B. Hopper: \$ 84,700,00

2. The amount of legal fees Laura Wassmer paid her attorneys prior to the inception of the litigation that were the natural, probable and forseeable consequence of JPMorgan's fraud.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any, for the following:

Laura S. Wassmer: \$ 78,000.00

3. The loss of potential inheritance to Stephen B. Hopper that was a natural, probable and forseeable consequence of JP Morgan's fraud.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any, for the following:

Stephen B. Hopper: \$ 1,847,600,60

The loss of potential inheritance to Laura S. Wassmer that was a natural, probable and 4. forseeable consequence of JP Morgan's fraud.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any, for the following:

Laura S. Wassmer: \$ 1,847,500.00

If you answered "Yes" to Question 28, then answer the following question. Otherwise do not answer the following question.

#### Question No. 29

Did the negligence, if any, or knowing participation in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty, if any, of those named below proximately cause Stephen Hopper's, Laura Wassmer's, or the Estate's damages?

"Negligence" when used with respect to Jo Hopper, Stephen Hopper, and Laura Wassmer means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which a person of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.

"Negligence" when used with respect to the conduct of Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray, means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which an attorney would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which an attorney would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.

"Ordinary care" means that degree of care that would be used by a person of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances.

"Proximate cause" means a cause that was a substantial factor in bringing about an event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using the degree of care required of him or her would have foreseen that the event, or some similar event might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.

"Knowing participation in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty" requires that (1) the person or entity knowingly participated in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty, and (2) that person or entity knew of the fiduciary relationship and was aware of his participation in JPMorgan's breach of its duty.

a. Answer "Yes" or "No" with regard to the negligence, if any, of the following:

Jo Hopper
Stephen Hopper
Laura Wassmer
Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray

VES

b. Answer "Yes" or "No" with regard to knowing participation in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty, if any, of each of the following:

Jo Hopper
Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray

If you answered "Yes" to Question 29 for more than one of those named below, then answer the following question. Otherwise do not answer the following question.

Assign percentages of responsibility only to those you found caused or contributed to cause the injury you found in question 28. The percentages you find must total 100 percent. The percentages must be expressed in whole numbers. The percentage of responsibility attributable to any one is not necessarily measured by the number of acts or omissions found. The percentage attributable to any one need not be the same percentage attributed to that one in answering another question.

#### Question No. 30

For each person or entity you found caused or contributed to cause the injury, find the percentage of responsibility attributable to each for the conduct you have found:

JPMorgan .	90
Jo Hopper (negligence)	70
Jo Hopper (knowing participation)	8
Stephen Hopper	0
Laura Wassmer (negligence)	0.
Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray (negligence)	70
Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray (knowing participation)	0

Total . 100%

Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "Yes" to any part of Question No. 27. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

To answer "yes" to the following question, your answer must be unanimous. You may answer "No" to the following question only upon a vote of five or more jurors. Otherwise, you must not answer the following question.

#### Question No. 31

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the harm to Stephen B Hopper and/or Laura S. Wassmer resulted from fraud as found in Question 27?

"Clear and convincing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof that produces a firm belief or conviction of the truth of the allegations sought to be established.

#### Fraud occurs when-

- 1. A party makes a material misrepresentation; and
- 2. The misrepresentation is made with knowledge of its falsity or made recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as a positive assertion, and
- 3. The misrepresentation is made with the intention that it should be acted on by the other party, and
- 4. The other party relies on the misrepresentation and thereby suffers injury.

#### Fraud also occurs when-

- 1. A party fails to disclose a material fact within the knowledge of that party; and
- 2. The party knows that the other party is ignorant of the fact and does not have an equal opportunity to discovery the truth; and
- 3. The party intends to induce the other party to take some action by failing to disclose the fact; and
- 4. The other party suffers injury as a result of acting without knowledge of the undisclosed fact.

#### "Misrepresentation" means-

1. A statement of opinion based on a false statement of fact; or

- 2. A statement of opinion that the maker knows to be false; or
- 3. An expression of opinion that is false, made by one who has, or purports to have, special knowledge of the subject matter of the opinion.

Answer "Yes" or "No" as to each of the following:

Stephen B. Hopper Ves

Answer the following question regarding JPMorgan only if you unanimously answered "Yes" to Question 31 regarding that defendant. Otherwise, do not answer the following question regarding that defendant

#### Question No. 32

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, should be assessed against JPMorgan and awarded to Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer as exemplary damages, if any, for the conduct found in response to Question 31.

"Exemplary damages" means an amount that you may in your discretion award as a penalty or by way of punishment.

Factors to consider in awarding exemplary damages, if any, are-

- a. The nature of the wrong.
- b. The character of the conduct involved,
- c. The degree of culpability of JPMorgan
- d. The situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned
- e. The extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice and propriety
- f. The net worth of JPMorgan

Answer in dollars and cents, if any, as to each of the following:

Laura S. Wassmer \$1,000,000,600.00

Stephen B. Hopper \$ 1,000,000,000.00

Did the negligence, if any, of JPMorgan proximately cause injury to Stephen B. Hopper and/or Laura S. Wassmer?

"Negligence" means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which a person of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.

"Ordinary care" means that degree of care that would be used by a person of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances.

"Proximate cause" means a cause that was a substantial factor in bringing about an event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using the degree of care required of him would have foreseen that the event, or some similar event, might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.

Answer "Yes" or "No" for each of the following:

Laura S. Wassmer

vas

Stephen B. Hopper

VAS

Answer the following question only if you answered "Yes" to Question Number 33. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

#### **Question No. 34**

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer for their damages, if any, that were proximately caused by negligence?

"Proximate cause" means a cause that was a substantial factor in bringing about an event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using the degree of care required of him would have foreseen that the event, or some similar event, might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.

Consider the following elements of damages, if any, and none other. Answer in dollars and cents, if any, for the following:

1. The amount of legal fees Stephen Hopper paid to his attorneys prior to the inception of the litigation that were the natural, probable and forseeable consequence of JPMorgan's negligence.

Stephen B. Hopper: \$ 84,500.00

 The amount of legal fees Laura Wassmer paid her attorneys prior to the inception of the litigation that were the natural, probable and forseeable consequence of JPMorgan's negligence.

Laura S. Wassmer: \$ 78,000.00

3. The loss of potential inheritance to Stephen B. Hopper that was a natural, probable and forseeable consequence of JP Morgan's negligence.

Stephen B. Hopper: \$1,847,500.00

4. The loss of potential inheritance to Laura S. Wassmer that was a natural, probable and forseeable consequence of JP Morgan's negligence.

Laura S. Wassmer: \$ 1,847,500.00

If you answered "Yes" to Question 34, then answer the following question. Otherwise do not answer the following question.

#### Question No. 35

Did the negligence, if any, or knowing participation in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty, if any, of those named below proximately cause Stephen Hopper's or Laura Wassmer's damages?

"Negligence" when used with respect to Jo Hopper, Stephen Hopper, and Laura Wassmer means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which a person of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.

"Negligence" when used with respect to the conduct of Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray, means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which an attorney would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which an attorney would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.

"Ordinary care" means that degree of care that would be used by a person of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances.

"Proximate cause" means a cause that was a substantial factor in bringing about an event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using the degree of care required of him or her would have foreseen that the event, or some similar event might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.

"Knowing participation in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty" requires that (1) the person or entity knowingly participated in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty, and (2) that person or entity knew of the fiduciary relationship and was aware of his participation in JPMorgan's breach of its duty.

a.	Answer "Yes" or "No" with regard to the negli-	gence, if any, of the following
	Jo Hopper	NO
	Stephen Hopper	NO
	Laura Wassmer	10
	Gary Stolhach and Glast Phillips & Murray	202

If you answered "Yes" to Question 35 for more than one of those named below, then answer the following question. Otherwise do not answer the following question.

Assign percentages of responsibility only to those you found caused or contributed to cause the injury you found in question 34. The percentages you find must total 100 percent. The percentages must be expressed in whole numbers. The percentage of responsibility attributable to any one is not necessarily measured by the number of acts or omissions found. The percentage attributable to any one need not be the same percentage attributed to that one in answering another question.

#### Question No. 36

For each person or entity you found caused or contributed to cause the injury, find the percentage of responsibility attributable to each for the conduct you have found:

JPMorgan	90
Jo Hopper (negligence)	0
Jo Hopper (knowing participation)	$\triangle$
Stephen Hopper	ð.
Laura Wassmer (negligence)	0
Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray (negligence)	70
Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray (knowing participation)	

Total <u>100%</u>

Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "Yes" to Question 33. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

To answer "Yes" to any part of the following question, your answer must be unanimous. You may answer "No" to any part of the following question only upon a vote of 5 more jurors. Otherwise, you must not answer that part of the following question.

#### Question No. 37

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the harm to Stephen B. Hopper, Laura S. Wassmer, or the Estate resulted from gross negligence attributable to JPMorgan?

"Clear and convincing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof that produces a firm belief or conviction of the truth of the allegations sought to be established.

"Gross negligence" means an act or omission by JPMorgan

- 1. which when viewed objectively from the standpoint JPMorgan at the time of its occurrence involves an extreme degree of risk, considering the probability and magnitude of the potential harm to others; and
- 2. of which JPMorgan has actual, subjective awareness of the risk involved, but nevertheless proceeds with conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare of others.

You are further instructed that JPMorgan may be grossly negligent because of an act by Susan Novak if, but only if--

- 1. JPMorgan authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or
- 2. Susan Novak was unfit and JPMorgan was reckless in employing her, or
- 3. Susan Novak was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of employment, or
- 4. JPMorgan or a manager of JPMorgan ratified or approved the act.

A person is a manager or is employed in a managerial capacity if-

1. that person has authority to employ, direct, and discharge an employee of JPMorgan; or

2. JPMorgan has confided to that person the management of the whole or a department or division of the business of JPMorgan

Answer "Yes" or "No" as to each of the following:

Laura S. Wassmer \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Stephen B. Hopper 468

Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "Yes" to Question 37. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

#### Question No. 38

You must unanimously agree on the amount of any award of exemplary damages.

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, should be assessed against JPMorgan and awarded to Stephen B. Hopper, Laura Wassmer or the Estate as exemplary damages, if any, for the conduct unanimously found in response to Question 37?

"Exemplary damages" means an amount that you may in your discretion award as a penalty or by way of punishment.

Factors to consider in awarding exemplary damages, if any, are-

- 1. The nature of the wrong.
- 2. The character of the conduct involved.
- 3. The degree of culpability of JPMorgan.
- 4. The situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned.
- 5. The extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice and propriety.
- 6. The net worth of JPMorgan.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any, for each of the following:

Laura S. Wassmer \$1,000,000,000.00

Stephen B. Hopper \$/, acception, and acceptance.

Did JPMorgan commit conversion against the Estate?

Conversion occurs when:

- 1. a party owned or had possession of the property or entitlement to possession, and
- 2. another party unlawfully and without authorization assumed and exercised control over the property to the exclusion or, or inconsistent with, the plaintiff's rights as an owner, and
- 3. the first party demanded return of the property, and
- 4. the other party refused to return the property.

Answer	"Yes" or "No."
Answer:	<u> 705</u>

If you answered "Yes" to Question 39, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

# Question No. 40

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly compensate the Estate for the value of the property JPMorgan converted, if any, valued at the time of such conversion?

Answer in dollars and cents for damages, if any:

Answer: \$3,695,000.00

Does JPMorgan as Independent Administrator hold money that in equity and good conscience belongs to the Estate?

Answer "Yes" or "No":  $\sqrt{95}$ 

If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 41, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

## Question No. 42

What is the amount of money held by JPMorgan as Independent Administrator that in equity and good conscience belongs to the Estate?

Answer: \$3,695,000.00

### Question No. 43

Did JPMorgan as Independent Administrator act in good faith, whether successful or not, in defending the action for its removal?

From September 21, 2011 through December 7, 2015, JPMorgan as Independent Administrator defended Jo Hopper's Removal Action.

"Removal Action" means Mrs. Hopper's claims for removal of JPMorgan as Independent Administrator.

"Good faith" means an action that is prompted by honesty of intention and a reasonable belief that the action was probably correct.

Answer "Y	es" or "No."	
A mayaran	17)	
Answer:	NO)	

### Question No. 44

What is a reasonable fee for the necessary services of the attorneys for JPMorgan as Independent Administrator in connection with its defense of the Removal Action, stated in dollars and cents?

Factors to consider in determining a reasonable fee include—

- 1. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal services properly.
- 2. The likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
- 3. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
- 4. The amount involved and the results obtained.
- 5. The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
- 6. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
- 7. The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
- 8. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered.

Attorneys' Fees Incurred in Defense of the Removal Action:

\$1,185,775.00

### Question No. 45

What is the amount of JPMorgan as Independent Administrator's reasonable attorneys' fees necessarily incurred in connection with the proceedings and management of the estate?

Factors to consider in determining a reasonable fee include-

- 1. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal services properly.
- 2. The likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer:
- 3. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
- 4. The amount involved and the results obtained.
- 5. The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
- 6. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
- 7. The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
- 8. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered.

Answer with an amount for representation after December 7, 2015:

1. For representation through trial and the completion of proceedings in the trial court.

Answer: \$ 685,632,00

2. For representation through appeal to the court of appeals.

Answer: \$ 100,000,00

3. For representation at the petition for review stage in the Supreme Court of Texas.

Answer: \$ 75,000.00

4. For representation at the merits briefing stage in the Supreme Court of Texas.

Answer: \$ 50,000.00

5. For representation through oral argument and the completion of proceedings in the Supreme Court of Texas.

Answer: \$ 50,000.00

### Presiding Juror:

- 1. When you go into the jury room to answer the questions, the first thing you will need to do is choose a presiding juror.
  - 2. The presiding juror has these duties:
    - a. have the complete charge read aloud if it will be helpful to your deliberations;
    - b. preside over your deliberations, meaning manage the discussions, and see that you follow these instructions;
    - c. give written questions or comments to the bailiff who will give them to the judge;
    - d. write down the answers you agree on;
    - e. get the signatures for the verdict certificate; and
    - f. notify the bailiff that you have reached a verdict.

Do you understand the duties of the presiding juror? If you do not, please tell me now.

### Instructions for Signing the Verdict Certificate:

- 1. Unless otherwise instructed, you may answer the questions on a vote of five jurors. The same five jurors must agree on every answer in the charge. This means you may not have one group of five jurors agree on one answer and a different group of five jurors agree on another answer.
  - 2. If five jurors agree on every answer, those five jurors sign the verdict.

If all six of you agree on every answer, you are unanimous and only the presiding juror signs the verdict.

- .3. All jurors should deliberate on every question. You may end up with all six of you agreeing on some answers, while only five of you agree on other answers. But when you sign the verdict, only those five who agree on every answer will sign the verdict.
- 4. There are some special instructions before Questions 3, 4, 25, 26, 31, 32, 37, and 38 explaining how to answer those questions. Please follow the instructions. If all six of you answer those questions, you will need to complete a second verdict certificate for those questions.

Do you understand these instructions? If you do not, please the me now

### Verdict Certificate

Our verdict is not unanimous. Fir	ve of us have agreed to each and every ans
ned the certificate below.	e in the cent
ignature	Name Printed
Re Action	RANDY GOUT
00 01	
futue Amis	Irelsie Alvanez
Bolly Miller	Bothal Miller
12/1	C# 1 ALLA
. M. SA	Stacey Leonack

### **Additional Certificate**

I certify that the jury was unanimous in answering the following questions. All six of us agreed to each of the answers. The presiding juror has signed the certificate for all six of us.

Questions 3, 25, 31, and 37 and 4, 26, 32, and 38.

Signature of Presiding Juro

Printed Name of Presiding Juror



April 4, 2018

JEFFREY S. LEVINGER Board Certified Civil Appellate Law Texas Board of Legal Specialization

By E-Mail

Van H. Beckwith Baker Botts L.L.F. 2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700 Dallas, TX 75201

Re: No. PR-11-3238-1; In re Estate of Max D. Hopper; Jo N. Hopper v. JPMorgan Chase

Bank, et al..; in the Probate Court No. 1 of Dallas County, Texas

Dear Van:

This Rule 11 letter will confirm that Laura Wassmer, Stephen Hopper, the Estate of Max Hopper, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. have agreed to settle this case based on the confidential terms set forth in the email communication between Robert Sacks and me dated April 3 and 4, 2018. Laura Wassmer, Stephen Hopper, and the Estate agree to withdraw their Motion for Judgment and the hearing set on it for April 5-6, 2018, and the parties shall announce this settlement to the Court. I would appreciate it if you would sign this letter below to signify your acceptance of it.

Sincerely

genrex/s. Levinger Counsel for Laura Wassmer, Stephen Hopper, and the Estate

of Max Hopper

JL/rh Enclosure

AGREED

Van H. Beckwith

Counsel for JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

**EXHIBIT** 

H

LEVINGER PC | 1445 ROSS AVENUE | SUITE 2500 | DALLAS, TEXAS 75202 | P 214.655.6817 | 7 214.655.6808 | 3 jlevinger@levingerpc.com

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### CAUSE NO. PR-11-3238-1

IN RE: ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED	Ş Ş	IN THE PROBATE COURT
	§	
	§	
JO N. HOPPER,	§	
	§	
Plaintiff,	§	
	§	NO. 1
v.	§	
	§	
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,	§	
STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S.	8	
WASSMER,	§	
•	8	
Defendants.	§	DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

# MOTION TO QUASH AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND OBJECTION TO SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM

### To the Honorable Court:

Pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 176.6(d) and (e), 192.6(b), 199.4, and 205.2, and subject to and without waiving the motion to compel arbitration filed by Laura Wassmer and Stephen Hopper, nonparty witness Jeffrey S. Levinger ("Levinger") moves to quash and for protective order, and objects as follows, with respect to the Attorneys' Notice of Intent to Take the Oral and Videotaped Deposition of Jeffrey S. Levinger with Subpoena Duces Tecum ("Notice") attached hereto as Exhibit A.

1. At approximately 9:35 a.m. on Monday, April 16, 2018, John Malesovas, an attorney who claims to be an intervenor in the fee dispute that has

arisen in this matter, sent an email to Levinger attaching the Notice. This Notice was not served in the manner required by Rules 176.5 and 205.1. Therefore, it is unenforceable for that reason alone. Nonetheless, out of an abundance of caution, Levinger will respond to the Notice as follows.

- 2. First, in accordance with Rule 199.4, Levinger objects to the time and place designated for the deposition. The time (Tuesday, April 17) and place (the offices of Fee, Smith, Sharp, and Vitullo) are not reasonable. Further, inasmuch as the Notice seeks the production of documents from a nonparty on only one day's notice, it fails to comply with Rule 205.2. Accordingly, the Notice should be quashed and a protective order granted.
- 3. Second, in accordance with Rule 192.6(b), Levinger is entitled to a protective order to protect him and his clients, Laura Wassmer and Stephen Hopper from undue burden, unnecessary expense, harassment, annoyance, invasion of personal, constitutional, and property rights, and intrusion into confidential and privileged matters.
- 4. Third, in accordance with Rules 176.6(d) and (e), Levinger objects to, and is entitled to a protective order from, the Notice's request for documents and other items. The document request is objectionable because it seeks confidential and privileged information. Further, a protective order is necessary to protect Levinger and his clients from undue burden, unnecessary expense, harassment, annoyance,

invasion of personal, constitutional, and property rights, and intrusion into confidential and privileged matters.

5. Fourth, the Notice violates the Temporary Restraining Order signed on April 10, 2018, which entitles the Intervenors (which includes Malesovas) to expedited depositions of only Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer.

For all these reasons, the Notice should be quashed, a protective order denying the requested discovery should be entered, the objections should be sustained, and all other relief to which Levinger or his clients are entitled should be granted. In the meantime, the deposition requested in the Notice is stayed in accordance with Rule 199.4.

Respectfully submitted,

Jeffrey S. Levinger

Jeffrey S. Levinger State Bar No. 12258300 Levinger PC 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500 Dallas, TX 75201 Telephone: 214-855-6817

Fax: 214-855-6808

jlevinger@levingerpc.com

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a copy of this Motion to Quash and For Protective Order and Objection to Subpoena Duces Tecum was served by electronic transmission on the following counsel on this 16th day of April, 2018.

John L. Malesovas Malesovas Law Firm 1901 South Mopac Expressway Suite 320 Austin, TX 78746

Alan S. Loewinsohn
Kerry F. Schonwald
Loewinsohn Flegle Deary
Simon LLP
12377 Merit Dr. Suite 900
Dallas, TX 75251

Van H. Beckwith Jessica B. Pulliam Baker Botts, L.L.P. 2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700 Dallas, TX 75201

Brian P. Lauten Brian Lauten, P.C. 3811 Turtle Creek Blvd. Suite 1450 Dallas, TX 75219 Anthony L. Vitullo Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, L.L.P. Three Galleria Tower 13155 Noel Road, Suite 1000 Dallas, Texas 75240

John C. Eichman Grayson L. Linyard Hunton & Williams, LLP 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700 Dallas, TX 75202

Evan A. Young Baker Botts, L.L.P. 98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500 Austin, TX 78701

James E. Pennington Law Offices of James. Pennington, P.C. 900 Jackson Street, Suite 440 Dallas, Texas 75202

/s/ Jeffrey S. Levinger

Jeffrey S. Levinger

# TAB A

### CAUSE NO. PR-11-3238-1

IN RE: ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED,	§ IN THE PROBATE COURT §
JO N. HOPPER,	\$ \$ \$
Intervenor,	9 69 6
<b>V.</b>	§ NO. 1
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., STEPHEN B. HOPPER, and LAURA S. WASSMER,	§ § NO.1 § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § § §
Defendants.	§ OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULIO, LLP Attorneys,	\$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$ \$
Vi	9 &9 &9 &9 &9 &9 &9 &9 &9 &9 &9 &9 &9 &9
STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, individually and as Beneficiaries of the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,	07 cm
Defendants.	

# ATTORNEYS' NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE THE ORAL AND VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF JEFFREY S. LEVINGER WITH SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM

TO: Jeffrey S. Levinger, Levinger PC, 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500, Dallas, TX 75202.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 199.2, Attorneys will take the oral deposition of Jeffrey S. Levinger. The deposition will be held at the offices Attorneys' Notice of Intent to Take the Oral and Videotaped Deposition of Jeffrey S. Levinger with Subpoena Duces Tecum

Page 1

of Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vituilo, LLP, Three Galleria Tower, 13155 Noel Road, Suite 1000, Dallas, Texas, 75240; telephone 972-934-9100. The deposition will be taken on Tuesday, April 17, 2018, beginning at 9:00 a.m., and will continue from day to day until complete.

Pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 199.1(c), notice is given that the deposition may be recorded by stenographic means and by non-stenographic videotape recording before a certified court reporter.

Said deposition, when so taken and returned according to law, will be used in evidence upon the trial of said cause, and you may be present at such time to examine said witness as you may see proper.

Pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 199.2(b)(5), Jeffrey S. Levinger is directed to produce all documents set out on Exhibit "A" and all documents reviewed by him to prepare to testify at this deposition.

Respectfully submitted,

John L. Malesovas

MALESOVAS LAW FIRM State Bar No. 12857300

1801 South Mopac Expressway, Suite 320

Austin, TX 78746

Telephone:

(512) 708-1777

Telecopier: (512) 708-1779

ichn@malesovas.com

ATTORNEYS' NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE THE ORAL AND VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF JEFFREY S. LEVINGER WITH SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has been served on all counsel of record on April 14, 2018, in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to:

Alan S. Loewinsohn
Jim L. Flegle
Kerry F. Schonwald
Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP
12377 Merit Dr., Suite 900
Dallas, Texas 75251
214-572-1717 Facsimile
alan@lfdslaw.com
imf@lfdslaw.com
kerrys@lfdslaw.com
Attorneys for Intervenor Jo Hopper

Jeffrey S. Levinger
J. Carl Cecere
Levinger PC
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500
Dallas, TX 75202
214-855-6808 Facsimile
jlevinger@levingerpc.com
cecere@cecerepc.com
Attorneys for Defendants, Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

John C. Eichman
Grayson L. Linyard
Hunton & Williams, LLP
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700
Dallas, TX 75202
214-468-3599 Facsimile
jeichman@hunton.com
glinyard@hunton.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, Deceased,
and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., in its Corporate Capacity

ATTORNEYS' NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE THE ORAL AND VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF JEFFREY S. LEVINGER WITH SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM

Van H. Beckwith
Jessica B. Pulliam
Baker Botts L.L.P.
2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700
Dallas, TX 75201
214-661-4677 Facsimile
van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com
jessica.pulliam@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Evan A. Young
Baker Botts L.L.P.
98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
Austin, TX 78701
512-322-8306 Facsimile
evan.young@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant,
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

9n.M

ATTORNEYS' NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE THE ORAL AND VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF JEFFREY S. LEVINGER WITH SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM

### EXHIBIT "A"

- 1. all documents reviewed by him to prepare to testify at this deposition.
- 2. All email, text, electronic, and paper communication between you and any attorney for JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("JPM") regarding the negotiation and consummation of the settlement between Dr. Stephen Hopper ("Hopper") and Laura Wassmer ("Wassmer") and JPM ("Settlement"), as well as all attachments to any such communication.
- 3. All email, text, electronic, and paper communication between you and Hopper or Wassmer prior to 10:09 am, April 5, 2018, as well as all attachments to any such communication.
- 4. All email, text, electronic, and paper communication between you and Jim Pennington regarding the Settlement prior to 10:09 am, April 5, 2018, as well as all attachments to any such communication.
- 5. All email, text, electronic, and paper communication between you and Steve Block, or his attorney, Robert Toby, regarding Hopper, Wassmer, Intervenors or this case.

ATTORNEYS' NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE THE ORAL AND VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF JEFFREY S. LEVINGER WITH SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM

### Subpoena

### THE STATE OF TEXAS

### COUNTY OF TEXAS

To the sheriff, constable, or any person authorized to serve and execute subpoenas as provided in Rule 176, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

### Greetings:

You are hereby commanded to subpoena and summon the following witness who may be served as follows:

### JEFFREY S. LEVINGER

Levinger PC 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500 Dallas, TX 75202 214-855-6817

to appear before a Court Reporter, at the offices of Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP, Three Galleria Tower, 13155 Noel Road, Suite 1000, Dallas, TX 75240; telephone 972-934-9100, on Tuesday, April 17, 2018, at 9:00 a.m., in order to give deposition as a witness on behalf of the Attorneys in Cause NO. PR-11-3238-1; In re Estate of Max D. Hopper; Jo N. Hopper v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, et al; Probate Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas, to attend from day to day until lawfully discharged.

SAID ABOVE NAMED WITNESS IS FURTHER COMMANDED to produce at said time and place set forth above, the following books, papers, documents, or other tangible things, to-wit:

- 1. all documents reviewed by him to prepare to testify at this deposition.
- All email, text, electronic, and paper communication between you and any attorney for JP
  Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("JPM") regarding the negotiation and consummation of the
  settlement between Dr. Stephen Hopper ("Hopper") and Laura Wassmer ("Wassmer") and
  JPM ("Settlement"), as well as all attachments to any such communication.
- 3. All email, text, electronic, and paper communication between you and Hopper or Wassmer prior to 10:09 am, April 5, 2018, as well as all attachments to any such communication.
- All email, text, electronic, and paper communication between you and Jim Pennington regarding the Settlement prior to 10:09 am, April 5, 2018, as well as all attachments to any such communication.
- 5. All email, text, electronic, and paper communication between you and Steve Block, or his attorney, Robert Toby, regarding Hopper, Wassmer, Intervenors or this case.

The said witness shall continue in attendance from day to day and time to time until discharged according to law. Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served upon that person may be

deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena is issued, and may be punished by fine or confinement, or both.

WITNESS MY HAND this the 14th day of April, 2018.

Respectfully submitted,

John L. Malesovas

Malesovas Law Firm

State Bar No. 12857300

1801 South Mopac Expressway, Suite 320

Austin, TX 78746

Telephone:

(512) 708-1777

Telecopier:

(512) 708-1779

john@malesovas.com

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has been served on all counsel of record on April 14, 2018, in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to:

Alan S. Loewinsohn

Jim L. Flegle

Kerry F. Schonwald

Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP

12377 Merit Dr., Suite 900

Dallas, Texas 75251

214-572-1717 Facsimile

alank@lfdslaw.com

jimf@lfdslaw.com

kerrys@lfdslaw.com

Attorneys for Intervenor Jo Hopper

Jeffrey S. Levinger
J. Carl Cecere
Levinger PC
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500
Dallas, TX 75202
214-855-6808 Facsimile
ilevinger@levingerpc.com
ccecere@cecerepc.com

Attorneys for Defendants, Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

John C. Eichman
Grayson L. Linyard
Hunton & Williams, LLP
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700
Dallas, TX 75202
214-468-3599 Facsimile
jeichman@hunton.com
glinyard@hunton.com

Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, Deceased, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., in its Corporate Capacity

Van H. Beckwith
Jessica B. Pulliam
Baker Botts L.L.P.
2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700
Dallas, TX 75201
214-661-4677 Facsimile
van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com
jessica.pulliam@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Evan A. Young
Baker Botts L.L.P.
98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
Austin, TX 78701
512-322-8306 Facsimile
evan young@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant,
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

John K. Malesovas

### OFFICER'S RETURN

Came to hand the	day of	A.D. 20_	at	o'elock	m., and
executed on the	day of	A.D. 20	at		o'clock
m., by delivering to	)				thin named
witness, in person, a	true copy of this Trial Sub	poena and tendering	him \$10.0	00 which he acc	epted.
FEES:					
Serving Subpoena Mileage	\$				
TOTAL	\$				
	***	•		Proces	s Server
	****		_ County	, Texas	

### CAUSE NO. PR-113238-1

IN RE: ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED

JO N. HOPPER

Plaintiff,

v.

JP MORGAN CHASE, N.A., STEPHEN B. HOPPER and LAURA S. WASSMER

Defendants.

JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP

Intervenors,

STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, and JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,

Defendants.

IN THE PROBATE COURT

NO. 1

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

### MOTION TO QUASH AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND OBJECTION TO HEARING SUBPOENAS DUCES TECUM

Subject to and without waiving the pending motion to compel arbitration, and pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 176.6(d)-(f) and 192.6(b), Defendants, Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer ("the Clients") and nonparty attorney Jeffrey S. Levinger ("Levinger") file this Motion to Quash and for Protective Order, and object as follows, with respect to the Subpoenas Duces Tecum ("Subpoenas") attached hereto as Exhibits A-C.

Clients object to Intervenors' Subpoenas, and they object to the temporary injunction

MOTION TO QUASH AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

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proceeding, because this dispute is subject to binding arbitration. Clients do not waive their position that the Court must compel arbitration of all claims asserted by Intervenors in this action.

### Levinger Subpoena

- 1. At approximately 7:00 a.m. on Wednesday, April 18, 2018, John Malesovas, an intervenor in this lawsuit, attempted to have Levinger served with the Subpoena attached as Exhibit A. The Subpoena purports to require Levinger to attend the temporary injunction hearing scheduled for April 24, 2018 and to produce at the hearing six categories of documents and other items. This Subpoena was not served in the manner required by Rule 176.5 because it lacks the requisite proof of service. Therefore, it is unenforceable for that reason alone. Nonetheless, out of an abundance of caution, the Clients and Levinger will respond to the Subpoena as follows.
- 2. First, in accordance with Rules 176.6(e)-(f) and 192.6(b), a protective order should be entered to protect the Clients and Levinger from undue burden, unnecessary expense, harassment, annoyance, invasion of personal, constitutional, and property rights, and intrusion into confidential and privileged matters. In addition, Levinger has a conflicting and previously-scheduled court appearance in another case that precludes him from attending the hearing on April 24.
- 3. Second, in accordance with Rules 176.6(e) and (f), the Clients and Levinger object to, and are entitled to a protective order from, the Subpoena's request for documents and other items. The document request is objectionable because it seeks confidential and privileged information. Further, a protective order is necessary to protect the Clients and Levinger from undue burden, unnecessary expense, harassment, annoyance, invasion of personal, constitutional, and property rights, and intrusion into confidential and privileged matters.

MOTION TO QUASH AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

### Objections to Documents Requested in Levinger Subpoenas Duces Tecum

Request No. 1. All documents reviewed by him to prepare to testify at this deposition.

Response: Clients object to this request because this dispute is subject to binding arbitration and Defendants do not waive their position that the Court must compel arbitration of all claims asserted by Intervenors in this action. This request is vague and confusing – Levinger has not testified at any deposition.

Request No. 2. All email, text, electronic and paper communication between you and any attorney for JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. ("JPM") regarding the negotiation and consummation of the settlement between Dr. Stephen Hopper ("Hopper") and Laura Wassmer ("Wassmer") and JPM ("Settlement"), as well as all attachments to any such communication.

Response: Clients object to this request because this dispute is subject to binding arbitration and Clients do not waive their position that the Court must compel arbitration of all claims asserted by Intervenors in this action. Clients object to this request on the basis that the documents requested are protected by confidentiality pursuant to the settlement agreement between Defendants and JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. ("JPMorgan").

Request No. 3. All email, text, electronic and paper communication between you and Hopper or Wassmer prior to 10:09 a.m., April 5, 2018, as well as all attachments to any such communication.

Response: Clients object to this request because this dispute is subject to binding arbitration and Clients do not waive their position that the Court must compel arbitration of all claims asserted by Intervenors in this action. Clients object to this request on the basis of the attorney-client privilege. Levinger is withholding documents responsive to this request based on the attorney-client privilege.

Request No. 4. All email, text, electronic and paper communication between you and Jim Pennington prior to 10:09 a.m., April 5, 2018, as well as all attachments to any such communication.

Response: Clients object to this request because this dispute is subject to binding arbitration and Clients do not waive their position that the Court must compel arbitration of all claims asserted by Intervenors in this action. Clients object to this request on the basis of the attorney-client privilege. Levinger is withholding documents responsive to this request based on the attorney-client privilege.

### The Clients' Subpoenas

4. At approximately 6:00 p.m. on April 17, 2018, John Malesovas, an intervenor in this lawsuit, served the Clients' attorney with the Subpoenas attached as Exhibit B and C. The Subpoenas require the Clients to attend the temporary injunction hearing scheduled for April 24, 2018 and to produce at the hearing nine (9) categories of documents and other items. In accordance with Rules 176.6(e) and (f), the Clients object to, and are entitled to a protective order from, the Subpoenas' request for documents and other items.

### Objections to Documents Requested in Clients' Subpoenas Duces Tecum

Request No. 1. All emails and text messages between and among Laura Wassmer, Dr. Stephen Hopper, and/or anyone else including, but not limited to Jim Pennington and Jeff Levinger (singularly, collectively, and/or disjunctively) regarding settlement of the claims with JPMorgan Chase including but not limited to the ultimate formation of the Rule 11 settlement agreement with JP Morgan Chase, up and until the time the Intervenors were terminated as the attorneys of record for Ms. Wassmer and Dr. Hopper, which was approximately at 10 a.m. on April 5, 2018—as set forth in Exhibit 3 to the TRO hearing.

Response: Clients object to this request because this dispute is subject to binding arbitration and Clients do not waive their position that the Court must compel arbitration of all claims asserted by Intervenors in this action. Clients object to this request on the basis that the documents requested are protected by confidentiality pursuant to the settlement agreement between Defendants and JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. ("JPMorgan"). Clients are withholding documents responsive to this request on the basis of the attorney-client privilege.

Request No. 2. All documents that support the accusations, allegations, and aspersions cast against Lenny Vitullo and his law firm, Fee Smith Sharp & Vitullo, as set forth in the April 5, 2018 termination letter, which was offered into evidence as Exhibit 3 at the TRO hearing.

Response: Clients object to this request because this dispute is subject to binding arbitration and Clients do not waive their position that the Court must compel arbitration of all claims asserted by Intervenors in this action. Clients object to this request because it is overly broad, burdensome, vague, and ambiguous and it fails to describe the documents sought with reasonable particularity and specificity as required by Rule 196.1. Moreover, this request is beyond the scope of permissible discovery and constitutes an impermissible request for Clients to marshal their evidence. *Loftin v. Martin*, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex.1989) (disapproving a similar request because the request did not identify any particular type of documents; rather, it was merely a request for all evidence the other party might have in support of its allegations); *See also In re TIG Ins. Co.*, 172 S.W.3d 160, 168 (Tex. App. Beaumont 2005, orig. proceeding). Subject to and without waiving these objections, Clients are unable to completely respond to this request at this

4

time because Intervenors have not provided Clients with their complete files, although those files have been requested by Clients.

Request No. 3. All documents that support your position that the contingency agreements, which were admitted into evidence as Exhibits 1-2 at the TRO hearing are unenforceable—either in whole or in part.

Response: Clients object to this request because this dispute is subject to binding arbitration and Clients do not waive their position that the Court must compel arbitration of all claims asserted by Intervenors in this action. Clients object to this request because it is overly broad, burdensome, vague, and ambiguous and it fails to describe the documents sought with reasonable particularity and specificity as required by Rule 196.1. Moreover, this request is beyond the scope of permissible discovery and constitutes an impermissible request for Clients to marshal their evidence. Loftin v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex.1989) (disapproving a similar request because the request did not identify any particular type of documents; rather, it was merely a request for all evidence the other party might have in support of its allegations); See also In re TIG Ins. Co., 172 S.W.3d 160, 168 (Tex. App. Beaumont 2005, orig. proceeding). Subject to and without waiving these objections, Clients are unable to completely respond to this request at this time because Intervenors have not provided Clients with their complete files, although those files have been requested by Clients.

Request No. 4. Copies of all fee agreements that you have with Jeff Levinger, including all billing statements sent to you by Jeff Levinger—and all checks paid to Jeff Levinger; this request specifically includes, also, any and all collateral agreements reached with Jeff Levinger to aid and abet your termination of Lenny Vitullo and any monies Mr. Levinger received or you have contracted to pay him for saving attorneys' fees that are due and owing to Mr. Vitullo et al., if any.

Response: Clients object to this request because this dispute is subject to binding arbitration and Clients do not waive their position that the Court must compel arbitration of all claims asserted by Intervenors in this action. Clients also object to the argumentative, improper and misleading manner in which this request is worded; there were no collateral agreements reached with Jeff Levinger to aid and abet the termination of Lenny Vitullo, nor did Mr. Levinger receive any money for saving any fees which may be owed to Mr. Vitullo. Subject to, and without waiving any of the aforementioned objections, Clients have already produced the fee agreement with Jeff Levinger, billing statements sent by Jeff Levinger and checks paid to Jeff Levinger.

Request No. 5. All documents that establish what you claim to be the dollar amount of attorney's fees in dispute, why there is a dispute, why the dispute was not raised until after a settlement was reached, and how those disputed amounts are quantified and the basis for you disputing what you plainly owe in the contingency contracts at issue.

Response: Clients object to this request because this dispute is subject to binding arbitration and Clients do not waive their position that the Court must compel arbitration of all claims asserted by Intervenors in this action. Clients object to this request on the basis that the documents requested are protected by confidentiality pursuant to the settlement agreement

between Clients and JPMorgan. Clients object to this request because it is overly broad, burdensome, vague, and ambiguous and it fails to describe the documents sought with reasonable particularity and specificity as required by Rule 196.1. Moreover, this request is beyond the scope of permissible discovery and constitutes an impermissible request for Clients to marshal their evidence. Loftin v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex.1989) (disapproving a similar request because the request did not identify any particular type of documents; rather, it was merely a request for all evidence the other party might have in support of its allegations); See also In re TIG Ins. Co., 172 S.W.3d 160, 168 (Tex. App. Beaumont 2005, orig. proceeding). Clients also object to the argumentative, improper and misleading manner in which this request is worded; Clients dispute that they owe a contingency fee under the agreements. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Clients are unable to completely respond to this request at this time because Intervenors have not provided Clients with their complete files, although those files have been requested by Clients.

Request No. 6. All documents that support the dollar amount of what you claim you owe to Intervenors, if any, under the contingency agreements and all documents that show how that dollar amount was calculated.

Response: Clients object to this request because this dispute is subject to binding arbitration and Clients do not waive their position that the Court must compel arbitration of all claims asserted by Intervenors in this action. Clients dispute that they owe a contingency fee under the agreements; instead, Intervenors may only recover a fee based on quantum meruit. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Clients are unable to completely respond to this request at this time because Intervenors have not provided Clients with their complete files, although those files have been requested by Clients.

Request No. 7. All documents that show when you actually made the decision to terminate the Intervenors—including but not limited to all correspondence with Jeff Levinger, which would establish that the decision was allegedly made six months ago, albeit the termination was not actually done until April 5, 2018.

Response: Clients object to this request because this dispute is subject to binding arbitration and Clients do not waive their position that the Court must compel arbitration of all claims asserted by Intervenors in this action. Clients are withholding documents responsive to this request on the basis of the attorney-client privilege. Clients also object to the argumentative, improper and misleading manner in which this request is worded; Clients dispute that the decision to terminate the Intervenors was made six months ago.

Request No. 8. All tape recordings of Lenny Vitullo, Taylor Horton or any other attorney in this case.

**Response:** Clients object to this request because this dispute is subject to binding arbitration and Clients do not waive their position that the Court must compel arbitration of all claims asserted by Intervenors in this action. Subject to and without waiving this objection, Clients have already produced these recordings to Intervenors.

Request No. 9. Your executed settlement agreement with JPMorgan Chase.

Response: Clients object to this request because this dispute is subject to binding arbitration and Clients do not waive their position that the Court must compel arbitration of all claims asserted by Intervenors in this action. Clients object to this request on the basis that the documents requested are protected by confidentiality pursuant to the settlement agreement between Defendants and JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. ("JPMorgan").

#### Conclusion

For those reasons set forth herein, the Clients request this Court to quash the Subpoenas, enter a protective order, sustain the objections herein and that the Clients have all other relief, at law or in equity, which the Clients may be entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

s/James E. Pennington
James E. Pennington
State Bar No. 15758510
LAW OFFICES OF JAMES E. PENNINGTON, P.C.
900 Jackson Street, Suite 440
Dallas, Texas 75202-4473
Telephone: (214) 741-3022
Facsimile: (214) 741-3055
jep@jeplawyer.com

Attorneys for Defendants Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 23rd day of April, 2018, the foregoing *Motion to Quash and* for *Protective Order* was filed using the e-filing system which will send notification of such filing to the following parties via email:

Brian P. Lauten Brian Lauten, P.C. 3811 Turtle Creek Boulevard, Ste. 1450

MOTION TO QUASH AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

7

Dallas, Texas 75219 blauten@brianlauten.com Attorneys for Intervenor Fee Smith Sharp & Vitullo, LLP

John L. Malesovas Malesovas Law Firm State Bar No. 12857300 1801 South Mopac Expressway, Suite 320 Austin, TX 78746 john@malesovas.com Attorney for Intervenor, John Malesovas

Alan S. Loewinsohn
Jim L. Flegle
Kerry F. Schonwald
Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP
12377 Merit Dr., Suite 900
Dallas, Texas 75251
alanl@lfdslaw.com
jimf@lfdslaw.com
kerrys@lfdslaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Jo Hopper

Jeffrey S. Levinger
J. Carl Cecere Levinger PC
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500
Dallas, TX 75202
jlevinger@levingerpc.com
cecere@cecerepc.com
Attorneys for Defendants, Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

John C. Eichman
Grayson L. Linyard
Hunton & Williams, LLP
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700
Dallas, TX 75202
214-468-3599 Facsimile
jeichman@hunton.com
glinyard@hunton.com

Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, Deceased, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., in its Corporate Capacity

Van H. Beckwith Jessica B. Pulliam Baker Botts L.L.P.

MOTION TO QUASH AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700
Dallas, TX 75201
214-661-4677 Facsimile
van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com
jessica.pulliam@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Evan A. Young
Baker Botts L.L.P.
98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
Austin, TX 78701
512-322-8306 Facsimile
evan.young@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

s/ James E. Pennington
James E. Pennington

## Subpoena



### THE STATE OF TEXAS

#### COUNTY OF TEXAS

To the sheriff, constable, or any person authorized to serve and execute subpoenas as provided in Rule 176, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

### Greetings:

You are hereby commanded to subpoena and summon the following witness who may be served as follows:

### JEFFREY S. LEVINGER

Levinger, P.C. 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500 Dallas, TX 75202 (214) 855-6817

to appear before on, Tuesday, April 24, 2018, at 9:00 a.m., at the Dallas Probate Court No. 1, Dallas County, 1201 Elm Street, Suite 2400-A, Dallas, Texas 75207, to give testimony at Intervenors' application for a temporary injunction evidentiary hearing in Cause NO. PR-11-3238-1; In re Estate of Max D. Hopper; Jo N. Hopper v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, et al.; Probate Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas, to attend from day to day until lawfully discharged.

SAID ABOVE NAMED WITNESS IS FURTHER COMMANDED to produce at said time and place set forth above, the following books, papers, documents, or other tangible things, to-wit:

- 1. all documents reviewed by him to prepare to testify at this deposition.
- 2. All email, text, electronic, and paper communication between you and any attorney for JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("JPM") regarding the negotiation and consummation of the settlement between Dr. Stephen Hopper ("Hopper") and Laura Wassmer ("Wassmer") and JPM ("Settlement"), as well as all attachments to any such communication.
- 3. All email, text, electronic, and paper communication between you and Hopper or Wassmer prior to 10:09 am, April 5, 2018, as well as all attachments to any such communication.
- 4. All email, text, electronic, and paper communication between you and Jim Pennington regarding the Settlement prior to 10:09 am, April 5, 2018, as well as all attachments to any such communication.
- 5. All email, text, electronic, and paper communication between you and Steve Block, or his attorney, Robert Toby, regarding Hopper, Wassmer, Intervenors or this case.
- 6. Any tape recordings you have of Intervenors.

The said witness shall continue in attendance from day to day and time to time until discharged according to law. Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served upon that person may be deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena is issued, and may be punished by fine or confinement, or both.

Exhibit A

WITNESS MY HAND this the 16th day of April, 2018.

Respectfully submitted,

MALESOVAS LAW FIRM State Bar No. 12857300

1801 South Mopac Expressway, Suite 320

Austin, TX 78746

Telephone:

(512) 708-1777 Telecopier: (512) 708-1779

john@malesovas.com

### ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENOR

### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has been served on all counsel of record on April 16, 2018, in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to:

Brian P. Lauten Brian Lauten, P.C. 3811 Turtle Creek Blvd., Suite 1450 Dallas, TX 75219 blauten@brianlauten.com Attorneys for Intervenor, Fee Smith Sharp & Vitullo, L.L.P.

Alan S. Loewinsohn Jim L. Flegle Kerry F. Schonwald Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP 12377 Merit Dr., Suite 900 Dallas, Texas 75251 214-572-1717 Facsimile alanl@lfdslaw.com jimf@lfdslaw.com kerrys@lfdslaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiff Jo Hopper

Jeffrey S. Levinger
J. Carl Cecere
Levinger PC
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500
Dalias, TX 75202
214-855-6808 Facsimile
jlevinger@levingerpc.com
cecere@cecerepc.com
Attorneys for Defendants, Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

John C. Eichman Grayson L. Linyard Hunton & Williams, LLP 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700 Dallas, TX 75202 214-468-3599 Facsimile jeichman@hunton.com glinyard@hunton.com Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, Deceased, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., in its Corporate Capacity Van H. Beckwith Jessica B. Pulliam Baker Botts L.L.P. 2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700 Dallas, TX 75201 214-661-4677 Facsimile van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com jessica.pulliam@bakerbotts.com

Evan A. Young
Baker Botts L.L.P.
98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
Austin, TX 78701
512-322-8306 Facsimile
evan.young@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

John L. Malesovas

### OFFICER'S RETURN

Came to hand the	day of	A.D. 20	at	o'elock	m., and
executed on the	day of	A.D. 20	at		o'eleek
m., by deliverin	g to				the within
named witness, in p	erson, a true copy of this	Trial Subpoena ar	id tender	ing him \$10.0	0 which he
accepted.	••	-		_	
FEES:					
Serving Subpoena	\$				
Mileage	\$				
TOTAL	\$				
	****			Proce	ss Server
			Counts	. Texas	

Exhibit A

Page 277

## Subpoena

### THE STATE OF TEXAS

### COUNTY OF TEXAS

To the sheriff, constable, or any person authorized to serve and execute subpoenas as provided in Rule 176, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

### Greetings:

You are hereby commanded to subpoena and summon the following witness who may be served as follows:

### LAURA S. WASSMER

c/o James E. Pennington Law Offices of James E. Pennington, P.C. 900 Jackson Street, Suite 440 Dallas, TX 75202 214-741-3022 (Telephone)

to appear before on, Tuesday, April 24, 2018, at 9:00 a.m., at the Dallas Probate Court No. 1, Dallas County, 1201 Elm Street, Suite 2400-A, Dallas, Texas 75207, to give testimony at Intervenors' application for a temporary injunction evidentiary hearing in Cause NO. PR-11-3238-1; *Inre Estate of Max D. Hopper; Jo N. Hopper v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, et al;* Probate Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas, to attend from day to day until lawfully discharged.

SAID ABOVE NAMED WITNESS IS FURTHER COMMANDED to produce at said time and place set forth above, the following books, papers, documents, or other tangible things, towit:

- All emails and text messages between and among Laura Wassmer, Dr. Stephen Hopper, and/or anyone else including, but not limited to, Jim Pennington and Jeff Levinger (singularly, collectively, and/or disjunctively) regarding settlement of the claims with JPMorgan Chase, up and until the formation of the Rule 11 settlement agreement with JPMorgan Chase, up and until the time the Intervenors were terminated as the attorneys of record for Ms. Wassmer and Dr. Hopper, which was approximately at 10:00 a.m. on April 5, 2018 as set forth in Exhibit 3 to the TRO hearing.
- 2. All documents that support the accusations, allegations, and aspersions cast against Lenny Vitullo and his law firm, Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, as set forth in the April 5, 2018 termination letter, which was offered into evidence as Exhibit 3 at the TRO hearing.
- 3. All documents that support your position hat the contingency agreements, which were admitted into evidence as Exhibits 1-2 at the TRO hearing are unenforceable either in whole or in part.
- 4. Copies of all fee agreements that you have with Jeff Levinger, including all billing statements sent to you by Jeff Levinger and all checks paid to Jeff Levinger; this request specifically includes, also, any and all collateral agreements reached with Jeff Levinger to

Exhibit B

- aid and abet your termination of Lenny Vitullo and any monies Mr. Levinger received or you have contracted to pay him for saving attorneys' fees that are due and owing to Mr. Vitullo et al., if any,
- 5. All documents that establish what you claim to be the dollar amount of attorney's fees in dispute, why there is a dispute, why the dispute was not raised until after a settlement was reached, and how those disputed amounts are quantified and the basis for you disputing what you plainly owe in the contingency contracts at issue.
- All documents that support the dollar amount of what you claim you owe to Intervenors, if any, under the contingency agreements and all documents that show how that dollar amount was calculated.
- 7. All documents that show when you actually made the decision to terminate the Intervenors including but not limited to all correspondence with Jeff Levinger, which would establish that the decision was allegedly made six months ago, albeit the termination was not actually done until April 5, 2018.
- 8. All tape recordings of Lenny Vitullo, Taylor Horton or any other attorney in this case.
- 9. Your executed settlement agreement with JPMorgan Chase.

The said witness shall continue in attendance from day to day and time to time until discharged according to law. Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served upon that person may be deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena is issued, and may be punished by fine or confinement, or both.

WITNESS MY HAND this the 17th day of April, 2018.

Respectfully submitted,

John L. Malesovas Malesovas Law Firm

State Bar No. 12857300

1801 South Mopac Expressway, Suite 320

Austin, TX 78746

Telephone: (

Telecopier:

(512) 708-1777 (512) 708-1779

john@malesovas.com

ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENOR

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has been served on all counsel of record on April 17, 2018, in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to:

Brian P. Lauten
Brian Lauten, P.C.
3811 Turtle Creek Blvd., Suite 1450
Dallas, TX 75219
blauten@brianlauten.com
Attorneys for Intervenor, Fee Smith Sharp & Vitullo, L.L.P.

Alan S. Loewinsohn
Jim L. Flegle
Kerry F. Schonwald
Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP
12377 Merit Dr., Suite 900
Dallas, Texas 75251
214-572-1717 Facsimile
alanl@lfdslaw.com
jimf@lfdslaw.com
kerrys@lfdslaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Jo Hopper

James E. Pennington
Law Offices of James E. Pennington, P.C.
900 Jackson Street, Suite 440
Dallas, TX 75202
214-741-3055 Facsimile
Jep@Jeplawver.com
Attorneys for Defendants, Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

Jeffrey S. Levinger
J. Carl Cecere
Levinger PC
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500
Dallas, TX 75202
214-855-6808 Facsimile
jlevinger@levingerpc.com
cecere@cecerepc.com
Attorneys for Defendants, Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

Exhibit B

John C. Eichman
Grayson L. Linyard
Hunton & Williams, LLP
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700
Dallas, TX 75202
214-468-3599 Facsimile
jeichman@hunton.com
glinyard@hunton.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, Deceased,
and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., in its Corporate Capacity

Van H. Beckwith
Jessica B. Pulliam
Baker Botts L.L.P.
2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700
Dallas, TX 75201
214-661-4677 Facsimile
van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com
jessica.pulliam@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Evan A. Young
Baker Botts L.L.P.
98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
Austin, TX 78701
512-322-8306 Facsimile
evan.young@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

John L. Malesovas

#### OFFICER'S RETURN

Came to hand the	day of	A.D, 20	at	o'clock_	m., and
executed on the	day of	A.D. 20	at		o'clock
m., by deliverin	g to				the within
named witness, in p	erson, a true copy of this	s Trial Subpoena an	d tenderi	ng him \$10.0	00 which he
accepted.	• •	•		-	
FEES:					
Serving Subpoena Mileage TOTAL	\$ \$ \$				
			and the second s	Proce	ess Server
			_County,	Texas	

## Subpoena

#### THE STATE OF TEXAS

#### COUNTY OF TEXAS

To the sheriff, constable, or any person authorized to serve and execute subpoenas as provided in Rule 176, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

#### Greetings:

You are hereby commanded to subpoena and summon the following witness who may be served as follows:

#### STEPHEN B. HOPPER

c/o James E. Pennington Law Offices of James E. Pennington, P.C. 900 Jackson Street, Suite 440 Dallas, TX 75202 214-741-3022 (Telephone)

to appear before on, Tuesday, April 24, 2018, at 9:00 a.m., at the Dallas Probate Court No. 1, Dallas County, 1201 Elm Street, Suite 2400-A, Dallas, Texas 75207, to give testimony at Intervenors' application for a temporary injunction evidentiary hearing in Cause NO. PR-11-3238-1; In re Estate of Max D. Hopper; Jo N. Hopper v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, et al; Probate Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas, to attend from day to day until lawfully discharged.

SAID ABOVE NAMED WITNESS IS FURTHER COMMANDED to produce at said time and place set forth above, the following books, papers, documents, or other tangible things, to-

- All emails and text messages between and among Laura Wassmer, Dr. Stephen Hopper, and/or anyone else including, but not limited to, Jim Pennington and Jeff Levinger (singularly, collectively, and/or disjunctively) regarding settlement of the claims with JPMorgan Chase, up and until the formation of the Rule 11 settlement agreement with JPMorgan Chase, up and until the time the Intervenors were terminated as the attorneys of record for Ms. Wassmer and Dr. Hopper, which was approximately at 10:00 a.m. on April 5, 2018 as set forth in Exhibit 3 to the TRO hearing.
- All documents that support the accusations, allegations, and aspersions cast against Lenny Vitullo and his law firm, Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, as set forth in the April 5, 2018 termination letter, which was offered into evidence as Exhibit 3 at the TRO hearing.
- All documents that support your position hat the contingency agreements, which were admitted into evidence as Exhibits 1-2 at the TRO hearing are unenforceable – either in whole or in part.
- 4. Copies of all fee agreements that you have with Jeff Levinger, including all billing statements sent to you by Jeff Levinger and all checks paid to Jeff Levinger; this request specifically includes, also, any and all collateral agreements reached with Jeff Levinger to

Exhibit C Page 283

MR:283

- aid and abet your termination of Lenny Vitullo and any monies Mr. Levinger received or you have contracted to pay him for saving attorneys' fees that are due and owing to Mr. Vitullo et al., if any.
- 5. All documents that establish what you claim to be the dollar amount of attorney's fees in dispute, why there is a dispute, why the dispute was not raised until after a settlement was reached, and how those disputed amounts are quantified and the basis for you disputing what you plainly owe in the contingency contracts at issue.
- All documents that support the dollar amount of what you claim you owe to Intervenors, if any, under the contingency agreements and all documents that show how that dollar amount was calculated.
- All documents that show when you actually made the decision to terminate the Intervenors—including but not limited to all correspondence with Jeff Levinger, which would establish that the decision was allegedly made six months ago, albeit the termination was not actually done until April 5, 2018.
- 8. All tape recordings of Lenny Vitullo, Taylor Horton or any other attorney in this case.
- 9. Your executed settlement agreement with JPMorgan Chase.

The said witness shall continue in attendance from day to day and time to time until discharged according to law. Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served upon that person may be deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena is issued, and may be punished by fine or confinement, or both.

WITNESS MY HAND this the 17th day of April, 2018.

Respectfully submitted,

John L. (Malesovas Malesovas Law Firm

State Bar No. 12857300

1801 South Mopac Expressway, Suite 320

Austin, TX 78746

Telephone: (512) 708-1777

Telecopier: (512) 708-1779 john@malesovas.com

ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENOR

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has been served on all counsel of record on April 17, 2018, in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to:

Brian P. Lauten
Brian Lauten, P.C.
3811 Turtle Creek Blvd., Suite 1450
Dallas, TX 75219
blauten@brianlauten.com
Attorneys for Intervenor, Fee Smith Sharp & Vitullo, L.L.P.

Alan S. Loewinsohn
Jim L. Flegle
Kerry F. Schonwald
Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP
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alanl@lfdslaw.com
jimf@lfdslaw.com
kerrys@lfdslaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Jo Hopper

James E. Pennington
Law Offices of James E. Pennington, P.C.
900 Jackson Street, Suite 440
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glinyard@hunton.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, Deceased,
and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., in its Corporate Capacity

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Jessica B. Pulliam
Baker Botts L.L.P.
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Dallas, TX 75201
214-661-4677 Facsimile
van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com
jessica.pulliam@bakerbotts.com
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Evan A. Young
Baker Botts L.L.P.
98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
Austin, TX 78701
512-322-8306 Facsimile
evan.young@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

John L. Malesovas

#### OFFICER'S RETURN

Came to hand the	day of	A.D. 20	_ at	o'clock _	m., and
executed on the	day of	A.D. 20	at		o'clock
m., by delivering	ig to				the within
named witness, in p	person, a true copy of this	Trial Subpoena an	d tenderii	ng him \$10.0	00 which he
accepted.					
FEES:					
Serving Subpoena	\$		•		
Mileage	\$				
TOTAL	\$				
			***************************************	Proce	ess Server
			_ County,	Texas	

#### CAUSE NO. PR-11-03238-1

IN RE: ESTATE OF IN THE PROBATE COURT MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED JO N. HOPPER Plaintiff, ٧. NO. 1 JP MORGAN CHASE, N.A., STEPHEN B. HOPPER and LAURA S. WASSMER DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS Defendants. JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP Intervenors, STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, and JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendants.

#### AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

Please take notice that the hearing on Intervention Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration has been re-scheduled for Monday, April 30, 2018, at 10:00 a.m., before the Honorable Judge Brenda Hull Thompson in Probate Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas.

AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING - MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

#### Respectfully submitted,

s/ Anne M. Johnson

James E. Pennington
State Bar No. 15758510
LAW OFFICES OF JAMES E. PENNINGTON, P.C. 900 Jackson Street, Suite 440
Dallas, Texas 75202-4473
Telephone: (214) 741-3022
Facsimile: (214) 741-3055
jep@jeplawyer.com

Anne M. Johnson
State Bar No. 00794271
Andrew W. Guthrie
State Bar No. 24078606
HAYNES AND BOONE LLP
2323 Victory Avenue, Suite 700
Dallas, Texas 75219
Telephone: (214) 651-5376
Facsimile: (214) 200-0487
anne.johnson@haynesboone.com
andrew.guthrie@haynesboone.com

Attorneys for Defendants Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on this 24<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2018, the foregoing *Amended Notice of Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration* was filed using the e-filing system which will send notification of such filing to the following parties via email:

Brian P. Lauten
Brian Lauten, P.C.
3811 Turtle Creek Boulevard, Ste. 1450
Dallas, Texas 75219
blauten@brianlauten.com
Attorneys for Intervenor Fee Smith Sharp & Vitullo, LLP

John L. Malesovas
Malesovas Law Firm
State Bar No. 12857300
1801 South Mopac Expressway, Suite 320
Austin, TX 78746
john@malesovas.com
Attorney for Intervenor, John Malesovas

Alan S. Loewinsohn
Jim L. Flegle
Kerry F. Schonwald
Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP
12377 Merit Dr., Suite 900
Dallas, Texas 75251
alanl@lfdslaw.com
jimf@lfdslaw.com
kerrys@lfdslaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Jo Hopper

Jeffrey S. Levinger
J. Carl Cecere
Levinger PC
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500
Dallas, TX 75202
jlevinger@levingerpc.com
ccecere@cecerepc.com
Attorneys for Defendants, Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

John C. Eichman
Grayson L. Linyard
Hunton & Williams, LLP
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700
Dallas, TX 75202
214-468-3599 Facsimile
jeichman@hunton.com
glinyard@hunton.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as Independent Administrator of the
Estate of Max D. Hopper, Deceased, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., in its Corporate Capacity

Van H. Beckwith
Jessica B. Pulliam
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2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700
Dallas, TX 75201
214-661-4677 Facsimile
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jessica.pulliam@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Evan A. Young
Baker Botts L.L.P.
98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
Austin, TX 78701
512-322-8306 Facsimile
evan.young@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

s/ Anne M. Johnson
Anne M. Johnson



#### CAUSE NO. PR-11-3238-1

IN RE: ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED,		IN THE PROBATE COURT			
JO N. HOPPER,	0000				
Intervenor,	8				
٧.	9 8	NO. 1			
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., STEPHEN B. HOPPER, and LAURA S. WASSMER,	ത ത ത ത ത ത ത ത ത ത ത ത				
Defendants.	8	OF DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS			
JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LL Intervenors, v. STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S, WASSMER, individually and as Beneficiaries of the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, JPMORGAN CHASE	<i>തതതതതതതതതതതതതതത</i> <u>P</u>				
BANK, N.A.,  Defendants.	<i>6</i>				

#### **TEMPORARY INJUNCTION ORDER**

Came to be heard on the 24<sup>TH</sup> day of April 2018, after appropriate notice to the parties and after the parties presented arguments, Fee Smith Sharp & Vitullo, LLP and John L. Malesovas d/b/a Malesovas Law Firm's (collectively, "Intervenors") *Verified Petition(s) in Intervention, Application for Temporary Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction, and Application for Declaratory Relief* against, *inter alia*, Stephen Hopper and

PR - 11 - 03238 - 1
COTI
ORDER - TEMPORARY INJUNCTION (OCA)
1822829

Laura Wassmer, individually and as beneficiaries of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, deceased, (hereinafter jointly "Clients") and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (hereinafter "JPM") (Clients and JPM hereinafter jointly, "Defendants" with respect to the claims now pending in this Intervention).

The Court, after considering the *Intervenors' Collective Verified Original Petition in Intervention, Application for Temporary Restraining Order, Temporary Injunction, and Application for Declaratory Relief,* the evidence submitted by Intervenors *in camera*, the relevant exhibits, the arguments of counsel, concludes that—unless immediately restrained, Defendants will irreparably injure Intervenors.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute brought before it under both, Tex. Estates Code Ann. § 32.007 et seq. (Vernon 2014), and, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.005 et seq. (Vernon 2014) (authorizing declaratory judgment actions in probate court when such relief is germane to an Estate).

Intervenors respective Pleas and application for Injunctive Relief are timely filed, given that this Court has yet to sign a judgment; and, therefore, retains plenary power over this proceeding. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 60 et seq.

This Court has, preliminarily, taken judicial notice, pursuant to Rule 201 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, of the following facts that, in reasonable probability, appear to be true at this preliminary stage of the proceeding:

- 1.) In, around, or about November of 2015, Clients executed a valid and enforceable contingency agreement ("CA") with Intervenors;
- 2.) On or about April 5, 2018, attorneys for Clients and JPM appeared before this Court and announced, without revealing any of the substantive terms, that a confidential settlement had been reached between them in the underlying dispute pending in this Court (hereinafter "Settlement");
- 3.) On or about the same day, April 5, 2018, but—literally what appears to have been within minutes after the Court was informed that a settlement had been reached by the parties in this underlying dispute—Clients terminated their CA with Intervenors by and through their attorney, James Pennington;

- 4.) Intervenors have filed what, by all accounts, appears to be a valid and enforceable First Party Attorney's Fees Lien in the proceeds of the Settlement:
- 5.) Intervenors fully performed; or, at the very least, substantially and materially performed all of their duties, responsibilities, and obligations under the CA at or before the time Clients terminated the CA—as those legal terms are meant in, *Tillery & Tillery v. Zurich Ins. Co.*, 54 S.W.3d 356, 360-61 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, no pet.), *Enochs v. Brown*, 872 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no writ), *disapproved of on unrelated grounds*, by *Roberts v. Williamson*, 111 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. 2003), and *Mandell & Wright*, 441 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. 1969); and
- 6.) Given the timing of the termination of Intervenors, Clients are estopped, quasi-estopped, and/or have waived any and all defenses, if any, that could or would be lodged to the CA or the quality of the legal services performed by Intervenors.

The Court finds that Clients have admitted that some of the settlement funds belong to Intervenors, but Clients refuse to identify the amount that belongs to Intervenors and refuse to allow the undisputed amount that belongs to Intervenors to be paid to Intervenors. Based on this, as well as the Court's findings above, Intervenors are entitled to immediate payment of a portion of the settlement funds once they become due and payable under the terms of the settlement. The Court finds that within hours after the Court heard Intervenors' Application for a Temporary Restraining Order where Intervenors were asking this Court to protect the settlement funds in dispute pending the outcome of their Petition in Intervention and after the Court took the matter under advisement, Clients executed a settlement agreement with JPM which required JPM to wire transfer the settlement funds to any location designated by Clients, which would necessarily include a foreign bank account, and further required Intervenors to waive their lien on the settlement funds and to withdraw their Petition in Intervention claiming an interest in the settlement funds, and that Clients still refused to pay

Intervenors any of the settlement funds. The Court finds that this action by Clients was designed to attempt to circumvent this Court's inherent power to protect the disputed funds and to circumvent intervenors' lien on the Settlement funds.

The Court finds that based on all of the foregoing and all of the other evidence and stipulations presented, the settlement funds are in danger of being lost or depleted unless this Court exercises its inherent power to protect the settlement funds pending the outcome of Intervenors' Petition in Intervention.

Based upon these preliminary findings, this Court is of the opinion that Intervenors have established a probability of success on the merits on their application for, inter alia, declaratory relief. See Tex. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.004 et seq. (Vernon 2014). This Court is of the opinion that, unless restrained, one or more Defendants are likely to cause permanent damage to Intervenors, should they be allowed to transfer, hypothecate, assign, or take title to Intervenors' interest in the settlement proceeds before the pleas in Intervention are adjudicated on the merits. Such harm would be irreparable and injury would be imminent because this Court is of the opinion that there is no showing; or, in the alternative, an inadequate showing that Defendants could timely and immediately pay the disputed funds to Intervenors, should Intervenors ultimately prevail in this proceeding, and because Intervenors have a security interest in and lien upon a portion of the settlement proceeds which would be eviscerated by allowing Clients to dispose of 100% of the settlement proceeds as they saw fit and/or by risk that such funds will be lost or depleted or otherwise disposed of. Moreover, given the Court's preliminary findings set forth above in (i)-(vi). Intervenors have established a property right and secured interest in the proceeds at issue, and the loss of such funds and property right would leave Intervenors with no adequate remedy at law.

The Court is, THEREFORE, of the opinion that Intervenors are entitled to the issuance of an Order of Temporary Injunction and that such an Order is necessary to protect Intervenors' rights. This ORDER is necessary because of the immediate need to enforce the security interest and lien which Intervenors have in a portion of the settlement proceeds and to stop the wrongful flow of funds in the near future from being disseminated to either Clients or their attorneys, or some other third party subject to

Clients' direction and control, upon which Intervenors would have no adequate remedy at law. Without intervention by this Court, Intervenors' property right, that is Intervenors' security interest in and lien upon the settlement proceeds, would be destroyed and there would be no way to restore that property right in the Settlement proceeds themselves.

It is therefore **ORDERED**, **ADJUDGED**, and **DECREED** that Defendants, Stephen Hopper, Laura Wassmer, and JPMorgan Chase, N.A., and any of his, her, their, or its agents, servants, employees, successors, assigns and those persons in active concert or participation therewith, must:

- 1) Deposit all of the settlement proceeds due to Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer, individually and as beneficiaries of the Estate of Max Hopper, Deceased, into a safekeeping account with JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, to be treated as a deposit in the registry of the Court, and to be held in trust until further order of this Court. Funds in this safekeeping account shall be withdrawn only upon Order of this Court;
- 2) The parties are ORDERED to preserve and prevent the destruction of all documents, including electronic data, emails, and notes, that relate in any way to the matters and claims set forth in the Intervenors' respective Pleas on file—and, moreover, all electronic storage devices must be imaged and preserved.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the \$10,000 corporate or surety cash bond currently deposited with the appropriate clerk of this Court shall remain in place.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that trial in this matter is set for Actober 1, 2018 at 9:30 o'clock a.m. Parties are Ordered to appear for a scheduling conference on gre before Signed and issued this the 21 day of April 2018, at 9:05 o'clock p.m. 3018

JUDGE PRESIDING

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PR 11-32 38 age 296

#### CAUSE NO. PR-11-03238-1

IN RE: ESTATE OF IN THE PROBATE COURT MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED JO N. HOPPER Plaintiff, v. NO. 1 JP MORGAN CHASE, N.A., STEPHEN B. HOPPER and LAURA S. WASSMER Defendants. DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE. SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP Intervenors, STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, and JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendants.

## SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING ON MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

Please take notice that the hearing on Intervention Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration has been re-scheduled for Tuesday, May 8, 2018, at 4:00 p.m., before the Honorable Judge Brenda Hull Thompson in Probate Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas.

SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING - MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

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#### Respectfully submitted,

#### s/ Anne M. Johnson

James E. Pennington
State Bar No. 15758510
LAW OFFICES OF JAMES E. PENNINGTON, P.C. 900 Jackson Street, Suite 440
Dallas, Texas 75202-4473
Telephone: (214) 741-3022
Facsimile: (214) 741-3055
jep@jeplawyer.com

Anne M. Johnson
State Bar No. 00794271
Andrew W. Guthrie
State Bar No. 24078606
HAYNES AND BOONE LLP
2323 Victory Avenue, Suite 700
Dallas, Texas 75219
Telephone: (214) 651-5376
Facsimile: (214) 200-0487
anne.johnson@haynesboone.com
andrew.guthrie@haynesboone.com

Attorneys for Intervention Defendants Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 25<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2018, the foregoing **Second Amended Notice of Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration** was filed using the e-filing system which will send notification of such filing to the following parties via email:

Brian P. Lauten
BRIAN LAUTEN, P.C.
3811 Turtle Creek Boulevard, Ste. 1450
Dallas, Texas 75219
blauten@brianlauten.com
Attorneys for Intervenor Fee Smith Sharp & Vitullo, LLP

John L. Malesovas
MALESOVAS LAW FIRM
1801 South Mopac Expressway, Suite 320
Austin, TX 78746
john@malesovas.com
Attorney for Intervenor, John Malesovas

Alan S. Loewinsohn
Jim L. Flegle
Kerry F. Schonwald
LOEWINSOHN FLEGLE DEARY SIMON LLP
12377 Merit Dr., Suite 900
Dallas, Texas 75251
alanl@lfdslaw.com
jimf@lfdslaw.com
kerrys@lfdslaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff Jo Hopper

Jeffrey S. Levinger
J. Carl Cecere
LEVINGER PC
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500
Dallas, TX 75202
jlevinger@levingerpc.com
ccecere@cecerepc.com
Attorneys for Defendants, Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING - MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

MR:299

John C. Eichman
Grayson L. Linyard
HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LLP
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700
Dallas, TX 75202
214-468-3599 Facsimile
jeichman@hunton.com
glinyard@hunton.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as Independent Administrator of the
Estate of Max D. Hopper, Deceased, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., in its Corporate Capacity

Van H. Beckwith
Jessica B. Pulliam
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700
Dallas, TX 75201
214-661-4677 Facsimile
van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com
jessica.pulliam@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Evan A. Young
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
Austin, TX 78701
512-322-8306 Facsimile
evan.young@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

s/ Anne M. Johnson
Anne M. Johnson

#### CAUSE NO. PR-11-3238-1

JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP IN THE PROBATE COURT .

Intervenors,

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\$\tau\$ \tau\$ \tau\$ \tau\$ \tau\$ \tau\$ \tau\$ \tau\$ \tau\$ \tau\$ STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, individually and as Beneficiaries of the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,

NO. 1

Defendants.

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

Intervenors' (Lawyers) Consolidated Traditional Rule 166a(c) Motion for Summary Judgment (MSJ) on their Secured and Fully Vested Property and Ownership Rights to the Disputed Funds, Application for Attorney's Fees, and Brief in Support (filed 4.20.18), will be heard on Wednesday, May 23, 2018 at 2:00 PM in the front of Judge Brenda Hull Thompson, The Probate Court, Renaissance Tower, 1201 Elm Street, 24th Floor, Suite 2400-A, Dallas, Texas 75270, Dallas County, Texas.

Respectfully Submitted,

**BRIAN LAUTEN, P.C.** 

**BRIAN P. LAUTEN** 

State Bar No. 24031603 blauten@brianlauten.com 3811 Turtle Creek Blvd., Ste. 1450

Dallas, Texas 75219

(214) 414-0996 telephone

**ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENORS** 

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has been served on all counsel of record on April 26, 2018, in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to:

Alan S. Loewinsohn Jim L. Flegle Kerry F. Schonwald Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP 12377 Merit Dr., Suite 900 Dallas, Texas 75251 214-572-1717 Facsimile alani@lfdslaw.com ilmf@lfdslaw.com kerrys@lfdslaw.com

Attorneys for Intervenor Jo Hopper

John C. Eichman

Grayson L. Linyard Hunton & Williams, LLP 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700 Dallas, TX 75202 214-468-3599 Facsimile jeichman@hunton.com glinyard@hunton.com Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, Deceased, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., in its Corporate Capacity

Evan A. Young Baker Botts L.L.P. 98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500 Austin, TX 78701 512-322-8306 Facsimile evan.young@bakerbotts.com Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Jeffrey S, Levinger J. Carl Cecere Levinger PC 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500 Dallas, TX 75202 214-855-6808 Facsimile jlevinger@levingerpc.com ccecere@cecerepc.com Attorneys for Defendants, Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

Van H. Beckwith Jessica B. Pulliam Baker Botts L.L.P. 2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700 Dallas, TX 75201 214-661-4677 Facsimile van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com jessica.pulliam@bakerbotts.com Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

James E. Pennington Law Offices of James E. Pennington, P.C. 900 Jackson Street, Suite 440 Dallas, TX 75202 iep@jeplawyer.com Attorneys for Defendants Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

**BRIAN P. LAUTEN** ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENORS

#### CAUSE NO. PR-11-3238-1

JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a IN THE PROBATE COURT § MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP \$\text{com} \text{com} Intervenors. NO. 1 ۷. STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, individually and as Beneficiaries of the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendants. DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

## JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM AND FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP'S CONSOLIDATED SECOND AMENDED PETITION IN INTERVENTION, APPLICATION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, TEMPORARY & PERMANENT INJUNCTION

COMES NOW, John L. Malesovas, d/b/a Malesovas Law Firm ("MLF") and Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP ("FSSV") (MLF and FSSV, collectively "Attorneys"), and files this Second Amended Petition in Intervention, Application for Declaratory Judgment, Temporary and Permanent Injunction complaining of Defendants, Stephen B. Hopper ("Hopper"), Laura S. Wassmer ("Wassmer"), individually and as beneficiaries of the Estate of Max D. Hopper (collectively "Clients"), the Estate of Max D. Hopper, deceased and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("JPM"), and for cause would show the following:

## I. DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN

1.01 Intervenors requests this lawsuit proceed under a Level 3 Discovery Control Plan pursuant to Rule 190.4 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

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#### II. PARTIES

- 2.01 John L. Malesovas is an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Texas and doing business as Malesovas Law Firm.
- 2.02 FSSV is a limited liability partnership and law firm and doing business as Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP.
- 2.03 Hopper, individually and as a beneficiary of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, deceased, was a former client of Attorneys and is being served herewith pursuant to TRCP 21a.
- 2.04 Wassmer, individually and as a beneficiary of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, deceased, was a former client of Attorneys and is being served herewith pursuant to TRCP 21a. Hopper and Wassmer are hereinafter jointly referred to as "Clients".
- 2.05 The Estate of Max D. Hopper is an estate in administration under the jurisdiction of this Court, and Clients have asserted claims herein on behalf of the Estate as the beneficiaries of the Estate.
- 2.06 JPM is also a Defendant in the underlying case and an interested party to this Petition in Intervention and is being served herewith pursuant to TRCP 21a.

### III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3.01 Venue is proper in Dallas County, Texas pursuant to §15.002(a)(1), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code, as Dallas County is the county in which all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred and because venue is proper in the underlying action. This Court has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate this

dispute because Intervenors have a secured and fully vested property interest and property right in the settlement proceeds at issue, which are "incident" to the Estate of Max D. Hopper—and JPM is the Independent Administrator of said Estate (and JPM is in exclusive possession of the disputed funds). See TEX. ESTATES CODE ANN. § 32,007 et seq. (Vernon 2014), and, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37,005 et seq. (Vernon 2014) (authorizing declaratory judgment actions in probate court when such relief is germane to an estate). To the extent that the Estate of Max D. Hopper is a party to the settlement with JPM or to the extent that beneficiaries of the Estate of Max D. Hopper are parties to the settlement with JPM, then this Court and only this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over this matter.

#### IV. FACTS

4.01 Attorneys represented Clients pursuant to a valid and enforceable contingency fee agreement in the underlying lawsuit pending in this Court. A true and correct copy of the contingent fee agreement was admitted into evidence at the Temporary Injunction hearing (hereinafter, "Agreement"). Intervenors fully performed under the terms of the Agreement. On April 3-4, 2018, Clients' Appellate Counsel, Jeff Levinger, settled Clients' claims against JPM. Clients, through Levinger, caused to be filed a Rule 11 agreement memorializing the fact that a confidential settlement had been reached between Clients on the one hand and JPM on the other hand ("Settlement"). At approximately 9:05 a.m. on April 5, 2018, Anthony L. Vitullo appeared before this Court on Clients' behalf and announced in open court that a confidential settlement had been reached between Clients and JPM. At approximately 10:10 a.m. on April 5, 2018, Clients' attorney, Jim Pennington, terminated Attorneys without cause and advised

Attorneys that Clients would not compensate Attorneys in accordance with the Agreement. Pennington also advised Attorneys that he was going to instruct Levinger to retain an unspecified percentage of the Settlement proceeds in his trust account. On April 6, 2018, FSSV withdrew from representing Clients in the underlying lawsuit. Attorneys own a secured and fully vested property right in the Settlement proceeds (up to the very limits of their contingency interest as set forth in the Agreement). Counsel for Clients and JPM, the latter is the current holder of the Settlement proceeds, have refused to tender any funds directly to the Attorneys, given the pendency of the dispute at hand. Attorneys filed, *inter alia*, a Petition in Intervention to enforce their property rights in the Settlement proceeds. The Court granted Attorneys' request for a TRO and a Temporary Injunction has since been issued.

4.02 Attorneys have a justiciable interest in the pending suit because the disposition of the Settlement proceeds will impact their property rights. This lawsuit is a declaratory judgment action against Clients and JPM to enforce Attorneys' fully vested and secured property rights. As such, pursuant to *Texas Mut. Ins. Co, v. Ledbetter*, 251 S.W.3d 31 (2008), Attorneys are first party, secured lienholders in the Settlement proceeds of this case, and have an absolute right to intervene. Thus, Attorneys seek a declaration from this Court pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code § 37.001 et. seq. (Vernon 2014), confirming Attorneys' security and property interest in the Settlement proceeds and, ultimately, an order directing JPM and Clients to pay such interest directly to Attorneys.

4.03 Attorneys fully performed under the Agreement and obtained a favorable jury verdict on Clients' behalf. Consequently, Clients were able to later secure a

confidential settlement with JPM. Only after Clients, through their appellate attorney, Jeff Levinger, unilaterally settled with JPM—did Clients terminate Attorneys. Clients accepted, used, and enjoyed the services of Attorneys which resulted in the Settlement—the services were valuable and Clients obtained a benefit. In accordance with Tillery & Tillery v. Zurich Ins. Co., 54 S.W.3d 356 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied), and Enochs v. Brown, 872 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. App. - Austin 1994, no writ), Clients are estopped and, at the very least, quasi-estopped from challenging the validity of the Agreement and the fee due and owing to Attorneys thereunder and the property rights Attorneys have to the Settlement proceeds, which are currently being held by JPM. Moreover, consistent with Tillery and Enochs, Clients have waived each and every defense, if any, that could otherwise be lodged to the validity of the Agreement, given that Attorneys were terminated only after the legal services were accepted, used, and enjoyed by Clients, resulting in a demonstrable benefit to Clients. Further, it would be unconscionable for Clients to be permitted to avoid paying the fees owed, given that Clients have already accepted the benefits of the Attorneys' legal services that were provided under the Agreement. Indeed, by accepting the benefits of the legal services provided under the Agreement, Clients have waived any right to complain about either the quality of those services or the fees that are due and owing as a consequence of those services having been fully provided. Accordingly, Attorneys seek a declaration defining the breadth and scope of their fully secured and vested property rights in the settlement; and, once those rights are declared, an order of disbursement of fees owing to Attorneys consistent with the Court's award of declaratory relief.

4.04 In addition, Attorneys seek the recovery of their attorneys' fees pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM CODE § 37.009 (Vernon 2014)—in enforcing their lien and property rights herein. All conditions precedent to Attorneys' claim for relief have been fully performed, have occurred, accrued, or have been waived.

## V. APPLICATION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF UNDER SECTION 37.001

- 5.01 Attorneys incorporate all of the preceding paragraphs as if they were set forth in their entirety herein.
- 5.02 Attorneys seek a declaratory judgment pursuant to the TEXAS UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT ("UDJA"), TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE & REMEDIES CODE § 37.001 et seq. (Vernon 2014). An actual and justiciable controversy exists and has arisen between Attorneys, Clients, and JPM. Attorneys seek declaratory relief, a disbursement order, and a judgment against Clients and JPM pursuant to the UDJA declaring the rights, status, and other legal relations of Attorneys *vis a vis* these parties regarding the payment of Attorneys' fees from the Settlement proceeds. Because the Estate is a party to the Settlement, this Honorable Court has exclusive jurisdiction to declare and formally adjudicate Attorneys' ownership rights in the Settlement proceeds.
  - 5.03 Attorneys are entitled to a declaration as follows:
  - a. Attorneys own a secured and fully vested property right in the Settlement proceeds currently held by JPM;
  - Attorneys are entitled to immediate possession of their property rights in the Settlement proceeds currently held by JPM;
  - This Court has exclusive jurisdiction to declare the rights of the parties to the Settlement proceeds currently held by JPM;
  - d. Attorneys are entitled to the full and exclusive use, possession and

- enjoyment of their interest in the Settlement proceeds currently held by JPM:
- e. It is in the best interest of the Estate to pay Attorneys their interest in the Settlement proceeds currently held by JPM; and
- f. Clients and JPM be directed to pay Attorneys their fees from the Settlement proceeds currently held by JPM directly to Attorneys.
- 5.04 Attorneys also seek all legal fees and expenses from Clients and JPM as allowed under the UDJA as this would be fair and equitable given the facts and circumstances of this dispute.

### VI. TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION

- 6.01 Attorneys seek a permanent injunction. Attorneys have shown a probability of success on the merits because Attorneys have a fully vested and secured property interest in the settlement proceeds. Attorneys fully performed their obligations under the Agreement. Attorneys have a fully vested and secured property interest in the Settlement proceeds and Clients have informed Attorneys that they do not intend to pay or honor Attorneys' interest in the Settlement proceeds—either in whole or in part.
- 6.02 Unless this Honorable Court immediately restrains Clients and JPM from diverting the Settlement proceeds, the Attorneys will suffer immediate and irreparable injury, for which there is no adequate remedy at law, because in effect, Attorneys will have lost the protection of their security interest in the Settlement proceeds. Moreover, neither of the Defendants are bonded and Clients have established a pattern and practice of terminating their lawyers and refusing to pay their lawyers—either in whole or in part. Attorneys have a first party, secured lien on and fully vested security interest in the Settlement proceeds, the purpose of which is to prevent Clients from taking all of

the Settlement proceeds and unilaterally controlling their use and disposition—to the detriment of Attorneys, who are entitled to be compensated for their services rendered (and their legal expenses advanced and paid on Clients' behalf). Based on the record before this Court, Attorneys have established and will further show on final disposition:

- a) The harm to Attorneys is imminent because Clients and JPM may attempt, if not restrained, to have Attorneys' interest in the Settlement proceeds paid to Clients' attorney, Jeff Levinger.
- b) This imminent harm will cause Attorneys irreparable injury; in that, once Defendants pay the Settlement proceeds to Jeff Levinger, Attorneys will not be able to enforce their lien and security interest because Levinger will be obligated to hold the funds in his trust account, interest free, until the ownership of the fees is resolved. On the contrary, Rule 1.14 et seq. of the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct do not require, nor do they even allow, Clients' attorney to take possession of the Settlement proceeds, over Attorneys' objections, because Attorneys have a fully vested and secured ownership and property right in the Settlement proceeds at issue. To the contrary, Attorneys' first party lien and security interest allow them to take possession of their portion of the Settlement proceeds as duly authorized by the Agreement executed between Clients and Attorneys. Thus, unless a permanent injunction issues, Attorney's lien and security interest in the Settlement proceeds will be eviscerated. In addition, Attorneys' interest in the Settlement proceeds will not be protected from unauthorized distributions, conversion, or bank failure.
- c) There is no adequate remedy at law which will enforce Attorneys' lien and security interest absent action from this Court. Indeed, Clients are not bonded and there has been no showing that Clients could respond and, in fact, pay money damages in the amounts due and owing should they prematurely take possession of the

funds and disburse those funds beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. Clients will simply be unable to respond in—whole or in part—in damages upon final trial from this intervention unless Attorneys' interest in the Settlement proceeds is protected by this Court.

## VII. <u>BOND HAS BEEN POSTED/</u> <u>WRITS HAVE BEEN ISSUED, FILED,</u> AND DULY SERVED

7.01 Attorneys have posted a reasonable bond in accordance with this Court's order granting a temporary injunction and the appropriate writs have been issued, duly filed, and served on the parties' attorneys of record in accordance with Rule 21a.

#### VIII. RELIEF REQUESTED

- 8.01 Attorneys have obtained a temporary injunction and an order requiring the funds to be deposited with JPM under the exclusive control of this Court, which Attorneys request remain in place and are not waived by this pleading.
- 8.02 Attorneys request the Court to issue a permanent injunction, consistent with the Court's temporary injunction previously granted, authorizing the following relief, to-wit:
  - 8.02.1 Restraining Clients from taking any action to transfer, liquidate, convert, encumber, pledge, loan, share, sale, market for sale, conceal, hide, secret, dissipate, deplete, neglect, misuse, damage and/or destroy, lease, assign, granting a lien, security interest, or other interest in, allow the use of, or otherwise dispose of any and all part of Attorneys' interest in the Settlement proceeds;
  - 8.02.2 Ordering that Defendants and any of his, her, their, or its agents, servants, employees, successors, assigns and those persons in active concert or participation therewith, must:

- 1. Deposit into the registry of this Court the portion of Attorneys' interest in the Settlement proceeds which Clients contend they do not owe Attorneys under the Agreement, which shall remain on deposit in the registry until further Order of the Court, when such funds become available and are ripe for distribution from JPM to the underlying Plaintiffs in satisfaction of the confidential settlement agreement reached herein;
- Pay directly to Attorneys the portion of Attorneys' interest in the Settlement proceeds which Clients do not dispute to be due and owing from the Settlement proceeds immediately when those funds become available under the terms of the Settlement; and
- Upon final trial and declaration, that the Court enter a disbursement order causing payment to be directed to Attorneys for their legal services rendered in accordance with the Agreement.

8.03 After a final trial on the merits, the Court should immediately disburse all funds due and owing to Attorneys consistent with their ownership rights, as reflected in the Agreement.

# IX. ALTERNATIVELY, UNDER RULE 48, ATTORNEYS MOVE THE COURT FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING THE DISPUTED FUNDS TO BE DEPOSITED INTO THE REGISTRY PENDING A FINAL DISPOSITION ON THE MERITS (WHICH IS A NON-APPEALABLE ORDER

9.01 Under Rule 48, Attorneys plead in the alternative that this court has the inherent power to order that disputed funds be deposited in the registry of the court. See Prodeco Exploration, Inc. v. Ware, 684 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1<sup>st</sup> Dist.] 1984, no writ) ("The trial court has the inherent authority to direct [a party] to deposit disputed funds into the registry of the court pending the outcome of the litigation."); see also Castilleja v. Camero, 414 S.W.2d 431, 433 (Tex. 1967). In

addition, in order to secure an order directing a party to deposit disputed funds in the registry of the Court, a party does *not* have to satisfy the prerequisite for securing a temporary injunction. *Diana River & Assocs., P.C. v. Calvillo*, 986 S.W.2d 795, 797-798 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.) (*citing McQuadev. E.D. Sys. Corp.*, 570 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1978, no writ)). Orders to deposit money into the registry of the court cannot be characterized as temporary injunctions and are non-appealable. *Prodeco*, 684 S.W.2d at 201; *Alpha Petroleum Co. v. Dunn*, 60 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1933, writ dism'd).

9.02 Clients have filed a pleading in response to Attorneys' intervention wherein Clients admit that there are disputed funds from the Settlement proceeds. But Clients do not identify the amount of the disputed portion of the Settlement proceeds. Clients suggest that this unidentified amount of funds be kept in their possession, through their attorney, Jeff Levinger, pending the outcome of this dispute. Distilled to its essence, Clients want exclusive control to all of the disputed funds without oversight from this Court and without even identifying the amount they would claim is in dispute. That is obviously unacceptable to Attorneys to let the fox guard the hen house pending the outcome of this matter—and Clients' proposal is inconsistent with Attorney's vested and fully secured property rights in the Settlement proceeds at issue.

9.03 Accordingly, pursuant to this Court's inherent power, Attorneys move this Court, in the alternative under Rule 48, to order that all of the Settlement proceeds be deposited into the registry of this Court (or any other independent escrow account agreed to by the parties that is subject to the jurisdiction of the Court) pending the adjudication of Attorneys' application for a permanent injunction.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Intervenor Attorneys respectfully request a declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction, a disbursement order for their share of the settlement proceeds upon which they are entitled, an award of attorney's fees, and for all such further relief, whether in law or in equity, to which they may show themselves justly entitled.

Respectfully Submitted,

BRIAN LAUTEN, P.C.

**BRIAN P. LAUTEN** 

State Bar No. 24031603 blauten@brianlauten.com 3811 Turtle Creek Boulevard

Ste. 1450

Dallas, Texas 75219 (214) 414-0996 telephone

(214) 744-3015 facsimile

ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENORS

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has been served on all counsel of record on May 1, 2018, in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to:

Alan S. Loewinsohn
Jim L. Flegle
Kerry F. Schonwald
Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP
12377 Merit Dr., Suite 900
Dallas, Texas 75251
214-572-1717 Facsimile
alanl@lfdslaw.com
jimf@lfdslaw.com
kerrys@lfdslaw.com

Attorneys for Intervenor Jo Hopper

Jeffrey S. Levinger
J. Carl Cecere
Levinger PC
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500
Dallas, TX 75202
214-855-6808 Facsimile
ilevinger@levingerpc.com
ccecere@cecerepc.com

Attorneys for Defendants Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

Grayson L. Linyard Hunton & Williams, LLP 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700 Dallas, TX 75202 214-468-3599 Facsimile jeichman@hunton.com glinyard@hunton.com Attorneys for Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,

John C. Eichman

Van H. Beckwith
Jessica B. Pulliam
Baker Botts L.L.P.
2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700
Dallas, TX 75201
214-661-4677 Facsimile
van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com
jessica.pulliam@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Evan A. Young
Baker Botts L.L.P.
98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
Austin, TX 78701
512-322-8306 Facsimile
evan.young@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

James E. Pennington
Law Offices of James E. Pennington, P.C.
900 Jackson Street, Suite 440
Dallas, TX 75202
jep@jeplawyer.com
Attorneys for Defendants
Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

BRIAN P. LAUTEN
ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENORS

#### NO. PR-11-3238-1

IN RE: ESTATE OF	,	PROBATE COURT
MAX D. HOPPER,		
DECEASED		
JO N. HOPPER,		
Plaintiff,	NO. 1	
v.		
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,		
STEPHEN B. HOPPER and LAURA S. WASSMER,		
Defendants.	}	S COUNTY, TEXAS

#### JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A.'S NOTICE REGARDING APRIL 24, 2018, TEMPORARY INJUNCTION ORDER

JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. ("JPMorgan"), in its capacity as the independent administrator of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, deceased, and in its corporate capacity, understands Intervenors have asked the Court to issue a Writ of Injunction on the Court's April 24, 2018, Temporary Injunction Order ("Order"), but as of the date of this Notice, JPMorgan has not been served with such Writ.

JPMorgan, however wishes to keep the Court fully apprised of certain facts relevant to its Order, to explain clearly and unambiguously that JPMorgan has no current obligation to make any settlement payment pursuant to the Confidential Settlement Agreement it entered into with Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer (the "Heirs"), and to make clear to the Court that if, and when, the conditions precedent to its payment obligations occur, it will comply with the Court's Order to the extent that Order remains in effect, as well as any other then-existing Court Orders regarding the safe-keeping of any settlement amount JPMorgan has an obligation to pay.

The Confidential Settlement Agreement includes certain conditions precedent to any obligation on the part of JPMorgan to make any settlement payment. Specifically, JPMorgan only becomes obligated to pay the confidential "Settlement Amount"

[w]ithin 10 business days following (i) the execution of this Agreement by all Parties, (ii) the delivery to JPMorgan of the documents required by Section 2(b), and (iii) the delivery to JPMorgan of (x) a completed W9 and (y) wire transfer instructions, on the letterhead of the account owner, of such account or accounts as the Heirs may designate....

Section 2(b) requires the following before any payment obligation on JPMorgan's part comes due:

JPMorgan's obligation to pay the Settlement Amount is subject to the Heirs' prior satisfaction and removal of all Attorneys' Liens that have been or may be filed or asserted prior to the date of JPMorgan's obligation to pay the Settlement Amount, including but not limited to the liens asserted and petitions in intervention already filed by Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP and John L. Malesovas d/b/a Malesovas Law Firm. For purposes of this Section, the Heirs "satisfaction and removal" shall mean that the Heirs have delivered to JPMorgan (i) written waivers as to JPMorgan only, signed by all attorneys who have asserted liens and (ii) to the extent such attorneys have filed actions in any court or petitions to intervene in the Action, documents evidencing that such actions or petitions have been withdrawn or an order from a court or arbitrator permitting JPMorgan to pay the Settlement Amount to the Account(s) and no conflicting order of another court or arbitrator shall be in effect precluding such payment.<sup>1</sup>

Because those conditions precedent have not been fully satisfied, JPMorgan has no current obligation to make any Settlement Payment. Thus, until satisfaction and removal of any liens as to JPMorgan only and dismissal of any associated petition in intervention as to JPMorgan only, whether by agreement or Court or arbitration order, no Settlement Payment is due, and none will be made by JPMorgan to the Heirs, their current counsel, or any other party. If, in the future, all conditions precedent to payment are satisfied and JPMorgan becomes obligated to make a Settlement Payment, JPMorgan will abide by all then-existing Court Orders regarding the payment or safe-keeping of any settlement funds.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The parties agree that the cited portion is not confidential and may be disclosed to the Court without waiving the confidential portions of the Confidential Settlement Agreement. Should the Court want to review a copy of the Confidential Settlement Agreement, with the settlement amount redacted, JPMorgan will provide an *in camera* review.

In the meantime, the funds necessary to satisfy any possible future funding of the Confidential Settlement Agreement remain with JPMorgan.

Respectfully submitted,

BAKER & BOTTS L.L.P.

sh: Amarin

Van H. Beckwith State Bar No. 02020150 van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com Jessica B. Pulliam State Bar No. 24037309 jessica.pulliam@bakerbotts.com

2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700

Dallas, Texas 75201

Telephone: (214) 953-6500 Telecopy: (214) 661-4677

#### **HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH, LLP**

John C. Eichman State Bar No. 06494800 jeichman@huntonAK.com Grayson L. Linyard State Bar No. 24070150 glinyard@huntonAK.com

1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700 Dallas, Texas 75202-2700 Telephone: (214) 468-3300 Telecopy: (214) 468-3599

ATTORNEYS FOR
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
IN ITS CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE
OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED AND
IN ITS CORPORATE CAPACITY

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has been served on the following counsel of record via the electronic service manager and/or by email on this 4th day of May, 2018.

Alan S. Loewinsohn
Jim L. Flegle
Kerry F. Schonwald
LOEWINSOHN FLEGLE DEARY SIMON L.L.P.
12377 Merit Drive, Suite 900
Dallas, Texas 75251
alanl@lfdslaw.com
jimf@lfdslaw.com
kerrys@lfdslaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Brian P. Lauten
BRIAN LAUTEN, P.C.
3811 Turtle Creek Boulevard
Ste. 1450
Dallas, Texas 75219
blauten@brianlauten.com
Attorney for Intervenors

Jeffrey S. Levinger
J. Carl Cecere
LEVINGER PC
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500
Dallas, Texas 75202
jlevinger@levingerpc.com
ccecere@cecerepc.com

James E. Pennington
Law Offices of James E. Pennington, P.C.
900 Jackson Street, Suite 440
Dallas, Texas 75202
jep@jeplawyer.com

Anne M. Johnson
Andrew W. Guthrie
HAYNES AND BOONE LLP
2323 Victory Avenue, Suite 700
Dallas, Texas 75219
Anne.johnson@haynesboone.com
Andrew.guthrie@haynesboone.com
Attorneys for Defendants
Laura Wassmer and Stephen Hopper

Van H. Beckwith

#### CAUSE NO. PR-11-03238-1

IN RE: ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, IN THE PROBATE COURT DECEASED JO N. HOPPER Plaintiff, JP MORGAN CHASE, N.A., STEPHEN B. HOPPER and LAURA S. WASSMER Defendants. NO. I JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP Intervenors, ٧, STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, and JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS Defendants.

#### REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

Defendants Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer ("the Clients") file this Reply in Support of their Motion to Compel Arbitration, and their Supplement to Motion to Compel Arbitration (collectively, the "Motion"), to address arguments raised in Intervenors' (Lawyers) Consolidated Objections and Response to Hopper and Wassmer's (Clients) Motion to Compel Arbitration and Bench Brief in Support of Temporary Orders & Relief (the "Response"). The

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

Motion is set for hearing on May 8, 2018, at 4:00 pm. The Clients submit the following reply points in support of the Motion:

A. This is a fee dispute between the Lawyers and the Clients that falls squarely within the arbitration provision in their Fee Agreements.

There is no dispute that the Lawyers' Fee Agreements contain a broad, unlimited, and unambiguous arbitration provision:

20. ARBITRATION: It is Attorney's goal to maintain at all times a constructive and positive relationship with Client on the matter described above and on future matters in which Attorney may perform services for Client. However, should a dispute arise between Attorney and Client, a prompt and fair resolution is in the interests of all concerned. To this end, if any controversy or claim arises out of is related to this agreement, any services provided by Attorneys to Client in connection with Client's Claims, or any other matter that may arise between Client and Attorney (including malpractice claims and fee disputes), Attorneys and Client both waive any right to bring a court action or have a jury trial and agree that the dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration to be conducted in Dallas, Texas before the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA with one arbitrator who must be an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Texas.

(Ex. A-1 § 20; Ex. B-1 § 20) (highlighting added). Indeed, the Lawyers have "fully embrace[d] the language and contractual obligations of the parties as set forth and articulated in [the Fee Agreements] including, specifically, its arbitration provision." (Response at 1.)

The only question, then, is whether the Lawyers' claims fall within the scope of their arbitration provision. *In re Rubiola*, 334 S.W.3d 220, 223 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding). But, on that issue, there really is no question because the scope of the provision is so broad. Section 20, drafted by the Lawyers, covers "any controversy or claim" related to the Fee Agreements, and "any other matter that may arise between Client and Attorney." (Ex. A-1 § 20; Ex. B-1 § 20.) As if that weren't clear enough, Section 20 specifically mentions "fee disputes" as the kind of matter that is covered by the arbitration provision. (*Id.*) Because the intervention proceedings here are a *dispute* over whether the Lawyers are entitled to the *fee* contemplated by the Fee

Agreements, these proceedings fall squarely within the scope of the arbitration provision—and must be compelled to arbitration.

Despite this clear language, the Lawyers assert several arguments to avoid the arbitration provision they drafted. Each argument fails.

First, there is no "non-signatory" issue because there is no request—or need—to compel JP Morgan to arbitration. (See Response at 9-10.) JP Morgan is not a party to the fee dispute between the Lawyers and the Clients, and thus will not be part of the arbitration proceeding. Even assuming that JP Morgan had a current obligation to pay any settlement proceeds—and it does not, for reasons discussed in its Notice Regarding April 24, 2018 Temporary Injunction Order, filed May 4, 2018 ("JP Morgan Notice")—JP Morgan would simply stand in the position of an interpleader plaintiff. JP Morgan has indicated that it will pay the settlement proceeds as directed by the arbitrator or a court when all settlement conditions have been satisfied. (See Transcript of April 9, 2018 TRO hearing at 50; see also JP Morgan Notice at 2.) As a result, the Clients do not (and will not) seek any order against JP Morgan in the arbitration. The Transamerica case cited by the Lawyers, which involved the enforcement of an arbitration award against a non-signatory, is entirely irrelevant because no such relief is being sought here. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd., 284 S.W.3d 385, 392-93 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).

Further, as noted above and in the JP Morgan Notice, JP Morgan has no obligation to fund the settlement until certain conditions precedent are met, one of which requires the Lawyers to release their liens as against JP Morgan. (JP Morgan Notice at 2.) Because the Lawyers have refused to satisfy this condition, the Lawyers are preventing the Clients—and themselves—from receiving any settlement funds (including undisputed funds). In so doing, the Lawyers are

violating their ethical duties to the Clients and potentially subjecting themselves to State Bar discipline. See Tex. Disc. R. Prof. Conduct 1.14. But again, these disputes—over any fees due to the Lawyers from the settlement proceeds—do not concern JP Morgan, which will pay the same settlement amount regardless of where the money goes. There is no "non-signatory" issue in applying the arbitration provision to this dispute, and the Lawyers cannot avoid their own provision by trying to concoct one.

Second, the Clients are not "estopped" from enforcing the arbitration provision. (Response at 11.) The Lawyers argue there is "nothing to arbitrate" because they "have vested and secured property and ownership rights" in their contingency fee. (Id.) But the extent to which the Lawyers have contingency "rights" under the Fee Agreement is very much in dispute; Clients contend the agreement is unenforceable under Texas law, and that will be the subject of the arbitration. Even assuming the Lawyers were right about the impact of Tillery and Enochs (and they are not), those cases go to the ultimate question of whether a lawyer is entitled to the fee under a contract—the very issue that is covered by the arbitration provision and therefore must be decided by the arbitrator. See Tillery & Tillery v. Zurich Ins. Co., 54 S.W.3d 356, 357 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied) (holding that lawyer "was not entitled to enforce the contingent fee agreement"); Enochs v. Brown, 872 S.W.2d 312, 319-20 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no writ) (holding that "the trial court did not err in awarding attorney's fees to [lawyer] based on the contract"). These are merits arguments that the Lawyers can (and must) assert in the arbitration; they provide no basis to avoid arbitration altogether.

Nor are the Clients taking "irreconcilable positions" by seeking arbitration under an agreement they claim is unenforceable. (Response at 11.) It is black-letter law that an arbitration clause can be valid and enforceable even if it is contained "in a contract that the

arbitrator later finds to be void." *E.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna*, 546 U.S. 440, 448 (2006). Indeed, arbitration provisions are severable from the contracts in which they are contained. *Id.* at 445-46. Thus, unless the challenge is to the validity of the arbitration clause itself—and there is no such challenge in this case by any party (*see* Response at 1)—the issue of the validity of the agreement as a whole must be decided by the arbitrator in the first instance. *Buckeye Check Cashing*, 546 U.S. at 445-46; *see also In re Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp.*, 235 S.W.3d 206, 210 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding). Simply put, there is nothing inconsistent about the Clients' contention that: (1) the Fee Agreement is unenforceable, but that (2) that decision must be made by the arbitrator, because of the valid arbitration clause.

# B. This Court must rule on the Motion immediately because the Lawyers have filed—and set for hearing on May 23—a dispositive summary judgment motion.

For the reasons described above and in the Motion, the Clients believe this case requires an unconditional order compelling the Lawyers' claims to arbitration. But whatever the Court's ruling might be, it must be soon.

The Texas Supreme Court has mandated that motions to compel arbitration "should be resolved without delay." *In re Houston Pipe Line Co.*, 311 S.W.3d 449, 451 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding). As a result, Texas appellate courts often find trial courts to have abused their discretion by deferring a ruling on a motion to compel arbitration—or other related challenges to the forum—in favor of:

Merits discovery:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In re Houston Pipeline Co., 311 S.W.3d at 452 (granting mandamus where trial court ordered merits discovery "rather than ruling on the legal issues raised by the motion to compel [arbitration]"); In re Susan Newell Home Builders, Inc., 420 S.W.3d 459, 462-63 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus where trial court ordered discovery that "goes directly to the merits of [plaintiff's] claims" and deferred ruling on certain motions to compel arbitration); In re MHI Partnership, Ltd., 7 S.W.3d 918, 923 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus where trial court forced parties to litigate before ruling on motion to compel arbitration and holding "the trial judge had no discretion to defer his ruling until after discovery had been completed in the case").

- Injunctive relief;<sup>2</sup> and
- Summary judgment proceedings.<sup>3</sup>

The last point is particularly salient here, as the Lawyers have filed—and set for hearing on May 23rd—a summary judgment motion on the very fee dispute that belongs in arbitration. The mere existence of this motion shows that the Lawyers are seeking to have this Court decide merits issues that can only be decided by the arbitrator. But in any event, the Lawyers' inappropriate summary-judgment filing imposes a short deadline on the Court's arbitration ruling, as the Clients' summary-judgment response will be due on May 16th, a little more than a week after the hearing on the Motion.

If the Clients are forced to file a summary-judgment response in this Court—and thus, to litigate the fee dispute on the merits—they will have been deprived of their contractual right to arbitration. See MHI Partnership, Ltd., 7 S.W.3d at 921 (requiring parties to participate in discovery would deprive them "of the benefits of the arbitration clause... and the purpose of providing a rapid, inexpensive alternative to traditional litigation would be defeated") (quoting Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272–73 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding)); see also Tantrum, 2017 WL 3275901, at \*9 ("Texas law prohibits trial courts from ruling on a case's merits while a motion to compel arbitration is pending."); MetroPCS, 391 S.W.3d at 340 (allowing case to move forward without ruling on forum challenge "will vitiate and render illusory the subject matter of an appeal—i.e., trial in the proper forum") (internal quotations

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> In re MetroPCS Comms., Inc., 391 S.W.3d 329, 340 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus where trial court granted TRO and set temporary injunction for hearing "without first ruling on relators' motions respecting the forum selection clause in question"); see also Pinto Tech. Ventures, L.P. v. Sheldon, 526 S.W.3d 428, 437 (Tex. 2017) (Texas courts may "draw analogies between forum-selection clauses and arbitration clauses, which are 'a specialized kind of forum-selection clause.") (internal citations omitted).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Tantrum Street, LLC v. Carson, No. 05-16-01096-CV, 2017 WL 3275901, at \*9-10 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 25, 2017, orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus where trial court ruled on summary judgment motion while motion to compel arbitration was pending).

omitted). Therefore, unless the Court rules on the Motion by May 10th—or at a minimum, grants a continuance of the May 23rd summary-judgment hearing—the Clients will have no choice but to seek emergency relief from the Dallas Court of Appeals in order to protect their rights to arbitration. See id. The Clients therefore respectfully request a ruling on the Motion by no later than May 10th.<sup>4</sup>

#### CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

The Clients respectfully request that the Court compel the Lawyers/Intervenors to pursue their claims in arbitration; stay or dismiss the Lawyers' claims; and grant the Clients all other relief, at law or in equity, to which they may be entitled.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> In the event the Court denies the Motion, the Clients respectfully request a stay of all discovery and trial proceedings pending an accelerated appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 51.016, 171.098; Tex. R. App. P. 29.3 (stay of proceedings pending interlocutory appeal appropriate "to preserve the parties' rights until disposition of the appeal"). Without a stay, the Clients would be denied the "rapid, inexpensive alternative to traditional litigation" they are entitled to under the arbitration provision, even if the court of appeals ultimately rules in their favor. See In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co. FSB, 235 S.W.3d 185, 195 (Tex. 2007); Tex. R. App. P. 29.5 (trial court "must not make an order" pending an interlocutory appeal that "interferes with or impairs the jurisdiction of the appellate court or any relief sought or that may be granted on appeal").

#### Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Anne M. Johnson

James E. Pennington
State Bar No. 15758510
LAW OFFICES OF JAMES E. PENNINGTON, P.C. 900 Jackson Street, Suite 440
Dallas, Texas 75202-4473
Telephone: (214) 741-3022
Facsimile: (214) 741-3055
jep@jeplawyer.com

Anne M. Johnson State Bar No. 00794271 Andrew W. Guthrie State Bar No. 24078606 HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP 2323 Victory Avenue, Suite 700 Dallas, Texas 75219 Telephone: (214) 651-5376 Facsimile: (214) 200-0487 anne.johnson@haynesboone.com andrew.guthrie@haynesboone.com

Attorneys for Defendants
Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 4th day of May, 2018, the foregoing Reply in Support of Motion to Compel Arbitration was filed using the e-filing system which will send notification of such filing to the following parties via email:

Brian P. Lauten BRIAN LAUTEN, P.C. 3811 Turtle Creek Boulevard, Ste. 1450 Dallas, Texas 75219 blauten@brianlauten.com

Attorney for Intervenor Fee Smith Sharp & Vitullo, LLP

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

John L. Malesovas MALESOVAS LAW FIRM State Bar No. 12857300 1801 South Mopac Expressway, Suite 320 Austin, TX 78746 john@malesovas.com

## Attorney for Intervenor, John Malesovas

Alan S. Loewinsohn
Jim L. Flegle
Kerry F. Schonwald
LOEWINSOHN FLEGLE DEARY SIMON LLP
12377 Merit Dr., Suite 900
Dallas, Texas 75251
alanl@lfdslaw.com
jimf@lfdslaw.com
kerrys@lfdslaw.com

#### Attorneys for Plaintiff Jo Hopper

Jeffrey S. Levinger
J. Carl Cecere
LEVINGER PC
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500
Dallas, TX 75202
jlevinger@levingerpc.com
ccecere@cecerepc.com

# Attorneys for Defendants, Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

John C. Eichman Grayson L. Linyard HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LLP 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700 Dallas, TX 75202 214-468-3599 Facsimile jeichman@hunton.com glinyard@hunton.com

Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, Deceased, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., in its Corporate Capacity

Van H. Beckwith
Jessica B. Pulliam
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700
Dallas, TX 75201
214-661-4677 Facsimile
van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com
jessica.pulliam@bakerbotts.com

Evan A. Young BAKER BOTTS L.L.P. 98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500 Austin, TX 78701 512-322-8306 Facsimile evan.young@bakerbotts.com

Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

/s/ Anne M. Johnson
Anne M. Johnson

#### CAUSE NO. PR-11-3238-1

JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a IN THE PROBATE COURT MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP Intervenors,  $\omega$   $\omega$   $\omega$   $\omega$   $\omega$   $\omega$   $\omega$   $\omega$   $\omega$ NO. 1 ٧. STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, individually and as Beneficiaries of the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED, the ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER. DECEASED, JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendants. DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

# AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING ON INTERVENORS' CONSOLIDATED TRADITIONAL RULE 166a(c) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Intervenors' (Lawyers) Consolidated Traditional Rule 166a(c) Motion for Summary Judgment (MSJ) on their Secured and Fully Vested Property and Ownership Rights to the Disputed Funds, Application for Attorney's Fees, and Brief in Support (filed 4.20.18), will be heard on **Monday**, **June 11**, **2018 at 9:00 AM** in the front of Judge Brenda Hull Thompson, The Probate Court, Renaissance Tower, 1201 Elm Street, 24<sup>th</sup> Floor, Suite 2400-A, Dallas, Texas 75270, Dallas County, Texas.

1

Respectfully Submitted,

**BRIAN LAUTEN, P.C.** 

BRIAN P. LAUTEN

State Bar No. 24031603
blauten@brianlauten.com
3811 Turtle Creek Blvd., Ste. 1450
Dallas, Texas 75219
(214) 414-0996 telephone
ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENORS

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has been served on all counsel of record on May 9, 2018, in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to:

Alan S. Loewinschn
Jim L. Flegle
Kerry F. Schonwald
Loewinschn Flegle Deary Simon LLP
12377 Merit Dr., Suite 900
Dallas, Texas 75251
214-572-1717 Facsimile
alanl@lfdslaw.com
jimf@lfdslaw.com
kerrys@lfdslaw.com
Attorneys for Intervenor Jo Hopper

John C. Eichman
Grayson L. Linyard
Hunton & Williams, LLP
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700
Dallas, TX 75202
214-468-3599 Facsimile
jeichman@hunton.com
glinyard@hunton.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A.,
as Independent Administrator of the Estate
of Max D. Hopper, Deceased,
and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., in its

Evan A. Young
Baker Botts L.L.P.
98 San Jacinto Blvd., Suite 1500
Austin, TX 78701
512-322-8306 Facsimile
evan.young@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant,
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

Corporate Capacity

Jeffrey S. Levinger
J. Carl Cecere
Levinger PC
1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500
Dallas, TX 75202
214-855-6808 Facsimile
ilevinger@levingerpc.com
ccecere@cecerepc.com
Attorneys for Defendants, Stephen B.
Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

Van H. Beckwith
Jessica B. Pulliam
Baker Botts L.L.P.
2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700
Dallas, TX 75201
214-661-4677 Facsimile
van.beckwith@bakerbotts.com
jessica.pulliam@bakerbotts.com
Attorneys for Defendant, JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A.

James E. Pennington Law Offices of James E. Pennington, P.C. 900 Jackson Street, Suite 440 Dallas, TX 75202 jep@jeplawyer.com Attorneys for Defendants Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer

BRIAN P. LAUTEN
ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENORS

#### CAUSE No. PR-11-3238-1

IN RE: ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED	§ §	IN THE PROBATE COURT
W	§	
JO N. HOPPER	8	
Plaintiff,	Š	.NO. 1
V.	§	
	8	
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.	§	
STEPHEN B. HOPPER AND LAURAS.	§	
WASSMER,	§	
Defendants.	§	DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

# PLAINTIFF'S UNOPPOSED MOTION TO SEVER HEIRS' CLAIMS AND INTERVENTION CLAIMS

Plaintiff Jo N. Hopper ("Plaintiff" or "Mrs. Hopper") files this Unopposed Motion to Sever Heirs' Claims and Intervention Claims ("Motion") as follows:

1. In September 2011, Plaintiff filed suit against JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (the "Bank") for, *inter alia*, declaratory judgment, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract regarding the Bank's actions related to the administration of the Estate of Max D. Hopper. Mrs. Hopper also sued Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer (collectively, the "Heirs") for declaratory judgment. The suit against the Bank and the Heirs is the "Underlying Action." Broadly speaking, Mrs. Hopper asserted two categories of declaratory judgment claims in the Underlying Action. The first generally related to rights regarding the home she shared with her husband on Robledo Drive, as well as other personal property, including but not limited to whether the Bank or the Heirs could force a sale or partition of the home and other personal property (the "Robledo Declaratory Judgment Claims"). Summary judgment rulings related to the Robledo Declaratory Judgment Claims were appealed in 2012, and in 2014, the El Paso Court of Appeals ruled in Mrs. Hopper's favor regarding those claims. The second category of

declaratory judgment claims sought a declaration from the Court that Mrs. Hopper does not owe the Bank, the Estate of Max D. Hopper (the "Estate"), or the Heirs for any professional fees incurred by the Bank in connection with the administration of her late husband's estate, including but not limited to attorney's fees (the "Hunton & Williams Fees Claims"). Prior to the commencement of the trial, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment regarding the Hunton & Williams Fees Claims.

- 2. The Heirs also asserted claims against the Bank, including for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, fraud, money had and received, conversion, negligence, and gross negligence (the "Heirs' Claims").
- Trial commenced on the August 28, 2017 on the remaining claims. The case was submitted to the jury on September 25, 2017, and on that date, the Court accepted the jury's verdict.
- 4. The Court held hearings on post-trial motions on January 4, 2018 and April 4 and 5, 2018. Prior to the commencement of the April 4, 2018 hearing, counsel for the Heirs, Lenny Vitullo, announced that the Heirs had settled the Heirs' Claims with the Bank and that the Heirs were withdrawing their Motion for Entry of Final Judgment. As a result, the only currently outstanding motions before the Court are: (1) Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Final Judgment and (2) the Bank's Amended Motion for JNOV, and, alternatively, Motion to Disregard Jury Findings or Suggestion of Remittitur.
- 5. Shortly after Mr. Vitullo announced the Heirs' settlement with the Bank on the record, the Heirs terminated their fee agreements with Mr. Vitullo's firm, Fee Smith, Sharp & Viutllo ("FSSV") and co-counsel the Malesovas Law Firm ("Malesovas"). On April 4, 2018, Malesovas filed a Petition in Intervention in the above-styled action. On April 6, 2018, FSSV

filed its Petition in Intervention, Application for Declaratory Relief, Request for TRO and Temporary Injunction. On April 9, 2018, FSSV and Malesovas filed a Consolidated First Amended Joint Petition in Intervention and Petition for Declaratory Judgment, Application for Temporary Restraining Order, for Temporary Injunction, and Motion to Deposit Funds in the Registry. FSSV and Malesovas are, collectively, the "Intervenors." On May 1, 2018, the Intervenors filed their Consolidated Second Amended Petition in Intervention, Application for Declaratory Judgment, Temporary and Permanent Injunction (the "Intervention Claims").

- 6. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 41, "[a]ny claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately." The Rule "grants the trial court broad discretion in the matter of severance . . . of causes." Guaranty Fed. Sav. Bank. v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d 652, 658 (Tex. 1990). See also Liberty Nat'l Fire Insur. Co. v. Akin, 927 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. 1996) ("Severance of claims under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.")
- 7. Plaintiff requests a severance of the Heirs' Claims and the Intervention Claims so that Plaintiff may go forward to a final judgment against the Bank and the Heirs and to avoid further delay and hardship.
- 8. Severance of the Heirs' Claims and the Intervention Claims will serve justice, avoid prejudice, and contribute to the prompt resolution of this cause by allowing Plaintiff to proceed to final judgment with her claims against the Bank and the Heirs. *See In re State*, 355 S.W.3d 611, 613-614 (Tex. 2011); *F.F.P. Oper. Partners v. Duenez*, 237 S.W.3d 680, 693 (Tex. 2007).

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that the Court order that the Heirs' Claims and the Intervention Claims be severed, made the subject of a separate cause, and assigned a separate

cause number on the docket of this Court, in accordance with the terms of the proposed Order granting severance. Plaintiff further requests the Court grant her such additional relief to which she is justly entitled.

Dated: May 9, 2018

Respectfully submitted,

#### LOEWINSOHN FLEGLE DEARY SIMON LLP

By: <u>/s/ Alan S. Loewinsohn</u> Alan S. Loewinsohn

State Bar No. 12481600 alani@lfdslaw.com

Jim L. Flegle

State Bar No. 07118600

jimf@lfdslaw.com

Kerry Schonwald

State Bar No. 24051301

kerrys@lfdslaw.com

12377 Merit Drive, Suite 900

Dallas, Texas 75251 (214) 572-1700

FAX: (214) 572-1717

#### **COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF**

#### **CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE**

Counsel for the Bank, the Heirs, and the Intervenors have all stated that they are unopposed to the relief sought in this Motion.

/s/ Kerry Schonwald
Kerry Schonwald

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#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served upon the following counsel of record this 9<sup>th</sup> day of May, 2018 via e-service.

John C. Eichman HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700 Dallas, Texas 75202

Brian P. Lauten Brian P. Lauten, P.C. 3811 Turtle Creek Blvd, Suite 1450 Dallas, Texas 75219 Van H. Beckwith Jessica B. Pulliam BAKER & BOTTS, L.L.P. 2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700 Dallas, Texas 75201

Jeffrey S. Levinger J. Carl Cecere Levinger, PC 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500 Dallas, Texas 75202

/s/ Alan S. Loewinsohn
ALAN S. LOEWINSOHN

#### LFDS

LOEWINSOHN FLEGLE DEARY SIMON LLF

May 9, 2018

#### VIA E-FILING

Clerk, Probate Court No. 1 1201 Elm Street, Suite 2400-A Dallas, TX 75270

Re: Cause No. PR-11-3238-1; Estate of Max D. Hopper; Jo N. Hopper v. Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer v. JPMorgan Chase Bank pending in Probate Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas

Dear Clerk:

Enclosed please find the proposed Unopposed Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Sever Heirs' Claims and Intervention Claims.

Please present this Order for the Court's consideration.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Very truly yours,

Alan S. Loewinsohn Direct: 214-572-1700 alanl@lfdslaw.com

ASL:bsa

Enclosure

cc: John C. Eichman, Brian P. Lauten, Van H. Beckwith, Jessica B. Pulliam, Jeffrey S. Levinger, J. Carl Cecere (all with enclosures via e-filing)

12377 MERIT DRIVE, SUITE 900 DALLAS, TEXAS 75251-2224 P 214.572.1700 F 214.572.1717 www.lfdslaw.com

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#### DOCKET SHEET CASE NO. PR-11-03238-1

IN THE MATTER OF MAX HOPPER, DECEDENT Location: Probate Court

Case Type: ANCILLARY

Subtype: JUDGMENT

Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H

Filed on: 09/21/2011

Case Number History: PR-11-03238-3

DECLARATORY

CASE INFORMATION

Related Cases

PR-10-01517-1 (ANCILLARY LAWSUIT) PR-18-01390-1 (SEVERED)

Bonds

CASH BOND \$10,000.00 4/11/2018

POSTED

Counts:

CASE ASSIGNMENT

DATE

Current Case Assignment

Case Number

Court Date Assigned

Judicial Officer

PR-11-03238-1 Probate Court

01/21/2016

THOMPSON, BRENDA H

Party Information		
DECEDENT HOPPER, MAX D.		ad Attorneys
DATE	Events & Orders of the Court	ÍNOEX
09/21/2011	ORIGINAL PETITION (OCA)  PLAINTIFF'S ORIGINAL PETITION FOR: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, BREACH OF CONTRACT, BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, FRAUD, ET AL, FOR REMOVAL OF INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATOR, AND, JURY DEMAND	54 pages
09/21/2011	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
09/21/2011	MISC. EVENT  WESTLAW/LEGAL INFORMATION	
09/27/2011	ISSUE CITATION  Party: DEFENDANT JP MORGAN CHASE, N.A.  PRIVATE PROCESS	2 pages
09/27/2011	ISSUE CITATION  JP MORGAN CHASE, N.A.  Unserved  RTN	2 pages
10/06/2011	COUNTER CLAIM  Party: DEFENDANT JP MORGAN CHASE, N.A.; DEFENDANT HOPPER, STEPHEN  B.; DEFENDANT WASSMER, LAURA S.  ORGINAL ANSWER, SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS, COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS-CLAIM (E-FILE)	

# DOCKET SHEET CASE NO. PR-11-03238-1

10/06/2011	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
10/13/2011	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE (E-FILE)	
10/14/2011	JURY DEMAND	
10/17/2011	ORIGINAL ANSWER  STEPHEN HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S ORIGINAL ANSWER TO JO HOOPER'S ORIGINAL PETITION	
10/17/2011	ORIGINAL ANSWER  STEPHEN HOOPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S ORIGINAL ANSWER TO JPMORGAN  CHASE BANK, N.A.'S PETITION	
10/17/2011	RESPONSE  Party: PLAINTIFF HOPPER, JO N.  TO JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS	Vol./Book 2, Page 36, 4 pages
10/17/2011	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
10/19/2011	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
10/20/2011	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
10/20/2011	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
10/21/2011	☑ FIAT	
10/21/2011	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
10/31/2011	CANCELED SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS (1:50 PM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  REQUESTED BY ATTORNEY/PRO SE  reset to Nov 9th @ 9:30	
11/02/2011	NOTICE - HEARING / FIA'S  CORRESPONDENCE LETTER	
11/07/2011	AMENDED ANSWER  PLAINTIFF JO N. HOPPER'S AMENDED RESPONSE TO JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS	Vol./Book 2, Page 30, 6 pages
11/07/2011	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
11/08/2011	MISC. EVENT	
11/09/2011	SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  Counterclaim, Crossclaim	
11/15/2011	ORDER - MISCELLANEOUSORDER ON SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS	Vol./Book 2, Page 40, 2 pages

# DOCKET SHEET CASE NO. PR-11-03238-1

11/15/2011	MISC, EVENT	
11/18/2011	© RULE 11 AGREEMENT  JOHN EICHMAN	Vol./Book 2, Page 43, 1 pages
11/18/2011	Q rule 11 agreement	Vol./Book 2, Page 44, 2 pages
11/18/2011	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
11/28/2011	Q RULE 11 AGREEMENT  E-FILE-MELINDA H. SIMS	Vol./Book 2, Page 42, 2 pages
11/28/2011	TRULE 11 AGREEMENT -MARK ENOCH	Vol./Book 2, Page 46, 3 pages
11/29/2011	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
11/30/2011	MOTION - PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT  PLAINTIFF JO N. HOPPER'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT	Vol./Book 18, Page 237, 60 pages
11/30/2011	AMENDED PETITION  PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED ORIGINAL PETITION FOR: DECLARATORY  JUDGMENT, BREACH OF CONTRACT, BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, FRAUD, ET  AL. FOR REMOVAL OF INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATOR, AND JURY DEMAND	
11/30/2011	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
11/30/2011	Correspondence - Letter to file	
12/02/2011	RULE 11 AGREEMENT	
12/02/2011	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
12/05/2011	NOTICE OF HEARING	
12/20/2011	COUNTER CLAIM  Party: DEFENDANT HOPPER, STEPHEN B.; DEFENDANT WASSMER, LAURA S.  AND CROSS CLAIM FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT	
12/20/2011	MOTION - SUMMARY JUDGMENT  Party: DEFENDANT HOPPER, STEPHEN B.; DEFENDANT WASSMER, LAURA S.  (PARTIAL)	Vol./Book 34, Page 676, 36 pages
12/20/2011	MOTION - CONTINUANCE Party: DEFENDANT HOPPER, STEPHEN B.; DEFENDANT WASSMER, LAURA S.	
12/20/2011	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	

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CASE NO. PR-11-03238-1		
12/21/2011	LETTER TO COURT  JAMES ALBERT JENNINGS.	
12/21/2011	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
12/21/2011	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
12/23/2011	MOTION - CONTINUANCE (11:45 AM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)	
12/23/2011	RESPONSE Party: PLAINTIFF HOPPER, JO N. TO STEPHEN B. HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE	
12/23/2011	MOTION TO DISQUALIFY RECENTLY-NAMED OPPOSING COUNSEL GERRY W. BEYER	
12/23/2011	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
12/30/2011	CANCELED MOTION - PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  REQUESTED BY ATTORNEY/PRO SE	
01/09/2012	MOTION - PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT  Party: DEFENDANT HOPPER, STEPHEN B.; DEFENDANT WASSMER, LAURA S.  FIRST AMENDED (E-FILE)	Vol./Book 34, Page 636, 40 pages
01/10/2012	MOTION - PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT  Party: DEFENDANT HOPPER, STEPHEN B.; DEFENDANT WASSMER, LAURA S.  SECOND AMENDED (E-FILE)	Vol./Book 34, Page 592, 44 pages
01/10/2012	2 CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
01/12/2012	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  JUDGE DID NOT SIGN OFF ON THIS - ORDER GRANTING STEPHEN HOPPER'S AND  LAURA WASSMER'S UNOPPOSED MOTION OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUSEL	
01/13/2012	MOTION - PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT  Party: DEFENDANT HOPPER, STEPHEN B.; DEFENDANT WASSMER, LAURA S.  SECOND AMENDED MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT	Vol./Book 18, Page 193, 64 pages
01/13/2012	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
01/17/2012	NOTICE  OF WITHDRAWAL AS COUNSEL FOR NO. N. HOPPER (GERRY W. BEYER'S)	
01/17/2012	RULE 11 AGREEMENT	
01/17/2012	NOTICE  STEPHEN B. HOPPER'S AND LAURA S. WASSMER'S NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION WITH PREJUDICE	
01/17/2012	MOTION - QUASH Party: PLAINTIFF HOPPER, JO N.	

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# DOCKET SHEET CASE NO. PR-11-03238-1

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	AND OR FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER OF DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF INTENTION TO TAKE ORAL AND VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF JO N. HOPPER	
01/17/2012	(1) MOTION - QUASH	
	Party: PLAINTIFF HOPPER, IO N.	
	AND OR FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER OF DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF INTENTION TO TAKE ORAL AND VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF CELIA DORIS KING AND	
	SUBPOENA DUCES TECEM	
01/17/2012	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
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01/17/2012	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
01/17/2012	(1) CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
01/17/2012	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
	ES COMMON MATTER TO THE	
01/17/2012	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
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01/20/2012	(1) NOTICE - APPEARANCE OF PROFESSOR THOMAS M. FEATHERSTON, JR.	
	Of Their Edder House St. P. Miller Divis, St.	
01/20/2012	♠ MOTION	
	MOTION TO CONTINUE HEARING AND OBJECTION ON AND AS TO STEPHEN HOPPER'S	
01/23/2012	CANCELED MOTION - PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)	
	REQUESTED BY ATTORNEY/PRO SE	
01/23/2012	RESPONSE	Vol./Book 34, Page 454, 38 pages
	RESPONSE OF STEPHEN B. HOOPER AND LAURA S, WASSMER TO JO HOPPER'S	ा धरुर ४७४, ७० pages
	MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT	
01/24/2012	MOTION - PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT	Vol./Book 34, Page 493, 5 pages
	SUBJECT TO PAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CONTINUE HEARING AND OVJECTIONS, ET	rage 495, 5 pages
	AL. FILED 1/20/12 PLAINTIFF JO N. HOPPER'S OBJECTION TO STEPHEN B, HOPPER'S AND LAURA S. WASSMER'S AFFIDAVITS OFFERED IN SUPPORT OF	
	THEIR SECOND AMENDED MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT	
01/24/2012	MOTION - PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT	Vol./Book 34,
V172112012	SUBJECT TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CONTINUE HEARING AND OBJECTIONS	Page 499, 49 pages
	FILED 1/20/12 PLAINTIFF JO N. HOPPER'S RESPONSE TO STEPHEN B. HOPPER'S AND LAURA S. WASSMERS SECOND AMENDED MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY	
	JUDGMENT	
01/24/2012	ET	
U1/24/2U12	[AMENDED ANSWER]  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BNAK, N.A.'S FIRST AMENDED ANSWER, SPECIAL	
	EXCEPTION, COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS-CLAIM IN RESPONSE TO JO N. HOPPER'S FIRST AMENDED ORIGINAL PETITION	
	FUWI AMBRUDD ORIGINAL FEITHON	l
01/24/2012	ORIGINAL ANSWER  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S ORIGINAL ANSWER AND, SPECIAL	
	EXCEPTIONS TO STEPHEN HOOPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S COUNTERCLAIM	

# DOCKET SHEET CASE NO. PR-11-03238-1

	CASE 110. X IX-11-03236-1
	AND CROSS CLAIM FOR DECLORATORY JUDGMENT
01/24/2012	RESPONSE
	JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S RESPONSE TO JO HOPPER'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND STEPHEN HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S SECOND AMENDED MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
01/24/2012	AFFIDAVIT  AFFIDAVIT OF SUSAN H. NOVAK IN SUPPORT OF INDEPENDENT  ADMINISTRATOR'S RESPONSE TO MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT -  CONFIDENTIAL FILED UNDER SEAL
01/25/2012	CANCELED MOTION - PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  REQUESTED BY ATTORNEY/PRO SE
01/25/2012	CANCELED MOTION - HEARING (2:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E) BY COURT ADMINISTRATOR
01/25/2012	MOTION - QUASH  Party: PLAINTIFF HOPPER, JO N.  AMENDED MOTION TO QUASH AND OR FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER OF  DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF INTENTION TO TAKE ORAL AND VIDEOTAPED  DEPOSTION OF CELIA DORIS KING AND SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM
01/25/2012	MOTION - QUASH  Party: PLAINTIFF HOPPER, JO N,  AMENDED MOTION TO QUASH AND OR FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER OF  DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF INTENTION TO TAKE ORAL AND VIDEOTAPED  DEPOSITION OF JO. N. HOPPER
01/25/2012	MOTION TO ALLOW WITHIN 24 DAYS OF HEARING, SERVICE AND FILING OF STEPHEN HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S, FIRST AND SECOND AMENDED MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDMENT FILED WITH THE COURT ON JAN, 9 AND 10, 2012 (E- FILED)
01/27/2012	RESPONSE  Party: PLAINTIFF HOPPER, JO N.  TO MOTION TO ALLOW, WITHIN 24 DAYS OF HEARING, SERVICE AND FILING OF STEPHEN B. HOPPER'S AND LAURA S. WASSMER'S FIRST AND SECOND AMENDED MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED WITH THE COURT ON 1/9/12 AND 1/10/12
01/27/2012	RESPONSE  RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITIONS AND, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION TO POSTPONE MEDIATION
01/30/2012	(2) CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE
01/30/2012	VACATION LETTER  MARK C. ENOCH (3/9/123/27/12) AND (7/13/128/7/12)
01/30/2012	MOTION - PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING NOTEBOOK
01/30/2012	MOTION - CONTINUANCE SUBJECT TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CONTINUE HEARING AND OBJECTIONS (FILED JANUARY 20, 2012)

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Vol./Book 34, Page 548, 44 pages

# DOCKET SHEET CASE NO. PR-11-03238-1

	CASE NO. PR-11-03238-1
01/30/2012	MISC. EVENT AUTHORITIES AND STATUES
01/30/2012	MOTION  PLAINTIFF'S AND DEFENDANT CHILDREN'S JOINT MOTION TO STAY
01/31/2012	MOTION - PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (2:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  Mr. Enoch Motion Partial S J set second filed Dec 19 2011
01/31/2012	MOTION - PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (2:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  Mr. Jennings Lead Counsel. Motion Partial SJ filed Nov 30, 2011 is set first
01/31/2012	MOTION - HEARING (2:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  Plntf Jo N. Hoppers Mot to continue Hrg and Obj on and as to Stephen Hoppers & Laura Wassmers 2nd Amd Mot Partial Summary Judgment with Affidavits
01/31/2012	MOTION - HEARING (2:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  Motion Allow Service & Filing within 24 days
01/31/2012	ORIGINAL ANSWER Party: PLAINTIFF HOPPER, JO N. AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
01/31/2012	ORIGINAL ANSWER  Party: PLAINTIFF HOPPER, JO N.  AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO DEFENDANTS STEPHEN HOPPER AND LAURA WASSMER
01/31/2012	MISC. EVENT Party: PLAINTIPF HOPPER, JO N. REPLY TO THE DEFENDANT STEPCHILDREN'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITIONS AND, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION TO POSTPONE MEDIATION
01/31/2012	MISC, EVENT  PLAINTIFF'S ADDITIONAL MATERIALS/SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR MOTION  FOR: PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING NOTEBOOK
02/03/2012	MOTION - QUASH (9:15 AM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)
02/03/2012	MOTION - QUASH (9:15 AM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  Response to Motion to Quash
02/06/2012	MOTION - QUASH (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  Response to Motion Quash
02/06/2012	MOTION - QUASH (9:05 AM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  Response to Motion Quash
02/06/2012	MOTION - QUASH (9:10 AM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  Response to Motion Quash
02/06/2012	MOTION - QUASH (9:15 AM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  Response to Motion Quash
02/06/2012	MOTION - QUASH (9:20 AM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  Response Motion Quash

# DOCKET SHEET CASE NO. PR-11-03238-1

	1	
02/06/2012	MOTION - QUASH (9:25 AM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  Response to Motion Quash	
02/07/2012	MISC. EVENT  SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM FOR VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION ISSUAED IN THE  NAMED OF THE STATE OF TEXAS TO CELIA DORIS KING	
02/07/2012	NOTICE OF HEARING MARK ENOCH	
02/09/2012	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
02/13/2012	MOTION Party: DEFENDANT JP MORGAN CHASE, N.A. TO ENFORCE MEDITATION ORDER	
02/13/2012	NOTICE - HEARING / FIAT EFILED. NOTICE OF HEARING (NO FIAT)	
02/14/2012	ORDER - SUMMARY JUDGMENT  MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER TO MEDIATION	Vol./Book 18, Page 297, 2 pages
02/14/2012	MOTION  PLAINTIFF JO N. HOPPER'S MOTION TO MODIFY THE COURT'S FEBRUARY 14, 2012  ORDER ON THE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND, ALTERNATIVELY, FOR  NEW TRIAL, PER T.R.C.P., RULE 329B; AND, MOTION TO SEVER	25 pages
02/17/2012	MOTION - HEARING (9:10 AM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  Mottion to Quash, Response in Alternative postpone mediation	
02/17/2012	MOTION - ENFORCE (9:10 AM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E) the Mediation Order	
03/05/2012	ORDER - MISCELLANEOUS	Vol./Book 21, Page 458, 2 pages
	-ORDER-ORDER ON THE MOTION TO ALLOW, WITHIN 24 DAYS OF HEARING, SERVICE AND FILING OF STEPHEN HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S FIRST AND SECOND AMENDED MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED WITH THE COURT ON JANUARY 9 AND 10, 2012, AND AFTER HEARING ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL AND REVIEWING THE PLEADINGS AND NOTING THE FILING DATES, THE COURT FINDS THAT THE MOTION IS WELL TAKEN AND SHOULD BE GRANTED.	Tago too, 2 pages
03/05/2012	RULE 11 AGREEMENT	Vol./Book 34, Page 450, 3 pages
03/14/2012	MOTION - NEW TRIAL RECONSIDERATION, CLARIFICATION, AND MODIFICATION.	
03/15/2012	VACATION LETTER	l pages
03/19/2012	MOTION - PROTECT Party: PLAINTIFF HOPPER, JO N.	
03/20/2012	NOTICE OF HEARING	
03/20/2012	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	11 pages
-		2 pages

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# DOCKET SHEET CASE NO. PR-11-03238-1

	CASE NO, FR-11-03238-1	
03/23/2012	LETTER TO COURT	
04/06/2012	MOTION - COMPEL  PLAINTIFF JO N. HOPPER'S MOTION TO COMPEL	
04/10/2012	MOTION - SEVER Party: DEFENDANT HOPPER, STEPHEN B.; DEFENDANT WASSMER, LAURA S.	
04/10/2012	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE (MULTIPLE COURT JUDGMENTS)	4 pages
04/11/2012	RESPONSE  JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S RESPONSE TO JO HOPPER'S MOTION TO MODIFY  ORDER AND FOR NEW TRIA, AND STEPHEN HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S  MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL RECONSIDERATION, CLARIFICATION, AND  MODIFICATION.	
04/13/2012	MOTION - NEW TRIAL (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  Reconsideration, Clarafication & Modification(Mark Enoch motion)	
04/13/2012	MOTION - SEVER (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  Motion to Modicfy Feb 14th 2012 order in the Alternative Mottion New Trial and Motion Sever (Jim Jennings motion)	×
04/13/2012	MOTION - SEVER (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E) Stephen Hopper's & Laura Wassmer's Motion Sever	
04/13/2012	RESPONSE  Party: PLAINTIFF HOPPER, JON.  TO JPMORGAN CHASE BANK RESPONSE TO JO HOPPER'S MOTION TO MODIFY ORDER AND FOR NEW TRIAL, AND STEPHEN HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S MOTION FOR NEW TRAIL, RECONSIDERATION, CLARIFICATION AND MODIFICATION	
04/18/2012	MOTION - PROTECT Party: DEFENDANT HOPPER, STEPHEN B.; DEFENDANT WASSMER, LAURA S.	5 pages
04/19/2012	SUPPLEMENTAL: MOTION  PLAINTIFF JO N. HOPPER'S FIRST SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION TO COMPEL	ugh indian graphing
04/19/2012	RESPONSE  PLAINTIFF JO N. HOPPER'S RESPONSE TO STEPHEN HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S MOTION FOR PROTECTION	
04/24/2012	RESPONSE  OF STEPHEN B, HOPPER AND LAURA S. WASSMER TO PLAINIFF'S MOTION AND FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY.	
04/24/2012	LETTER TO COURT  THE GRAHAM LAW FIRM	***************************************
04/25/2012	MOTION - COMPEL (11:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  Planitiff Jo N. Hopper's Motion to Compel (Mr. Jennings)	
04/25/2012	LETTER TO COURT	2 pages

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	CASE NO. PR-11-03238-1	
	JOHN C. EICHMAN	
04/25/2012	ORDER -ORDER DECLARING NULL PRIOR ORDER: ON THIS DAY ON THE COURT'S OWN MOTION, THE COURT REVISITED AND AS A RESULT THEREOF, HEREBY DECLARES NULL AND VOID THE ORDER ENTITLED "ORDER" WHICH WAS SIGNED BY THE COURT ON FEBRUARY 14, 2012	Vol./Book 34, Page 453, 1 pages
04/26/2012	LETTER TO COURT	
05/03/2012	VACATION LETTER 5/25/126/1/12 (ATTY, JOHN C. EICHMAN)	
05/04/2012	MOTION - ENTER ORDER  PLAINTIFF JO N. HOPPER'S MOTION TO ENTER SCHEDULING ORDER	Vol./Book 42, Page 972, 10 pages
05/07/2012	LETTER TO COURT	
05/08/2012	Notice of Hearing	
05/08/2012	VACATION LETTER 5/10/12 & 5/11/12-5/18/12 & 6/4/12-6/8/12 (MICHAEL L. GRAHAM)	
05/08/2012	MOTION - STAY STEPHEN HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S MOTION TO STAY	
05/08/2012	LETTER TO COURT	
05/09/2012	(1) LETTER TO COURT  HUNTON WILLIAMS	
05/10/2012	RESPONSE  Party: PLAINTIFF HOPPER, JO'N,  TO STEPHEN HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S IMPROPERLY SET AND FILED MOTION TO STAY	
05/11/2012	SCHEDULING CONFERENCE (11:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  Motion to Enter Scheduling Order	
05/11/2012	MOTION - STAY DISCOVERY (11:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)	
05/18/2012	ORDER - SUMMARY JUDGMENT -ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT	Vol./Book 34, Page 712, 2 pages
06/08/2012	MOTION Party: PLAINTIFF HOPPER, JO N. AMENDED MOTION TO ENTER SCHEDULING ORDER- PLAINTIFF II	
06/15/2012	MOTION - NEW TRIAL MOTION FOR NEW IRIAL, RECONSIDERATION, CLARIFICATION, AND MODIFICATION OF THE MAY 18, 2012 ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT	
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## DOCKET SHEET CASE NO. PR-11-03238-1

CASE NO. PR-11-03238-1			
06/18/2012	MOTION - SEVER	Vol./Book 52, Page 728, 5 pages	
	Party: PLAINTIFF HOPPER, JO N. SUBJECT TO PLAINTIFF JO N. HOPPER'S MOTION TO MODIFY AND RECONSIDER THE COURT'S MAY 18TH ORDER, OR ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION FOR NEW TRAIL		
06/18/2012	MOTION PLAINTIFF JO N. HOPPER'S DESIGNATION OF CO-COUNSEL (E-FILE)		
06/19/2012	VACATION LETTER (JAMES ALBERT JENNINGS) 6/22/12-6/25/12 AND 8/23/12-9/4/12		
06/21/2012	MOTION -FOR PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTION PURSUANT TO TEXAS PROBATE CODE SECTION 149B (E-FILE)		
06/22/2012	TRO HEARING (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)		
06/22/2012	MOTION -STEPHEN HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S FIRST AMENDED MOTION TO SEVER (E-FILE)	Vol/Book 52, Page 734, 5 pages	
06/22/2012	MOTION - CONTINUANCE  PLAINTIFF JO N. HOPPER'S MOTION TO CONTINUE HEARING ON STEPHEN  HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, RECONSIDERATION,  CLARIFICATION, AND MODIFICATION OF THE MAY 18, 2012 ORDER ON MOTION  FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND THEIR MOTION TO SERVE,		
06/22/2012	RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE OF JUNE 27, 2012 HEARING (E-FILE)		
06/25/2012	MISC. EVENT  STEPHEN HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S FIRST AMENDED CROSS CLAIM (E-FILE)-DATED-JUNE 22, 2012		
06/27/2012	SCHEDULING CONFERENCE (11:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  Plntfs Partially apposed Amended Motion Enter Scheduling Ord.		
06/27/2012	MOTION - SEVER (11:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E) & Motion To Stay Two Different Motions		
06/27/2012	MOTION - NEW TRIAL (11:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E) & Motion Reconsideration   document. (Mark Enoch Motion)		
06/27/2012	ORDER - SCHEDULING -LEVEL 3 SCHEDULING ORDER	Vol./Book 42, Page 982, 5 pages	
07/30/2012	MOTION - HEARING (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  Application for Partition and Distribution		
08/02/2012	NOTICE - HEARING / FIAT	2 pages	
08/02/2012	MISC. EVENT  STEPHEN HOOPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S MOTION TO ORDER PLAINTIFF TO ALLOW THE HEIRS TO INSURE THEIR CURRENT YET DEISPUTED UNDIVED INTEREST IN ROBLEDO AND TO PROHIBIT INTERFERENCE OF PLAINTIFF WITH THE HEIR'S ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE		
08/02/2012	RESPONSE EC057J017006389- JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR		

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	CASE NO. FR-11-03230-1	
	NEW TRIAL, MOTION TO SERVE, MOTION TO STAY, AND MOTION FOR PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTION. (E.FILED)	
08/03/2012	MISC. EVENT  PLAINTIFF JO N. HOPPER'S OPPOSTION TO: STEPHEN HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S MOTION TO ORDER PLAINTIFF TO ALLOW THE HEIRS TO INSURE THEIR CURRENT YET DISPUTED UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN ROBLEOD AND PROHIBIT INTERFERENCE OF PLAINTIFF WITH THE HEIRS' ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE	
08/03/2012	MISC. EVENT  PLAINTIFF JO N., HOPPER'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO ORDER'S POINTS NOS. SIX  ("6") AND SEVEN("7")	
08/03/2012	MISC. EVENT  PLAINTIFF JO N. HOPPER'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO ORDER'S POINT NO. "2"	
08/03/2012	MISC. EVENT PLAINTIFF JO N. HOPPER'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTION PURSUANT TO TEXAS PROBATE CODE SECTION 149B	
08/06/2012	MOTION - NEW TRIAL (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E) & Motion to Sever	
08/06/2012	MOTION - SEVER (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)	
08/06/2012	MOTION - NEW TRIAL (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer; MILLER, MICHAEL E) Plaintiffs Motion to Modify New Trial & Motion to Sever	
08/06/2012	MOTION - HEARING (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  Motion To Stay	
08/06/2012	MOTION - HEARING (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  Motion Stay (Graham)	
08/06/2012	APPLICATION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  to file 1494 (Demand Accounting)	
08/06/2012	MOTION - HEARING (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  Application for Partition and Distribution filed 6-21-12	
08/06/2012	MOTION - HEARING (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  Motion to order Plutf to allow Heirs to Insure theler current Yet Disputed undiveded interestetcfiled 8-2-12 by Mark Enoch office	
08/07/2012	E LETTER TO COURT	
08/08/2012	LETTER TO COURT	
08/13/2012	1 LETTER TO COURT	
08/15/2012	NOTICE - APPEAL (E-FILE)	
08/15/2012	ORDER -SECOND REVISED ORDER ON MOTINS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT	Vol./Book 52, Page 726, 2 pag

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08/15/2012	Order - Order to server	Vol./Book 52, Page 733, 1 pages
08/15/2012	ORDER -ORDER ON WRITTEN AND ORAL MOTIONS	Vol./Book 52, Page 739, 3 pages
08/15/2012	ORDER -ORDER ON WRITTEN AND ORAL MOTIONS	Vol./Book 54, Page 764, 3 pages
08/15/2012	ORDER -SECOND REVISED ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT	Vol./Book 54, Page 767, 2 pages
08/16/2012	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
08/30/2012	MOTION  PLAINTIFF'S AND DEFENDANT CHILDREN'S JOINT MOTION TO STAY	
08/30/2012	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  THERE WAS NO JUDGE THAT SIGN OFF ON THIS ORDER - ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S AND DEFENDANT CHILDREN'S (UNOPPOSED) JOINT MOTION TO STAY	
08/30/2012	MOTION  PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT CHILDREN'S JOINT MOTION TO STAY	,
09/10/2012	NOTICE - APPEAL  PLAINTIFF JO N. HOPPER'S NOTICE OF NOTICE	
09/10/2012	NOTICE-APPEAL	
09/12/2012	MOTION - ENTER ORDER  PLAINTIFF JO N. HOPER'S MOTION TO ENTER NEW ORDER OF SEVERANCE.	
09/18/2012	MISC. EVENT  JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL ITEMS TO BE INCLUDED IN REPORTER'S RECORD ( E-FILE )	3 pages
09/21/2012	NOTICE  OF INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATOR'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE COURT'S AUGUST 15, 2012 ORDER	
09/27/2012	LETTER TO COURT	
09/28/2012	CANCELED MOTION - HEARING (2:15 PM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E) REQUESTED BY ATTORNEY/PRO SE	
10/03/2012	LETTER TO COURT	
10/05/2012	LETTER TO COURT	
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10/08/2012	CLERKS RECORDS	
10/11/2012	CLERKS RECORDS  CORRESPONDENCE LETTERS (ADDITIONS)	
10/12/2012	ি LETTER TO COURT	
10/17/2012	CLERKS RECORDS  2nd. SUPPLEMENTAL FILED BY- MICHAEL A. YANOF (THOMPSON COE ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS)	
10/17/2012	ORDER - CONSOLIDATE  -CONSOLIATED ORDER RE: MOTIONS TO SEVER AND ASSIGNING NEW CAUSE NUMBER	Vol./Book &1, Page &57, \$ pages
10/17/2012	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
10/19/2012	CANCELED MOTION - HEARING (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E)  REQUESTED BY ATTORNEY/PRO SE	
10/25/2012	MISC. EVENT  DESIGNATION OF TRANSCRIPTS,	
10/31/2012	A MOTION  STEPHEN HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL.	
11/01/2012	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  LETTER TO JUDGE MILLER (E-FILE)	
11/02/2012	MOTION - HEARING (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: MILLER, MICHAEL E) Plantiffs and Children Joint Motions to stay filed 8-30-12	
11/02/2012	MOTION - EMERGENCY  EMERGENCY MOTION TO ENFORCE RULE 11 AGREEMENT AND FOR SANCATIONS	
11/02/2012	ORDER -ORDER GRANTING STEPHEN HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL-CHRISTOPHER M. MCNEILL AND STEVEN R. BLOCK ARE HEREBY SUBSTITUTED AS COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR STEPHEN HOPPER AND LAURA WASSMER	
11/02/2012	MISC. EVENT  NOTICE OF APPEAL AND CLERKS RECORD TRANSFERRED TO THE EIGHT COURT  OF APPEALS IN EL PASO, TX.: DENISE PACHECO, CLERK EIGHT COURT OF  APPEALS, 500 EAST SAN ANTONIO, SUITE 1203 EL PASO, TEXAS 79901-2421 PHONE #  (915) 546-2240	
11/02/2012	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
11/06/2012	LETTER TO COURT  LETTER BRIEF, AND, SUBMISSION OF WRITTEN ORDER TO VACATE SCHEDULING  ORDER	
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	CASE NO. FR-11-03230-1
11/07/2012	LETTER TO COURT  FROM JOHN C.EICHMAN
11/07/2012	LETTER TO COURT  RESPONSE TO MR. EICHMAN LETTER OF NOVEMBER 7TH
11/07/2012	LETTER TO COURT  RESPONSE TO MR. JENNINGS' and MR. EICHMAN'S -LETTER
11/08/2012	LETTER TO COURT  RESPONSE TO MR. MCNEILL'S E-FILED LETTER NOVEMBER 7TH
11/09/2012	ORDER  VACATING THE LEVEL 3 SCHEDULING ORDER DATED JUNE 27, 2012
11/13/2012	ORDER  PLAINTIFF'S AND DEFENDANT CHILDREN'S (UNOPPOSED) JOINT MOTION TO STAY
11/13/2012	ORDER  FIFTH COURT OF APPEALS- ( DENIED )
11/16/2012	MISC. EVENT COURT OF APPEALS EIGHT DISTRICT OF TEXAS
11/26/2012	CLERKS RECORDS SUPPLEMENTAL- TRANSFERRED TO THE EIGHT COURT OF APPEALS IN EL PASO
12/28/2012	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE
01/16/2013	VACATION LETTER  TOM CANTRILL, ATTY
07/19/2013	LETTER TO COURT  -FROM HUNTON AND WILLIAMS (JOHN C. EICHMAN( A DISK IS INCLUDED IN ENVELOPE)
12/03/2014	OPINION  JUDGMENT- COURT OF APPEALS EIGHT DISTRICT OF TEXAS- EL PASO
12/10/2014	OPINION -JUDGMENT ON OPINION FROM COURT OF APPEALS EIGHT DISTRICT OF TEXAS- EL PASO, TEXAS (COPY)
09/10/2015	MOTION - SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL  WITH PROPOSED ORDER ATTACHED
09/10/2015	MISC. EVENT  AMENDED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
09/14/2015	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  PAYMENT FOR PROPOSED ORDER TO SUB COUNSEL

	CASE NO. PR-11-03238-1
09/21/2015	ORDER -ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTUION OF COUNSEL
10/27/2015	NOTICE OF HEARING
10/29/2015	NOTICE - APPEARANCE - ANTHONY L. VITULLO
11/11/2015	NOTICE OF HEARING  AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING
11/17/2015	CANCELED CONFERENCE (2:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: JOHNSON, MARGARET JONES), REQUESTED BY ATTORNEY/PRO SE
11/18/2015	MOTION - CONSOLIDATE  MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION AND LIFT STAY
11/19/2015	NOTICE OF HEARING
11/25/2015	MOTION PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DETERMINE LENGTH OF DEPOSITION
11/30/2015	NOTICE OF HEARING
11/30/2015	MOTION  AMENDED MOTION TO LIFT STAY
11/30/2015	NOTICE OF HEARING
12/02/2015	NOTICE - APPEARANCE - JAMES S. BELL
12/04/2015	RESPONSE  JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A.'S RESPONSE TO N. HOPPER'S MOTION TO  DETERMINE LENGTH OF DEPOSITIONS
12/07/2015	AMENDED PETITION  PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED ORIGINAL PETITION FOR: DECLARATORY  JUDGMENT, BREACH OF CONTRACT, BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, FRAUD, ET.  AL., AND JURY DEMAND
12/08/2015	SCHEDULING CONFERENCE (2:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: JOHNSON, MARGARET JONES)  Events: 11/25/2015 MOTION  11/39/2015 MOTION  & MOTION TO LIFT STAY & MOTION TO DETERMINE LENGTH OF DEPOSITION
12/16/2015	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE
12/16/2015	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  LETTER TO HONORABLE MARGARET JONES-JOHNSON
01/04/2016	

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	ORDER  -ORDER OF RECUSAL AND REFERRAL FOR ASSIGNMENT-IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT ALL MATTERS IN THIS CAUSE BY REFERRED TO THE HONORABLE GUY HERMAN, PRESIDING JUDGE, STATUTORY PROBATE COURTS OF THE STATE OF TEXAS ETC.
01/04/2016	APPLICATION  APPLICATION FOR DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE  ORDER
01/05/2016	SISSUE CITATION  Party: DEFENDANT QUAGMIRE, LLC  ISSUED ON 1/5/16
01/05/2016	ISSUE CITATION QUAGMIRE, LLC Served: 01/11/2016 RTN: 2/29/2016
01/08/2016	RULE 11 AGREEMENT
01/11/2016	AMENDED ANSWER  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.???S FIRST AMENDED ANSWER TO STEPHEN HOPPER???S AND LAURA WASSMER???S FIRST AMENDED CROSS CLAIM
01/11/2016	AMENDED ANSWER  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.???S SECOND AMENDED ANSWER,  SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS, COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS-CLAIM IN RESPONSE TO JO N.  HOPPER???S SECOND AMENDED ORIGINAL PETITION
01/12/2016	ORDER -MINUTE ORDER 2016-003-IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT THE DALLAS COUNTY CLERK RANDOMLY REASSIGN THE ABOVE REFERENCED CASE TO A JUDGE OF ONE OF THE STATUTORY PROBATE COURTS LOCATED IN THE COUNTY, OTHER THAN THE JUDGE OF DALLAS COUNTY PROBATE COURT NO, 3 (ORDER FROM PRESIDING STATUTORY PROBATE JUDGE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS-JUDGE GUY S. HERMAN
01/12/2016	ORDER  AMENDED MINUTE ORDER 2016-001-IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THE APPOINTMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOE LOVING, A SENIOR STATUTORY PROBATE JUDGE ON JANUARY 6, 2016 IS SET ASIDE AND THAT THE ABOVE MATTERS ARE RANDOMLY REASSIGNED TO A JUDGE OF ONE OF THE OTHER STATUORY PROBATE COURTS LOCATED IN THE COUNTY, ETC. (THIS ORDER IS FROM JUDGE GUY S. HERMAN
01/21/2016	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  FROM JUDGE GUY S, HERMAN-PRESIDING STATUTORY PROBATE JUDGE
01/21/2016	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  FROM JUDGE GUY S. HERMAN, PRESIDING STATUTORY PROBATE JUDGE
01/21/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING  ON APPLICATION FOR DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

	CASE NO. FR-11-03236-1
01/26/2016	NOTICE - HEARING / FIAT
01/26/2016	AMENDED CROSS CLAIM - AMENDED COUNTER PETITION STEVEN HOOPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S SECOND AMENDED CROSS CLAIM
01/27/2016	MOTION - COMPEL,  PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS RESPONSIVE TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION SERVED ON JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
01/27/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING  AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING
01/27/2016	OBJECTION  JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. S OBJECTIONS TO JO HOPPER S NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE DEPOSITION OF CORPORATE REPRESENTATIVE AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
01/28/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING
01/28/2016	MOTION - DISMISS  DEFENDANT LAURA S. WASSMER S MOTION TO DISMISS
01/28/2016	MOTION - DISMISS  DEFENDANT STEPHEN B. HOOPER'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S SECOND  AMENDED PETITION PURSUANT TO CHAPTER 27 OF THE TEXAS CIVIL PRACIFCE  AND REMEDIES CODE
01/29/2016	MISC. EVENT  LAURA S. WASSMER AND STEPHEN B. HOPPER S JOINDER TO PLAINTIFF S MOTION  TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS RESPONSIVE TO REQUEST FOR  PRODUCTION SERVED ON JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
02/01/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING
02/02/2016	MOTION PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RESETTING OF HEARING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
02/03/2016	VACATION LETTER
02/03/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING
02/03/2016	RESPONSE  DEFENDANT LAURA S. WASSMER'S AND STEPHEN B. HOPPER'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RESETTING OF HEARING ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS
02/03/2016	. RESPONSE  DEFENDANT LAURA S. WASSMER'S AND STEPHEN B. HOPPER'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL
02/03/2016	RESPONSE  DEFENDANT LAURA S. WASSMER'S AND STEPHEN B. HOPPER'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DETERMINE LENGTH OF DEPOSITIONS

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02/05/2016	APPLICATION -AMENDED  FIRST AMENDED APPLICATION FOR DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY AND MOTION  FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
02/05/2016	RESPONSE  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS APPLICATION FOR DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
02/08/2016	MOTION  Party: DEFENDANT JP MORGAN CHASE, N.A.  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO SERVE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINITFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL OR TO CONTINUE HEARING AND MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME FOR NOTICE OF HEARING
02/08/2016	RESPONSE  Party: DEFENDANT JP MORGAN CHASE, N.A.  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION  TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS RESPONSIVE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION
02/10/2016	CONFERENCE (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)
02/10/2016	RESPONSE  DEFENDANT LAURA S. WASSMER S AND STEPHEN B. HOPPER S SUPPLEMENTED RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF S MOTION FOR RESETTING OF HEARING ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS
02/10/2016	ORIGINAL ANSWER - GENERAL DENIAL  DEFENDANTS LAURA S. WASSMER'S AND STEPHEN B. HOPPER'S GENERAL DENIAL  TO PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED ORIGINAL PETITION
02/16/2016	RULE II AGREEMENT
02/17/2016	MOTION  MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTED SERVICE
02/23/2016	MOTION - QUASH  JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION, OBJECTIONS TO JO HOPPER'S NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE DEPOSITION OF CORPORATE REPRESENTATIVE, AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
02/25/2016	MOTION - QUASH  DEFENDANTS MOTION TO QUASH NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE THE ORAL AND VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF GARY STOLBACH AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
02/25/2016	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  REGARDING NOTICE OF HEARING - 04/04/2016 AT 3:00 P.M JPMC'S MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION, OBJECTIONS TO JO HOPPER'S NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE DEPOSITION OF CORPORATE REPRESENTATIVE, AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
02/26/2016	NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE DEPOSITION  NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE ORAL DEPOSITION OF GARY STOLBACK

Printed on \$5/25/2018 at 9:10 AM

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02/29/2016	RETURN PERSONAL CITATION Porty: DEFENDANT QUAGMIRE, LLC
03/01/2016	MOTION  PLAINTIFF JO N. HOPPER AND DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S  MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER
03/03/2016	RETURN OF SERVICE  RETURN OF SERVICE - ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE OF NON-PARTY GARY STOLBACH  DEPOSITION SUBPOENA
03/04/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING
03/09/2016	VACATION LETTER - ALAN S. LOEWINSOHN
03/10/2016	MOTION - COMPEL  PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS RESPONSIVE TO FIRST AND SECOND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION SERVED ON STEPHEN B. HOPPER AND LAURA S. WASSMER
03/14/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING - MARCH 25, 2016 @ 9:30AM
03/15/2016	MOTION - DEFAULT JUDGMENT  PLAINTIFF S MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY DEFAULT JUDGMENT
03/16/2016	ORIGINAL ANSWER - GENERAL DENIAL
03/16/2016	SUBPOENA SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM (W/O EXHIBIT I) - LOCKE LORD LLP - MEMORANDUM OF ACCEPTANCE SIGNED MARCH 16, 2016
03/18/2016	RESPONSE  REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO FIRST AMENDED APPLICATION FOR  DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
03/21/2016	a vacation letter
03/22/2016	RESPONSE  PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO STEPHEN B. HOPPER AND LAURA S. WASSMER'S  APPLICATION FOR DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE  ORDER
03/22/2016	RESPONSE  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' FIRST  AMENDED APPLICATION FOR DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY AND MOTION FOR  PROTECTIVE ORDER
03/22/2016	MISC, EVENT  DEFENDANTS LAURA WASSMER, STEPHEN HOPPER, AND QUAGMIRE, LLC'S  PRIVILEGE LOG

	, CASE 110. ET 12. ODES 1
03/22/2016	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE
03/22/2016	RESPONSE  DEFENDANTS STEPHEN B. HOPPER AND LAURA S WASSMER S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS RESPONSIVE TO FIRST AND SECOND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION SERVED ON STEPHEN B. HOPPER AND LAURA S.WASSMER
03/24/2016	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  LETTER TO THE JUDGE
03/25/2016	SPECIAL SETTINGS (9:30 AM) (Iudicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H) (2) Motions to Dismiss- F 1/28/16; Application for Distribution of Property and Motion for Protective Order- F 1/4/2016; (2) Motions to Compel- F 4/6/12 & 3/10/16; Plaintiff's Motion to Determine Length of Deposition- F 11/25/15; Plaintiff's Amended Motion to Lift Stay- F 11/30/15
03/25/2016	ORDER -ORDER-ON DEFENDANTS STEPHEN B. HOPPER AND LAUARA S. WASSMER'S FIRST AMENDED APPLICATION FOR DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER ETC.
03/25/2016	ORDER -ORDER ON MOTION TO LIFT STAY
03/28/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING - AMENDED NOTICE - APRIL 4, 2016 @ 3:00PM
03/29/2016	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE
03/29/2016	ORDER - SCHEDULING  AMENDED SCHEDULING ORDER
04/01/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING  SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING
04/01/2016	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE
04/04/2016	CANCELED MOTION - QUASH (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)  REQUESTED BY ATTORNEY/PRO SE  F 2/23/16
04/04/2016	NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE DEPOSITION  WISUBPOENA
04/04/2016	MOTION - LEAVE  DEFENDANTS STEPHEN B. HOPPER AND LAURA S.WASSMER S MOTION FOR LEAVE  TO AMEND PETITION
04/06/2016	MOTION SECOND AMENDED MOTION
04/07/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING

	CASE NO. PR-11-03238-1
	- APRIL 18, 2016 @ 3:00PM
04/08/2016	MOTION - MODIFY  DEFENDANTS STEPHEN B. HOPPER AND LAURA S. WASSMER'S MOTION TO MODIFY CERTAIN PRETRIAL DEADLINES
04/13/2016	OBJECTION  PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO STEPHEN B. HOPPER AND LAURA S. WASSMER'S  AMENDED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION
04/13/2016	MOTION  DEFENDANTS STEPHEN B. HOPPER AND LAURA S. WASSMER'S SECOND AMENDED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION
04/18/2016	CANCELED MOTION - DISMISS (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)  REQUESTED BY ATTORNEY/PRO SE (2)- F 1/28/2016
04/18/2016	MOTION - COMPEL (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: PEYTON, JOHN B)  F 4/6/12
04/19/2016	VACATION LETTER - ALAN S. LOEWINSOHN
04/20/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING
04/21/2016	MOTION - COMPEL  PLAINTIFF S MOTION TO COMPEL ADDITIONAL DEPOSITION OF A CORPORATE REPRESENTATIVE OF JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.
04/22/2016	ORDER - COMPEL  ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF JO N. HOPPER'S MOTION TO COMPEL
04/25/2016	NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE DEPOSITION  CROSS-NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE ORAL DEPOSITION OF CELIA DORIS KING
04/27/2016	RESPONSE  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.???S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS  STEPHEN HOPPER AND LAURA WASSMER???S MOTION TO MODIFY CERTAIN PRE-  TRIAL DEADLINES
05/02/2016	MOTION - HEARING (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)  Defendants Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer's Motion to Modify Certain Pre-Trial  Deadlines- F 4/8/16
05/03/2016	MISC. EVENT  DEFENDANTS/CROSS- CLAIMANTS STEPHEN H. HOPPER AND LAURA S. WASSMER'S REQUEST DE NOVO HEARING
05/06/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING
05/09/2016	NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE DEPOSITION  AMENDED NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE ORAL DEPOSITION OF GARY STOLBACH
05/09/2016	

	CASE NO. 1 R-11-00230-1
	MOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE DEPOSITION  AMENDED CROSS-NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE ORAL DEPOSITION OF CELIA  DORIS KING
05/12/2016	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  WIPROPOSED AGREED ORDER APPPOINTING MEDIATOR
05/12/2016	ORDER -AGREED ORDER APPOINTING MEDIATOR
05/16/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING  AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING
05/23/2016	MOTION - COMPEL  PLAINTIFF S MOTION TO COMPEL ADDITIONAL DEPOSITION OF SUSAN NOVAK  AND FOR COSTS
05/25/2016	CERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION  ORAL & VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION - ALAN. S. LOEWINSOHN \$2,338.70
05/25/2016	CERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION  ORAL & VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION- ALAN S. LOEWINSOHN- \$777.60
05/25/2016	ECERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION  STEPHEN B, HOPPER -8973,75
05/25/2016	CERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION  REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE OF STEPHEN B. HOPPER - \$2395.90
05/25/2016	CERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION  LAURA WASSMER-VOL I
05/25/2016	ECERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION  LAURA WASSMER-VOLUME 2
05/27/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING
05/31/2016	AMENDED ANSWER  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S SUPPLEMENT TO ITS SECOND  AMENDED ANSWER TO JO N. HOPPER'S SECOND AMENDED PETITION
05/31/2016	AMENDED ANSWER  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S SUPPLEMENT TO ITS FIRST  AMENDED ANSWER TO HEIRS' FIRST AMENDED CROSS CLAIM
05/31/2016	APPLICATION -AMENDED  STEVEN HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S THIRD AMENDED CROSS CLAIM AND COUNTER CLAIM
05/31/2016	ÖRIGINAL ANSWER  STEVEN HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S AMENDED ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE  DEFENSES

	CASE NO. PR-11-03238-1
06/07/2016	MOTION - COMPEL  DEFENDANTS STEPHEN B. HOPPER'S AND LAURA S. WASSMER'S MOTION TO COMPEL CONTINUATION OF THE DEPOSITION OF TOM CANTRILL
06/09/2016	RESPONSE  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL ADDITIONAL DEPOSITION OF SUSAN NOVAK AND FOR COSTS
06/14/2016	NOTICE  NON-PARTY NOTICE OF INTENT TO ISSUE SUBPOENA FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO MICHAEL L. GRAHAM, P.C.
06/14/2016	NOTICE  NON-PARTY NOTICE OF INTENT TO ISSUE SUBPOENA FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO BAKER STREET ADVISORS, LLC
06/15/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING  AUGUST 9, 2016
06/15/2016	NOTICE  NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE ORAL DEPOSITION OF SARAH WILLIAMSON (NON-PARTY)
06/16/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING
06/17/2016	NOTICE - APPEARANCE
06/20/2016	CERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION  -JO N. HOPPER'S ORAL DEPOSITION VOL 1-\$1522.05
06/20/2016	© CERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION  -JO N. HOPPER'S ORAL DEPOSITION VOL 2- \$1175.75
06/20/2016	MOTION - QUASH  MOTION TO QUASH THE ORAL DEPOSITION OF LAURA S. WASSMER
06/20/2016	MOTION - QUASH  MOTION TO QUASH THE ORAL DEPOSITION OF STEPHEN B. HOPPER
06/21/2016	CERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION -THOMAS H. CANTRILL'S ORAL DEPOSITION-\$2956.90
06/21/2016	CERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION -SUSAN H. NOVAK'S ORAL DEPOSITION VOL 1-\$2271.55
06/21/2016	ECERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION -SUSAN H. NOVAK'S ORAL DEPOSITION VOL 2-\$1726,40
06/21/2016	MOTION - COMPEL  PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM STYEPHEN B. HOPPER AND LAURA S. WASSMER AND FOR SANCTIONS
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	CASE NO. PR-11-03238-1
06/21/2016	MOTION - COMPEL  PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL ADDITIONAL DEPOSITION OF STEPHEN B.  HOPPER AND LAURA S. WASSMER
06/22/2016	MOTION  JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.???S MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION OF JOHN C. EICHMAN, OBJECTIONS AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
06/23/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING
06/24/2016	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE
06/28/2016	STATUS CONFERENCE (4:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)
06/28/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING HEARING SET AUGUST 1, 2016 AT 3:00PM
06/28/2016	Order - scheduling Agreed second amended scheduling order
07/01/2016	ORIGINAL ANSWER  SECOND AMENDED ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
07/05/2016	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  W/ PROPOSED ORDER
07/05/2016	MOTION - SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL
07/08/2016	ORIGINAL ANSWER  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S THIRD AMENDED ANSWER, SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS, COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS-CLAIM IN RESPONSE TO JO N. HOPPER'S SECOND AMENDED ORIGINAL PETITION
07/08/2016	ORIGINAL ANSWER  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S ANSWER TO STEPHEN HOPPER'S  AND LAURA WASSMER'S THIRD AMENDED CROSS CLAIM
07/11/2016	CANCELED MOTION - COMPEL (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)  REQUESTED BY ATTORNEY/PRO SE  Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Additional Deposition of a Corporate Representation of  JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A F 4/21/16
07/19/2016	NOTICE  NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE ORAL DEPOSITION OF MICHAEL L. GRAHAM (NON-PARTY)
07/19/2016	ORDER - SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL  Party: ATTORNEY LOEWINSOHN, ALAN S  IT IS, THEREFORE, FURTHER ORDERED THAT THE LAW FIRM OF LOEWINSOHN FLEGLE DEARY LLP ARE PREMITTED TO WITHDRAW AND ARE HEREBY DISCHARGED AS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD FOR PLAINTIFF
07/19/2016	MOTION - COMPEL  -DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK MOTION TO COMPEL THE PRODUCTION

	OF DOCUMENTS
07/20/2016	MOTION - PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT -STEPHEN HOPPERD AND LAURA WASSMER'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGEMENT
07/20/2016	MOTION  -JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO DESIGNATE RESPONSIBLE THIRD PARTIES
07/21/2016	© OBJECTION  NON-PARTY J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES, LLC???S OBJECTIONS TO SUBPOENA AND MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
07/21/2016	MOTION  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.???S JOINDER IN NON-PARTY J.P.  MORGAN SECURITIES, LLC???S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
07/22/2016	MOTION - PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY  JUDGMENT REGARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES AS DAMAGES
07/25/2016	MOTION - PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK'S TRADITIONAL AND NO-EVIDENCE  MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING JO HOPPER'S MENTAL  ANGUISH DAMAGES
07/27/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING  2016-08-09 HEARING NOTICE FOR JPMC'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO DESIGNATE RESPONSIBLE THIRD PARTIES AND JPMC'S MOTION TO COMPEL THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
07/27/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING SPETEMBER 14, 2016 @ 2:00 P.M.
07/28/2016	MOTION  PLAINTIFF'S MOTTION FOR LEAVE TO SERVE PLAINTIFF'S FOURTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES TO DEFENDANT STEPHEN B. HOPPER AND LAURA S. WASSMER
08/01/2016	MOTION - COMPEL (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)  Plaintiff Jo N. Hopper's Motion to Compel Production of Documents from Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer and for Sanctions- F 6/21/16
08/01/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING
08/02/2016	RESPONSE  PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A'S MOTION TO COMPEL THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
08/03/2016	MOTION - COMPEL RESPONSE TO  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURE
08/03/2016	ENOTICE OF HEARING HEARING SET SEPTEMBER 14, 2016

08/03/2016	BOBJECTION  STEPHEN HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S OBJECTION TO JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S MOTION TO LEAVE TO DESIGNATE RESPONSIBLE THIRD PARTIES
08/04/2016	CERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION  REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION - GARY STOLBACH (AMOUNT \$1255.70)
08/04/2016	RESPONSE  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS STEPHEN HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S MOTION TO COMPEL THE CONTINUATION OF THE DEPOSITION OF TOM CANTRILL
08/05/2016	MOTION - SUMMARY JUDGMENT  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS
08/08/2016	RESPONSE  N.A.'S REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION
08/08/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING HEARING SET SEPTEMBER 1, 2016 AT 1:30 PM
08/08/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING  HEARING NOTICES FOR SEPTEMBER 1, 2016 (3-5 P.M.) AND SEPTEMBER 14, 2016 (2-4 PM)
08/08/2016	NOTICE  HEARING REMOVE FROM COURT'S DOCKET
08/08/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING  AMENDED NOTICE HEARING
08/09/2016	MOTION - COMPEL (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)  Defendants Stephen B. Hopper's and Laura S. Wassmer's Motion to Compel Continuation of the Deposition of Tom Contrill- F 6/7/16; Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s Motion to Compel the Production of Documents- F 7/19/16; JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s Motion for Leave to Designate Responsible Third Parties- F 7/20/16; Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Serve Plaintiff's Fourth Set of Interrogatories to Defendants Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmers- F 7/28/16 (only if time allows)
08/09/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING HEARING RE-SET SEPTEMBER 1, 2016 AT 3:00 P.M.
08/12/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING  JPMORGAN MULTIPLE HEARING NOTICE FOR 9/14/2016 & 9/26/2016
08/12/2016	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE
08/12/2016	MOTION - STRIKE  PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE STEVEN HOPPER AND LAURA WESSMER'S SECOND AMENDED ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
08/16/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING

	CASE NO. PR-11-03238-1
	-NOTICE OF HEARING ON 9/14/2016 @2PM
08/16/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING  2016-10-04 JPMORGAN'S AMENDED HEARING NOTICE (MOVING 3 HEARINGS SET FOR 9/26 TO 10/4 PER PLAINTIPF'S REQUEST AND AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES)
08/18/2016	NOTICE  NOTICE OF INTENT TO ISSUE SUBPOENA FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
08/18/2016	NOTICE  NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE DEPOSITION ON WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF CORPORATE REPRESENTATIVE OF GT NEXUS, INC.
08/24/2016	CERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION  TODD A. BAIRD-\$1801.00
08/24/2016	CERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION  JOHN K. ROUND-\$1431,10
08/24/2016	CERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION  KAL GRANT-\$1882.60
08/24/2016	MOTION - PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
08/25/2016	NOTICE  NOTICE OF FILING OF SUBSTITUTE EXHIBIT 9 TO JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.???S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS
08/25/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING
08/26/2016	MOTION - COMPEL  PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND INTERROGATORY RESPONSES FROM STEPHEN B. HOPPER AND LAURA S. WASSMER AND ADDITIONAL DEPOSITION OF GARY STOLBACH
08/29/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING -NOTICE OF HEARING ON SEPTEMBER 14, 2016 @1:30PM .
08/29/2016	AMENDED ANSWER  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.???S FOURTH AMENDED ANSWER, SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS, COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS-CLAIM IN RESPONSE TO JO N. HOPPER???S SECOND AMENDED ORIGINAL PETITION
08/30/2016	JURY TRIAL DEMAND
08/30/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING -NOTICE OF HEARING ON SEPTEMBER 14, 2016 @2PM
08/30/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING
08/30/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING  HEARING NOTICE UPDATE RE: 9/14/2016 HEARING ON JPMC'S SPECIAL

	CASE NO. 1 K-11-02200-1
	EXCEPTIONS (AS FILED 8/29/2016)
09/01/2016	MOTION - COMPEL  DEFENDANTS STEPHEN B. HOPPER'S AND LAURA S. WASSMER'S MOTION TO  COMPEL AGAINST PLAINTIFF JO N. HOPPER
09/07/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING  HEARING NOTICE - JPMORGAN'S FIRST AMENDED MOTION FOR SUMMARY  JUDGMENT REGARDING TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS - 10/4/2016 at 9:30  a.m.
09/07/2016	MOTION - SUMMARY JUDGMENT  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S FIRST AMENDED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS
09/07/2016	RESPONSE  PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHACE BANK, N.A'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
09/07/2016	RESPONSE  DEFENDANTS STEPHEN B. HOPPER'S AND LAURA S. WASSMER'S RESPONSE TO  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK
09/07/2016	ORIGINAL ANSWER -PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO STEPHEN HOPPER AND LAURA WASSMER'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
09/08/2016	AMENDED PETITION  PLAINTIFF'S THIRD AMENDED PETITION FOR: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, BREACH OF CONTRACT, BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, FRAUD, ET AL, AND, JURY DEMAND
09/08/2016	RESPONSE  DEFENDANTS' STEPHEN HOPPER AND LAURA WASSMER'S CONTINUATION OF THEIR RESPONSE TO JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., PART 3 EXHIBITS P; PART 4 THROUGH EXHIBIT Y
09/08/2016	RESPONSE -Def SH and LW resp to JPMC MSJ on atty fees Part 3
09/08/2016	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  WI PART TWO OF PLAINTIFF JO HOPPER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO STEPHEN  HOPPER AND LAURA WASSMER'S
09/08/2016	MOTION - SUMMARY JUDGMENT  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.???S TRADITIONAL AND NO-EVIDENCE  MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON STEPHEN HOPPER AND LAURA  WASSMER???S CLAIMS FOR ATTORNEYS??? FEES
09/08/2016	MOTION - SUMMARY JUDGMENT  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.???S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING JO HOPPER???S CLAIMS FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF PROPERTY TAXES OR FOR REPAIRS
09/08/2016	MOTION - SUMMARY JUDGMENT

#### DOCKET SHEET CASE NO. PR-11-03238-1

DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S TRADITIONAL AND NO-EVIDENCE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MRS. HOPPER'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT REGARDING THE DISTRIBUTION OF ROBLEDO

09/08/2016 | RESPONSE

09/12/2016

-DEFENDANTS' STEPHEN HOPPER AND LAURA WASSMER'S CONTINUATION OF THE RESPONSE TO JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. PART 2 EXHIBITS E-O

09/09/2016 RESPONSE

DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK

09/12/2016 MOTION

-DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ATTORNEYS FEES INCURRED BY PLAINTIFF MRS. HOPPER REGARDING DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS IN THE SEVERED SUIT

09/12/2016 RESPONSE

RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF JO HOPPER'S MOTION TO STRIKE THEIR SECOND

AMENDED ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

09/12/2016

DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S TRADITIONAL AND NO-EVIDENCE
MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING STEPHEN HOPPER'S
AND LAURA WASSMER'S CLAIMS FOR FRAUD, FRADULENT INDUCEMENT, AND
FRAUD BY NONDISCLOSURE

MOTION

DEFENDANTS LAURA S. WASSMER AND STEPHEN B. HOPPER'S NO EVIDENCE
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

09/13/2016 RULE 11 AGREEMENT
NOTICE OF RULE 11 AGREEMENT

AND DTPA CLAIMS

09/14/2016

SPECIAL SETTINGS (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)

Defendants/Cross-Claimants Stephen H. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer's Request for De
Novo Hearing on Jo Hopper's Motion to Compel- F 5/3/16; Stephen Hopper and Laura
Wassmer's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment- F 7/20/16; Defendant JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Altorney's Fees as DamagesF 7/22/2016; JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s Special Exceptions- F 7/8/16; Plaintiff's Motion
for Leave to Serve Plaintiff's Fourth Set of Interrogatories to Defendants Stephen B. Hopper
and Laura S. Wassmers- F 7/28/16 (only if time allows); Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Steven
Hopper and Laura Wassmer's Second Amended Answer and Affirmative Defenses- F 8/12/16

09/14/2016 NOTICE OF HEARING

09/14/2016 DESIGNATION - EXPERT WITNESS
-FIRST AMENDED DESIGNATION

(only if time allows)

09/15/2016 NOTICE OF HEARING
-FIRST AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING ON 9/20/16 @9:30

09/15/2016	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  -W/ PROPOSED ORDERS GRANTING JPMORGAN'S SPECIAL EXCEPTION AND  MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES AS  DAMAGES
09/15/2016	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE -W/PROPOSED ORDER
09/16/2016	NOTICE  NOTICE OF HEARING - SEPTEMBER 20, 2016 AT 9:30AM
09/16/2016	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE
09/16/2016	MOTION - COMPEL  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. S MOTION TO COMPEL THE HEIRS TO ANSWER INTERROGATORIES
09/16/2016	MOTION - COMPEL  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. S MOTION TO COMPEL THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS BY MRS. HOPPER
09/16/2016	RESPONSE  PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS
09/16/2016	NOTICE  NOTICE OF FILING OF AMENDED AFFIDAVIT
09/19/2016	© CERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION  JPMORGAN CHASE BANK- \$1339.55
09/19/2016	RESPONSE -RESPONSE TO JPMC'S MOTION TO COMPEL
09/19/2016	CERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION  MICHAEL L. GRAHAM-\$1,474.85
09/20/2016	MOTION - COMPEL (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)  Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A 's Motion to Compel the Production of Documents-F  7/19/16; Plaintiff's Motion to Comepl Production of Documents and Interrogatory Responses from Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer and Additional Deposition of Gary Stolbach- F 8/26/16; Defendants Stephen B. Hopper's and Laura S. Wassmer's Motion to Compel Against Plaintiff Jo N. Hopper-F 9/1/16
09/21/2016	MOTION  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF JOHN T. COX III, JERRY JONES, AND ANTHONY L VITULLO
09/22/2016	MISC. EVEN'T STIPULATION
09/22/2016	NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE DEPOSITION  REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION - DEPOSITION ON WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF KEVIN J.  TAYLOR

	CASE NO. PR-11-03238-1
09/27/2016	AFFIDAVIT  -PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S  TRADITIONAL AND NO-EVIDENCE MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT  REGARDING JO HOPPER'S MENTAL HEALTH ANGUISH DAMAGES
09/27/2016	AMENDED PETITION PLAINTIFF'S FOURTH AMENDED PETITION
09/27/2016	RESPONSE  PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S FIRST AMENDED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS
09/27/2016	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE -LETTER TO THE COURT
09/27/2016	RESPONSE  -DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.???S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S  MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
09/27/2016	RESPONSE -RESPONSE TO JPMC'S TRADITIONAL AND NO EVIDENCE MSJ ON FRAUD CLAIMS I
09/27/2016	RESPONSE  -RESPONSE TO JPMC'S TRADITIONAL AND NO EVIDENCE MSJ ON FRAUD CLAIMS PART 2
09/27/2016	RESPONSE -RESPONSE TO JPMC'S TRADITIONAL AND NO EVIDENCE MSJ ON FRAUD CLAIMS W COVERS PART 3
09/27/2016	E RESPONSE 2016-09-27 D'S RESP TO JPMC MSJ TEMP ADMIN CLAIM
09/28/2016	RESPONSE -PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S TRADITIONAL AND NO-EVIDENCE MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING JO HOPPER'S FRAUD AND DTPA CLAIMS
09/28/2016	RESPONSE  PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ATTORNEYS' FEES REGARDING DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
09/28/2016	RESPONSE
09/28/2016	RESPONSE  PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S  TRADITIONAL AND NO-EVIDENCE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF  BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM REGARDING DISTRIBUTION OF ROBLEDO
09/28/2016	RESPONSE -STEPHEN B. HOPPER AND LAURA WASSMER'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S TRADITIONAL AND NO-EVIDENCE MOTION FOR

	CASE I (O, LICIA TODESOLA	
	SUMMARY JUDGEMENT TO CLAIMS FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES	
09/28/2016	ORIGINAL ANSWER  PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S  MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING JO HOPPER'S CLAIMS FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF PROPERTY TAXES OR FOR REPAIRS	
09/29/2016	CERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION  ORAL DEPOSITION - ATTORNEY ALAN LOEWINSOHN FOR \$1147.75	
09/29/2016	CERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION	
09/29/2016	APPLICATION -AMENDED  STEPHEN HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S FOURTH AMENDED CROSS CLAIM AGAINST JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.	
09/29/2016	RESPONSE  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS  TRADITIONAL AND NO EVIDENCE MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT  REGARDING THE HEIRS' CLAIMS FOR FRAUD, FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT, AND  FRAUD BY NONDISCLOSURE	
09/29/2016	RESPONSE  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS  TRADITIONAL AND NO-EVIDENCE MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT  REGARDING JO HOPPER???S MENTAL ANGUISH DAMAGES	
09/30/2016	園MOTION PLANTIFF'S IST MOTION IN LIMINE	
09/30/2016	MOTION - IN LIMINE  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S MOTION IN LIMINE	
09/30/2016	RESPONSE  PLAINTIFF'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT	
09/30/2016	MOTION -PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO SUPPLEMENT PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE	
10/03/2016	RESPONSE  PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF JOHN T. COX, III, JERRY JONES, AND ANTHONY L. VITULLO	
10/03/2016	RESPONSE  DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF JERRY JONES AND ANTHONY L. VITULLO	
10/03/2016	APFIDAVIT AS TO LEGAL SERVICES AND FEES  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S NOTICE OF FILING OF BUSINESS RECORDS AFFIDAVITS AND RECORDS	
10/03/2016	ORDER - SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS	I

#### DOCKET SHEET CASE NO. PR-11-03238-1

OVER OVERRULING JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S SPECIAL EXCEPTION NO 2 10/03/2016 alorder. ACCORDINGLY, DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. 'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO DESIGNATE RESPONSIBLE THIRD PARTIES IS HEREBY GRANTED 10/04/2016 SPECIAL SETTINGS (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H) Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Jo Hopper's Mental Anguish Damages- F 7/25/16; Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding Temporary Administration Claims- F 8/5/16; Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment- F 8/24/16; Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Jo Hopper's Claims for Reimbursement of Property Taxes or for Repairs- F 9/8/16; Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Attorneys' Fees Incurred by Plaintiff Mrs. Hopper Regarding Declaratory Judgments in the Severed Sult- F 9/12/16 10/04/2016 CERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION JOHN T. COX, III-\$1656,00 10/04/2016 OBJECTION DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S OBJECTION TO STEPHEN HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE 10/04/2016 DOBJECTION DEFENDANTS STEPHEN B. HOPPER'S AND LAURA S. WASSMER'S OBJECTIONS TO JPMORGAN'S TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST 10/05/2016 SPECIAL SETTINGS (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer; THOMPSON, BRENDA H) Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment on Mrs. Hopper's Claim for Breach of Contract Regarding the Distribution of Robledo- F 9/8/16; Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment on Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer's Claims for Attorneys' Fees- F 9/8/16; Defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s Traditional and No-Evidence Motions for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Jo Hopper's Fraud and DTPA Claims- F 9/12/16; Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s Traditional and No-Evidence Motions for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Stephen Hopper's and Laura Wassmer's Claims for Fraud, Fraudulent Inducement, and Fraud by Nondisclosure- F 9/12/16; Defendants Laura S. Wassmer and Stephen B. Hopper's No Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment- F 9/12/16; Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s Motion to Exclude Testimony of John T. Cox III, Jerry Jones, and Anthony L. Vitullo- F 9/21/16 10/05/2016 SPECIAL SETTINGS (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H) Continuation from Morning Docket 10/06/2016 PRE-TRIAL HEARING (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H) 10/07/2016 2 CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE REVISED PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF JERRY JONES 10/11/2016 SPECIAL SETTINGS (4:15 PM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H) 10/11/2016 CERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION LOIS A, STANTON-\$4,962.45

10/11/2016

医 CERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION

MARK K. SALES-\$3,279.50

	CASE NO. PR-11-03238-1
10/11/2016	EL CERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION  MICHAEL V. BOURLAND-\$1,769.65
10/13/2016	GERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION  JERRY JONES-\$1345.85
10/17/2016	CANCELED JURY TRIAL (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H) OTHER REASONS
10/18/2016	CANCELED JURY TRIAL (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H) OTHER REASONS
10/19/2016	CANCELED JURY TRIAL (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H) OTHER REASONS
10/20/2016	CANCELED JURY TRIAL (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H) OTHER REASONS
10/21/2016	CANCELED JURY TRIAL (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H) OTHER REASONS
10/24/2016	CANCELED JURY TRIAL (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H) OTHER REASONS
10/25/2016	CANCELED JURY TRIAL (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H) OTHER REASONS
10/26/2016	CANCELED JURY TRIAL (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H) OTHER REASONS
10/27/2016	CANCELED JURY TRIAL (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H) OTHER REASONS
10/28/2016	CANCELED JURY TRIAL (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H) OTHER REASONS
11/15/2016	© CERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION  STEPHEN B. HOPPER-\$597.15
11/15/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING
11/22/2016	NOTICE OF HEARING  AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING
11/29/2016	CERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION  ORAL DEPOSITION OF ANTHONY L. VITULLO- \$1147.85
11/30/2016	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE (10:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)
12/06/2016	VACATION LETTER -TAYLOR A. HORTON
12/19/2016	RULE 11 AGREEMENT  NOTICE OF RULE 11 AGREEMENT
01/05/2017	Z VACATION LETTER

## DOCKET SHEET

CASE NO. PR-11-03238-1

	VACATION LETTER - ATTORNEY ALAN LOEWINSOHN
01/05/2017	MOTION - STRIKE
01/05/2017	PNOTICE OF HEARING
01/06/2017	NOTICE OF HEARING -NOTICE OF HEARING ON 2/15/17 @3PM
01/09/2017	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)
01/13/2017	NOTICE -NOTICE OF SETTLEMENTS AND INTENT TO SEEK SETTLEMENT CREDIT
01/23/2017	NOTICE OF HEARING -NOTICE OF HEARING ON 1/31/17 @1:30PM
01/31/2017	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)
02/10/2017	RESPONSE  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE DESIGNATION OF GLAST, PHILLIPS & MURRAY AND GARY STOLBACH AS RESPONSIBLE THIRD PARTIES AS TO PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES
02/10/2017	RESPONSE  RESTRICTED-CONTAINS SENSITIVE/CONF DATA - APPENDIX TO DEFENDANT  JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE  THE DESIGNATION OF GLAST, PHILLIPS & MURRAY AND GARY STOLBACH AS  RESPONSIBLE THIRD PARTIES AS TO PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES
02/13/2017	PLEA TO JURISDICTION  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION
02/14/2017	NOTICE OF HEARING NOTICE OF HEARING - PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION 2/20/2017 @ 1:30 P.M.
02/14/2017	RESPONSE -REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE
02/15/2017	MOTION - STRIKE (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)  Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Designation of Glast, Phillips & Murray and Gary Stolbach as Responsible Third Parties as to Plaintiff's Damages- F 1/5/17
02/15/2017	AFFIDAVIT - CHRIS MCNEILL
02/15/2017	AFFIDAVIT - CINDY FERTITIA
02/15/2017	AFFIDAVIT - MORRISA COSTANZO
02/17/2017	E RESPONSE -PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO THE BANK'S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

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## DOCKET SHEET CASE NO. PR-11-03238-1

02/20/2017	PRE-TRIAL HEARING (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)  Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. s Plea to the Jurisdiction- F 2//3/17 (only if time allows)
02/20/2017	ERESPONSE  DEF STEPHEN HOPPER & LAURA WASSMER RESPONSE
02/20/2017	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  W/ PROPOSED ORDER
02/20/2017	NOTICE OF HEARING -NOTICE OF HEARING ON 2/22/17 @1PM
02/22/2017	NOTICE OF HEARING  HEARING SET FEBRUARY 24, 2017 AT 11:00 AM
02/27/2017	NOTICE OF HEARING
03/13/2017	Table Vacation Letter
03/31/2017	ORDER - SUMMARY JUDGMENT  ORDER ON PLAINTIFF JO HOPPER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
03/31/2017	MOTION - PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT  ORDER ON DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES AS DAMAGES
03/31/2017	ORDER ON PLAINTIFF IO HOPPER'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE DESIGNATION OF GLAST, PHILLIPS & MURRAY AND GARY STOLBACH AS RESPONSIBLE THIRD PARTIES AS TO PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES
03/31/2017	ORDER -ON DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. 'S TRADITIONAL AND NO-EVIDENCE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON MRS. HOPPER'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT REGARDING THE DISTRUBUTION OF ROBLEDO
03/31/2017	☐ ORDER -ON DESIGNATION OF RESPONSIBLE THIRD PARTY
03/31/2017	ORDER -ON PLEA TO JURISDICTION
03/31/2017	ORDER - ON PLAINTIFF JO HOPPER'S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO SERVE FOURTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES ON STEPHEN B. HOPPER AND LAURA S. WASSMER
03/31/2017	ORDER -ON PLAINTIFF JO HOPPER'S MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL DEPOSITION OF GARY STOLBACH
03/31/2017	ORDER

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	- ON DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK. N.A.'S TRADITIONAL AND NO- EVIDENCE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING STEPHEN B. HOPER'S AND LAURA S. WASSMER'S CLAIMS FOR FRAUD, FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT, AND FRAUD BY NONDISCLOSURE
03/31/2017	ORDER -ON DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A, 'S TRADITIONAL AND NO-EVIDENCE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING JO HOPPER'S MENTAL ANGUISH DAMAGES
03/31/2017	ORDER ON REQUEST FOR FOR DE NOVO HEARING
03/31/2017	ORDER -ON DEFENDANT JPMORGAN BANK. N.A.'S TRADITIONAL AND NO-EVIDENCE MOTION FOR UMMARY JUDGMENT ON STEPHEN HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S CLAIMS FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES
03/31/2017	ORDER ON DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING JO HOPPER'S CLAIMS FOR REIMBURSEMENT ON PROPERTY TAXES OR FOR REPAIRS
03/31/2017	ORDER -ON DEFENDANT JBMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ATTORNEYS' FEES INCURRED BY PLAINTIFF MRS. HOPPER REGARDING DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS IN THE SEVERED SUIT
03/31/2017	ORDER -ON DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF JOHN T. COX, III, JERRY JONES AND ANTHONY L. VITULLO
03/31/2017	ORDER - COMPEL  -ON DEFENDANT JPMPRGAN CHASE BANK, N. A. 'S MOTION TO COMPEL THE PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
04/04/2017	ORDER - COMPEL  ORDER ON DEFENDANTS STEPHEN B. HOPPER'S AND LAURA S. WASSMER'S  MOTION TO COMPEL CONTINUATON OF THE DEPOSITION OF TOM CANTRILL
04/06/2017	MOTION  JOINT MOTION FOR PRE-ADMISSION OF CERTAIN EXHIBITS
04/06/2017	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE
04/18/2017	VACATION LETTER -JAMES S. BELL
05/17/2017	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  W/ PROPOSED ORDER
06/06/2017	LETTER TO COURT  FILING OF LETTER MAND DELIVERED TO JUDGE THOMPSON 5/16/2017 FROM JOHN EICHMAN

	CHOR I TO, I RULE TO ALL T
06/06/2017	NOTICE  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S NOTICE OF FILING OF BUSINESS RECORDS AFFIDAVIT AND RECORDS OF D.W. SKELTON & ASSOCIATES
06/08/2017	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE -WITH AMENDED TRIAL SETTING ORDER
07/12/2017	PLEA TO JURISDICTION  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION  REGARDING THE HEIRS' INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS, AND, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,  SPECIAL EXCEPTION TO THE HEIRS' FOURTH AMENDED CROSS CLAIM
07/12/2017	NOTICE OF HEARING  HEARING NOTICE - 7/25/17 AT 9:30 A.M DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK,  N.A.'S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION REGARDING THE HEIRS' INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS,  AND, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEIRS' FOURTH  AMENDED CROSS CLAIM, FILED JULY 12, 2017
07/18/2017	MISC. EVENT  RULE 166 - JOINT PRE TRIAL REPORT
07/19/2017	ORIGINAL ANSWER
07/21/2017	RESPONSE  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION AND SPECIAL EXCEPTION
07/21/2017	NOTICE  DEFENDANTS' AMENDED NOTICE OF FILING AFFIDAVIT
07/21/2017	NOTICE  DEFENDANTS' AMENDED NOTICE OF FILING AFFIDAVIT
07/21/2017	NOTICE  AMENDED NOTICE OF FILING
07/25/2017	PRE-TRIAL HEARING (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H) & Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s Plea to the Jurisdiction Regarding the Heirs' Individual Claims, and, in the Alternative, Special Exception to the Heirs' Foruth Amended Cross Claim- F 7/12/17
07/26/2017	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  W/ PROPOSED ORDERS
08/01/2017	NOTICE OF HEARING
08/03/2017	MOTION  JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE AND STRIKE STEPHEN B. HOPPER'S AND LAURA S. WASSMER'S FIFTH SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURE
08/04/2017	NOTICE OF HEARING  NOTICE OF HEARING - JPMC'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE, ET AL. SET FOR 8/9/17 AT 9:30 A.M.  .

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08/07/2017	MOTION  DEFENDANTS LAURA S. WASSMER AND STEPHEN B. HOPPER'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE COURT'S RULING AND REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO REPLEAD
08/08/2017	RESPONSE  RESPONSE TO JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE AND STRIKE
08/09/2017	NOTICE OF HEARING  NOTICE OF RE-SET HEARING - 8/16/17 at 10:30 a.m ALL PARTIES MOTIONS IN LIMINE and JPMC'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE
08/16/2017	MOTION - HEARING (10:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)  Plaintiff's First Motion in Limine- F 9/30/16; Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s  Motion in Limine- F 9/30/16; Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer's Motion in Limine  JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s Motion to Exclude Evidence and Strike Stephen B. Hopper's  and Laura S. Wassmer's Fifth Supplemental Response to Request for Disclosure- F 8/3/17;  Defendants Laura s. Wassmer and Stephen B. Hopper's Motion for Clarification of the  Court's Ruling and Request for Leave to Replead- F 8/7/17
08/18/2017	MOTION - IN LIMINE PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTIONIN LIMINE NO.7
08/18/2017	AMENDED CROSS CLAIM - AMENDED COUNTER PETITION S HOPPER AND L WASSMER FIFTH AMENDED CROSS CLAIM AGAINST JPMC
08/18/2017	DEPUTY REPORTER STATEMENT
08/21/2017	ORDER - ON DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. 'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE AND STRIKE STEPHEN B. HOPPER'S AND LAURA S. WASSMER'S FIFTH SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURE
08/21/2017	ORDER - ON DEFEBDANTS LAURA S. WASSMER AND STEPHEN B. HOPPER'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF THE COURT'S RULING AND REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO REPLEAD
08/22/2017	EXHIBIT LIST  DEFENDANT STEPHEN B. HOPPER'S AND LAURA S. WASSMER'S THIRD  SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBIT LIST
08/23/2017	MOTION - STRIKE  JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S MOTION TO STRIKE STEPHEN B, HOPPER'S AND LAURA S, WASSMER'S FIFTH AMENDED CROSS CLAIM, AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SPECIAL EXCEPTION
08/24/2017	BLETTER TO COURT
08/28/2017	JURY TRIAL (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)
08/28/2017	NOTICE -DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF AMENDED CROSS DEPOSITION DESIGNATIONS
08/28/2017	BRIEFFILED

	CASE NO. 1 K-11-05250-1
08/29/2017	JURY TRIAL (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)
.08/30/2017	JURY TRIAL (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)
08/30/2017	MOTION - IN LIMINE  PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION IN LIMINE
08/31/2017	JURY TRIAL (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)
09/01/2017	JURY TRIAL (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)
09/01/2017	MOTION - IN LIMINE  PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION IN LIMINE
09/05/2017	JURY TRIAL (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)
09/05/2017	OBJECTION  STEPHEN HOPPER AND LAURA WASSMER'S OBJECTIONS TO JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S SEVENTH SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL EXHIBIT LIST
09/06/2017	JURY TRIAL (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)
09/06/2017	BRIEF FILED  PLAINTIFF'S TRIAL BRIEF ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE GARTNER STOCK
09/07/2017	JURY TRIAL (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)
09/08/2017	JURY TRIAL (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)
09/11/2017	JURY TRIAL (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)
09/11/2017	MOTION  MOTION FOR LEAVE TO SUBSTITUTE ONE OF PLAINTIFF'S TRIAL
09/11/2017	AMENDED PETITION  PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED DRAFT PROPOSED JURY CHARGE
09/11/2017	MISC. EVENT
09/11/2017	MOTION  PMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE NUMBER 24
09/12/2017	JURY TRIAL (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)
09/13/2017	JURY TRIAL (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)
09/13/2017	MOTION  JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
09/14/2017	JURY TRIAL (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)
09/14/2017	JURY TRIAL DEMAND

## DOCKET SHEET

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CASE	No.	PR-	11.	-0323	8-1

	PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED DRAFT PROPOSED JURY CHARGE
09/14/2017	MISC. EVENT  DEFENDANTS STEPHEN B. HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S FIRST AMENDED PROPOSED JURY CHARGE
09/14/2017	MISC. EVENT -PLAINTIFF'S THIR AMENDED DRAFT PROPOSED JURY CHARGE
09/15/2017	JURY TRIAL (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)
09/18/2017	JURY TRIAL (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)
09/18/2017	MOTION  PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ENFORCE TRIAL SUBPOENA
09/18/2017	RESPONSE  NON-PARTY HUNTON AND WILLIAMS, LLP'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ENFORCE TRIAL SUBPOENA
09/18/2017	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  PROPOSED DOCUMENTS
09/19/2017	JURY TRIAL (9:00 AM) (Indicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)
09/20/2017	MISC. EVENT  DEFENDANTS STEPHEN B. HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S SECOND AMENDED POPOSED JURY CHARGE
09/20/2017	Brief filed  PLAINTIFF'S BENCH BRIEF ON JURY CHARGE
09/20/2017	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S FIRST AMENDED PROPOSED JURY  CHARGE
09/20/2017	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  PLAINTIFF'S FIFTH AMENDED DRAFT PROPOSED JURY CHARGE
09/20/2017	BRIEF FILED  JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S BENCH BRIEF RE: CHAPTER 33 AND ESTATES  CODE ???? 404.0037 AND 352.051
09/21/2017	MISC. EVENT THIRD AMENDED PROPOSED JURY CHARGE
09/21/2017	B BRIEF FILED  LAURA S. WASSMER AND STEPHEN B. HOPPER'S TRIAL BRIEF ON JPMORGAN  CHASE BANK, N.A.'S SELF-DEALING
09/22/2017	MISC. EVENT  DEFENDANTS STEPHEN B. HOPPER AND LAURA WASSMER'S SUPPLEMENTAL  QUESTION AND INSTRUCTION TO THE HEIRS' THIRD AMENDED PROPOSED JURY  CHARGE

09/22/2017	MOTION  JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON STEPHEN B. HOPPER???S AND LAURA S. WASSMER'S CLAIMS
09/25/2017	MISC. EVENT  JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A'S ADDITIONAL REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS  REGARDING (1) ESTATES CODE 404.0037 AND (2) RESIGNATION OF A PERSONAL  REPRESENTATIVE
09/25/2017	MOTION  JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S FIRST AMENDED MOTION FOR DIRECTED  VERDICT ON PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
09/25/2017	MOTION  JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A'S FIRST AMENDED MOTION FOR DIRECTED  VERDICT ON STEPHEN B. HOPPER'S AND LAURA S. WASSMER'S CLAIM
09/25/2017	MOTION STEPHEN B. HOPPER AND LAURA WASSMER'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
09/25/2017	RESPONSE  PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTN JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S  MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
09/25/2017	MOTION - IN LIMINE  DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION IN LIMINE  REGARDING CLOSING ARGUMENTS
09/25/2017	MISC. EVENT  DEFENDANTS STEPHEN B. HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMENR'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS TO THE GEIRS' THIRD AMENDED PROPOSED JURY CHARGE
09/25/2017	MOTION HEIRS' SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR INSTRUCTED /DIRECTED VERDICT
09/25/2017	RESPONSE  DEFENDANTS STEPHEN B. HOPPERS' AND LAURA S. WASSMERS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDENT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A'S FIRST AMENDED MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
09/25/2017	MISC. EVENT  DEFENDANTS STEPHEN B. HOPPER'S AND LAURA WASSMER'S THIRD  SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS TO THE HEIRS' THIRD AMENDED  PROPOSED JURY CHARGE
09/25/2017	CHARGE OF COURT
09/25/2017	ORDER  PLAINTIFF'S TENDERED JURY CHARGE QUESTION
09/25/2017	ORDER  DEFENDANTS STEPHEN B. HOPPER AND LAURA WASSMER SUBMIT THE

	CASE NO. PR-11-03238-1
	FOLLOWING REQUESTED INSTRUSTIONS AND OUST
09/27/2017	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  LETTER TO THE JUDGE
10/06/2017	RESPONSE  DEFENDANTS/CROSS CLAIMANTS LAURA WASSMER AND STEPHEN HOPPER'S  MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT
10/06/2017	RESPONSE  CROSS CLAIMANTS BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT
10/09/2017	MOTION PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEGAL RULINGS RE ATTORNEY'S FEES
10/20/2017	MOTION  LAURA'S AGREED MOTION TO WITHDRAW
10/20/2017	MOTION STEPHEN'S AGREED MOTION TO WITHDRAW
10/26/2017	ORDER - GRANTING MOTION TO WITHDRAW  Party: ATTORNEY BELL, JAMES S; DEFENDANT HOPPER, STEPHEN B.  IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED THAT JAMES S. BELL,  ESQ. OF THE LAW FIRM JAMES S. BELL, P.C. IS PERMITTED TO WITHDRAW AS  COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR THE HEIRS AND IS RELIEVED FROM ANY ALL  RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS CASE. AGREED: STEPHEN B. HOPPER
10/26/2017	ORDER - GRANTING MOTION TO WITHDRAW  Party: ATTORNEY BELL, JAMES S; DEFENDANT WASSMER, LAURA S.  IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED THAT JAMES S. BELL, ESQ. OF THE LAW FIRM JAMES S. BELL, P.C. IS PERMITTED TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR THE HEIRS AND IS RELIEVED FROM ANY ALL RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS CASE. AGREED: LAURA S. WASSMER
10/30/2017	NOTICE - APPEARANCE
11/02/2017	NOTICE OF HEARING
11/02/2017	图 NOTICE OF HEARING
11/02/2017	DNOTICE OF HEARING
11/03/2017	BNOTICE OF HEARING
11/09/2017	MOTION  JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S MOTION FOR JNOV AND, ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION TO DISREGARD JURY FINDINGS OR SUGGESTION OF REMITTITUR
11/10/2017	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  LETTER TO JUDGE THOMPSON RE UPCOMING 11/13/17 TELEPHONIC  CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS SCHEDULING OF THE PARTIES' POST-TRIAL MOTIONS

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12/06/2017	MOTION  JOINT MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL EXHIBITS & PROPOSED  ORDER	
12/06/2017	ELETTER TO COURT  LETTER TO COURT REPORTER REQUESTING RECORD OF TRIAL	
12/11/2017	園 ORDER GRANTING JOINT MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF SUPPLEMENT TRAIL EXHIBITS	
12/18/2017	RESPONSE  JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S RESPONSE TO JO HOPPER'S MOTION FOR LEGAL RULINGS REGARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CLAIMS	
12/29/2017	MOTION  JOINT MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL EVIDENCE AND  EXHIBIT	
12/29/2017	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE -LETTER TO THE JUDGE	
01/03/2018	MISC. EVENT  JPMORGANS' OPPOSITION TO JOINT MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF SUPPLEMENTAL  TRIAL EVIDENCE AND EXHIBIT	
01/04/2018	SPECIAL SETTINGS (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H) Plaintiff's Motion for Legal Rulings Regarding Attorneys' Fees for Declaratory Judgment Claims- F 10/9/17	
01/05/2018	CANCELED SPECIAL SETTINGS (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H) OTHER REASONS Continuation Hearing from 1/4/18	
01/08/2018	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  W/ EXHIBIT	
01/09/2018	LETTER TO COURT	
01/16/2018	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  LETTER TO THE JUDGE	
01/16/2018	BRIEF FILED  LETTER BRIEF TO JUDGE THOMPSON	
01/19/2018	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  LETTER TO JUDGE THOMPSON	

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01/29/2018	LETTER TO COURT  W/ EXHIBITS
02/01/2018	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  LETTER TO THE JUDGE
02/23/2018	ID MOTION  JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S MOTION TO RESET THE MARCH 7-8, 2018 HEARING TO MAY 23-24, 2018 AND REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING CONFERENCE
02/27/2018	TELEPHONE CONFERENCE (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)
02/27/2018	NOTICE OF HEARING  REVISED NOTICE OF HEARINGS FOR APRIL 5-6, 2018
03/14/2018	OBJECTION  JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEGAL RULINGS REGARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CLAIMS
03/14/2018	REQUEST FOR FINDING OF FACT / CONCLUSIONS OF LAW  REQUEST FOR FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
03/14/2018	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE -W/PROPOSED ORDER
03/19/2018	RESPONSE  HEIRS' OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEGAL RULINGS RE ATTORNEYS' FEES FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CLAIMS
03/27/2018	MOTION - EMERGENCY  JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A.'S EMERGENCY MOTION TO SET BRIEFING  SCHEDULE .
03/27/2018	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  WIPROPOSED DOCUMENTS
03/28/2018	ORDER  ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEGAL RULINGS REGARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CLAIMS
03/30/2018	MOTION  MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGEMENT
04/02/2018	RESPONSE  HOPPER AND WASSMER'S RESPONSE TO JPMORGAN CHASE'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
04/02/2018	SUPPLEMENTAL: MOTION  JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S AMENDED MOTION FOR JNOV AND, ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION TO DISREGARD JURY FINDINGS OR SUGGESTION OF REMITTITUR

	ONOM TOOL THE AT LONG OF T
04/02/2018	MOTION  JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A.'S JNOV BRIEF RELATING TO LIABILITY
04/02/2018	MOTION  JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A.'S JNOV BRIEF RELATING TO PUNITIVE DAMAGE
04/04/2018	Rule 11 agreement
04/05/2018	SPECIAL SETTINGS (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)  Defendants/Cross Claimants Laura Wassmer and Stephen Hopper's Motion for Entry of  Final Judgment- F 10/6/17; Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Final Judgment; JPMorgan Chase  Bank, N.A. 's Motion for JNOV and, Alternatively, Motion to Disregard Jury Findings or  Suggestion of Remittitur- F 11/9/17
04/06/2018	SPECIAL SETTINGS (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)  Continuation Hearing from 4/5/18
04/06/2018	MOTION - WITHDRAW ATTORNEY  MOTION FOR WITHDRAWL OF COUNSEL OF RECORD
04/06/2018	© COUNTER CLAIM  COUNTER CLAIM/CROSS ACTION/INTERPLEADER/INTERVENTION/THIRD  PARTY/CONTEST
04/06/2018	MISC. EVENT ORDER ON MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL
04/06/2018	ORDER - WITHDRAW ATTORNEY  Party: ATTORNEY VITULLO, ANTHONY LEONARD  ORDER ON MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL-ANTHONY L. VITULLO OF  THE LAW FIRM FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO IS PERMITTED TO WITHDRAW AS  COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR THE HEIRS AND IS RELIEVED FROM ANY AND ALL  RESPONSIBILITY IN THIS CASE
04/06/2018	ADVERSE ACTIONS  FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP'S PETITION IN INTERVENTION, APPLICATION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF, REQUEST FOR TRO AND TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
04/09/2018	TRO HEARING (4:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)
04/09/2018	RESPONSE  OBJECTION TO PETITIONS
04/09/2018	AMENDED PETITION  JOHN L. MALESOVAS, D/B/A MALESOVAS LAW FIRM AND FEE, SMITH SHARP & VITULLO, LLP'S CONSOLIDATED FIRST AMENDED JOINT PETITION IN INTERVENTION AND PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION, AND MOTION TO DEPOSIT FUNDS IN THE REGISTRY
04/10/2018	国 LETTER TO COURT
04/10/2018	ORDER - TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER —TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
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04/11/2018	MOTION - COMPEL  MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
04/11/2018	置LETTER TO COURT
04/11/2018	NOTICE  JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S NOTICE OF RECEIPT OF TEMPORARY  RESTRAINING ORDER
04/12/2018	LETTER TO COURT
04/13/2018	NOTICE OF HEARING
04/13/2018	LETTER TO COURT  W/PROPOSED DOCUMENTS
04/13/2018	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  LETER TO THE JUDGE
04/16/2018	MOTION - QUASH  MOTION TO QUASH AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND OBJECTION TO SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM
04/18/2018	RETURN OF SERVICE  RETURN OF SERVICE
04/18/2018	RETURN OF SERVICE  RETURN OF SERVICE
04/18/2018	RETURN OF SERVICE  RETURN OF SERVICE
04/20/2018	RESPONSE  OBJECTION & RESPONSE TO HOPPER AND WASSMER'S MOTION TO COMPEL
04/20/2018	SUPPLEMENTAL: MOTION SUPPLEMENT TO MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
04/20/2018	RESPONSE  JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S RESPONSE LETTER BRIEF
04/20/2018	LETTER TO COURT  LETTER TO JUDGE
04/20/2018	MOTION - SUMMARY JUDGMENT INTERVENOR'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
04/23/2018	MOTION - QUASH  MOTON TO QUASH AND FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND OBJECTION TO HEARING

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04/24/2018	TEMPORARY INJUNCTION (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H) & Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration- F 4/11/18
04/24/2018	NOTICE TO CREDITORS
04/24/2018	ORDER - TEMPORARY INJUNCTION (OCA)  TEMPORARY INJUNCTION ORDER
04/25/2018	NOTICE OF HEARING SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING
04/26/2018	FINDINGS OF FACT / CONCLUSIONS OF LAW  NOTICE OF PAST DUE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
04/26/2018	NOTICE OF HEARING NOTICE OF HEARING ON INTERVENORS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
04/30/2018	WRIT  Party: DEFENDANT HOPPER, STEPHEN B.  WRIT OF TEMPORARY INJUNCTION - ON HOLD
04/30/2018	ISSUE CITATION HOPPER, STEPHEN B. Unserved RTN:
04/30/2018	WRIT  Party: DEFENDANT WASSMER, LAURA S.  WRIT OF TEMPORARY INJUNCTION - ON HOLD
04/30/2018	ISSUE CITATION WASSMER, LAURA S. Unserved RTN:
04/30/2018	WRIT Party: DEFENDANT JP MORGAN CHASE, N.A. WRIT OF TMEPORARY INJUNCTION - ON HOLD
04/30/2018	ISSUE CITATION  JP MORGAN CHASE, N.A.  Unserved  RTN:
04/30/2018	NOTICE - CHANGE OF ADDRESS  NOTICE OF CHANGE OF FIRM NAME
05/01/2018	APPLICATION -AMENDED  SECOND AMENDED PETITION IN INTERVENTION, APPLICATION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT, TEMPORARY & PERMANENT INJUNCTION
05/04/2018	NOTICE  JPMORGANCHASE BANK, N.A.'S NOTICE REGARDING APRIL 24, 2018, TEMPORARY

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05/04/2018	MOTION - COMPEL  REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
05/08/2018	MOTION - COMPEL (4:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)  Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration- F 4/11/18
05/09/2018	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE
05/09/2018	MOTION - WITHDRAW ATTORNEY
05/09/2018	NOTICE OF HEARING  AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING ON INTERVENORS' CONSOLIDATED TRADITIONAL RULE 1666(c) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
05/09/2018	MOTION  PLAINTIFF'S UNOPPOSED MOTION TO SEVER HEIRS' CLAIMS AND INTERVENTION  CLAIMS
05/09/2018	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE
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05/11/2018	RESPONSE  PLAINTIFFS RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT JPMMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S  REQUEST FOR FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
05/14/2018	ECERTIFICATE - DEPOSITION  FURTHER CERTIFICATION OF THE ORAL AND VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF  LAURA WASSMER
05/14/2018	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE  FURTHER CERTIFICATION OF THE ORAL AND VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF  LAURA WASSMER
05/14/2018	DNOTICE - APPEAL INTERVENTION DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF ACCELERATED APPEAL
05/14/2018	REQUEST FOR CLERK PREPARED RECORD  REQUEST FOR PREPARATION OF CLERK'S RECORD IN AN ACCELERATED APPEAL
05/14/2018	REQUEST REPORTER RECORD  REQUEST FOR PREPARATION OF REPORTER'S RECORD IN AN ACCELERATED  APPEAL
05/15/2018	RULING  RULING ON DEFENDANT JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.'S REQUEST FOR FINDING  OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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#### THE PROBATE COURT

# DOCKET SHEET

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	FURTHER CERTIFICATION OF ORAL AND VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF STEPHEN HOPPER	
05/17/2018	CORRESPONDENCE - LETTER TO FILE	
05/21/2018	NOTICE  NOTICE OF CANCELLING INTERVENOR'S MSJ	
05/22/2018	2 VACATION LETTER	
06/11/2018	CANCELED MOTION - SUMMARY JUDGMENT (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: THOMPSON, BRENDA H)  REQUESTED BY ATTORNEY/PRO SE  Intervenors' (Lawyers) Consolidated Traditional Rule 166a(c) Motion for Summary Judgment (MSJ) on Their Secured and Fully Vested Property and Ownership Rights to the Disputed Funds, Application for Attorney's Fees, and Brief in Support- F 4/20/18	

DATE FINANCIAL INFORMATION

ATTORNEY LOEWINSOHN, ALAN S		
Total Charges	338.00	
Total Payments and Credits	0.00	
Balance Due as of 5/25/2018	338.00	
,		
DECEDENT HOPPER, MAX D.		
Total Charges	997.00	
Total Payments and Credits	997.00	
Balance Due as of 5/25/2018	0.00	
DEFENDANT HOPPER, STEPHEN B.		
Total Charges	66.00	
Total Payments and Credits	66.00	
Balance Due as of 5/25/2018	0.00	
N. 9-9-9-9-9-9-9-9-9-9-9-9-9-9-9-9-9-9-9-		
DEFENDANT JP MORGAN CHASE, N.A.		
Total Charges	68.00	
Total Payments and Credits	68.00	
Balance Due as of 5/25/2018	0.00	
TAPPERENTO ANTE AVACIDATED. LATED A C		
DEFENDANT WASSMER, LAURA S. Total Charges	6.00	
Total Payments and Credits	6.00	
Balance Due as of 5/25/2018	0.00	
Dannie Due as 01 5/25/2010	0.00	
INTERVENOR Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP		
Total Charges	116.00	
Total Payments and Credits	116.00	
 Balance Due as of 5/25/2018	0.00	
SHOREVY PAV RD BI VIALUMVAN	****	
INTERVENOR Malesovas, John L		
Total Charges	85,00	
Total Payments and Credits	85.00	
Balance Due as of 5/25/2018	0.00	
PLAINTIFF HOPPER, JO N.		
Total Charges	367.00	
Total Payments and Credits	367.00	
Balance Due as of 5/25/2018	0.00	
ATTORNEY VITULLO, ANTHONY LEONARD		
PROBATE RESTRICTED DESPOSIT Balance as of 5/25/2018	10,000.00	

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### Transaction Detail for LOEWINSOHN, ALAN S on Case# PR-11-03238-1

#### TXDALLASPROD

N THE MATTER	OF							
Date F	Reference	Pavor	Charges	Payments	Credits	Ralance	Disbursed	Escrov

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#### **CLERK'S CERTIFICATE**

THE STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF DALLAS

I, JOHN F. WARREN,

Clerk of the County Court of Dallas County, Texas do hereby certify that the documents contained in this record to which this certification is attached are all of the documents specified by Texas Rule of Appellant procedure 34.5 (a) and all other documents timely requested by a party to this proceeding under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.5 (b). In the cause of PR-11-03238-1.

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL at my office in Dallas County, Texas this 31st day of May, 2018.



JOHN F. WARREN, Clerk County Court Dallas County. Texas

TRINIDAD PIMENTEL, Deputy Clerk

REPORTER'S RECORD VOLUME 1 OF 5 COURT OF APPEALS NO. 05-18-00558-CV CAUSE NO. PR-11-3238-1

IN THE ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED

THE PROBATE COURT

JO N. HOPPER Plaintiff,

V.

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A. STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER Defendants.

JOHN L. MALESOVAS d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP Intervenors,

V.

STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, and JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A., Defendants.

NUMBER ONE

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

==========

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APPEARANCES

BRIAN LAUTEN, Attorney SBOT No. 24031603 Brian Lauten, PC 3811 Turtle Creek Blvd. Suite 1450 Dallas, Texas 75219

Telephone: 214-414-0996

ATTORNEY FOR: THE INTERVENORS

#### APPEARANCES CONT'D.

Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon

SBOT No. 12481600

12377 Merit Drive, Suite 900

Dallas, Texas 75251

Telephone: 214-572-1700 Facsimile: 214-572-1717

ATTORNEY FOR: JO N. HOPPER

ANNE M. JOHNSON, Attorney

SBOT No. 00794271

Haynes and Boone LLP

2323 Victory Avenue, Suite 700

Dallas, Texas 75219

Telephone: 214-651-5376

Facsimile: 214-200-0487

#### --AND--

JAMES E. PENNINGTON, Attorney

SBOT No. 15758510

Law Offices of James E. Pennington, P.C.

900 Jackson Street, Suite 440

Dallas, Texas 75202

Telephone: 214-741-3022

Facsimile: 214-741-3022

ATTORNEY FOR: DEFENDANTS

ALAN S. LOEWINSOHN, Attorney

SBOT No. 12481600

Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP

12377 Merit Drive, Suite 900

Dallas, Texas 75251

Telephone: 214-572-1700

Facsimile: 214-572-1717

ATTORNEY FOR: JO N. HOPPER

VAN H. BECKWITH, Attorney

SBOT No. 02020150

JESSICA PULLIAM, Attorney

SBOT No. 24037309

Baker Botts, LLP

2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700

Dallas, Texas 75201

Telephone: 214-953-6505

ATTORNEYS FOR: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.

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No. 1	Letter dated 4/6/18 From Mr. Pennington To Mr. Malesovas and Mr. Lauten	d 36	58	2	
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No. 6	Rule 11 Letter Filed April 4, 2018	28	31	3	
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REPORTER'S RECORD VOLUME 2 OF 5 CAUSE NO. PR-11-3238-1 COURT OF APPEALS NO. 05-18-00558-CV

IN THE ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED

THE PROBATE COURT

JO N. HOPPER Plaintiff,

V.

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A. STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER Defendants.

JOHN L. MALESOVAS d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP Intervenors,

V.

STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, and JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A., Defendants.

NUMBER ONE

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER HEARING

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On the 9th day of April, 2018, A.D., the following proceedings came on for hearing in the aboveentitled and numbered cause before the HONORABLE COURT, BRENDA HULL THOMPSON, Judge Presiding, held in Dallas, Dallas County, Texas.

Proceedings reported by oral stenography.

#### APPEARANCES

BRIAN LAUTEN, Attorney SBOT No. 24031603 Brian Lauten, PC 3811 Turtle Creek Blvd. Suite 1450 Dallas, Texas 75219 Telephone: 214-414-0996

ATTORNEY FOR: THE INTERVENORS

JAMES E. PENNINGTON, Attorney SBOT No. 15758510 Law Offices of James E. Pennington, P.C. 900 Jackson Street, Suite 440 Dallas, Texas 75202 Telephone: 214-741-3022

Facsimile: 214-741-3022

ATTORNEY FOR: DEFENDANTS

JEFFREY S. LEFINGER, Attorney SBOT No. 12258300 Levinger, PC 145 Ross Avenue, Suite 2500 Dallas, Texas 75201

Telephone: 214-855-6817 Facsimile: 214-855-6808

--AND--

J. CARL CECERE, Attorney

SBOT No. 24050397 6035 McCommas Blvd. Dallas, Texas 75206

Telephone: 469-600-9455

ATTORNEYS FOR: STEPHEN HOPPER & LAURA WASSMER

VAN H. BECKWITH, Attorney SBOT No. 02020150 JESSICA PULLIAM, Attorney SBOT No. 24037309 Baker Botts, LLP 2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700 Dallas, Texas 75201

Telephone: 214-953-6505

ATTORNEYS FOR: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.

#### APPEARANCES, CONT'D.

ROBERT L. TOBEY, Attorney

SBOT No. 20082975

Johnson Tobey Baruch, PC

3308 Oak Grove Avenue

Dallas, Texas 75204

Telephone: 214-741-4260 Facsimile: 214-741-6248

ATTORNEY FOR: BLOCK GARDEN & MCNEILL LAW FIRM

ALAN S. LOEWINSOHN, Attorney

SBOT No. 12481600

Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP

12377 Merit Drive, Suite 900

Dallas, Texas 75251

Telephone: 214-572-1700 Facsimile: 214-572-1717

ATTORNEY FOR: JO N. HOPPER

ALSO PRESENT:

GRAYSON L. LINYARD, Attorney

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Court Reporter's Certificate

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#### [PROCEEDINGS]

THE COURT: All right, this is PR-11-3238 the Estate of Max Hopper versus Jo Hopper versus JPMorgan Chase and John L. Malesovas versus Stephen Hopper, et al. All right so, let's start with the announcements over here.

MR. LAUTEN: Good afternoon Your Honor,
Brian Lauten appearing on behalf of John Malesovas and
Lenny Vitullo of Fee Smith Sharp & Vitullo, the
interveners.

MR. PENNINGTON: Good afternoon Your

Honor, I'm Jim Pennington I'm here appearing on behalf

of Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer as defendants to the

intervention filed by Mr. Malesovas and the Fee Smith

Sharp and Vitullo law firm.

MR. LEVINGER: Your Honor, my name is

Jeff Levinger together with Mr. Cecere here, sitting

behind me and we represent Laura Wassmer and Stephen

Hopper in the Estate, in connection with their claims

against JPMorgan Chase, that have now settled, effective

last Wednesday, according to the Court's hearings on

Thursday and Friday.

MR. BECKWITH: Your Honor, Van Beckwith and Jessica Pulliam on behalf of JPMorgan Chase N.A.

Your Honor, we're here just simply to make sure that the settlement agreement, proposed settlement agreement, the

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1
     terms of which are protected and remain confidential,
     which one of the key terms. So, we'll enter an
 2
 3
     appearance for that purpose.
                    MR. TOBEY: Your Honor, Robert Tobey for
 5
    Block Garden & McNeill. That is another law firm for
    the Plaintiffs in this lawsuit.
                    THE COURT: For the Plaintiffs?
 8
                    MR. TOBEY: For the -- I'm sorry, we're
 9
     in a different lawsuit. For Ms. Wassmer and Dr. Hopper.
10
    And we're not a party to this case but, we're here as an
     interested observer.
11
12
                    THE COURT: All right so what other case
13
     are you talking about?
                    MR. TOBEY: The primary case that was
14
15
    pending against JPMorgan.
16
                    THE COURT:
                               So are you replacing --
17
                    MR. TOBEY:
                               We are not replacing anybody.
18
                    THE COURT: Which side are you joining
19
     on?
20
                    MR. TOBEY: We're an interested observer
21
     in this hearing. My clients have a contingent fee
22
     agreement with the clients --
23
                    THE COURT: All right well --
24
                    MR. TOBEY: -- Mrs. Wassmer and Dr.
25
     Hopper.
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1 THE COURT: All right, so your client is 2 who? 3 MR. TOBEY: Our client is the law firm of 4 Block Garden & McNeill. 5 THE COURT: Sir? 6 MR. LOEWINSOHN: And way in the back, Your Honor, Alan Loewinsohn is here representing Mrs. Hopper. I don't anticipate I will be participating but, 9 not knowing the direction of the hearing, I thought I 10 needed to make sure that I didn't need to participate. 11 So, I will be here but probably relatively quiet in the 12 back. 13 THE COURT: Thank you. All right so what I have set today is the Application for Temporary 14 15 Restraining Order; is that correct? 16 MR. LAUTEN: Yes, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: All right. 18 MR. LAUTEN: Your Honor, I'll try to be 19 really brief. Let me tell you four things: The facts, 20 the law, what we want, and why we're entitled to it. 21 First, on April 4th, a confidential settlement was 22 reached in this case, and as this Court is undoubtedly 23 aware, Mr. Vitullo has lived and breathed this case for 24 two years or so. He tried a jury trial in this Court 25 for a month.

On April 5th I believe he was in this

Court an actually had a conversation with the Court off
the record, and said look there's a confidential
settlement, enjoyed being in here. Literally, within an
hour of that announcement, we get a letter terminating
us, as the lawyer for the clients, in this case. After
all the works been done, within minutes of the
settlement, we're terminated and we're told that the
agreement, the contingency agreement is unenforceable;
we're not going to pay you for your work. They won't
tell us the exact amount that's in dispute but, they say
you know what, we'll take the entire contingency fee
interest and we'll put it in our new lawyer's trust
account.

Let me tell you first and foremost what the law is on that. I've got these cases and I'll approach in a minute and ask you if I can and give them to you highlighted. I've done a bunch of fee disputes; this is what I do. A big part of my practice is representing lawyers, in these kind of cases. The law's real clear. Once an attorney under a contingency fee agreement has performed, substantially performed or completed his work, at that moment in time, the clients are estopped to not pay the lawyer. That's Tillery v. Zurich.

Actually Dale Tillery who's the Judge in the 134<sup>th</sup> District Court, when he was a lawyer he had this issue in the *Enoch's* case. They say look, if you could do this Your Honor, people would do it. I just settled this big contingency case; I've got a great idea. I'm going to fire my lawyer and not pay him. You lose all of your defenses under the agreement, if the client does that. As a matter of law, once there's substantial performance, the lawyer's entitled to his fee. That's the law; I've got those cases.

So what do we want? What we're asking the Court to do, number one is, they need to tell us what's in dispute. Are they saying we're entitled to 20 percent of the fee, 30 percent of the fee? 45 percent is what the agreement says. I'm happy to tender the contingency agreement in camera. I'm happy to tender the termination letter in camera. They won't tell us that.

What we're asking the Court to do, therefore, to keep the status quo, is to deposit whatever they say the disputed funds are, with respect to the contingency fee interest at issue, into the registry of the Court; we can do it under seal. We're not here to violate the confidential agreement; the Court doesn't need to know what that is. But we want

the money put in the registry of the Court, if they're going to take the position, we get to keep your work and we don't get to pay you.

They've raised this point, I think, which is: Does the Court have jurisdiction to do this? The Court absolutely, has jurisdiction to do it. The Court has the inherit power to do it. Those cases are Prodego v. Ware, Diana River v. Calvillo and the Supreme Court's case in Castilleja. I've got those cases highlighted and before I finish, if I can, I'll approach and give them to you. And here's what they say. They say the Court absolutely has jurisdiction, under its inherit authority, to put money in the registry of the Court especially, in Probate Court 37.005 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, that says this Court has declaratory judgment relief to decide money that's ancillary to an estate.

It gets better, Your Honor. You don't have to grant a TRO today, you don't have to grant an injunction today because what these cases say is that putting money into the registry of the Court that's in dispute, which this is, we have a property right. We've earned the money; we did the work; is a non-appealable order. It cannot be appealed. The Court has inherent authority to do it and the Court can put that money into

the registry. Can I approach and show you these cases?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LAUTEN: And I've got copies for the other side. The first one is *River*, and the second is *Prodego* and I've got copies. Can I approach, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LAUTEN: In other cases exactly like this one that was put in dispute. So, we want the disputed funds put in the registry and we want the Court to enter an expedited discovery order. I'd like to go depose these Plaintiffs. And I want to come back and next month and I want a summary judgment, because we're entitled to be paid; it's just that simple. Now let me briefly respond to what the position of the clients is. And just look at this from the optics of fairness.

You did all the work. You got a favorable jury verdict. You successfully defended a three-million-dollar counter claim. We're not going to pay you, now that the case is settled. We want you to put the money in our lawyer's, our new lawyer's trust account, where you can't get it outside the registry of the Court. And we want to go to arbitration, under the agreement we say, is unenforceable. That doesn't work. So at the end of the day what we're -- oh, and they made

one argument: Oh, we've waived the right to be here.

The Court -- you can't waive subject matter
jurisdiction, Your Honor.

So here's what we're asking the Court to do. Number one, the precedent of allowing a client to allow a lawyer to allow a lawyer to spend two years working on a file, to terminate the day they did the settlement, allow the client to take the money into their new lawyer's trust account and say' we'll get it back to you in a couple of years after arbitration' is absolutely preposterous and it's offensive. We're asking the Court to put the money in the registry up to the disputed percentage; they need to say what that is.

The Court can enter that order under seal so there's no prejudice of the confidentiality. I want an expedited discovery order, which this Court can grant, under the TRO rules germane to fee disputes, and this Court has jurisdiction because the corpus is germane to an estate, and I want to come back in 30 days and have a summary judgment and my client needs to be paid. That's what I'm asking the Court to do. I'm happy to answer any of your questions and again, I've got these cases.

I'd like to approach if I could give you the Enoch's case because this case stands for a

proposition that, they can talk about their defenses all they want. Once you perform, it's over. You can't eat the cake at the restaurant and say, God I just didn't like it; I'm not going to pay for it. That's the situation we're in. We wanted a TRO. The money needs to be put in the registry. We can do all this under seal. And we want to depose these people and we want to get to the bottom of it, and we're entitled to be paid.

Honor?

I'm happy to answer any of your questions you've got but that's the situation we're in. I also have a copy of 37.005, which is the Civil Practice and Remedies Code provision that gives this Court jurisdiction over DEC actions germane to the estate.

And subject to any of the questions you've got, I appreciate the time. I'm happy to respond to whatever they come up with.

MR. PENNINGTON: May I respond, Your

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, have you had an opportunity to read our objection that we filed, with the Court, earlier today?

THE COURT: No sir, I've been on this bench all day long.

MR. PENNINGTON: I understand Your Honor.

I just ask so I'll know ahead of time, how much detail I wanted to go into with you, with respect to our objection and response. If I could approach the bench?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. PENNINGTON: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, we have raised a number of objections in our response. The first, foremost objection is that the contingency fee agreement that their trying to enforce in this case, contains an arbitration clause. And when we claim the Court does not have jurisdiction, as I put in my objection my response, the reason why we put that in there is because Mr. Vitullo and his law firm, waived their right to pursue any action, in Court. It doesn't specify all the different types of action but, it was clear the language in there, I've quoted it in my response on page 2, but this is the exact wording taken out of the contingency fee agreement, which they are now seeking to enforce, in this Court.

shows, that they waived their right to pursue any claim in Court. Any action at all. The case law is very clear, with respect to this issue, and because of that, I think that this case does not belong to this Court; it belongs in arbitration. We have asked the Court to sustain our objection and to compel Mr. Vitullo, his

firm, and Mr. Malesovas to pursue their claims in arbitration, if they wish to pursue those. But, those claims are not ripe, this Court does not have -- should not have allowed them to pursue this claims before this Court.

And Your Honor, a copy of the contingency fee agreement was actually attached to one of the, it was the initial intervention filed by Mr. Malesovas. He attached the copy of the fee agreement to his petition in intervention, as an exhibit, which is why I did not attach it to my response. But it is in the Court's record. Now, I might add, Your Honor that the attorney's at Fee Smith, including Mr. Vitullo, were the ones who actually drafted this agreement so, I don't think they can claim that they weren't aware of it or that the arbitration provision is somehow unfair.

The other objection that I have raised Your Honor, is that with respect to the request for temporary restraining order, subject to our objections of this matter going forward in this Court, we had pointed out in our response, there is no imminent harm here. That is obviously, one of their requisite elements that they have to satisfy, in order to get any type of injunctive relief. And the reason why there is no imminent harm Your Honor, is because we have offered,

I have offered specifically, on behalf of my clients, to allow the disputed portion of the settlement proceeds to remain in a trust account, specifically Mr. Levinger's trust account. If they're not happy with that, I've offered to receive the funds, disputed portion of the funds, in my trust account.

THE COURT: All right well, I guess I'm not understanding; what is the disputed portion of the funds that we're talking about?

MR. LAUTEN: Good question.

MR. PENNINGTON: Well they claim, they claim --

MR. BECKWITH: Oh, I didn't say anything it yet, Your Honor but I do want to be really careful just on behalf of JPMorgan Chase. We haven't agreed to pay anybody anything, yet. I mean, we're still working through the terms of the settlement agreement. And we certainly haven't agreed to pay money in the registry of the Court. So, I do want to be careful that if Your Honor ordered something to be placed into the registry of the Court, we worry about the confidentiality of the settlement agreement, which is inviolate is not supposed to be disclosed to anyone.

Mr. Loewinsohn and I, as Your Honor

knows, and Your Honor spent a lot of time last Thursday and Friday working though Ms. Hopper's request for judgment, and I do have concerns that if the value or amount of this settlement agreement, the one between the heirs and JPMorgan Chase, was disclosed even to Your Honor, given where we find ourselves with a pending request for a judgment, that that would be potentially prejudicial to and certainly objected to by JPMorgan Chase.

I just want to make sure we're crystal clear on that. We have no agreement to pay any money right now, into a registry of the Court. And we have no agreement, right now signed, to pay the heirs money. I do join though, in Mr. Pennington's request, and Mr. Levinger's request; I know you asked to see Mr. Vitullo and Mr. Levinger in Court so, here we are. But it does seem that, since a lawyer's bar license is tied to their trust account, that that would be the most logical place to place this money.

So, I just wanted to make that objection clear, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, things disappear from trust accounts too but I'm willing to listen so, go ahead.

MR. PENNINGTON: Well, Your Honor with

respect to that issue, I have put my request in writing to the extent that there's any dispute about that and I'm happy to offer that letter and will do so into evidence. But, on April 6<sup>th</sup> I sent a letter to Mr.

Lauten and Mr. Malesovas, offering to place the entire 45 percent interest, that they claim as a contingency fee, to allow that to remain in Mr. Levinger's trust account.

And to be clear, I cited the ethical obligations, under Rule 1.14 of any attorney receiving funds, that he knows are in dispute. That rule makes it clear, that any lawyer in possession of funds, has an obligation to place those funds into his trust account and not to disburse those funds, until the matter has been finally, resolved. So, I cited the rule, assured Mr. Lauten that we would comply with that rule, and alternatively, if they weren't happy with that Your Honor, we even offered to place those funds into another escrow account, maintained by an independent third party.

And so, we're not, by any means we're not trying to just make a quick grab for the settlement, then pay the money all directly to my clients. What we're trying to do is we acknowledge that the dispute exists, we're trying to comply with the remedy that's

set forth in Rule 1.14 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules, which govern all attorney's, and we've suggested that we would comply with all of those obligations. And if there's a dispute about whether it's Mr. Levinger or my trust account, as I mentioned, we're willing to agree to a third party to set up a different trust account, to place those funds until the matter is resolved.

One thing is clear Your Honor, is that they also, under that rule, there's actually case law on point, with respect to this issue, to emphasize how important an attorney's obligation is under Rule 1.14 but, if Mr. Levinger received those funds and he paid them out knowing there's a dispute, his bar license would be on the line. And I can cite the Court the case law but, if that is a concern notwithstanding that, as I've mentioned, we've offered to alleviate that concern, by putting them into a third parties trust account.

In addition to that Your Honor, there has been no threat; no one has actually threatened to pay out those funds to anyone. And one of the things I pointed out in my response was that, just the fear alone that someone may do something, is not enough. That's insufficient to support the Court entering a temporary restraining order. You have to have actual evidence, that someone has threatened to do something against the

law or inappropriate with your property, and that simply does not exist, in this case.

To the contrary, we have shown the other side that we are willing not to pay those funds, or disburse those funds to the clients, until the matter has been finally resolved. The other problem with this matter pending in this Court Your Honor is that there's an extreme risk of a violation of Rule 1.05. Rule 1.05 has to do with the confidentiality of information regarding clients, and this goes back to our claim for arbitration. If this case goes forward in this Court, or the Court allows that to happen, then the problem is that there's a risk that all of this disclosure of confidential information will end up happening in this Court, and will be a matter of public record.

And not only that, but, it'll leave something to the adverse parties, to which my clients were previously, on the opposite side of the case from. And there is an exception in Rule 1.05, which I'm sure Mr. Lauten would address with you but the exception under that rule says that under certain circumstances, when a lawyer is trying to recover a fee, he can, to the extent reasonably necessary, reveal confidential information but there are limitations on that. The rule itself says, to the extent reasonably necessary.

In our position, in this case, is that it is not reasonable or necessary to disclose any information in this Court, regarding the merits of the fee dispute claim. All that should be taken in an arbitration setting, where the privacy interest of the parties, can be protected. And so for that reason, we feel, in addition to all the other reasons that we set forth in our response, that this case has no place in this Court, and the Court should compel arbitration and compel Mr. Vitullo and his firm to seek their claims in arbitration. They simply have another place to do that.

In addition to that, Your Honor, by going forward in this case, they threaten to change the status The whole purpose of a temporary restraining order quo. is to preserve the status quo of the parties, until the dispute can be resolved, or there could be a further In this case, by them taking the actions they hearing. have, they're actually endangering and jeopardizing the very settlement that my clients have reached, with JPMorgan Chase. If they wanted to pursue their fee dispute claim, they can do it in arbitration, under the protection of the privacy interest, which would serve to protect all of the parties and would also not jeopardize the settlement, because all of those matters would be protected, under the stroke of the arbitration statute.

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Your Honor, after they filed their initial request for a temporary restraining order, then we filed our objection and our response, and then they shifted their strategy. And now their strategy, what they put in their amended petition and intervention, is now they've asked the Court to deposit the funds in the registry of the Court.

THE COURT: I'm not following you, sir.

MR. PENNINGTON: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: What are you saying the initial strategy was and what is the shift?

MR. PENNINGTON: The initial strategy
Your Honor, was they asked for a temporary restraining
order and injunctive relief. And their initial papers
they filed, with respect to the intervention, they
mentioned nothing about putting the funds in the
registry of the Court, under a motion to deposit the
funds. They have now amended their petition in
intervention and actually, filed a motion to deposit the
funds in the registry of the Court. And they've cited
these cases that Mr. Lauten handed to you just a moment
ago.

The River case, and I've forgotten the other cases he mentioned but, there are a series of cases that he cites in his motion and that he provided

to you just a moment ago, that allows for, in certain instances, for funds to be put into the registry of the Court. The problem that Mr. Lauten has though, in this case, is that his client and Mr. Malesovas, have waived their right to seek any kind of action in Court, under the arbitration clause.

So, they cannot even come into Court and request those funds to be put in the registry of the Court. They would have to do that under the --with the Triple A or some other arbitration panel but one thing is clear they cannot do it in this Court. But separate and apart from that Your Honor, they have another even bigger problem, and that is those cases require, before this Court can order funds to be paid under the registry of the Court, they have to present evidence that the funds are in danger of being lost or depleted. And there simply is no evidence of that in this case.

And if I can approach Your Honor, I have a case I'd like to show the Court that stands for that very proposition. May I approach, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. PENNINGTON: This is a Dallas Court of Appeals case, that actually deals with this very issue, and in that case, the Applicant sought both a temporary restraining order and asked the Court to

deposit funds in the registry of the Court. That went up on appeal and the Dallas Court of Appeals said that it was an abuse of discretion for the Court in that case, to order the funds to be paid in the registry of the Court, because there was no evidence that the funds were in danger of being lost or depleted. And that is the exact situation, here. We are not -- there's no threat that my clients are going to run away with the money. Instead, it's just the opposite.

We have offered to take the disputed portion of the funds, and whether we put them in my trust account, or in Mr. Levinger's account, or some other third party, we've offered a remedy to them under Rule 1.14 and they have remedy of law under that same rule. So, they just don't like it but, they do have a remedy. In addition to that Your Honor, they can also go to the arbitration association the American Arbitration Association and obtain the same relief with the Triple A if they want but, they haven't done that.

So, for all of those reasons Your Honor, we would request that their motion be denied, and we would request that this Court compel this matter, compel Mr. Vitullo, his firm, and Mr. Malesovas to pursue their claims in arbitration and to strike the interventions and to otherwise, deny all their relief.

MR. LAUTEN: Can I respond, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LAUTEN: First of all, there is no Motion to Compel binding arbitration, before you or set for hearing today, at all, point number one; it's not even before you. Point number two, is you asked a great question and it's a question that I have emailed them about and I've asked them about. What is the dispute? What's the amount in dispute? What's the dispute? He can't even tell you that. What's in dispute is simply his clients don't want to pay. That's it. That's all I've heard.

He offered into evidence the termination letter. I have no objection to that. I hope you'll admit it because what you'll find in that letter is that he's taking the position, that the agreement that he now want to enforce in arbitration, he terminated on the basis that it probably, wasn't enforceable.

THE COURT: All right. I have not seen the termination letter and I'm looking through what I have here, and I don't have any contingency fee agreement.

MR. LAUTEN: And I brought that to admit into evidence, in camera. I figured they would say, oh, that's confidential, you can't enforce your rights,

which they're now doing. They're saying well, we hold 1 all the cards, we get to keep your money, you can't try to get your money because you breaching confidentiality. 3 I anticipate that argument. I've got the contingency agreements. I'll offer them into evidence right now, as Exhibits 1 and 2, in camera. If they want a foundation or a predicate, I'll put Mr. Vitullo on the stand right 8 now, we can prove them up; I brought them. 9 If he's got a problem with 10 confidentiality, let's kick everybody out, we'll do it 11 in camera, and I'll put Mr. Vitullo on the stand right 12 here, Your Honor. 13 MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor I --14 MR. LAUTEN: Tell me what you want to do. 15 MR. PENNINGTON: If I could see a copy of 16 the agreement, I doubt very seriously, that I would 17 dispute the authenticity of the agreement. But, it was 18 attached and I can show the Court a copy, with the 19 attachment. 20 THE COURT: I'm just saying I don't have 21 it. 22 MR. PENNINGTON: I understand, Your 23 Honor. 24 THE COURT: All right. MR. PENNINGTON: I was going to show you

a copy, that was actually attached, to the petition in intervention.

THE COURT: Well I need to know whether or not there's an offering to admit it into evidence and if there's an objection. And if the offer is in camera, whether or not that makes a difference to you.

MR. LAUTEN: I'd offer into evidence right now Exhibits 1 and 2, which are the signed agreements of the client. If he has an objection of confidentiality, then I'm happy to offer them, subject to in camera, in camera of evidentiary finding.

MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, I have no objection to the authenticity of these documents. I would prefer that they be submitted in camera.

Although, this one, as I said was -- it's my understanding it was attached to the petition in intervention so it's already a public record.

MR. LAUTEN: No, it's -- the two agreements are different, Your Honor and I'm offering two separate exhibits, Exhibits 1 and 2. If I could approach, I can give you copies.

THE COURT: All right, let me see what you're talking about.

MR. LAUTEN: Do you have stickers?

[Exhibits marked]

Your Honor, I've handed you what I've already marked, pre-marked for identification, as Exhibits 1 and 2 to the hearing, and I'd offer those into evidence now.

[Intervenors Exhibits 1 and 2 offered]

THE COURT: Mr. Pennington?

MR. PENNINGTON: No objection, Your

Honor.

MR. LAUTEN: Your Honor, I'd offer the termination letter, as Exhibit 3 into evidence, dated April 5, 2018.

[Intervenors Exhibit 3 offered]

THE COURT: All right. Now, let me understand that your Exhibit 1 is a contingency contract of representation and then, we have the same caption on Exhibit 2. Are they the same thing or--?

MR. LAUTEN: Good question, Your Honor.

Exhibits 1 and 2 are signed by each client. They're the same underlying agreement but, different signatures on both but it's really important that the Court understands this is a big deal. If you look at Ms.

Wassmer's interlineations on the contingency agreement, she said we're responsible for defending the counter claims. Why is that important? Because there was a three-million-dollar defense of those claims. We're

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entitled to a contingency fee on those claims, above the
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     45 percent. I've been trying to find out for three
     days, what is in dispute.
                    THE COURT: All right. Well my question
     is -- as I said, are both of these documents the
     operative documents?
                    MR. LAUTEN: Correct, your Honor.
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                    THE COURT: All right so, -- Sir?
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                    MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, with respect
     to Exhibit 3, I do not --
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                    THE COURT: Let's not move to three.
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     Let's stay with one and two okay?
                    MR. PENNIGTON: I understand.
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                    THE COURT: All right, I need to
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     understand. Exhibit 1 has some interlineations and it
     looks like they're initialed by at least, Laura Wassmer.
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    And then Exhibit 2 doesn't have any -- All right Exhibit
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     1 is not dated; Exhibit 2 seems to be dated so --
                    MR. LAUTEN: I'd offer Exhibit's 1 and 2.
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     If there's a problem with the foundation, I'm happy to
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     put Mr. Vitullo up on the stand right now. I'm happy to
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     prove it up, if that's what you want me to do.
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                    MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, we don't
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     object to the authenticity of either of those exhibits.
     We believe those to be duplicate copies of the
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contingency fee agreements that were signed by my clients.

THE COURT: Okay. So, I guess the question is: Were these two signed at two different times, or what?

MR. PENNINGTON: My understanding, Your Honor, is I think that one client signed one version, and the other client made some interlineations, and then signed -- it's the same contract. At least, that's my understanding but, that the, one of the clients made some notes, on their version that they signed, then they sent it back.

MR. LAUTEN: That's correct. I agree with that.

THE COURT: Okay so one client agrees on a different scope of representation than the other client?

MR. LAUTEN: That's my position, Your
Honor. My position is that Laura Wassmer is at risk for
an additional contingency fee for the successful defense
of the claims, based on the very interlineations she
wrote. That would only go to show one thing, the 45
percent they want escrow, is insufficient under the
agreements they signed, if that's what they want to do.
But be that as it may, all we're really here -- what

that documents prove is this.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not asking you that. I'm just asking the question. Am I to understand that we are operating under one agreement for Laura Wassmer, and another agreement for Stephen Hopper?

MR. LAUTEN: That's my position, Your Honor, yes. Albeit, they're the same with respect to the contingency, on the affirmative claims.

MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, the more important matter is that both of these agreements contain an arbitration clause.

THE COURT: Well, I'm just trying to get my question answered, okay?

MR. PENNINGTON: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: I see that they both have an arbitration clause.

MR. VITILLO: Your Honor, I can speak to that question, since I'm the one that presented the contingency fee contracts, to both my clients. If I may, without revealing any -- I want to make sure I don't reveal any confidential information; I don't believe it is but the first contract, Your Honor, was signed by Stephen Hopper. The second contract, which is the same contract, was signed by Laura Wassmer, which she may interlineations, but she made changes to that

contract to include the defense of the JPMorgan Chase counterclaims.

After those two contracts were signed, fist by Stephen Hopper and the Laura Wassmer, I then had a conversation, a phone conversation with both of them, to make sure all of us were on the same page, okay? So, that's how those contracts evolved. And so, it was first signed by Stephen Hopper, then it was signed and changed by Laura Wassmer, and then I had a conference call with Stephen and Laura to make sure that my scope of representation does, in fact, include defending the counterclaims of JPMorgan Chase.

THE COURT: Okay. And is there documentation of that?

MR. VITULLO: Of me defending the counterclaims, yes, Your Honor. But, -- absolutely.

THE COURT: All right. I'm sorry I interrupted you.

MR. PENNINGTON: That's all right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay what was your --

MR. LAUTEN: Before you do that -- I'm sorry to interrupt. Can I please get a ruling on offering Exhibit 3 into evidence, Your Honor? I offered Exhibit 3, the termination letter and I didn't get a

ruling on that. 1 THE COURT: Well, I'm going to get to it 3 but I'm trying to get finished with 1 and 2 --MR. LAUTEN: Sure. THE COURT: -- okay? So, I think I've gotten my questions answered with respect to 1 and 2. 6 Do you have anything you want to add? 8 MR. PENNINGTON: With respect to 1 and 2, 9 Your Honor, the only thing is what I've just pointed out 10 which is, that they both contain an arbitration 11 provision. 12 THE COURT: All right. 13 MR. PENNINGTON: So, it's now undisputed that both of the agreements they're trying to enforce, 14 15 contain that arbitration clause, which requires this matter to go to arbitration. And it contains the 16 language that I quoted in my response. 17 18 THE COURT: Okay. 19 MR. PENNINGTON: Are you ready for me to 20 respond to the rest of the arguments or are you --21 THE COURT: No, just a minute. 22 MR. PENNINGTON: Yes, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: All right. Now, the Court's 24 going to admit Exhibits 1 and 2. And then, with respect 25 to Exhibit 3?

[Intervenors Exhibits 1 and 2 admitted]

MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, with respect to Exhibit 3, which I believe is the termination letter, I don't dispute -- I would agree to the authenticity of this letter. The authenticity of it is not disputed. The only objection I have, with respect to this exhibit being admitted into evidence, is that it does contain what is information I consider not to be or to be confidential. And this goes back to my previous claim, about part of the problem why this case should be in arbitration and not in your Court is because, we're now getting into matters which are confidential.

If I have to start explaining why my clients terminated Mr. Vitullo to justify their termination, that opens up a whole can of worms and matters, which should not be disclosed to the public. They are private and especially, in light of the fact that all the parties signed an arbitration provision, those matters should be decided in arbitration and not here in this Court.

But, I have no objection to this Exhibit 3 being admitted into evidence, provided that there's some, that it's done under seal or under some order of confidenti --

THE COURT: What portion of this letter

is confidential?

MR. PENNINGTON: It's in the first paragraph where we start getting into the decision, the reason for the --

THE COURT: Well, just tell me exactly, what language you consider to be confidential.

MR. PENNINGTON: Well, Your Honor, if I may, if I point that language out on the record, counsel for JPMorgan Chase is here in the courtroom, and I don't want to reveal any confidential information that might have an adverse effect on the settlement. So, that's my concern. I feel like I'm being put in a box right now.

THE COURT: Well, I mean I appreciate what you're saying but, you know, I guess you know --

MR. PENNINGTON: Well maybe I could do it this way, Your Honor. If I start with the sentence that I believe, contains the confidential information but, this is on the -- it's the third sentence that says:
"Their decision to terminate this relationship is based on a number of factors." That sentence all the way through the next-to-last sentence, which says: "As a result, I'm notifying you that my clients are, effective immediately, terminating the relationship." Everything in between that, I believe, is confidential. And I would ask the Court to have that be admitted, just in

camera.

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THE COURT: Mr. Lauten?

MR. LAUTEN: I don't have any objection to it being admitted either under seal or in camera but, I would like it to be before the Court, for the purpose of this hearing so, it's up to you.

THE COURT: Well, it's before the Court; I'm holding it.

MR. LAUTEN: Well I'm offering it into evidence but, I don't want someone to, you know, have some basis to file a grievance against us. So, if that's what the implication is, I'm happy to offer it into evidence, you know, in camera, outside the presence of parties that are adverse, to us. But, at the same time, my point though obviously, is there's nothing confidential in here.

THE COURT: Mr. Beckwith?

MR. BECKWITH: Your Honor, I just want to make sure, since I've been shown this letter and I've been told I shouldn't see the letter, that it doesn't say anything about the terms of the settlement and the amount of the settlement. That's my biggest concern, Your Honor. I don't think anybody wants to --

MR. PENNINGTON: I'll represent to you

25 it's not.

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MR. PENNINGTON: Okay. Then with that
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     representation, Your Honor, I'll sit back down.
                    THE COURT: All right. So, the Court is
     going to admit Exhibit 3.
                 [Intervenors Exhibit 3 admitted]
                    MR. PENNINGTON: Is it going to be
     admitted in camera, Your Honor or for all purposes?
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                    THE COURT: I think I'm going to admit
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     Exhibit 3, for all purposes.
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                    MR. PENNINGTON: So, my objection is
     overruled, Your Honor?
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                    THE COURT: Yes.
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                    MR. LAUTEN: I don't know exactly where
    we are but could I make a big point here? Were you -- I
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     can't remember where we left it.
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                    MR. PENNINGTON: I'm sorry but I wasn't
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17
     through.
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                    MR. LAUTEN: Oh, go ahead, that's fine.
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                    MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, in response
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    to that letter, I would like to offer Exhibit 4.
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                      [Exhibit No. 4 offered]
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                    MR. LAUTEN: Object hearsay, object
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     relevance.
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                    MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, Exhibit 4, I
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     mean, if I have to -- if they won't stipulate to the
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authenticity of this, I will represent to the Court that this is a true and correct copy of a letter that was sent to Mr. Lauten on April 6, 2018. And I would request that this document be admitted, at this time.

MR. LAUTEN: My objection is not to authenticity. My objection is to relevance and hearsay.

MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, the relevance is that this letter shows that I have agreed to put the funds into either Mr. Levinger's trust account, my trust account or that of an offer to put it into that of a third party. And it goes to the very heart, I mean, they have to show that there's some imminent harm that the funds will be lost or depleted or removed. And if those funds — if I'm agreeing on behalf of my client, to put those funds and to hold them at the Trust, until the settlement or until this matter is finally resolved, there is no danger or imminent threat of the funds being lost or depleted because they're going to remain in a trust account, either mine Mr. Levinger's or some other third parties.

MR. LAUTEN: This is important point,

Your Honor, and this is the big issue here. This is why
we're in a separate box. This is an ownership issue at
this point and Mr. Loewinsohn, back there, had this
issue in the Hunton Hill fee dispute and that is this:

On the one hand you have the Mandal right line of cases that say, if you terminate your contingency fee lawyer without cause, you get the entire contingency fee interest but, if with cause, you get quantum meruit.

We're not under that body of case law. The reason is because we've done the work. The case is over. It's our property. We own those funds. We have a vested interest. There's no dispute here. They can't wait until aha, we've got a settlement now and we don't want to pay you. And when they argue we want to put it in Mr. Levinger's account, he's the one that is criticizing Mr. Vitullo in Exhibit 3, that you've just admitted.

Why should we surrender control of our money that we own? We have a property right per Exhibit 1 and 2 and they're in evidence. And those contingency fee agreements, the moment we do the work, we own it.

Not their portion, our portion. It works both ways. We can't hold their money any more than they can hold our money. And if they think that it's all protected because lawyers are subject to bar rules, well then, give it to us and let us put it in our trust account.

I mean under the rule of Goose v. Gander, it works both ways. So, but that's the big issue here, these aren't disputed funds. We own the property right,

because we've done the work. The Tillery case and the Enoch case that I handed you, say they are estopped. It you could do this Your Honor, every time Mr. Branson or Ted Lyon or somebody went and got a thirty or fortymillion dollar-settlement, it would be malpractice for the client to say, I'm firing you. Let me keep the money we'll go arbitrate. Let me see if I can get a discount on what I already owe you. People would do that if you could do that. You can't. And that's what Enoch said.

three months before trial or a year before trial, absolutely. But they can't tie up the money that we now own. That is the distinction between the former and the latter is we have done the work and now that Exhibits 1 through 3 are in evidence, it is undisputed in this courtroom, that they terminated on the very day the settlement was announced, in here. You've got undisputed proof that they terminated the day the case ended, for all practical purposes.

MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor -
THE COURT: All right. It's almost 5
O'clock so let's wrap it up.

MR. PENNINGTON: I'll make it quick, Your Honor. You know, Rule 1.14 gives the Court the exact

remedy that needs to be applied in this case and that is, I mean, they don't like it but, the ethical rules require that any disputed funds, be held in a large trust account or escrow account. We've agreed to comply with that. The only disagreement we're having is the place where those funds are going to be held.

And Your Honor, I mean they may not, you know, he's citing this good for the goose, good for the gander rule but, the bottom line here is, Rule 1.14 says exactly what the remedy is and that's, it's held in trust or escrow. If they don't like it, they can go to the Triple A, the arbitration panel, and ask them for some kind of injunctive relief or ask them to put the funds into the registry of the arbitration panel.

They have many other remedies available to them but, they don't have the remedy of coming into this Court and asking for the funds to be deposited into the registry. They waived it when they signed the arbitration agreement. And the problem I've got right now is, I can't fairly defend my client and explain to you, why they terminated their clients, and give you a full explanation, which I think if I could give it to you, I think it might affect whether or not you believe that they're entitled to their fee or not.

I'm in a box right now and I shouldn't be

here, because we should be in arbitration where I can explain to an arbitrator why my clients are disputing the fee. Mr. Lauten is trying to put the burden on me and say that I have the burden to tell this Court the amount that's in dispute. I don't have that burden. He's the one who's trying to have the Court put funds in the registry.

He's got to come forward and tell the Court how much those funds are, without disclosing any settlement amount. That's why I said we would withhold the entire 45 percent. I'm not going to give you an amount but, I'll tell you the percentage and I've also asked them to tell me if they've got any expenses that they've incurred, and we'll withhold those, too. But all that can be done under the arbitration umbrella, and not in this Court.

Now, I did move to compel, in my response, on page three, at the bottom of my objection, I specifically asked this Court to compel that their claims be submitted to binding arbitration. So, Mr. Lauten is incorrect on that. They filed their petition in intervention at noon on Friday so, I have had all weekend, that's it, to get ready. But I did ask for that relief in my papers, my objection I filed, I asked the Court to compel this matter to arbitration.

repeat this line of cases, the *Tillery* case, which say that my plan is estopped, once they fully perform. Well first of all, it's a disputed issue about whether they have fully performed. We have put that in our response that if that agreement is enforceable, which we have an issue over but, if it is enforceable, we believe that Mr. Vitullo's firm breached that agreement. And, I can't go into the details as to why, because that would breach confidentiality and so forth but, one thing I can tell you is that the case law he relies upon, the *Tillery* case and the *Enoch's* case, both of those cases were questioned by a more recent case, a Dallas Court of Appeals case, called *Neece v. Lyon*.

And this is a 2015 case, where the Dallas Court of Appeals specifically, addressed this issue, and they said that -- and this was a fight between a client and a lawyer over some fees, and then that case, the Court recognized that the clients could, even after the lawyer fully performed, the clients could assert a claim for restitution and rescission of the agreement, after the fact, and that they did have those defenses available to them.

MR. LAUTEN: I'm the lawyer in that case. That was a barratry case; still pending and that's not

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what it says. I represent Mr. Lyon in that case. If
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     you want to talk about it, that's not what it says.
     It's a barratry case.
                    MR. PENNINGTON: Well, I --
                    MR. LAUTEN: In fact, Rod Phelan and I
     did that case.
                    THE COURT: Excuse me, sir. I don't
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     allow --
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                    MR. LAUTEN: I apologize for the
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     interruption.
                   I'm sorry.
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                    MR. PENNINGTON: I've got a copy of the
     case Your Honor, if you want it.
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                    THE COURT: All right, thank you.
                    MR. PENNINGTON: But the bottom line,
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     Your Honor is whatever the remedy is and whatever
     defenses my clients may or may not have, those are all
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     issues that should be decided in arbitration and not in
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     this Court. Your Honor, I just want to make sure before
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     I finish, if I could get a ruling on my offer of exhibit
     four.
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                    THE COURT: Uh, let's see --
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                    MR. PENNINGTON: That was the April 6^{th}
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     letter, Your Honor.
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                    THE COURT: Any objection?
                    MR. LAUTEN: I object to relevance and
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hearsay.

MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, I apologize, I misspoke. I said Exhibit 4, It's Defendants Exhibit 1, that I handed to you, I apologize.

THE COURT: Sir?

MR. LAUTEN: Here's the problem with the relevance: 1.14 that he keeps citing you about putting the money in the lawyer's trust account, that's this lawyer's trust account. Not the person criticizing is over here. If he wants us to put the disputed money in Mr. Vitullo's trust account as 1.14 says, and hold it there, I have no problem with that.

MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, but -MR. LAUTEN: Hold on, let me finish.

MR. PENNINGTON: Sorry.

MR. LAUTON: But, what he's trying to say is, the ethical rule when there's a dispute between a lawyer and a client, it goes in that lawyer's trust account. That's Mr. Vitullo. What he's saying is put the money in this lawyer's account, who follows our instructions, not yours. Well what happens when that happens, Your Honor? Who's going to tell Mr. Levinger what to do with that money? A Court's going to have to tell him to give it back. He's not going to give it back to us because he thinks it's right. It's our

property.

MR. BECKWITH: Yes, Your Honor, just briefly. The status quo as we are here today, is we have a Rule 11 Agreement that's been filed with the Court, there was an announcement that announced that the heirs and JPMorgan had reached a settlement. There is a definitive, confidential term sheet and the parties are negotiating a final definitive settlement agreement. The money that is part of the settlement, is at JPMorgan today. A material term of the settlement is confidentiality and I don't think Mr. Vitullo, Mr. Lauten, Mr. Pennington, Mr. Levinger or anybody wants to violate that. But the material term of the settlement is the confidentiality.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Beckwith?

I've expressed to you my deep concern that after all of the time that you invested in the judgment hearing last week, I do think it would be inappropriate for Your Honor to gain knowledge of the heirs' settlement, as you're trying to weigh the decision on the judgment of that important decision.

Here's what -- I did say earlier that I joined in Mr.

Pennington's request for the trust account. I join in Mr. Lauten's request, too. There are five lawyers in front of the bar here, all of whom are duty bound to

keep money in their trust account subject to licensure literally, their state bar license hangs on the line.

And so any of the five lawyers ought to be able to take the money, Mr. Vitullo, Mr. Lauten, anybody.

on the phone this morning trying to solve this is, there are a ton of banks and title companies and trust companies. Your Honor could say, you-all go find one and send it there. But I think those are the simple solutions here. So then, we can keep the settlement on track, and then let the lawyers go fight about it as they need to fight about it in arbitration, or in Your Honors Court. But let's just find a place to put the money. There are five trust accounts here that we could put it in or, in a bank or, a title or, a trust company. I hope that's helpful.

MR. LAUTEN: And to Mr. Beckwith's point, we're happy to agree to an independent third party to hold this money, as long as, it's subject to your order on when it gets released. If you simply just tell us to leave and put it in Mr. Levinger's trust account, we're never going to get that money back until we go to you or a different court and say give it back. That's why we need the Court to maintain jurisdiction over the corpus. But I don't have a problem with Mr. Beckwith's

suggestion, if it's a third-party escrow agent or bank or whoever.

But Mr. Levinger, he's a great lawyer, dear friend of mine; he answers to his clients as we all do. He doesn't answer to me and he doesn't answer to Mr. Vitullo. If you want to do a third party, that's' duty bound to follow the order of you or this Court, I'm fine with that.

THE COURT: All right. We need to wrap up. We're past the allocated time. Can you hear me?

MR. PENNINGTON: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: I said can you hear me?

MR. PENNINGTON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. This is my concern and you know we have invested a considerable amount of time in this Hopper case. And, I guess, Mr. Pennington, I believe that your clients have created a problem that jeopardizes all the work that's in this case. And I'm concerned that, I mean based on what I'm hearing from Mr. Beckwith, I'm just kind of reading between the lines and basically, he's saying that they're negotiating the terms of the agreement.

And so, I guess one of my concerns is, that the agreement may fall apart, which would be problematic for your clients and possibly, for this

case. And also, there's an intervention that was filed, which means that it may be problematic, in terms of getting a final judgment on all of the work that has already been done. And with respect to your client's concerns about -- I mean, there's something here that I don't understand.

I don't understand how Mr. Levinger and Mr. Cecere were the Appellate Counsel on a case with Mr. Vitullo and now they're on opposite sides. So, that's not clear to me how that works and I find that an odd posture. And I find it an odd posture to suggest that given that circumstance, that Mr. Levinger should be the person that I should trust to hold the funds. Because it appears that his interest now, is adverse to Mr. Vitullo.

And, of course, you've got the Court in the position of, you don't want me to understand what the settlement is because of the effect on the confidentiality, and Mr. Beckwith doesn't want the Court to know or doesn't want it put into the Court registry because, somebody can do the math and figure out what they paid. And so, you know, when I look at the root cause of all this problem, it comes back to your clients and your client's decisions.

And I'm concerned that, I mean, I

understand that there's an issue with respect to whether or not the arbitration agreement is enforceable but, I don't think that the issue should be whether or not the Court has authority to protect whatever assets are in the case or not in the case. And you know, I'm really challenged to understand why this issue cannot be worked out because of the risk to all of the work that we have put into this case. And I --

MR. PENNINGTON: As to that point, Your Honor, and I'm not trying to interrupt you, I apologize but, as to that very issue, I mean, I heard Mr. Lauten just agree on behalf of his clients, that they would do that, with a third party.

THE COURT: Well, I have been party to cases, in fact, I probably have some cases down here where there's been some funny business with trust accounts, so I'm not persuaded that that's the most protection that I can give, okay because, even if I put funds in a trust account, that person is not bonded. And that law firm may not be bonded sufficiently or insured sufficiently if that person decides to take a permanent vacation on that money.

And so, I mean, I'm very concerned about the protection of everyone's interest but, I think that, you know, I'm kind of in a box too, without knowing what

I'm protecting. I mean, as I said, this whole thing has developed from your clients' decisions. And your clients are not providing the Court, in my judgment, an appropriate resolution. So, I mean, I'm willing to give you a chance to talk with Mr. Lauten but, I mean, maybe the resolution is that Chase Bank keeps the money, until you-all work out your disputes.

MR. BECKWITH: That's what I was just asking my client, Your Honor, but the settlement -
MR. LAUTEN: I think we're okay with

MR. BECKWITH: The final terms of the settlement is that we have finality, you can sign the settlement agreement and then, the money can be funded, once the arbitration is solved.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not --

MR. LAUTEN: Well, I'm not agreeing to that part. But, I was with you until you said arbitration.

THE COURT: I'm not going to say whether or not -- I need to read this stuff -- but I'm not going to say whether or not I'm going to refer you to arbitration today. But I am saying to you that I think it's disingenuous to suggest that the assets will be protected. And no disrespect to Mr. Levinger or any of

that.

you-all but, I just, -- You know, the bar rules, and I teach ethics all the time, are, you know, they're the rules but they're not the protection.

MR. BECKWITH: Your Honor, I didn't mean to suggest arbitration order, Your Honor, but we are happy to finalize settlement and the money will just sit there and someday, be funded upon the proper orders of the arbitrators or the Court.

MR. LEVINGER: Well, for clarity, the portion of the money that indisputably belongs to the clients, should go to the clients.

THE COURT: Well, sir, I mean, they have created this problem. And so, why should I put them in a better position than they were in, before they created this problem?

MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, with all due respect, I mean, my clients haven't really been afforded an opportunity to explain their position.

I mean, I guess my frustration is I've spent a huge amount of time on this case, and I would expect, that as officers of the Court, that issues like this would have been worked out. I understand that they haven't and that's why you're here but, as I said, I'm really concerned about the impact on getting to a point of

final judgment on the underlying case. And what you're doing is basically, you're taking the Court's time away from that case, moving into this issue.

MR. PENNINGTON: Well Your Honor, we're not doing that. That's what Mr. Vitullo's doing.

THE COURT: Well, you are doing it.

MR. LAUTEN: We got terminated, yeah,

sorry.

THE COURT: Okay, you are doing it. I mean I have a mountain of stuff to read from the last couple days of the hearing and now, I'm having to turn my attention to this issue and that's a problem.

MR. PENNINGTON: Well and I regret that you're having to do that, Your Honor and that's why I've asked for this matter to be compelled in arbitration.

THE COURT: Well and as I said, I have to even read a lot of stuff to decide whether or not that makes sense to me. And, you know, I haven't been fully informed on that issue because, I mean, this is just basically, a TRO hearing. And I'm sure that you have more information to provide me on whether or not the arbitration provision is enforceable, or whether or not there's waiver.

I'm not in a position to make that decision, today but, I need a resolution that protects

the alleged property interest that Mr. Vitullo or Mr. Lauten is asserting and I want to come up with something that is fair to your clients, as well as protect the interest of JPMorgan Chase, and hopefully not damage Ms. Hopper's interest.

MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, if Mr. -MR. LOEWINSOHN: Your Honor, if I may
state on that. Your Honor raises obviously, a very
important procedural point. I'm just going to put all
parties on the notice here that, we're going to need to
figure out procedurally how to remove this action from
the rest of the actions because, it will prejudice Mrs.
Hopper from obtaining her final judgment. And I will be
speaking to all counsel here about dealing with these
proceedings and separating them out.

MR. PENNINGTON: We can sever. We'll agree to severance. It's no problem. Don't worry Allan.

MR. LEVINGER: Further, Your Honor, -THE COURT: I don't know that The Court's
going to agree to it so we just need to -- I need to
have all of the information before I make that decision.
I mean you're piling the decisions that I need to make
pretty high that's what I'm saying to you. And I'm
willing to make the decisions but, I think that you

can't -- you can't expect me to just agree with you. 1 MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, what I heard 3 Mr. Beckwith offer just a moment ago was that his client would be willing to retain the funds, the disputed amount and that --THE COURT: If I agree that Mr. Beckwith's client retain the funds, he's going to retain 8 all of it. 9 MR. PENNINGTON: Well Your Honor --10 MR. BECKWITH: Your Honor, we are not --11 I'm not retaining them in some sort of special escrow account. I'm just agreeing not to pay them until 12 13 somebody tells me the settlement is scheduled. 14 MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, --15 MR. BECKWITH: When the settlement 16 agreement is done, it's going to be signed. But then 17 the funding of the settlement can depend upon 18 appropriate orders of the Court or the arbitrators. 19 THE COURT: I mean, why should I put your 20 clients in a better position and they've created this 21 issue? 22 MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, the reason 23 why is because Rule 1.14 is --24 THE COURT: Sir, I'm very familiar with 25 1.14. And as I said, I don't agree that a trust account

just of --MR. PENNINGTON: And no, I'm not talking 3 about that right now, Your Honor. What I was going to say was Rule 1.14 addresses the portion that's undisputed. THE COURT: Well but, you're unwilling to tell me what's disputed or undisputed or why there is a 8 dispute and so, I am without sufficient information to 9 make an informed decision. 10 MR. PENNINGTON: I'm sorry Your Honor, 11 but as to that issue, I think my letter, Defendant's 12 Exhibit 1, the April 6th letter says that the amount, we 13 can calculate the amount without telling the Court because we know that they're claiming a 45 percent 14 15 interest. So what I'm suggesting is that if Mr. Beckwith wants to retain 45 percent of the settlement 16 17 proceeds, and not pay that portion --THE COURT: I'm not --18 19 MR. LAUTEN: I can't agree to that. 20 THE COURT: We're not saying the same If I have to order Mr. Beckwith to retain 21 thing, sir. 22 the settlement, I'm going to order him to retain all of 23 it --24 MR. PENNINGTON: Can I just point out one 25 other thing?

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THE COURT: -- if that's the option I
 1
 2
     select.
                    MR. PENNINGTON: The other part of that
     is that, what you're saying now is you're going to order
     the entire amount --
                    THE COURT: I said if I make that
     decision, it's going to be the entire amount.
 8
                    MR. PENNINGTON: And the only reason -- I
9
     disagree with that Your Honor position --
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                    THE COURT: I understand.
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                    MR. PENNINGTON: And I just want to
12
     specifically point out that Rule 1.14 does say
13
     specifically, that if there's any amount that is not in
     dispute, that at least that portion, should be paid to
14
15
     the client.
16
                    THE COURT: All right well they're not
17
     telling me that any of that is not in dispute. Are you
18
     saying that it's all in dispute or not?
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                    MR. LAUTEN: That's exactly right, Your
20
     Honor.
21
                    MR. PENNINGTON: That is not true, Your
22
     Honor.
23
                    MR. LAUTEN:
                                 I'm telling you my position.
24
                    MR. PENNINGTON: Well, they put in their
     papers that they're only disputing the percentage that
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they're owed, under the contract. 1 THE COURT: Well, as I said, I don't have 3 any information to respond to. I'm not saying yes or I don't know what I am dealing with. And I'm prohibited from knowing what I'm dealing with so, you know, you've kind of got me in a difficult spot. Well I haven't read all this. I will look at it and I'll look 8 at your cases. 9 MR. LAUTEN: May I leave my proposed order, Your Honor? 10 11 THE COURT: If there's something else 12 that you think you can tell me that would be helpful, 13 I'm open to that. MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, before we 14 15 leave, can I just get a formal ruling on my offer of Defendant's Exhibit 1? 16 17 THE COURT: All right. I'll admit 18 Defendant's 1. 19 [Defendant's Exhibit No. 1 admitted] 20 MR. LAUTEN: Can I approach, Your Honor? 21 THE COURT: Yes. 22 MR. LAUTEN: This is a proposed TRO and a 23 proposed order for deposit into the registry. And if you want, I've got it on a thumb drive in Word so, 24 25 you're welcome to it or however, you want.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. BECKWITH: And Your Honor, I do object to the temporary restraining order to the extent that it calls for certain amount of money to be placed into the registry of the Court. I think that ruling will jeopardize these proceedings, jeopardize Your Honor as you are trying to work out the judgment with respect to Mrs. Hopper and the JNOV take nothing judgment that I requested or the judgment Mr. Loewinsohn requested and so, we would object.

Perhaps, an easier solution is to simply order that the funds be placed in some other well-known bank. Bank of America could take the funds I'm sure, Wells Fargo could take the funds, somebody could take the funds or you could order these parties to sit down and try to find a place to put these funds but, we would object to Your Honor and the registry.

MR. LEVINGER: I join in that objection for a slightly different reason, Your Honor and that is if a certain percentage goes into the registry of the Court, that would allow the public to determine what the amount of the settlement is and that's confidential.

MR. BECKWITH: I hope I was making that clear but that is the principal objection.

MR. LAUTEN: We're happy to let JPMorgan

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1
     Chase hold all of it as long as it takes.
                    THE COURT: Any redaction or anything
     new?
                    MR. PENNINGTON: Nothing new, Your Honor.
     I think it would be improper to order that they hold all
    of it.
                    THE COURT: Well, thank you very much.
 8
                    MR. LAUTEN: Thank you for your time,
 9
     Your Honor.
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                    MR. PENNINGTON: Thank you, Your Honor.
11
12
                         [End of Proceedings]
13
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24
     STATE OF TEXAS
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COUNTY OF DALLAS X

I, Jackie Galindo, Deputy Official Court
Reporter for the Probate Court Number One, Dallas
County, Texas, do hereby certify that the above and
foregoing contains a true and correct transcription of
all portions of evidence and other proceedings requested
in writing by counsel for the parties to be included in
this request in the above-styled and numbered cause, all
of which occurred in open court or in chambers and were
reported by me.

I further certify that this Reporter's

Record of the proceedings does truly and correctly

reflects the exhibits, if any, offered by the respective

parties.

 $$\operatorname{\textsc{MY}}$  OFFICIAL HAND, this the 1st day of June, 2018.

/S/: Jackie Galindo

Jackie Galindo, Texas CSR #7023
Expiration Date: 12/31/19
Official Court Reporter
The Probate Court,
Renaissance Tower, 2400-A
Dallas County, Texas
214-653-6066

# REPORTER'S RECORD VOLUME 3 OF 5 CAUSE NO. PR-11-3238-1 COURT OF APPEALS NO. 05-18-00558-CV

IN THE ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED

THE PROBATE COURT

JO N. HOPPER Plaintiff,

V.

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A. STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER Defendants.

JOHN L. MALESOVAS d/b/a
MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE
SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP
Intervenors,

V.

STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, and JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A., Defendants.

NUMBER ONE

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

TEMPORARY INJUNCTION HEARING

On the 24th day of April, 2018, A.D., the following proceedings came on for hearing in the above-entitled and numbered cause before the HONORABLE COURT, BRENDA HULL THOMPSON, Judge Presiding, held in Dallas, Dallas County, Texas.

Proceedings reported by oral stenography.

#### APPEARANCES

BRIAN LAUTEN, Attorney
SBOT No. 24031603
Brian Lauten, PC
3811 Turtle Creek Blvd. Suite 1450
Dallas, Texas 75219
Telephone: 214-414-0996

ATTORNEY FOR: THE INTERVENORS

ANNE M. JOHNSON, Attorney SBOT No. 00794271
Haynes and Boone LLP 2323 Victory Avenue, Suite 700 Dallas, Texas 75219
Telephone: 214-651-5376
Facsimile: 214-200-0487

JAMES E. PENNINGTON, Attorney SBOT No. 15758510 Law Offices of James E. Pennington, P.C. 900 Jackson Street, Suite 440 Dallas, Texas 75202

Telephone: 214-741-3022 Facsimile: 214-741-3022

Facsimile: 214-572-1717

--AND--

ATTORNEY FOR: DEFENDANTS

ALAN S. LOEWINSOHN, Attorney SBOT No. 12481600 Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP 12377 Merit Drive, Suite 900 Dallas, Texas 75251 Telephone: 214-572-1700

ATTORNEY FOR: JO N. HOPPER

VAN H. BECKWITH, Attorney SBOT No. 02020150 JESSICA PULLIAM, Attorney SBOT No. 24037309 Baker Botts, LLP 2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700 Dallas, Texas 75201 Telephone: 214-953-6505

ATTORNEYS FOR: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.

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#### DE CE WITNESSES:

ANTHONY L. VITULLO 38

## **EXHIBITS**

INTERVENORS	DESCRIPTION	Offered	Admitted
No. 1	Contingency Fee Contract signed by Laura Wassmer	24	25
No. 2	Contingency Fee Contract signed by Stephen Hopper	25	25
No. 3	Charge of the Court Filed Sept. 25, 2017	25	25
No. 6	Rule 11 Letter Filed April 4, 2018	28	31
No. 7	Letter to Mr. Lauten From Mr. Pennington Dated April 5, 2018	29	31
No. 8	Letter to Mr. Malesova From Mr. Pennington Dated April 5, 2018	s 29	31

# EXHIBITS, cont'd.

INTERVENORS	DESCRIPTION	Offered	Admitted
No. 11	Letter to Mr. Eichman From Mr. Vitullo Dated October 8, 2015	29	31
No. 13	Email to Mr. Vitullo From Mr. Stephen Hoppe Dated Jan. 25, 2016	30 r	31
No. 66	Order Granting Plainti Motion for Legal Rulin Dated March 28 2018		31
No. 70	Email to Mr. Vitullo From Mr. Levinger Dated April 3, 2018	31	31
No. 14	Email to Mr. Vitullo From Ms. Laura Wassmer Dated Jan. 25, 2016	34	33
DEFENDANTS	DESCRIPTION	Offered	Admitted
No. 2	Letter from Mr. Pennin To Mr. Vitullo and Mr. Malesovas dated 4/6/18		38

## PROCEEDINGS THE COURT: This is PR-11-3238 in the Estate of Max D. Hopper. May I have the attorneys announce, please? MR. LAUTEN: Good Morning, Your Honor, Brian Lauten appearing on behalf of the Intervenors, Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo and John Malesovas. MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, Anne Johnson and Jim Pennington and Andrew Guthrie here on behalf of the intervention Defendant Stephen Hopper and Laura 10 Wassmer. 11 THE COURT: Your last name is Johnson? 12 13 MS. JOHNSON: Johnson; thank you, Your 14 Honor. 15 THE COURT: And Mr. Pennington. 16 Sir? MR. LOEWINSOHN: And Your Honor, Alan 17 Loewinsohn, here on behalf of the Plaintiff Jo Hopper. 18

MR. BECKWITH: Your Honor, good morning,

Van Beckwith and Jessica Pulliam on behalf of JPMorgan

Bank in its corporate capacity as well as in its

independent administrator capacity.

THE COURT: All right. We're here on the

matter of the Temporary Injunction as well as the

Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration. All right,

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let's proceed. MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, in terms of the order that we take the arguments today, I wanted to request that we do consider the Motion to Compel Arbitration first, and --THE COURT: No, ma'am. MS. JOHNSON: Okay. THE COURT: That was not set first. 9 MS. JOHNSON: Okay, Your Honor, can I just be heard for 30 seconds, because I think we can 10 11 short circuit the temporary injunction issue because 12 they are now moving for injunctive relief pursuant to 13 the Texas Arbitration Act, so if this Court doesn't 14 order arbitration, then the statute that they are now relying on really doesn't apply. We could cover the 15 16 arbitration issue very quickly, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Thank you. 18 MS. JOHNSON: Okay. 19 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 20 MR. LAUTEN: Good Morning, Your Honor, 21 I'd like the chance to fully open, if I could, before we 22 start the injunction. 23 THE COURT: All right, how long do you 24 need? 25 MR. LAUTEN: Just a couple of minutes.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LAUTEN: There's three things we have to prove to you today: We've got to prove a probability of success on the merits; we've got to prove a irreparable harm; and we've got to prove no adequate remedy and law. That's if you grant an injunction, but germane to all of that, is your power to simply, put money in the registry, which is a non-appealable order, which doesn't even require injunctive relief.

Let me start with this issue, because this seems to be the issue primarily in dispute, and that is this argument out there that we have nothing to fear about dissipation of assets. Let me start with that. Number one: Albeit the settlement's confidential, I think it's important that the Court in camera, looks at that amount, for the simple reason if no other, number one: We've got to show that they got a benefit by our representation and two; the more important issue is they're not bonded. Nobody in this Court is bonded with respect to the settlement.

This is really important. Mr. Vitullo is the seventh, the seventh lawyer hired by these clients in this case. All seven were fired. Six out of the seven, including Mr. Vitullo, were not paid in whole or in part, what they were owed when they were fired. The

one that was paid was smart enough to get his money up front. We find out earlier this week that this isn't a legitimate business dispute, Judge. It's not. This was a long, thought out and planned attempt to avoid paying Mr. Vitullo.

In August of 2017, Dr. Hopper starts surreptitiously recording Mr. Vitullo, his lawyer. He starts tape recording him, right after the verdict and he's tape recording him all the way through February 23rd of 2018, behind his back. We find this out earlier this week. Meanwhile, we find out that Mr. Pennington, he wasn't brought in at the last minute to make this termination. He was hired in October. October. He's the legal malpractice lawyer. Then we find out -- you made a great point of the TRO -- why is it that Mr. Levinger, the appellate lawyer, is sitting at one table, seemingly adverse to trial counsel, whose supposed to be working with him, at the other table.

Meanwhile, the termination letter is offered to evidence in the expert, who says that Mr. Vitullo made mistakes and should be paid as the appellate lawyer, Mr. Levinger. Well let me tell you what we find out this week. As early as October, Mr. Levinger is interfacing with Mr. Pennington, the legal malpractice lawyer. And in his billing records, Mr.

Levinger is constantly talking to Mr. Pennington, despite the fact that Mr. Levinger never even went and got the entire trial transcript, it's his opinions to the legal malpractice lawyer in the termination letter as to why the guy he's supposed to be helping affirm the verdict should be fired.

And this is what is so disturbing to me and I'll prove this to you. Mr. Levinger reaches a settlement in the afternoon of April 3rd. He knows he's got a settlement, it's in an email and we've got those emails. After Mr. Levinger knows he's got a settlement, he emails Mr. Vitullo and says, hey what's our argument going to be on these jury charge responses? Why in the thunder is the appellate lawyer for six months, talking to the legal malpractice lawyer, when my clients are surreptitiously being tape recorded?

And after he knows he's got a settlement, instead of saying let's go celebrate, let's all get together and go have a cocktail, he's emailing Mr.

Vitullo asking what his arguments are going to be. Why?

Because he's trying to set him up because he knows the next day, he's going to be fired. Your Honor, and let me tell you what else happened. While your TRO was pending, after we had a restraining order hearing, these clients go huddle up with JPMorgan Chase to enter into a

more comprehensive settlement agreement and there's language in there, we're convinced, deals with our lien rights.

I had to deal with three different
lawyers in two different states to try to get my hands
on this settlement agreement, which I have not seen. I
talked to this guy Bob Sax in Los Angeles, he's not even
admitted in this case, who gives me a bunch of grief and
we go round and round. I said look, I'll make this real
simple. You redact out all of the confidential parts of
the settlement, you can designate it's highly
confidential under the protective order, no problem.
They won't do that. So I haven't even seen the
settlement agreement.

I got a nasty letter from Mr. Beckwith yesterday that I'm making misrepresentations to the Court, because I had a chance to go see the settlement and I just turned them down. The bottom line is these people have, in my opinion committed a fraud, because the entire time Mr. Vitullo is trying to do his job and protect the record on appeal, he doesn't know that surreptitiously these clients are tape recording him for six months. They have lawyers that I think knew while Mr. Vitullo is on the pleadings that they were being tape recorded, because when I asked those questions, oh

that's privilege.

I said Mr. Pennington, please tell me you didn't know this; he wouldn't answer that question. So absolutely, there's a fear of dissipation of assets.

Absolutely, if the money goes to these people, we'll never see it again and like I said, this is a legitimate business disagreement. They're sitting outside the bank in the getaway car waiting to go. That's what's happened since the beginning. Probability of success on the merits.

I would just beg you to allow us to play the video tape of Ms. Wassmer and Dr. Hopper from their depositions. I'll limit it to ten minutes and here's what they've admitted to. They've admitted to the things that they have to admit to, to not have anything to arbitrate, nothing to complain about and get us paid. We have a summary judgment that we've already filed. They've admitted they accepted the benefits of Mr. Vitullo's hard work.

That includes the DEC action that Mrs.

Hopper filed on the attorney's fees claim that you ruled on, the multi-million dollar deal. Mr. Vitullo wasn't even retained on that, but he came down there and handled it. He represented these people to a verdict.

He represented these people through settlement. He

stood by them the entire time. They accepted those benefits. They admitted that he performed a valuable service.

I can't talk to you right now about the settlement offers. I can't talk to you right now about the settlement they got for I guess the third set of lawyers they fired, on their behalf. I can't talk to you right now about the great result, because it's all confidential, but let me tell you what I can tell you. They can't use it as a sword and shield. They can't argue to you oh, well he didn't do a good job and then not tell us or not have the Court know what that result was, but they admit they accepted the work and admitted it was valuable.

That's all I have to prove under *Tillery*.

Under *Enochs*, once they accept the work, they're

completely estopped. They're not only estopped to avoid

paying, they're estopped to go argue about it. There's

nothing to arbitrate. We'll get to that in a minute,

but they're estopped, period.

So, at the end of the day there is absolutely a probability of success on the merits, there is irreparable harm, and the reason there is no adequate remedy at law is because a judgment to these people means nothing, if you can't collect it. They're not

bonded. They can't respond in damages or they simply won't. And if I need to call all six lawyers, who have been stiffed by these people, I'll do it. Thank you.

MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, for the record, we do object the proceeding on the injunction while the Motion to Compel is pending, but I will address the temporary injunction argument.

THE COURT: Okay, I need to have you speak up. I have some background noise here.

MR. PENNINGTON: Very well, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. PENNINGTON: Just for the record,
Your Honor, I was objecting to the proceeding on the
temporary injunction, without an opportunity to argue
the Motion to Compel, but --

THE COURT: Well, I didn't say that you don't have an opportunity, I was just commenting on the fact that this was set first and then the Motion to Compel Arbitration was set second, so I'm just following the order.

MR. PENNINGTON: Understood, Your Honor and I just wanted to note our objection on the record and the procedural way that this hearing is taking place. I think the law does make it clear that the Motion to Compel Arbitration should be heard first, but

I just wanted to put it on the record, that's all. With respect to the injunction, Your Honor, we disagree with a number of things Mr. Lauten said, but most importantly, he told you there were three things he has to prove in order to prevail on the temporary injunction hearing.

The probability of success on the merits, we dispute that issue. I don't think that Mr. Lauten can meet his burden, but the other two elements are even more glaring in this case. There is no evidence of any imminent harm at all. And in fact, as one of the things that we'll get into is Mr. Lauten mentioned was that he received this letter from Mr. Beckwith yesterday, with respect to the hearing today, and some of the pleadings that Mr. Lauten has filed.

I know Mr. Beckwith has offered to show the compromise settlement agreement to Mr. Lauten and all he asked was that he sign a Rule 11 Agreement, confirming that he would agree to maintain the confidentiality of that agreement, and I believe there may have been a few other terms. But Mr. Lauten was given an opportunity to look at the confidential settlement agreement between my clients and JPMorgan Chase.

But, as Mr. Beckwith pointed out to Mr.

Lauten very clearly in a letter just yesterday, he advised Mr. Lauten that one of the conditions precedent to any funding by JPMorgan of the settlement is that the -- One of the conditions precedent is that the funding of the actual settlement amount is contingent upon JPMorgan Chase receiving a release of lien from Mr. Vitullo and his law firm.

THE COURT: Say that again, please.

MR. PENNINGTON: That one of the conditions that has to be satisfied before JPMorgan Chase will fund any part of the settlement, is that JPMorgan Chase must be provided with a release of lien of the attorney's lien, that's been asserted by Mr. Vitullo's firm and Mr. Malesovas' firm in this case. And, Mr. Beckwith made it clear to Mr. Lauten that JPMorgan Chase has no intent on funding the settlement until they receive a release of lien from Mr. Vitullo and his law firm, in this case.

So, until that event happens, there will be no funding of the settlement and there is no imminent harm that anybody is going to receive any money, in this case. So, and we'll get into that in the case, later into the case in chief, but I did want to make the Court aware of that. So, the position that the intervention Plaintiffs have asserted in this case is they're trying

to show that there is some imminent danger that the settlement funds are going to be paid and that they won't be able to get their interest in the money. That argument is just a fallacy. There is no -- that's not going to happen.

The only person right now that controls whether the funding will go through is Mr. Vitullo and his law firm. So, until he provides that release of his lien that he's asserted in this case, there will be no funding of the settlement. JPMorgan is not obligated to pay the settlement under the agreement.

Your Honor, the other evidence that I believe that we've previously discussed at the TRO hearing is the fact that, for a separate reason there's no imminent harm, because Plaintiff's, or excuse me, the Defendant's in this case, my clients have offered to place the disputed fee amount into a separate trust account, whether it's one of the attorney's trust account or an independent third party escrow account or trust account. We've offered to do that and to give those assurances to Mr. Vitullo and his firm and Mr. Malesovas so that they know that those funds will not be paid to my clients, until this fee dispute matter has been resolved.

THE COURT: Are you talking about all the

funds or just the alleged disputed amount of the funds?

MR. PENNINGTON: Well, as to that

particular offer, it applies only to the disputed amount of the funds. The attorney's fees that are in dispute as well as their expenses. But to be clear, Your Honor, so there's no confusion on this issue, the letter and the condition precedent of the entire settlement being funded, that goes to the entire amount of the settlement.

So JPMorgan Chase has said they're not funding anything, not one penny of the settlement, until they receive a release of lien from Mr. Vitullo and his firm. You know, the other, the third element that Mr. Lauten has to show is that he has no adequate remedy at law, and that's just simply not the case here. They do have an adequate remedy. They're actually suing for breach of contract, trying to enforce the contract and they claim an amount of money, a certain amount of fees and expenses that they're claiming as damages, so they do have adequate remedy in this case.

Mr. Lauten made a point about the fact that nobody is bonded. There's no requirement that anybody be bonded but more importantly, the funds are not being paid, so that shouldn't even be an issue for the Court in this case. Mr. Lauten mentioned about that

there were seven different attorney's that my clients fired in this case and you know, there were -- it's ironic because Mr. Vitullo represented my clients with respect to at least one of those claims and he is the one who advised the clients with respect to that fee. But, if we have to get into all of the evidence that they intend to, I'll object to much of that coming into evidence because, I think they're just trying to show evidence of other bad acts to show that my clients conformed with that same behavior in this case so, I don't think that that's admissible.

With respect to Dr. Hopper's recorded conversations, I think what you're going to hear about that is that the reason Dr. Hopper started recording these conversations, in August of 2017, was because he received a frantic phone call from Taylor Horton, an associate who worked for Fee Smith. Mr. Horton was one of the attorney's at that law firm who had been working on the case and he was responsible for getting the case ready for trial.

Mr. Horton called Dr. Hopper and told him he was very concerned about the case because he was actually unable to get a hold of Mr. Vitullo. He had no idea of where he was, trial was coming up in and a week or a week-and-a-half and Mr. Horton was panicking

because he didn't know how to get the case ready for trial or what to do. So, Dr. Hopper became concerned and started recording the conversation with Mr. Horton at that point. There were also some other matters that Mr. Horton told Dr. Hopper that he was concerned about, about the way the case was being handled.

Under the contract, the contingency fee contract, the clients, it's very clear in the contract that the clients are not supposed to be paying for any of the expenses, but yet, they were being charged with all of the expenses in the case and they were being required to pay a large, not just a large number, but large amounts of expenses in the case and Mr. Horton was concerned about that and he basically, didn't think that the clients should be paying those expenses.

So, he had some concerns about that so based on that, those are the reasons, some of the reasons why Dr. Hopper began recording the conversations. It's interesting that Mr. Lauten accuses me of somehow knowing about this, these recorded conversations, I mean obviously, based on the timing that started happening before I was ever hired in the case. And when this issue came up in my clients' depositions, the way questions were asked by Mr. Lauten he was basically, asking whether the clients told me

that they had recorded the conversations for other 1 2 evidence. And I objected to that because that is 3 attorney-client privilege. Whatever the client communicates to me, during the course of the representation, is privileged. 6 But, I will represent to the Court that 7 while that was going on, I did not have knowledge that 8 my clients were tape recording conversations with Mr. 9 Vitullo or anyone at his firm. 10 THE COURT: As of when? 11 MR. PENNINGTON: I'm sorry, Your Honor? 12 THE COURT: When did you learn that they were taping him? 13 MR. PENNINGTON: Well, again Your Honor, 14 15 when I learned was much later and while I was -- I mean 16 I hesitate to be able to answer that question because I 17 think that that's privileged, about the timing of when I 18 learned, but --19 THE COURT: All right, well, you don't 20 have to --MR. PENNINGTON: But it was after the 21 22 fact. THE COURT: You don't have to answer. 23 24 MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, the last thing is Mr. Lauten makes a lot about this Tillery case

and that he believes my clients are estopped from being able to dispute whether they owe a contingency fee under this contract. As I have mentioned before though at the previous hearing, that issue is an issue that must be decided by an arbitrator, ultimately. I mean, that has to do with whether, with the enforceability of the fee provision of the contract and we are challenging that fee provision of the contract because I believe the evidence will show that prior to the time that Mr.

Vitullo entered into this contingency fee agreement, he had already been representing the clients for a long period of time.

And in fact, there was a prior contract that Mr. Vitullo entered into with the clients — actually, there were several contracts that Mr. Vitullo entered into with my clients, before he entered into the contingency agreement that is before you today. And so, what essentially, he did was he changed the terms of the agreement with the clients, regarding his fee in midstream. While he's representing the clients, he actually negotiated a deal for himself, with my clients and that is the reason why we're challenging the enforceability of the fee provision.

MR. LAUTEN: Your Honor, I'd call Dr. Hopper by video. I've edited it down to 17 minutes.

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I've got a copy of the designations,
 2
     Jim, if you want a copy.
 3
                    THE COURT: All right.
 4
                    MR. LAUTEN: Do you want us to dim the
 5
     lights, Your Honor, or can you see that okay, on the
 6
     projector.
                    THE COURT:
                                I can see it.
 8
                    MR. LAUTNE: Okay.
 9
                    THE COURT: And I will take a copy, also.
10
                    MR. LAUTEN: Okay. Can I approach, Your
11
     Honor?
12
                    THE COURT:
                                Thank you.
13
                    MR. VITULLO: Thank you.
14
                        [VIDEO CLIP PLAYED]
15
                    MR. LAUTEN: Your Honor, we call Laura
16
     Wassmer via video tape. We've edited that down to about
17
     ten minutes; it's pretty quick.
18
                         Here are the designations Jim.
19
                        [VIDEO CLIP PLAYED]
20
                    MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, at --
                    THE COURT: Stop for just a moment.
21
22
                        [VIDEO CLIP STOPPED]
23
                    MR. PENNINGTON: At this point, I'm going
     to object to any evidence regarding other attorneys that
24
25
     my clients hired and the circumstances surrounding that.
```

I think he's going to get into the fact that my clients had previously terminated some other lawyers and I object to that. I think it's irrelevant and it's inadmissible under Rule 404, 403 of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence.

THE COURT: I don't believe I can determine that without hearing it. I mean I understand what your representation is.

Sir?

MR. LAUTEN: Sure, 404b says you can't show bad acts to show conforming there with, but one of the exceptions to 404b is motive and knowledge. That's why it's being offered for number one and number two, in order to prove dissipation of assets, what's at the forefront of this, is the credibility of the people that are trying to get the money. And certainly germane to that is the fact that they have not paid six out of seven lawyers, and I'm entitled to explore that and put on that evidence.

THE COURT: Well, I'll overrule the objection.

[VIDEO CLIP CONTINUED]

MR. LAUTEN: Your Honor, I'd like to offer some exhibits at this time.

THE COURT: I have a question.

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MR. LAUTEN: Sure.
 2
                    THE COURT: On Exhibit 12, she referred
    to Jo. Who is she referring to?
                    MR. LAUTEN: Jo Hopper, Mr. Loewinsohn's
 5
    client.
                    THE COURT: All right.
                    MR. LAUTEN: Your Honor, at this time I'd
 8
    like to offer some exhibits, if that's okay.
 9
                    THE COURT: All right.
10
                    MR. LAUTEN: I'd offer Exhibit 1, which
11
     is the contingency fee contract signed by Laura Wassmer.
12
                [Intervenors Exhibit 1 is offered]
                    THE COURT: Any objection?
13
14
                    MR. PENNINGTON: I haven't seen it, Your
15
    Honor.
16
                    MR. LAUTEN: I'll get another set of
    exhibit stickers. I only marked it as Exhibit 1 for the
17
    hearing.
18
19
                    MR. PENNINGTON: They're marked at the
20
    bottom.
                    MR. LAUTEN: Yeah, that's my handwriting.
21
22
    We'll do a clean copy. Subject to the clean copy, I
23
    offer Exhibit 1.
                    MR. PENNINGTON: No objection, Your
24
    Honor.
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THE COURT: All right. Exhibit 1 is
 2
     admitted.
                [Intervenors Exhibit 1 is admitted]
                    MR. LAUTEN: Your Honor, I offer into
     evidence Exhibit 2, which is the contingency agreement
 6
     signed by Dr. Hopper.
                 [Intervenors Exhibit 2 is offered]
 8
                    THE COURT: Any objection?
 9
                    Mr. PENNINGTON: No objection, Your
     Honor.
10
11
                    THE COURT: Admitted.
12
                [Intervenors Exhibit 2 is admitted]
                    MR. LAUTEN: I offer Exhibit 3, which is
13
     the Charge of the Court and the verdict form, answered
14
15
    by the jury, on September 25, 2017.
16
                 [Intervenors Exhibit 3 is offered]
17
                    MR. PENNINGTON: No objection, Your
18
     Honor.
19
                    THE COURT: Admitted.
20
                [Intervenors Exhibit 3 is admitted]
                    MR. LAUTEN: I offer Exhibit 4 -- sorry.
21
22
     Your Honor, I'd offer into evidence Exhibit 4 and I'll
23
     let the record reflect that I've redacted out the
24
     settlement amount.
25
                 [Intervenors Exhibit 4 is offered]
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[Counsel confer about Exhibit 4]

MR. BECKWITH: Your Honor, on behalf of JPMorgan, I do object and I object for all the reasons that I raised and the temporary restraining order hearing. I have a concern about Your Honor seeing any portion of this confidential settlement agreement. It's confidential. This is the foundational term sheet that then makes its way into the confidential settlement agreement. We also worry that while Your Honor is considering the JNOV motion that I made and the judgment motion Mr. Loewinsohn made, that seeing any information about this settlement could taint the process Your Honor of working diligently towards and making a decision on that.

And so, for those reasons, Your Honor, we would object to any disclosure, whatsoever, of this term sheet, this information about the settlement as well as to follow along any requests Mr. Lauten to reveal the settlement agreement, itself.

MR. LAUTEN: I think I can fix this and massage this so everybody's comfortable. What I'll do is I'll withdraw Exhibit 4 as offered and instead, what I'll offer is simply, page 3 of Exhibit 4 and only the first two lines where it says "Bob my clients are in agreement" and the purpose of this to tie up the

relevance, is that this ties in my opening statement with Mr. Levinger has reached a settlement at time X, but the next exhibit will show he's emailing Mr. Vitullo later, asking what his appellate argument is going to be; that's the relevance. So, all I'm offering is the time stamp and those first two sentences on the third page as Exhibit 4.

MR. BECKWITH: Then perhaps, Your Honor, I mean, I think first of all, some of the testimony you already heard, puts much of that into the record, so I don't think it's a disputed fact, perhaps even too, there could be a stipulation on this point. I don't think you need this document at all. I mean, I do -- there is a serious risk to Your Honor, to the Court, and to the process, you're undertaking.

THE COURT: All right, well I'm going to take a 10-minute break. You all can talk about it and I'll be right back.

MR. BECKWITH: Okay.

[Short break taken]

MR. LAUTEN: Your Honor, just to kind of give you a road map, I'm almost finished with our case if chief. If you'll just hang with me for another minute or two, I've got about a half a dozen exhibits I want to admit.

THE COURT: All right, well what did we 2 determine on Exhibit No. 4? 3 MR. LAUTEN: On Exhibit 4, I'm going to 4 withdraw the exhibit, subject to the stipulation, open 5 court stipulation, between the lawyers on this side and 6 the clients on this side, subject to any objection JP would have that on Tuesday, April 3, 2018, at 4:05 p.m., 8 Jeff Levinger emailed Bob Sax, a lawyer on behalf of JPM, and that that email reflects that there was in 9 10 process, was an agreement to be reached on certain 11 times. That would be my proposed stipulation. 12 MR. PENNINGTON: I'll stipulate that, 13 Your Honor. 14 MR. BECKWITH: We have no objection to 15 that stipulation, Your Honor. 16 MR. LAUTEN: So, I'll withdraw four. 17 THE COURT: All right. 18 MR. LAUTEN: The next exhibit that I'll offer is the April 4, 2018 Rule 11 Agreement that was 19 20 filed as Exhibit 6. [Intervenors Exhibit 6 is offered] 21 22 THE COURT: All right, so it will be 23 Exhibit 6? 24 MR. LAUTEN: Yes ma'am, I can re-mark them, but they were already marked, so if it's okay,

even though they're out of order, that's the way I would 1 2 propose to do it unless --3 THE COURT: All right, so there's no 4 five? MR. LAUTEN: No five, that's correct. 6 MR. PENNINGTON: No objection to Exhibit 7 6, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: All right. 9 MR. LAUTEN: Offer into evidence Exhibit 10 7, and this is the April 5, 2018 termination letter as 11 to Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo. 12 [Intervenors Exhibit 7 is offered] MR. PENNINGTON: No objection, to Exhibit 13 14 7, Your Honor. 15 MR. LAUTEN: Offer Exhibit 8, it's the 16 same letter to as to John Malesovas. 17 [Intervenors Exhibit 8 is offered] 18 MR. PENNINGTON: No objection as to Exhibit 8. 19 20 MR. LAUTEN: I offer Exhibit 11; this is the October 8, 2015 letter to John Eichman. 21 22 [Intervenors Exhibit 11 is offered] 23 THE COURT: Now that's Exhibit 8 or 9? MR. LAUTEN: I'm sorry, Your Honor. It's 24 been pre-marked for identification as Exhibit 11.

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THE COURT:
                               11?
 2
                    MR. LAUTEN: I'd offer Exhibit 11.
 3
                    MR. BECKWITH: I have no objection.
 4
                    MR. LAUTEN: I offered 11.
 5
                    MR. PENNINGTON: No objection to Exhibit
 6
     11, Your Honor.
                    THE COURT: Go ahead.
 8
                    MR. LAUTEN: Did you admit 11?
 9
                    THE COURT: I'm just writing down which
10
     ones you are -- okay.
11
                    MR. LAUTEN: Okay, we can come back to it
12
     at the end if that's what you want to do. I offer
13
     Exhibit 13.
14
                [Intervenors Exhibit 13 is offered]
15
                    MR. PENNINGTON: No objection.
16
                    MR. LAUTEN: I would offer Exhibit 66.
17
                [Intervenors Exhibit No. 66 offered]
18
                    MR. PENNINGTON: No objection.
19
                    MR. LAUTEN: And Your Honor, at this time
20
     I would ask the Court to take judicial notice under Rule
     201 of its March 28, 2018 order of the disbursement of
21
22
     attorney's fees under the DEC action.
23
                    THE COURT: What's the date?
                    MR. LAUTEN: March 28, 2018.
24
                                                  I'd ask the
     Court to take judicial notice under Rule 201 of its
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1 order regarding the declaratory judgment action. I offer Exhibit 70. We offer Exhibit 70. 2 3 [Intervenors Exhibit 70 is offered] MR. PENNINGTON: No objection as to Exhibit 70. 6 MR. LAUTEN: So I would offer those exhibits at this time, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: All right, what I have is 9 Exhibit 1, 2, 3, No. 4 is withdrawn, no Exhibit 5, Exhibit 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 66, and 70. And you're asking 10 11 me to take judicial notice under Rule 201 of the March 12 28, 2018 order of the Court? 13 MR. LAUTEN: Yes, Your Honor. That's been pre-marked as Exhibit 66. 14 THE COURT: That is Exhibit 66? 15 16 MR. LAUTEN: Correct, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: All right, and the Court, not hearing any objections, Mr. Beckwith and Mr. Loewinsohn? 18 19 MR. LOEWINSOHN: No objection, Your 20 Honor. 21 MR. BECKWITH: No objections, Your Honor. MR. PENNINGTON: No objection, Your Honor 22 23 THE COURT: All right, the Court will 24 admit. [Intervenors Exhibits 1-3, 6-8, 11, 13, 66, 70 admitted]

MR. LAUTEN: Your Honor, before I publish these exhibits to the Court, I would just like to briefly spend two minutes walking you through what the significance of these exhibits are, in our view to our case in chief. Exhibits 1 and 2 are fully executed contingency agreements that were signed in writing by Dr. Hopper and Ms. Wassmer. And I'm going to approach and give you these after I -- may I approach?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LAUTEN: Exhibits 1 and 2 that were admitted are the signed contingency agreements. Exhibit 3 is the jury charge and verdict form with the numbers that the jury found.

THE COURT: You said they're pre-marked?

MR. LAUTEN: They've been admitted. Yes,
they're marked.

THE COURT: Okay, well as long as we can follow what they are, then you don't need to re-do them.

MR. LAUTEN: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LAUTEN: Exhibit 6 is the Rule 11 Agreement that was filed on April  $4^{\rm th}$ . April  $5^{\rm th}$  are the two termination letters that came after the Rule 11 that was executed, which is germane to our position that the lawyers fully perform. Exhibit 11 establishes that the

pre-trial initial settlement demand of the clients was 1.6 million and as the Court's aware from tab 3, the verdict was significantly above that.

Exhibit 13 is Dr. Hopper telling how much he appreciates the work Mr. Vitullo's doing. Exhibit 66 is the order where this Court found that Ms. Wassmer and Dr. Hopper owed no monies on Ms. Hopper's claim for attorney's fees, which you heard M. Vitullo represent her on. And Exhibit 70 is really important to us because the timing of this is after the stipulation you just heard between Mr. Levinger, where he's writing Mr. Vitullo about what arguments are going to be in the jury charge questionnaire when he at least knows in his head according to stipulation, he's about to reach an agreement.

And when you look at that Exhibit 70 and you reconcile it with the termination letter, which has been admitted as Exhibit 5, you'll see that the foundational basis for terminating Mr. Vitullo and Malesovas is Mr. Levinger's complaint that there's not a good record on appeal and that's the email that Mr. Levinger is sending about what's our argument going to be on these jury charge questions. So, subject to that —— and Your Honor, before I rest and close I got one more exhibit and I've redacted out all the other stuff,

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which I'll mark as Exhibit 14.
                    MR. PENNINGTON: What was, I'm sorry,
 3
     what was --?
 4
                    MR. LAUTEN: I offer Exhibit 14.
 5
                  [Intervenors Exhibit 14 offered]
 6
                    MR. PENNINGTON: But what was redacted?
                    MR. LAUTEN: The rest of it that could be
 8
     arguably confidential. I don't think you're going to
 9
     want us to offer the entire email, but we're happy to do
     so if you don't have an objection.
10
11
                    MR. PENNINGTON: I just wanted to
12
     understand that this is a redacted copy, that's all, and
13
     I have no objection to this exhibit.
14
                    MR. LAUTEN: May I approach, Your Honor?
15
                    THE COURT: Yes.
16
                    MR. LAUTEN: This is Exhibit 14.
17
                    THE COURT: All right. Exhibit 14 will
18
     be admitted.
19
                 [Intervenors Exhibit 14 admitted]
20
                    MR. LAUTEN: Your Honor, subject to any
     rebuttal, Plaintiff's Intervenors rest and close.
21
22
                    THE COURT: One more question: With
23
     respect to the exhibits referenced in these depositions,
     are these the same? I'm not --
24
25
                    MR. MALESOVAS: Your Honor, the exhibits
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that are admitted have the exhibit stickers from the deposition on them and then down at the bottom, they have the way they have been marked for purposes of this hearing. So when you see the actual sticker, for example, I think on Exhibit No. 1 if you look at Exhibit No. 1, there's an Exhibit No. 2 sticker on it. That was Exhibit No. 2, in the deposition.

THE COURT: All right.

Sir?

MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, before I begin, can I just ask how much time we have remaining for the hearing today?

THE COURT: Approximately, 30 minutes, 30 to 40 minutes.

MR. PENNINGTON: Total?

THE COURT: Well, this is scheduled for two hours, and today is the day that I have the Probate Section meeting, and so it's Professor Byers speaking today and so everybody wants to hear Professor Byers.

And then I have another obligation, so if you need more time I'll have to schedule that but that's all that we have today.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$  PENNINGTON: Okay, and so a total of how much time remaining then?

THE COURT: About 30 minutes.

MR. PENNINGTON: 30 minutes, okay. I 2 just want to make sure that we have time remaining to 3 hear the Motion to Compel Arbitration. Your Honor, let me just speed this up and get to a couple of exhibits 5 and see if we can -- I'll just introduce these and if 6 there's no objection, then --MR. LAUTEN: Yeah, I object to relevance, 8 hearsay. 9 MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, let me, just 10 for the record, mark this. 11 THE COURT: And just so you know, don't 12 feel like I'm giving your arguments not enough attention. I've read most of the materials that were 13 previously submitted to the Court. 14 15 MR. LAUTEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: I was up pretty late last night reading that. You don't have to take me through 17 everything. All right, so Exhibits 1 and 2? 18 19 MR. PENNINGTON: Exhibits 1 and 2, Your 20 Honor, we'll offer those at this time. [Defendant's Exhibits 1 and 2 offered] 21 22 THE COURT: Any objection? 23 MR. LAUTEN: I object to it as irrelevant 24 and hearsay. And just to put it in context with respect to the Baker Botts letter, I have a tremendous amount of

respect for that firm and Mr. Beckwith and to put that in the proper context, I would really have to cross-examine one of the lawyers and I'm not willing to do that. I don't think that's appropriate. The letter is irrelevant and its hearsay and I'd ask that my objection be sustained.

THE COURT: Well I'm in a position where if this is offered, I haven't read them, so I, you know, if I don't to read them I won't know whether or not they're hearsay, so...

MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, I can put
Mr. Beckwith on the stand if I need to prove up the fact
that he authored this letter and sent it to Mr. Lauten,
yesterday but I think it is relevant, because it goes to
the issue of the condition precedent to the settlement.

MR. LAUTEN: My objection is not authentication, I don't want to speak with Mr. Beckwith (inaudible) or sent it; my objection is hearsay. It's an out of court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted, and its hearsay.

THE COURT: Is it offered for the truth of the matters asserted in here?

MR. PENNINGTON: No, Your Honor. It's actually offered to show that there's no pending, or no imminent harm or no pending payment of any settlement

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1
     because there has been no release of the lien by Mr.
     Vitullo or his firm.
 3
                    MR. LAUTEN: That's the truth of the
 4
     matter asserted.
                    THE COURT: Sir?
 6
                    MR. PENNINGTON: Well, then I can put Mr.
     Beckwith on the stand if I need to.
 8
                    THE COURT: Well, I mean, I told you how
 9
     much time we have left. You can decide how you want to
10
     use your time.
11
                    MR. PENNINGTON: All right. I'll come
12
     back to this issue, Your Honor. And I'll offer Exhibit
13
     2 then, the April 6th letter.
14
                [Defendant's Exhibit No. 2 offered]
15
                    MR. LAUTEN: No objection, Your Honor.
16
                    THE COURT: All right, the Court will
     admit Exhibit 2, Defendant's 2.
17
18
                [Defendant's Exhibit No. 2 admitted]
19
                    MR. PENNINGTON: And Your Honor, at this
20
     time I would call Mr. Vitullo to the stand.
                        ANTHONY L. VITULLO,
21
22
     having been first duly sworn, testified as follows:
23
                    THE COURT: Be seated, please.
24
                        DIRECT EXAMINATION,
     BY MR. PENNINGTON:
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Q. Mr. Vitullo, you represented Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer in the underlying lawsuit, correct?

A. Yes, sir.

- Q. And, you're in Court today, seeking to enforce the terms of a contingency fee agreement that you entered into, with both of those clients, correct?
  - A. Yes, sir.

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- Q. And those agreements have been offered into evidence as Exhibits 1 and 2, correct?
  - A. Yes, sir.
- Q. At the time you entered into those contingency fee agreements with Ms. Wassmer and Dr. Hopper, you were already their attorney, correct?
  - A. Yes, sir.
- Q. Okay, and you were, prior to entering into these contingency agreements, you were representing both Ms. Wassmer and Dr. Hopper on an hourly basis, correct?
  - A. For a very limited purpose.
- 19 Q. But you were representing them on an hourly 20 basis?
  - A. On an hourly basis for a limited purpose of attending the mediation and getting ready for the mediation.
    - O. And that was --
- 25 A. That was the scope of representation in that

agreement.

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Q. And that mediation was the mediation that took place in this very lawsuit that we're here about today?

- A. It took place on November the  $9^{th}$  of 2015.
- Q. In the probate case, correct?
- A. Correct.
- Q. All right. And before that, how long had you known Dr. Hopper and Ms. Wassmer?
- A. I had met Dr. Hopper in Oklahoma City, in 2012.
- Q. And you actually referred both Ms. Wassmer and Dr. Hopper to another law firm here in town, Block & Garden, correct?
- 14 A. Yes.
  - Q. For the purpose of representing Ms. Wassmer and Dr. Hopper in the probate proceeding, correct?
- A. For a very limited purpose.
- Q. But you're the attorney that referred them to Block & Garden, correct?
  - A. Correct.
  - Q. And you're aware that following your referral of Dr. Hopper and Ms. Wassmer to the Block & Garden Law Firm, that they actually entered into a fee contract with that law firm, correct?
- A. Correct.

Q. And --2 THE COURT: Excuse me. One minute, just 3 I have to take that call. 4 [Brief interruption] 5 THE COURT: All right, I'm sorry. I had 6 to take that call. Mr. Vitullo, are you aware that you were 8 actually named as an attorney in the Block & Garden fee 9 agreement? 10 I found that out later, after the fact. 11 Q. Have you seen the Block & Garden fee agreement 12 before? 13 Α. Yes, I have. 14 MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, I'm going to 15 offer the Block and Garden fee agreement as Exhibit 3. 16 [Defendant's Exhibit 3 offered] 17 MR. LAUTEN: Objection hearsay and 18 there's been foundation to prove up that document 19 through this witness. 20 (By Mr. Pennington) Mr. Vitullo, I'll show you Exhibit 3 --21 22 THE COURT: I'll allow him some latitude 23 to see if we have a foundation. Go ahead. 24 25 (By Mr. Pennington) Have you seen Exhibit 3 Q.

before?

A. Yes.

- Q. Okay, and is it your understanding that that's a copy of the fee agreement between Block & Garden and Ms. Wassmer and Dr. Hopper?
- A. I believe this is a copy but I'm not sure if this is the version that Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer received on October the 8th, of 2012. I cannot testify to that, because on October the 8th of 2012 when this exhibit was presented to Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer, I was not copied with this, at all.
- Q. But do you have any reason to dispute that that's a true copy of the agreement between Block & Garden and Ms. Wassmer and Dr. Hopper?
- A. What I'm saying is this is an exhibit that's been presented to me as being a copy of the Block & Garden fee agreement. This -- what I'm saying is as of October the 8th of 2012, I'm not sure if this is the entire copy that was given to Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer, because I did not see this on October the 8th of 2012, or during that time period.
  - Q. Did you draft any part of that agreement, sir?
- 23 A. No.
  - Q. Did you send any language to Steve Block at Block & Garden for him to include as part of the

agreement that he entered into with the clients?

- A. Not as to this agreement. What I had -- what I had done in the past, prior to 2012, I had entered into contingency fee agreements with other clients, with the Block & Garden Law Firm, and Mr. Block and Chris McNeill had a copy of my form contingency fee contract that they had used in the past.
  - Q. Okay.

- A. So, there's language in this copy Exhibit 3 that is similar to the contingency fee agreement form that I've used in the past that Mr. Block and Mr. McNeill had in the past.
- Q. All right. But ultimately, you knew that Dr. Hopper and Ms. Wassmer were going to retain Block & Garden?
- A. Correct. But I did not know that they were going to retain Block & Garden and use a hybrid fee. My understanding, at the time, was that they were retained on a flat fee.
- MR. PENNINGTON: I'll offer Exhibit 3,
  21 Your Honor.
  - [Defendant's Exhibit No. 3 offered]

    MR. LAUTEN: Your Honor, I object. It's hearsay and it's no foundation so it's an exhibit

created by a different law firm that he can't prove up.

MR. PENNINGTON: Due to the time, Your 2 Honor, I don't have any --3 THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. 4 MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, at this time, due to the time constraints of the Court, I have 5 6 no further questions. MR. LAUTEN: I'll pass the witness, Your 8 I don't have any questions. Honor. 9 THE COURT: Does anyone else have some 10 questions? 11 MR. LOEWINSOHN: No, Your Honor. 12 MR. BECKWITH: No, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: You may step down. 14 MR. VITULLO: Thank you, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Call your next witness. 16 MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, at this 17 time, based on the time that's remaining, that we do 18 need time remaining to argue the Motion to Compel 19 Arbitration, I have no further witnesses at this time. 20 THE COURT: Well, I want to say this. 21 am willing to hear the Motion to Compel Arbitration; 22 this was added after the Temporary Injunction was 23 scheduled, and so I'm not trying to not give you 24 adequate time to argue your motion. It's just that I couldn't promise you that you would have enough time

today to argue that motion and, I mean, I'm perfectly willing to give you another opportunity at some other time, it's just that, you know, basically, you're crowding the docket today. So, you know, if you want to do this another day, we can do it another day. It's just that I'm not able to expend the time today. So, I mean, it's up to you.

MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, can I just

MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, can I just address that? We're willing to come back on the Motion to Compel Arbitration. The problem we have is that there's been a summary judgment motion filed that's set for May 4<sup>th</sup> and our response to that would be due this Friday.

THE COURT: It can't possibly be set for May  $4^{\rm th}$  because I'm out of town May  $4^{\rm th}.$ 

MS. JOHNSON: Okay. I thought Mr. Lauten represented that he was going to try to --

MR. LAUTEN: I was going to try and I've been unsuccessful, so now it's officially not set for May  $4^{\rm th}$ ; how's that?

MS. JOHNSON: Okay, Your Honor --

THE COURT: I apologize. I'm the curriculum chair for the National College of Probate

Judges annual meeting and so, I have to be there. So

I'm not going to be here; I'm leaving on the first.

MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, we're happy to come back on the Motion to Compel Arbitration, as long as we can get an agreement from Mr. Lauten that we'll have that motion heard before any response is due to the summary judgment motion.

THE COURT: Well, I haven't seen the summary judgment motion. I can't make a judgment on what that is and I'm certainly, not a party to any agreements that the lawyers make.

MR. PENNINGTON: The biggest concern,

Your Honor, is that in the temporary restraining order

that you signed that you said that they could file their

motion for summary judgment on 14 days' notice and I

think we're required to file our response five days

before the hearing.

THE COURT: I recall.

MR. PENNINGTON: And so, the concern here is that we haven't had an opportunity to conduct any discovery. We haven't been able to get all of my clients' files from Mr. Vitullo's firm and that's in dispute. But we haven't received any files from Mr. Malesovas' firm and there's some other lawyers' files we're waiting to receive, at the time. So we haven't had time to really flesh out this argument, but the Motion to Compel Arbitration is the most pressing issue

from our perspective.

THE COURT: I understand. It's just that, as I said, I set this for the temporary conjunction hearing and I didn't set it for the Motion to Compel Arbitration. I mean, you could have gotten a different date this week; it's just that you've chose to put it on this docket and it's not working.

MR. PENNINGTON: Well, with all due respect, Your Honor, when I had contacted your Court Coordinator, we sent a couple of letters in and I received a phone call from her and she said that, after she spoke with you, this was the earliest possible day that we could get it set so we just asked for it to be set, at that time.

THE COURT: I understand. I'm just trying to be fair, okay? And so, I don't want you to feel like I'm not willing to give you equal time or adequate time to explain your motion to me or argue your motion to me. It's just that today was crowded and so, that's the situation.

Sir, did you have something that you wanted to say?

MR. LAUTEN: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, go ahead.

MS. JOHNSON: So, Your Honor, we're happy

to proceed today. About how much time do we have, 2 approximately? THE COURT: About eight minutes. 4 MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I guess I would 5 ask that we be able to reschedule this hearing, but with 6 the understanding that it's not going to be until --THE COURT: That's an agreement you can 8 make with the lawyers. 9 MS. JOHNSON: Okay. All right. THE COURT: I'm not going to be --10 11 MS. JOHNSON: Okay. I'm going to do this 12 in eight minutes, Your Honor. 13 MR. LAUTEN: Okay, wait, can we -- I'm not going to interrupt you but --14 15 MS. JOHNSON: Sure. 16 MR. LAUTEN: -- procedurally the record 17 does not reflect that they've rested and closed yet and 18 I'm going to -- they need to either rest and close or we need to move on. 19 20 MR. PENNINGTON: We rest and close. 21 MR. LAUTEN: Okay. So much for that. 22 THE COURT: Mr. Beckwith? 23 MR. BECKWITH: Your Honor, I do think we need to make a couple of points very quickly, before 24 they actually make their closing arguments, Your Honor.

First of all, we've advised Your Honor that we have a confidential settlement agreement and I would ask that Your Honor take judicial notice of the notice that I filed and what it was was JPMorgan's Notice of Receipt of Temporary Restraining Order. I believe I filed it on April 11 of 2018. I'm looking here and I'll find it for Your Honor.

I'd ask that you take judicial notice of it because what it establishes is that there is a confidential settlement agreement that's been entered into and that the conditions precedent for payment have not been fulfilled. But if those conditions precedent are fulfilled, that JPMorgan will abide by any temporary restraining order that might exist at the time the conditions precedent are fulfilled. So we want to make sure that Your Honor take judicial notice of that notice that we filed.

MR. BECKWITH: It was filed on April 11, 2018. And I want to make sure Your Honor, as a part of that -- I'm still trying to find it. Yes, it is April 11, 2018 at 3:26 p.m. And I could read it to Your Honor if it would help. It just advises on the Rule 11 Agreement, pending negotiations on the Settlement and Release Agreement, and that the conditions precedent

payment that had not been made.

THE COURT: All right, I don't -- I'm sure if you said that you filed it, it hasn't -- I don't think I have it.

MR. BECKWITH: It does have a file stamp of 3:08 p.m. Your Honor. If I could, can I read it into the record just so that Your Honor can hear it.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. BECKWITH: "At 3:08 p.m. on April 11, 2018, JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A, JPMorgan in its capacity as the Independent Administrator of the Estate of Max D. Hopper, Deceased and in its corporate capacity has received this Courts April 10, 2018 temporary restraining order. As the Court is aware, the parties signed and filed on April 4, 2018, a Rule 11 Agreement announcing that's their settlement pursuant to a confidential term sheet." I believe the Rule 11 was put into evidence by Mr. Lauten, and so that's the reference there, Your Honor.

"JPMorgan notifies the Court that as of today, the parties have not yet signed their Settlement and Release Agreement. Once signed, JPMorgan notifies the Court that certain conditions precedent must occur before JPMorgan has any obligation to make any settlement payment. JPMorgan writes simply to inform

the Court that it is aware of, and will abide by the temporary restraining order, if it remains in effect, of JPMorgan's obligations to make a settlement payment arises."

So that was the notice that we provided to Your Honor. Your Honor, I think it also is incumbent that it protects JPMorgan's rights to the confidential settlement that we see if we can obtain a stipulation that, as of today, there is a confidential settlement agreement that exists between JPMorgan and the Heirs. I don't think that was disputed between either of the parties, so I'd ask the parties to confirm that.

MR. PENNINGTON: We'll stipulate to that Your Honor.

MR. LAUTEN: Your Honor, just to be real clear procedurally here, I don't have a problem with the Court taking judicial notice that they filed something and the filing says what it says, but I need -- I want to make sure the record is clear, I've never seen this settlement agreement, ever. It's been subpoenaed to be here. I'm not picking a fight over it, but I'm not in a position to agree or disagree as to what JPM's obligations are under an agreement that I haven't signed, that I haven't seen and that my clients aren't even a party to that contract, so I don't agree or

disagree. But if the Court wants to simply take judicial notice that they filed something and that's what it says, I don't have a problem with that.

MR. BECKWITH: And here's the issue, Your Honor. I need to make sure that the record is clear that there is a confidential settlement agreement in place, to protect JPMorgan's rights. I thought that was part of the hearing that both Mr. Lauten and Mr. Pennington established. And then I have represented to the Court as an officer of the Court that conditions precedent exist to payment. The money stays, as of right now is at JPMorgan, and that conditions precedent exist prior to any payment to the Heirs.

And so if I need to put on further evidence on that I will, but those are the only two points, I think, that should Your Honor make a decision and JPMorgan need to seek review of that decision that we need to establish. As for Mr. Lauten, Mr. Lauten and I exchanged a number of messages last week, trying to provide Mr. Lauten the chance to go read the settlement agreement and the dispute broke down on whether Mr. Lauten could obtain a copy of the settlement agreement.

THE COURT: Read the settlement agreement un-redacted or in full or just read --

MR. BECKWITH: Read the settlement in

full, un-redacted, right. And so Your Honor knows my concerns with Your Honor reading the settlement in full, with all due respect to the Court, and so that is the only concern that we have with respect to that. We want to make sure that our record is established that there's a confidential settlement agreement and conditions precedent that exist to payment of any money.

MR. LAUTEN: Just so this is clear, Your Honor, it is true that we talked about me going over and looking at the settlement without taking it, but then they wanted me to sign an agreement on confidentiality, and I'm not going to put myself in a position to be sued. I don't have a contract with these people; my clients don't have a contract with these people.

My alternative proposal is a Rule 11 that
I signed and it says send it to me, you can redact
whatever you want with confidentiality and I'll agree
it's protected, and if I don't abide by it, you can
sanction me, but you're not going to enter a contract
with me unless you pay me to enter a contract with you.
So that's how the disagreement broke down. But even as
we sit here today, I don't even know what they're
claiming is confidential. Is it the payment amount? Is
it the payment instructions? Is it the entire thing?
Every settlement I've ever seen has an exception for a

subpoena or Court order.

So, anyway I'm not in a position to agree or disagree because I simply haven't seen it. And I'll take ownership of my share of the fault for the disagreement breaking down, but as a practical matter, I haven't seen it; that's the point.

MR. BECKWITH: And to be clear, the entire settlement agreement is confidential. That's the way it was negotiated and signed by the parties as a confidential settlement agreement.

THE COURT: Well, I will tell you the Court is in a curious position. There seems to be a whole body of information that the Court is not privy to, which is problematic. In my view, it's hard for me to feel secure in any decision that I'm going to make without sufficient information. I mean, I'm just astounded at the absence of information that I am operating with and I'm expected to make a decision. However, that's the way you choose to operate so, --

MR. BECKWITH: Well, the information -THE COURT: I'll take judicial notice of
the fact that you have filed a piece of paper that
indicates that you have a settlement agreement. I'm not
representing to you or saying that I agree that it is a
confidential settlement agreement because I don't know

that it is because I've not seen it. So I can't acknowledge it as a confidential settlement agreement. And of course, I don't know whether or not it is an enforceable settlement agreement. I have not seen the terms of the condition precedent, and so I don't know anything about those terms, other than what you've told me.

And so, I have merely the representation that you will abide by an agreement that I've not seen and conditions that I've not reviewed. And that I am supposed to rely on Chase not to release the funds until or unless these unknown conditions are performed, I mean, that's from my advantage point.

MR. BECKWITH: And part of what puts us in this situation is the prior points that I raised last time, which is Your Honor is still considering our pending JNOV as well as Mr. Loewinsohn's motion for judgment as to Mrs. Hopper. And JPMorgan believes it would be prejudicial to the process, prejudicial to the Court, prejudicial to JPMorgan and perhaps, Mrs. Hopper for Your Honor to receive in the settlement agreement, to see it's terms, to see any payment amount, and then to be, with all of that information, also be deciding the JNOV and the motion for judgment.

We do think that's problematic. I've

raised that with Your Honor before and so that is the awkward situation I think we all find ourselves in. I tried to raise it last time, or perhaps these parties could agree to some escrow agent or some bank or some lawyer to take these funds so that we wouldn't even have to bother Your Honor but that apparently, wasn't taken up. I'm kind of in the box Your Honor is in, at this point.

THE COURT: Mr. Loewinsohn?

MR. LOEWINSOHN: A couple of points, Your Honor. First of all, if it is helpful to the process, I want to make clear whatever the Court decides regarding the settlement agreement or settlement amount, Ms.

Hopper and myself are not seeking to know that amount.

We don't need to know that amount and so I want to make that clear if the Court ends up looking at something in camera, I'm not going to take the position because we're a party in the lawsuit, we need to see it. So I wanted to make that clear.

Second, just for the record, I think Mr. Beckwith's suggestion that the Court is not able to divorce whatever information it learns in this proceeding, from its consideration of the motion for judgment by Mrs. Hopper and motion for JNOV, I think that it does not give the Court enough credit.

Court's all the time find out about settlements between one set of parties and still have to decide what to do about the remainder set of the parties. As long as the Court is honest and focused on the materials before them, which I greatly expect that this Court would be, I don't agree with Mr. Beckwith's suggestion and I can assure you, we don't believe it would prejudice Mrs. Hopper as the suggestion was made because I believe the Court would give no consideration to that, and will make its decisions independently, based on the information presented to you. Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. LAUTEN: If I could just make one final point, because this really, really bothers me immensely. These parties can enter into whatever agreement they want. I'm not a party to that contract. They can walk out of here and tear it up and enter a new agreement. What they've agreed to amongst themselves is of no moment as to my clients. The only way my clients' rights are going to be protected is by this Court making a decision to protect those rights.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?

MR. BECKWITH: Your Honor, I think if
that's the position the parties are going to take then I
think I should take a stand and testify to the

confidential settlement agreement, that it exists and that there are conditions precedent to payment under it so that you have that record.

MR. LAUTEN: Well I don't have a problem with that but if he's going to testify then we're going to have to get the agreement out and we're going to have to see it. I'm not going to take -- I have a tremendous amount of respect for Mr. Beckwith. I know he's a fantastic lawyer and good person. But like any other witness, I'm not going to take a witness's word on it on what a document says that I don't have in Court. So if we're going to put on some evidence we're going to have to get it out or the Court's going to have to look at it in camera. I don't care how we do it, but I gotta be able to cross-examine somebody about a document if it's going to be proven up without me seeing it.

MR. BECKWITH: What we've just heard is the parties are entitled to have a confidential settlement agreement. The fact that a fee dispute has broken out between the parties, one of the parties that are lawyers does not abrogate our confidential settlement agreement and does not expose it to public view, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not trying to make you do anything you don't want to do. I'm just trying

to figure out what is reasonable and equitable in this particular situation. And as I said, I seem to be making a decision without very much information, so I mean, of course, I guess I've been put in that position before so I will do the best that I can do.

MR. BECKWITH: But I've tried to represent to Your Honor as a member of this Bar and member of this Court, Your Honor precisely what's happened here, which is that there is a confidential settlement agreement that exists between the parties. All indicia of evidence that was put in by Mr. Lauten and that was discussed by Mr. Pennington, points towards that fact, but as a member of the Bar I'm telling you there is a confidential settlement agreement in place and I have filed a notice again, as a member of the Bar that that confidential settlement agreement has conditions precedent to payment.

And lastly, I'm telling you that the money that is associated with the settlement agreement remains today at JPMorgan Chase Bank. So, I'm making all of those representations to the Court; I don't think they're refuted representations, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. BECKWITH: I might be --

THE COURT: I understand that. I guess

in the back of my mind, I mean, I have seen people make confidential settlement agreements and I've seen people brought back out of them. I've seen people figure ways around them and I mean, lawyers do what lawyers do and so you know, there are a lot of agreements that are presented in the morning and that are, you know, torn up in the afternoon. So, you know, I'm in the position of being aware of that fact; now, I haven't heard you say that the confidential settlement agreement is not subject to revocation or modification or something else.

MR. BECHWITH: Whether it is or isn't Your Honor, I can tell you it is in existence today that, no doubt about it, it exists today.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. BECKWITH: What effect the parties make up, the Heirs and their lawyers and this dispute may have on that confidential settlement agreement remains to be seen, but what I can tell you is there is a condition precedent to payment.

THE COURT: I heard that. What I'm saying to you is that what you're not telling me is that there's no way that that settlement might not change, or might not be modified or that JPMorgan Chase may decide to walk away from it.

MR. BECKWITH: Your Honor, that doesn't

change the fact that today, there's a confidential 1 2 settlement agreement is in place, --3 THE COURT: I understand --MR. BECKWITH: -- fully in writing, fully 5 integrated, fully in existence. 6 THE COURT: All right. MR. LAUTEN: I know we're running out of 8 time. I do want two minutes for final argument if I can 9 get it before we run out. MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, can I just say 10 11 first -- I'm sorry. 12 THE COURT: Just a minute. 13 MS. JOHNSON: Okay. 14 THE COURT: So everybody can hear what you have to say. 15 16 MS. JOHNSON: I'm sorry, Your Honor. just wanted to say for the record that we will reset our 17 18 Motion to Compel Arbitration. THE COURT: I understand. 19 20 MS. JOHNSON: We understand the Court's 21 time constraints. I do want to make clear our positon 22 on the record that if anything further goes on in this 23 litigation, while there is a pending Motion to Compel 24 Arbitration that that cannot happen. That will be an abuse of discretion.

THE COURT: Ma'am, I'll decide that. 2 Thank you. 3 MS. JOHNSON: Okay. Thank you, Your 4 Honor. 5 MR. BECKWITH: Your Honor, I will further 6 represent that we will not -- I know Mr. Pennington would bear the same representation -- We will not 8 change, alter or revoke the settlement agreement without 9 notifying Your Honor, so you now have the confidential settlement agreement exist, conditions precedent to 10 11 payment exist that have not been fulfilled so there's no 12 payment obligation. And as officer of the Court I'm 13 representing to you we will not change, revoke, or alter 14 it without notifying the Court, in advance. 15 MR. PENNINGTON: I agree with that on 16 behalf of my clients, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you. 18 MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, may I at 19 this point, request a stay of any further proceedings 20 until we have a hearing on our Motion to Compel Arbitration? 21 22 MR. LAUTEN: It's not before you today, 23 Your Honor. 24 MR. PENNINGTON: Well it is part of our Motion to Compel and because we're unable to have a

hearing on our Motion to Compel, all I'm asking Your

Honor is that nothing else be set or no further

discovery or no further motions are set before you until

we've had an opportunity to have a hearing on a Motion

to Compel Arbitration.

THE COURT: Well, I can't promise you that, sir, I mean, I don't know what's going to happen tomorrow okay, but you're fee to reach that agreement with counsel if they choose to agree with you.

MR. LAUTEN: I just want to leave you with one thought without even getting into it. There's one issue before you today and that's the ownership and property rights of my clients with funds held by JPMorgan Chase. We don't have an arbitration agreement with JPMorgan. We don't have an agreement of any kind with them.

THE COURT: I understand, sir.

MR. LAUTEN: Okay.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else?

MS. JOHNSON: I just want to be clear.

The Court is denying our Motion to Stay the Proceedings pending our Motion to Compel Arbitration.

THE COURT: I'm not doing anything but moving that hearing at the moment, okay? I'm going to think about what I've heard and I'm going to have to

1 make some kind of decision pretty quickly, so I need to think about what I've heard and I'll be sending you 3 something, shortly. MR. PENNINGTON: Can we get a hearing 5 date Your Honor on our Motion to Compel, while we're 6 here? THE COURT: You can talk to Amanda. MR. LAUTEN: But before we adjourn Your 8 9 Honor, I've got a flash drive with our proposed orders. I know you're extremely busy. The only thing I would 10 11 ask the Court is to at least consider if it's going to 12 be awhile, extending the TRO because it expires by its 13 terms under 14 days. 14 MS. JOHNSON: And Your Honor, our positon is that is an absolute abuse of discretion. 15 This Court may not extend a TRO while there is a pending Motion to 16 17 Compel Arbitration. 18 MR. LAUTEN: Okay, well --19 MS. JOHNSON: This Court may not order 20 discovery. This Court may not deny our summary 21 judgment. 22 THE COURT: Ma'am? 23 MS. JOHNSON: Sorry, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Thank you. 25 Sir.?

MR. LAUTEN: My point is I would ask the Court to extend the TRO until the injunction is entered and I think the Court can decide on its own what the law is and isn't and I've got an order for the Court that I will leave you with the flash drive, if I can approach.

THE COURT: All right. Is this the  $14^{\rm th}$  day?

MR. LAUTEN: Yes, it is, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I'm sorry ma'am,
I don't mean to cut you off. It's just that you know, I
need to move along.

MS. JOHNSON: I understand, Your Honor, but I just have to be very clear. I think you are being lead into error, here. It is absolutely black letter law in the State of Texas that if there is a pending Motion to Compel Arbitration, the Court cannot extend the TRO, can't enter an injunction, you can't order discovery, you can't hear a summary judgment motion. And I'm sorry to be so forceful, Your Honor, but you are being lead into error by these lawyers.

MR. LAUTEN: Your Honor? Your Honor, that is simply untrue. We have a statute that specifically gives you jurisdiction, Chapter 171, before and even during an arbitration. And it is simply wrong for a lawyer to come in here and tell you you're

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committing error when it's not true.
                    MS. JOHNSON: No, I didn't say the Court
     was committing error. I'm telling you, you are being
     lead into error.
                    MR. LAUTEN: Okay, that's not true.
 6
                    MS. JOHNSON: The statute that he is
     referring to is the Texas Arbitration Act.
 8
                    THE COURT: Thank you.
 9
                    MS. JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
10
                    MR. LAUTEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
11
                    MR. PENNINGTON: Thank you.
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                         [End of proceedings]
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THE STATE OF TEXAS X

COUNTY OF DALLAS

I, Jackie Galindo, Deputy Official Court
Reporter for the Probate Court Number One, Dallas
County, Texas, do hereby certify that the above and
foregoing contains a true and correct transcription of
all portions of evidence and other proceedings requested
in writing by counsel for the parties to be included in
this request in the above-styled and numbered cause, all
of which occurred in open court or in chambers and were
reported by me.

I further certify that this Reporter's

Record of the proceedings truly and correctly reflects

the exhibits, if any, offered by the respective parties.

 $$\operatorname{\textsc{MY}}$  OFFICIAL HAND, this the 1st day of June, 2018.

/s/: Jackie Galindo

Jackie Galindo, Texas CSR #7023
Expiration Date: 12/31/19
Official Court Reporter
Probate Court, Dallas County, Texas
Renaissance Tower, 2400-A
Dallas Texas
214-653-6066

REPORTER'S RECORD VOLUME 4 OF 5 CAUSE NO. PR-11-3238-1 COURT OF APPEALS NO. 05-18-00558-CV

IN THE ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED

THE PROBATE COURT

JO N. HOPPER Plaintiff,

V.

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A. STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER Defendants.

JOHN L. MALESOVAS d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP Intervenors,

V.

STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, and JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A., Defendants.

NUMBER ONE

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION \_\_\_\_\_

On the 8th day of May, 2018, A.D., the following proceedings came on for hearing in the aboveentitled and numbered cause before the HONORABLE COURT, BRENDA HULL THOMPSON, Judge Presiding, held in Dallas, Dallas County, Texas.

Proceedings reported by oral stenography.

## APPEARANCES

BRIAN LAUTEN, Attorney SBOT No. 24031603 Brian Lauten, PC 3811 Turtle Creek Blvd. Suite 1450 Dallas, Texas 75219 Telephone: 214-414-0996

ATTORNEY FOR: THE INTERVENORS

ANNE M. JOHNSON, Attorney SBOT No. 00794271 Haynes and Boone LLP 2323 Victory Avenue, Suite 700 Dallas, Texas 75219 Telephone: 214-651-5376

Facsimile: 214-200-0487

## --AND--

JAMES E. PENNINGTON, Attorney SBOT No. 15758510

Law Offices of James E. Pennington, P.C.

900 Jackson Street, Suite 440

Dallas, Texas 75202

Telephone: 214-741-3022 Facsimile: 214-741-3022

ATTORNEY FOR: DEFENDANTS

ALAN S. LOEWINSOHN, Attorney

SBOT No. 12481600

Loewinsohn Flegle Deary Simon LLP

12377 Merit Drive, Suite 900

Dallas, Texas 75251

Telephone: 214-572-1700 Facsimile: 214-572-1717

ATTORNEY FOR: JO N. HOPPER

VAN H. BECKWITH, Attorney

SBOT No. 02020150

JESSICA PULLIAM, Attorney

SBOT No. 24037309

Baker Botts, LLP

2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700

Dallas, Texas 75201

Telephone: 214-953-6505

ATTORNEYS FOR: JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.

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Exhibits [None]

## 1 PROCEEDINGS THE COURT: All right. This is PR-11-2 3 3238 in the Matter of Max Hopper. May I have the attorneys announce, please? 4 5 MS. JOHNSON: Yes, Your Honor, Ann 6 Johnson, Jim Pennington and Andrew Guthrie for the intervention Defendants, Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer. 9 MR. LAUTEN: Good afternoon, Your Honor, 10 Brian Lauten on behalf of Fee Smith and John Malesovas, 11 and Michelle, my paralegal, is here, too. 12 MS. PULLIAM: Your Honor, Jessica Pulliam 13 of Baker Botts on behalf of JPMorgan. We do not anticipate participating today. I just wanted to let 14 15 you know we are here. 16 THE COURT: All right, what's your last 17 name? 18 MS. PULLIAM: Pulliam. P-u-l-l-i-a-m. 19 THE COURT: Anyone else? 20 MR. TOBEY: Your Honor, Robert Tobey for 21 the law firm of Block Garden & McNeill. I'm an 22 interested observer today. 23 THE COURT: All right, what -- Block --24 MR. TOBEY: Block, B-1-o-c-k. 25 THE COURT: Oh, okay.

1 MR. TOBEY: Garden, G-a-r-d-e-n and 2 McNeill, M-c-N-e-i-l-l. It's a law firm. 3 THE COURT: Yes. MR. TOBEY: They're counsel for Dr. 5 Hopper and Ms. Wassmer, also. They're filing a motion in order to withdraw. THE COURT: Your clients are filing a 8 motion to withdraw? 9 MR. TOBEY: They are. 10 THE COURT: Okay. MR. TOBEY: We'll e-file that. 11 I do not 12 anticipate participating in this hearing. 13 THE COURT: All right. How long do you anticipate, Ms. 14 15 Johnson? 16 MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I think I have 17 about 10 or 15 minutes. 18 THE COURT: All right. Proceed. 19 MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, we're here 20 today on the Motion to Compel Arbitration of Stephen 21 Hopper and Laura Wassmer. We're asking the Court today 22 for an order enforcing the arbitration provisions, in 23 the fee agreements that were drafted by the attorneys, 24 in the case, and we're asking the Court to compel 25 arbitration and stay all proceedings in this Court. Ι'd like to start by talking about the arbitration provision. May I approach, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, this is a copy of the arbitration provision. I know the Court has seen it before. It's contained in the fee agreements that are in the record. The fee agreements here, it's undisputed that they contain unambiguous, broad, unlimited, arbitration provisions that cover all matters that may arise between attorneys and clients, including fee disputes.

And the highlighted language here, Your Honor if I could just read that. "Any controversy or claim arises out of or is related to this agreement, any services provided by attorneys to client in connection with clients' claims or any other matter that may arise between client and attorney including malpractice claims and fee disputes. Attorneys and client both waive any right to bring a court action or have a jury trial and agree that the dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration."

Then it goes on to give details about how that arbitration should be conducted. Your Honor, there's no challenge to the enforceability of this provision. In fact, quite the opposite, the lawyer's

pleadings in this case state and I quote, that they
fully embrace the fee agreements, including
specifically, this arbitration provision. Nor is there
any argument about the broad and unambiguous scope of
this agreement, Your Honor.

They are not taking the position that the dispute at issue here is not within the scope of the agreement. They're not saying this is not a fee dispute, which it most certainly is. They're not saying that this is not a matter that has arisen between clients and attorneys, which it most certainly is. Having shown a valid arbitration clause -- this was our burden, Your Honor, we had to show a valid arbitration clause and we have to show that the fee dispute at issue in this proceeding, is within the scope of that clause.

Having met that burden, Your Honor, the Court should compel arbitration. The attorneys do not raise any defenses to arbitration. They do not claim that this cause is unconscionable. They do raise a number of arguments in an effort to avoid arbitration and I want to address those, briefly. The first argument they raise is that the Court cannot compel arbitration against a non-signatory. Certainly, there are a lot of issues when the Court is presented with an issue of arbitration as to a non-signatory but, none of

those are flagged here because there is no one -- we are not trying to compel a non-signatory, that is, JPMorgan to this dispute.

I would refer the Court to JPMorgan's filing on Friday, which was a notice to the Court about their position related to the temporary injunction. And here is what they said. They said we are not holding disputed funds and there is no need -- we are not holding disputed funds because we have no obligation to make a settlement payment until certain conditions precedent are met, right, and the Court knows that. The release of the liens and order from this Court saying that they can do so.

So, none of those conditions have been met and as a practical matter Your Honor, none of those conditions will be met until this fee dispute is resolved between the lawyers and the clients, in arbitration. They are not holding disputed funds and there is no need for this Court to compel them to do anything. They are akin to an interpleader Plaintiff. They're not a party to dispute, and we are not seeking to compel them to arbitrate.

The second argument that the lawyers have made to avoid arbitration is an estoppel argument and there are really two pieces to this. The first, they

say that we can't enforce an arbitration provision in the contract. You can't do that if you're also claiming that the contract is void or invalid. And Your Honor, that precise argument has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court, in the 2006 case of *Buckeye Check Cashing*.

arbitration provision in a contract is severable and of course, that is true here. We have a severance provision in this contract, its paragraph 15, which says that if any part of this contract is held unenforceable, it doesn't make the remainder of the contract unenforceable. In addition, the Court held explicitly in that case that any challenge to the enforceability of a contract should be decided by the arbitrator and not the Court.

What that means is that the situation we have here will happen, and it's not uncommon, which is that a court may enforce an arbitration provision in an agreement that an arbitrator may later find to be void. In fact, the lawyers, if anyone has taking any consistent position here, Your Honor, we submit that it is intervention Plaintiffs, because they are saying we fully embrace this contract that we drafted, that contains an arbitration provision yet, the arbitration

provision is invalid. There is absolutely no case authority for this inconsistency. If this were permitted Your Honor, it would render arbitration provision meaningless.

THE COURT: All right, tell me the case you cited, again?

MS. JOHNSON: Yes, Your Honor, I have a copy if you'd like it.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. JOHNSON: Thank you. The case is Buckeye Check Cashing. The other kind of estoppel argument they're making Your Honor, is really a quasi estoppel argument that goes to the merits of dispute and has no bearing on whether or not this Court should compel arbitration. Essentially, they're saying our right to recover a 45 percent fee is vested and secured and so there's nothing for an arbitrator to decide and there is no issue that should go to arbitration.

Well, Your Honor, that's belied by their own summary judgment filing. They filed a summary judgment motion in this court that is asking this Court, improperly asking this Court, to rule on the merits of the dispute. They've set that summary judgment motion for May 23rd and they're asking this Court for a merits ruling that should be decided by the arbitrator. And

that summary judgment filing, in their own petition, confirms that this is a merits issue. They give you —they cite these cases, *Tillery* and *Enochs and* they really go to the merits, Your Honor, about what amount should be paid to these lawyers and they have nothing to do with arbitration and they are not arbitration cases.

And Your Honor, I would remind the Court of the testimony that I think you heard at the temporary injunction hearing, which is that our clients do not dispute that compensation is owed to these lawyers.

That has never been a dispute. The issue, the merits issue that should be decided in arbitration is the amount of that compensation. That is the disputed issue. That is the disputed issue that must be decided, according to the lawyer's own agreement, by an arbitrator.

Your Honor, I also want to point out the timing issues related, that we have relevant to this issue, which is, we had a Texas Supreme Court opinion that's very clear that motions to compel arbitration must be resolved without delay and that a court abuses its discretion if it delays ruling on a Motion to Compel Arbitration. We have a particular urgency here, which has been created by the lawyer's filings. They have filed a merit summary judgment motion which is set for

May 23<sup>rd</sup>; our Response to that is due next week, May 16, and the Dallas Court of Appeals has been very clear in cases -- The Dallas Court of Appeals --, it's cited in our brief, Your Honor, the Dallas Court of Appeals has been very clear that a court cannot rule on -- its Tantrum is the name of the case, Your Honor.

A court cannot rule on a summary judgment motion while a Motion to Compel Arbitration is pending.

Nor, can it force a party to litigate by filing a response to the summary judgment motion because to do so would deprive that party of its contractual right to arbitration. Let me just make two final points Your Honor, just so you're up to speed on what developments in the case since we were last here on the temporary injunction hearing.

First, you heard from Mr. Tobey Block & Garden, which is another law firm that is seeking to recover their fees. They have filed a demand for arbitration so I just want to let the Court know that. They have a similar arbitration provision in their contract. The second development obviously, is that the Court has entered a temporary injunction and I want to remind the Court that when we were here the temporary injunction hearing, the authority that was proffered to the Court for the Court's ability to enter an injunction

was the Texas Arbitration Act.

The provision was 171.086 and what that provision says is that this Court, in support of arbitration, may sign various orders that promote case resolution, through arbitration. The other authority the Court was given was the *Center* case from the Dallas Court of Appeals. What that case said is that this Court can only render an injunction in support of arbitration.

So, we submit Your Honor, that the basis for the injunction that was proffered to you by the attorneys and on which this court entered injunction, was that this case would proceed to arbitration. Your Honor, in conclusion, all paths here lead to arbitration. We have an undisputed arbitration clause. We have a broad unambiguous scope. We have lawyer's filings saying that they are embracing that arbitration clause.

We have a summary judgment motion that tees up the merits that should be decided by the arbitrator, and we have this Court's own temporary injunction, which was rendered based on authority that presumes this issue is being decided in arbitration.

So, we ask this Court to grant the Motion to Compel Arbitration and stay all of the proceedings in this

case, pending arbitration.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LAUTEN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. First, no disrespect intended, Ms. Johnson was nice enough to move this hearing to accommodate a conflict I had and unfortunately, Mr. Vitullo is on vacation, and couldn't get back in time. So, no disrespect intended by him not being here. There are three reasons why this motion should be denied. And I'll talk about those in a second.

The first thing she did say that was correct is there's absolutely an enforceable arbitration clause in this dispute, no question. But its prong two of the analysis as to why this motion should be denied today, as the pleadings currently stand, without prejudice. The first issue is: Are there actually claims on file today that are within the course and scope in the umbrella of the arbitration provision? There are not. And there are three reasons why this motion should be denied.

First, there is no claim before this

Court that is subject to the arbitration provision at issue. Number two, they're fully estopped; there is nothing to arbitrate right now. And three, they've taken irreconcilable positions. Let me start with the

first issue. What Ms. Johnson didn't talk about is what is actually plead. We filed a second amended plea in intervention. There's only one claim pending before this Court and it's an application for declaratory relief under 37.005, JPM remains the Independent Administrator of the Estate.

Jurisdiction to dispose of property incident to the Estate and that is the settlement proceeds. The settlement proceeds, albeit it hasn't been funded, are entirely with JPM. Our DEC action complaint -- there's no breach of contract that's been filed. There's no legal malpractice case that's been filed. There's no breach of fiduciary duty case that's been filed. All of the claims that would fall within the orbit of an arbitration clause, none of that has been filed.

Our dispute primarily, is with who has the property, and that's JPM. We have no agreement with JPM. JPM's not only a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement, the lawyers have no agreement on any kind with JPM. The jurisdiction, the corpus at issue is in the hands of a party before you, who is not bound by any agreement, much less an arbitration agreement. I've got a case for you that's right on point. I've got copies of it and it's cited in our brief, if I can approach?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LAUTEN: Let the record reflect this is Transamerica v. Rapid Settlements, 284S.W.3d 385 and I would submit to you that that case is on all fours with the Instant (phonetic) case. Let me tell you what happened. That was a situation where you had a personal injury Plaintiff, injured in a car accident or something like that; they enter into a settlement agreement and instead of taking the cash, the lump sum for the settlement, the Plaintiff, which is, you know what happens all the time, is they structured the settlement to get an annuity over a certain amount of years.

Well the Plaintiff in that case decided that he wanted the money; that he didn't want to wait for the annuity stream. So, what happened, which is not wholly uncommon, is the Plaintiff reached out to this company called Rapid Settlements, which is one of these factoring companies and it enters it — the Plaintiff, who settled this case, structures a settlement; the annuity provider was Transamerica. The Plaintiff enters into this agreement with Rapid Settlements and agrees that Rapid Settlements in going to write him a check for \$5,000 and he's going to give him the annuity rights to \$100,000.

So, he's got a contract with Rapid

Settlements with an arbitration agreement. But the people who actually have the money Transamerica, they're not a party to any agreement. They're the JPM in this fact pattern. What happens? They go to arbitration and they simply, the client who entered the agreement with Rapid, but not the person that actually had the money Transamerica, they weren't a party to that contract. They go arbitrate. They move to compel the arbitration award. The Plaintiff loses. The arbitrator says you entered into an agreement; you gave up your rights on that annuity; you're bound by that.

Well, then they move to confirm the award, like coming back to this Court. The JPM in that particular scenario, Transamerica, who had no arbitration agreement with them said we're not bound by that, we're a non-signatory, you couldn't compel us to arbitration; we didn't go to arbitration. We're not going to comply with the arbitrator's award. We don't care about your arbitration award. Our contract's with the Plaintiff and that's what we're going to honor. And in that case, the Court said, that's right.

And in the Houston case, they held that it was reversible error to confirm the arbitration award because the person that actually had the money, the person that actually had the settlement, was not bound

by an arbitration award and they weren't privy to an agreement. That's exactly what we have here. We have a confluence. We have three parties. It's not just client and lawyer. It's client, lawyer and JPM and JPM's got the money. We had no agreement with them. They're not moving to compel arbitration with respect to JPM.

And furthermore, I would disagree that this is just a fee dispute; it's not. It's an ownership and property right dispute. We're entitled to that property right now. We own it. We have filed a DEC action and we're only seeking six findings. No legal malpractice claim, no breach of fiduciary duty claim. Why in the thunder would we go to arbitration and take a dozen depositions and spend three months to a year in arbitration when we're entitled to the property right now, in the hands of a party who is not subject to any arbitration agreement.

So, that's issue one, is there is no claim subject to the arbitration agreement as things currently stand. I totally agree with her. If we were to amend and sue them for breach of contract and all kinds of other things, yeah, I get that. If they were to sue us for legal malpractice, I get that. None of that is on file today. Point number two: They are

fully estopped. There's nothing to arbitrate. That's what *Tillery* says; that's what *Enochs* says. Those findings have been made in the injunction order, those cases are cited in your order, and lastly, they have taken a reconcilable position.

She is absolutely, right; I do not disagree with Buckeye. She is correct and she is telling you the truth when she says, that generally, that's up to the arbitrator, that the arbitration agreement can be severed from the contract. She's absolutely telling the truth on that. But there's a bigger point to be made here and that is simply this: The policy of this is absolutely, awful. They have accepted all of the benefits of this work, they terminate the lawyers literally within minutes of the settlement being reached; they fire the lawyers.

They say we agree the lawyers should be paid but they say we're not going to tell you what that number is nor are we going to pay any of it until an arbitrator or court tells us otherwise. And they want to be in a better position than they were before they did all of this and they created this mess and that is simply wrong.

I'm just telling you, Your Honor, if you
were to allow -- if a personal injury Plaintiff was

allowed to simply wait until the case is settled, until the Frank Bransons and Ted Lyons and Windle Turleys of the world, we're just not going to pay you. We're going to go to arbitration now and spend a year there. That's simply not the law. They are fully estopped. Lastly, I want to leave you if I could, with a copy of the DEC action statute. Can I approach?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. LAUTEN: And this is not just a DEC action statute, this is a unique provision of Chapter 37 that gives a Probate Court exclusive jurisdiction over this type of claim. In the Civil Rights and Remedies Code it says: "Declarations relating to trusts or estate". This is the statute that we plead in the only claim before this Court. And under 37.005 one, you have exclusive jurisdiction as the Probate Court to deal with a class of creditors who have an interest in funds germane to the Estate. We're a creditor. We're owed this money. We have a vested property right.

The Fifth Circuit applied Texas substantive law has held the minute the contingency fee is earned, it's a vested secured, fully vested estopped ownership right. That's it. Under this provision, the Court maintains exclusive jurisdiction to dispose of the corpus. I will just remind the Court this, JPM again,

who we have no agreement with, they have no agreement with, other than the settlement agreement -- by the way, I would love to see what the choice of law or forum selection is in that agreement, which we haven't seen.

But be that as it may, nobody has any agreement with them that they're the Independent Administrator. They got the property and they are not bound by any agreement to arbitrate. So, therefore, for these reasons we would ask the Court to do this: Deny the Motion to Compel Arbitration without prejudice as it stands right now, if the pleadings are later amended and broadened, it has to be re-analyzed to see if claims fall in the scope of that arbitration provision.

The bottom line is this, no, we're not running from our agreement. Our agreement's our best friend. Our agreement's why this case is over before it starts. Number one, there is no claim to arbitrate as things are currently plead. I'd ask the Court to consider and take judicial notice of our second amended petition in intervention. Number two, they are fully estopped under *Enochs* and *Tillery*. There is nothing to go back in time and litigate.

THE COURT: Just a second. The second amended petition is  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{--}}$ 

MR. LAUTEN: Yes, Your Honor, if you want

I can give you a copy of mine, a file-stamped copy. We 1 filed it on May 1st at 1:13 if I could approach? I don't have an extra copy for you Anne, but --MS. JOHNSON: I got it. THE COURT: So, you're asking for judicial notice of that? Take judicial notice of the MR. LAUTEN: 9 only pleading that could possibly be before the Court 10 with respect to their motion is one claim for 11 declaratory relief. 12 THE COURT: Any objection? 13 MS. JOHNSON: Uh, no, Your Honor. 14 MR. LAUTEN: And so, that's my argument. 15 I appreciate your time. I know that we've taken a 16 tremendous amount of your time away from how busy you are on Mr. Loewinsohn's side of the case. I'm happy to 17 18 answer any questions you've got, but again, I'd ask the 19 Court to deny the Motion to Compel Arbitration without 20 prejudice at this time. I got a proposed order if the 21 Court wants me to leave it. 22 THE COURT: All right. The Court's going 23 to take judicial notice of the second amended petition 24 in intervention. And the Court will take proposed orders from both sides.

MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, may I just respond, briefly?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. But I will take

proposed orders today.

MS. JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, Mr. Lauten's a very clever lawyer and he's made some very clever arguments here but they drafted this arbitration provision. This is the first time we've heard by the way, that their pleadings are outside the scope, but there is a whole bucket of law about how artful pleadings do not get you out of an arbitration clause. This arbitration clause does not say breach of contract claims go to arbitration. It says any matter that arises between the attorneys and the clients goes to arbitration. Any matter, Your Honor.

It is one of the broadest most unambiguous, unlimited arbitration clauses there can be. And simply because they have plead this as a DEC action, let's be very clear about the relief they are seeking. They are seeking that this Court declare that they are entitled to immediate disbursement of 45 percent of the settlement proceeds. They can dress that up as a DEC action, they can say oh, it's not breach of contract

it's not that. That is a matter that has arisen between attorneys and clients. That is a fee dispute that is specifically covered in this arbitration clause.

Your Honor, the Transamerica case they're coming up with -- and again, Mr. Lauten's a very clever lawyer but there is no non-signatory. Transamerica would only apply to bring JPMorgan in if they'd said we're not paying, no matter what, we're not paying. Then they would need to be a party to the arbitration but that is the opposite of what JPMorgan has said.

JPMorgan has said we have no dog in this fight. We will hold on to the proceeds until this dispute gets resolved, until this Court gives us an order that we can release it and then we will pay.

Your Honor, there is no non-signatory issue and if this Court stays the arbitration -- I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Excuse me. The last time I heard from Mr. Beckwith, he said that they were working with a settlement sheet, that they did not have a signed settlement agreement. And I guess the Court raised — he represented that they would comply with the settlement sheet, but he didn't say unequivocally, that Chase might or could not possibly back out of the settlement agreement and he didn't say that

unequivocally.

So, I guess one of the concerns that the Court has, because I've seen it happen, is that settlement agreements fall apart down here. And so, one of the problems with what they were proposing to me, as a resolution of the issue with the disputed funds, was that there was some guarantee in place that, you know, that Chase would not disburse the funds under certain conditions. However, you know, Chase probably would still retain an option to say that the conditions were not satisfied or that they had changed their mind.

And so, as I said, I didn't hear from Mr. Beckwith that Chase was unequivocally yoked to the settlement agreement. In fact, he said that the settlement agreement had not been signed or fleshed out. He said that they were working with the settlement terms.

MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I would like
Ms. Pulliam to respond to this but, I also refer the
Court to JPMorgan's filing on Friday. They filed --

THE COURT: I haven't seen it.

MS. PULLIAM: I have a copy for you, Your

Honor.

MS. JOHNSON: I understand but just to be clear, JPMorgan makes very clear that they will abide by

existing court orders regarding payment and that they holding -- they are waiting for this Court to make an order.

THE COURT: I understand that but a settlement agreement is not a settlement agreement until it's signed and --

MS. JOHNSON: It is signed Your Honor.

MS. PULLIAM: Your Honor, I just want to make clear because I was standing with Mr. Beckwith at the last hearing and if we weren't clear, we certainly intended to be clear that there was a signed settlement agreement at that time.

THE COURT: All right, well what I heard was that there were settlement terms that had been signed off on. I didn't --

MS. JOHNSON: Definitely. Your Honor, there was a Rule 11 Agreement that was filed with the Court and then there were two notices that JPMorgan has filed.

THE COURT: I have not seen them.

MS. JOHNSON: And if I may approach, I can give you the one that we filed most recently on last Friday, May 4th. So, in that notice, the excerpt portions of the confidential signed settlement agreement and those portions contained the conditions precedent to

settlement. I'll give you just a second to look at it,
Your Honor but I would direct to you the second page
that contains the excerpts to the settlement agreement.
So, Your Honor, this is a representation by JPMorgan
again, that there is a signed settlement agreement.

I believe Mr. Lauten was incorrect when he said that the bank is not bound by anything. It is certainly bound by this agreement. It's also made a representation to the Court about the terms that are contained in the settlement agreement. Those terms, as outlined in our filing, contain conditions precedent prior to any release of funds.

So, this idea that there are settlement proceeds currently that anybody has a property interest in, is incorrect. There are no settlement proceeds currently that are owed to anyone under the settlement agreement.

THE COURT: Well, I understand that but I guess --

Go ahead.

MR. LAUTEN: If you were to read this into the record right now it would be unbelievably unclear procedurally, where we are. And this is a true fact, that supplement is not in evidence. I haven't seen it. You haven't seen it in

camera. We have a lawyer telling you what an agreement says that nobody on this side of the table or the Court has actually seen and the point that was made at the prior hearing, which I think you're latching onto, is simply this: They can get together and change their own agreement at any time. We're not a party to that agreement. I haven't even seen their agreement. That's the point. They may file something today and say we'll do this and then tomorrow, they turn around and say we won't. That's the threat. And that was germane to the injunction, which the Court granted.

MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I just want to get us back to the issue. Is this is a dispute that should be compelled to arbitration? Whether or not -- if this Court compels arbitration, this Court's temporary injunction stays in place. And Your Honor, if I may approach again, this is a really important point. Mr. Lauten told you at temporary injunction hearing, the reason this Court had the right to enter an injunction -- it's really important that the Court understands this -- is that under the Texas Arbitration Act, before arbitration proceedings begin in support of arbitration, this Court can enter injunctions if it thinks there's going to be destruction of property.

This was the authority that was given to

this Court. If this Court orders arbitration that will not affect the temporary injunction, those proceeds aren't going anywhere until this arbitration is concluded. Those proceeds aren't going anywhere.

JPMorgan has said that. They have told this Court they are going to abide by the temporary injunction. We have said that. This corpus stays because JPMorgan has no obligation to pay these funds.

So, this court has entered a temporary injunction in support of arbitration. That is the authority that Mr. Lauten gave you and he's not disputing that. So, those funds are going to stay put. JPMorgan's going to hold on to those until this gets resolved and this Court enters a different order. This is a lot of noise trying to distract the Court from the issue that is before the Court, which is: Is this a dispute that needs to go to arbitration? It most certainly is and to be clear what they are asking for, they have filed a summary judgment motion and they're asking this Court to order, give us 45 percent of settlement proceeds right now. That is a fee dispute. It is a matter between attorney and client and it must be decided by an arbitrator.

MS. PULLIAM: Your Honor, again, we don't take a position on the arbitration issue. If this Court

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has any questions whatsoever after the representations that Mr. Beckwith made at the last hearing about the existence of a settlement agreement or the representations that my firm and Mr. Beckwith made in our May 4<sup>th</sup> hearing about the existence of a settlement agreement, including representations that there were excerpts from that settlement agreement included in our filing, we are happy to address that with filing an in camera redacted portion of it.

whether or not there was a settlement agreement. The question in my mind was whether or not that settlement agreement could be changed or altered or not honored. I mean, I see people change their minds every day. And so, the question in my mind was whether the representation was that there was a settlement agreement.

The question in my mind was well do I hang my hat on something that could change. And so, I'm not privy to the negotiations between the Intervenors and Chase Bank and so I don't know that, I mean, without having seen that, I don't know whether or not there's an opt-out provision in the settlement agreement, whether or not there's a -- you see what I'm saying?

MS. PULLIAM: Yeah.

THE COURT: I basically -- I made the observation that -- you're asking me to make a decision without much information. And so, you know, with those questions hanging in the air nobody decided to give the Court any more information so, I reached the conclusion that I reached.

MS. PULLIAM: And to be clear there is a signed settlement agreement by both parties that --

THE COURT: I'm clear on that, ma'am.

MS. PULLIAM: -- creates obligation and what is clear is that that will not change. That there is a settlement agreement that obligates my client that is signed by my client and that fact will not change.

And again, we're happy to present in camera if the Court is interested, a redacted version of the settlement agreement, subject to discussion with counsel.

MS. JOHNSON: And Your Honor, let me just speak, this is so important. This whole business about whether the settlement agreement can change, the Court has already protected against that, because you have entered a temporary injunction. You have said JPMorgan, nobody's getting these settlement funds.

THE COURT: Well, the settlement agreement and the temporary injunction -- I mean the injunction protects the funds. It doesn't protect the

agreement. MS. JOHNSON: That's true, Your Honor but 3 isn't that what the issue is? THE COURT: No. The issue and I'll say 5 it again, the issue is I am not sure about the settlement agreement. I'm not sure whether or not the settlement agreement can be changed or modified without 8 the Court being aware of it. I don't know. 9 MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, we will 10 represent -- we will propose today that we will notify 11 the Court immediately if the party's change any part of 12 the settlement agreement. But the point is everybody 13 here is concerned about what happens to these funds. 14 Nothing is happening to these funds while there's an 15 arbitration. The Court has entered a temporary 16 injunction preventing that. THE COURT: I understand. 17 18 MS. JOHNSON: Yeah. 19 MS. PULLIAM: So, really, --20 THE COURT: That's why I entered the temporary injunction. 21 22 MS. JOHNSON: That's right. And that 23 stays in place pending arbitration unless it's reversed by the Court of Appeals or unless the Court reverses 24 25 itself. That temporary injunction maintains those

funds. JPMorgan -- nothing is happening to those funds. 1 THE COURT: It maintains the funds, 3 It doesn't necessarily maintain the agreement. ma'am. You see what I'm saying? MS. JOHNSON: I do understand, Your Honor and I don't know what to say other than we will inform the Court if something changes in the agreement, but and 8 none of this, and again, Your Honor, all of this goes 9 to, all of this goes to an argument that there is now a 10 non-signatory who cannot be compelled to arbitration. 11 Again, there is absolutely no argument that's been 12 articulated related to JPMorgan that should prevent this 13 court from compelling its dispute to arbitration. THE COURT: All right. 14 15 Ma'am? MS. PULLIAM: Your Honor, I just want to 16 17 offer again, that we have a copy of the redacted version 18 of the settlement agreement that I'm happy to offer in 19 camera if the Court chooses subject to --20 MS. JOHNSON: We have no objection to 21 that, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: What about you? 23 MS. PULLIAM: I don't think she's looking 24 at me, Brian. MR. LAUTEN: I don't have a copy to offer into evidence, Your Honor so, if she wants to offer the agreement in camera, I don't have a problem with that.

I don't have a problem with seeing the agreement.

THE COURT: Well, they're not offering the agreement. They're offering a redacted copy of the agreement.

MR. LAUTEN: Well, I would need to know what they're redacting. I mean, it's hard to object to something you haven't seen, that's being shown to the Court without me getting a copy.

MS. PULLIAM: Your Honor, I can represent the only thing redacted in the settlement agreement is the amount of the settlement proceeds.

MR. LAUTEN: I don't have a problem with the Court seeing it in camera.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. PULLIAM: Your Honor, to assist the Court, the portions of the settlement agreement that are quoted in our May  $4^{\rm th}$  filings are contained in section 2 on page 3.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, we're just asking, given the timing, that we have a ruling quickly. I understand we put all that in our papers that we have a summary judgment response due next week. In the event

the Court denies our Motion to Compel Arbitration we would ask the Court for a stay of proceedings that we can seek emergency relief in the Dallas Court of Appeals and alternatively, we would ask the Court to continue the summary judgment hearing, which is set for May 23rd. That would give everybody more space to be able to resolve this issue.

THE COURT: The Court doesn't -- I don't have very many days left in this month that aren't already committed to other matters. And if the Motion for Summary Judgment is taken up on the 23<sup>rd</sup>, I'm planning to be out the following week.

MS. JOHNSON: The problem Your Honor, is that we would have to file a response on the summary judgment motion May 16<sup>th</sup>. We can't be forced to proceed to continue to litigate the case while there's a Motion to Compel pending and we would say even if the Court wants more time to rule that would give everybody more space if the Motion for Summary Judgment was continued.

THE COURT: All right, is there an objection?

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$  LAUTEN: If that pleases the Court, that's fine with us, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LAUTEN: It's totally up to you.

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THE COURT: All right. Sheriff? 3 THE BAILIFF: Yes. THE COURT: Could you get Amanda, please? I'm just running over with motions for summary judgment down here. I thought I'd had enough motions for summary judgment in Hopper but it 8 looks like I'm not done yet, I've done easily 20 9 something. 10 THE COURT: When is that set for? 11 MR. LAUTEN: I'm not sure, Your Honor, 12 off the top of my head. I thought it was 30 minutes but 13 I'm not 100 percent confident in telling you that's 14 accurate. 15 MS. JOHNSON: It's set at 2 p.m. on May 23<sup>rd</sup>. 16 THE COURT: You have an hour. Okay, I 17 18 have any time Tuesday afternoon, on June 5th. MS. JOHNSON: That's fine with me. Is 19 20 that okay with you, Jim? 21 MR. PENNINGTON: Your Honor, I've got a 22 trial starting on June the  $4^{th}$ . I'm told it's the number 23 one setting. 24 THE COURT: All right, what about 9 25 O'clock, June 6th. You think you'll be finished?

MR. PENNINGTON: No, unfortunately, it's 1 going to be about a week. THE COURT: I'm sorry? MR. PENNINGTON: It's going to be about approximately one week, Your Honor. MS. PULLIAM: Your Honor, I think that JPMorgan is a party to that hearing. I think the summary judgment is also directed to the bank. I have 9 my availability here but I don't have Mr. Beckwith's. 10 THE COURT: I can't hear you. 11 MS. PULLIAM: I have my availability on 12 my calendar here with me, but I don't have Mr. Beckwith's. One thing we can do is confer and -- If I'm 13 14 wrong, I'm happy to be wrong about that. 15 THE COURT: Okay, I could give you June 11th from 9-10 or I could give you June 11th at 3. 16 17 MS. PULLIAM: The 9-10 would be 18 preferable on my end but again, I haven't been able to confer with Mr. Beckwith. 19 20 MR. LAUTEN: We can make these times 21 work, Your Honor. You tell us when to be here and we'll 22 be here. 23 MS. JOHNSON: Those times are fine with 24 us too, Your Honor. 25 THE COURT: Okay, well I can, I mean, if

you aren't finish Monday morning, it'll run into my 10 1 O'clock docket but I can put you on say at 3 O'clock or move a case up to 1 O'clock and be finished at 2:30. I can put you on say 2:30-4 on Monday afternoon, worst case 3-5, Monday afternoon. Do you want to do that? MR. LAUTEN: Sure. MS. PULLIAM: The morning spot would be 8 preferable for me. I think I have to get on a plane later that afternoon, but --9 10 THE COURT: Can you text him or email him? 11 12 MS. PULLIAM: I just did. I just did. 13 THE COURT: All right. Okay. What we'll do is I'll move the date and you'll have an extended 14 15 amount of time to respond. MR. LAUTEN: Your Honor, can I approach 16 17 the bench and give you a proposed order? I think Ms. 18 Johnson may have already given you hers. 19 THE COURT: Yes. 20 MR. LAUTEN: Thank you. 21 MS. JOHNSON: So, Your Honor, that would 22 mean that our response would be June  $4^{th}$  and so we would 23 ask that the Court give us, that we have a ruling on 24 arbitration one way or the other a couple of weeks before our response is due. Thank you.

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THE COURT: Well, what I'll do is we'll
     set it on June 11^{th}. You'll either have the 9-10 slot or
     you'll have the 2:30-3:30 or 4, depending on --
                    MS. PULLIAM: We'll get back to you
     tomorrow morning.
                    THE COURT: Okay, is everybody okay with
     that? Can you all work that out?
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                    MR. LAUTEN: Sure, Your Honor.
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                    THE COURT: All right, and then your
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     response date would be --
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                    MS. JOHNSON: I believe June 4th, Your
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     Honor.
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                    [Counsel confer about dates]
                    THE COURT: All right, so everybody's
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     clear, either 9-10 on June 11^{th} or 2:30-3:30 on June 11^{th}
     or I can go a little bit later. Anything else? Just
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     notify the Court tomorrow.
18
                    MS. PULLIAM: Absolutely, Your Honor.
19
                    MR. LAUTEN: Your Honor, thank you.
20
                    MR. LAUTEN: Did you say 2:30 or 3:30 on
     June 11th?
21
22
                    THE COURT: I'm going to start another --
23
     I'll have a motion for summary judgment in front of
24
     yours that's going to start at 1pm and so, I've given
25
     them an hour-and-a-half. Let's start you at 3 O'clock
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to make sure I've given them enough time.
 1
                     MR. LAUTEN: Thanks, Judge.
                    MS. JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
                     THE COURT: Okay, thank you very much.
                        [End of proceedings]
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```

STATE OF TEXAS X

COUNTY OF DALLAS X

I, Jackie Galindo, Deputy Official Court
Reporter for the Probate Court Number One, Dallas
County, Texas, do hereby certify that the above and
foregoing contains a true and correct transcription of
all portions of evidence and other proceedings requested
in writing by counsel for the parties to be included in
this request in the above-styled and numbered cause, all
of which occurred in open court or in chambers and were
reported by me.

I further certify that this Reporter's

Record of the proceedings truly and correctly reflects

the exhibits, if any, offered by the respective parties.

 $$\operatorname{\textsc{MY}}$  OFFICIAL HAND, this the 1st day of June, 2018.

/S/: Jackie Galindo

Jackie Galindo, Texas CSR #7023 Expiration Date: 12/31/19 Official Court Reporter The Probate Court, Renaissance Tower, 2400-A Dallas County, Texas 214-653-6066

# REPORTER'S RECORD VOLUME 5 OF 5 CAUSE NO. PR-11-3238-1 COURT OF APPEALS NO. 05-18-00558-CV

IN THE ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED

THE PROBATE COURT

JO N. HOPPER Plaintiff,

V.

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A. STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER Defendants.

JOHN L. MALESOVAS d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP Intervenors,

V.

STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, and JPMORGAN CHASE BANK N.A., Defendants.

NUMBER ONE

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

HEARING EXHIBITS 

EXHIBITS VOL. 2								
INTERV	/ENORS	<u>Description</u>	Offered	Admitted	Vol.			
No.	1	Contingency Fee Contract signed By Laura Wassmer	28	34	2			
No.	2	Contingency Fee Contract signed By Stephen Hopper	28	34	2			
No.	3	Letter dated 4/5/18 From Mr. Penningtor To Mr. Lauten		37	2			
DEFENI	DANTS							
No.	1	Letter dated 4/6/18 From Mr. Penningtor To Mr. Malesovas ar Mr. Lauten	n nd	58	2			
EXHIBITS VOL. 3								
INTERV	/ENORS	DESCRIPTION	Offered	Admitted	Vol.			
No.	1	Contingency Fee Contract signed by Laura Wassmer	24	25	3			
No.	2	Contingency Fee Contract signed by Stephen Hopper	25	25	3			
No.	3	Charge of the Court Filed Sept. 25, 201		25	3			
No.	6	Rule 11 Letter Filed April 4, 2018	3 28	31	3			
No.	7	Letter to Mr. Laute From Mr. Penningtor Dated April 5, 2018	n 29	31	3			
No.	8	Letter to Mr. Males From Mr. Pennington Dated April 5, 2018	ì	31	3			

EXHIBITS, VOL 3 cont'd.								
INTERVENORS	DESCRIPTION	Offered	Admitted	Vol.				
No. 11	Letter to Mr. Eichman From Mr. Vitullo Dated October 8, 201	29	31	3				
No. 13	Email to Mr. Vitullo From Mr. Stephen Hopp Dated Jan. 25, 2016	30 per	31	3				
No. 66	Order Granting Plain Motion for Legal Rul Dated March 28, 2018		31	3				
No. 70	Email to Mr. Vitullo From Mr. Levinger Dated April 3, 2018	31	31	3				
No. 14	Email to Mr. Vitullo From Ms. Laura Wassmon Dated Jan. 25, 2016	er 34	33	3				
DEFENDANTS	DESCRIPTION	Offered	Admitted	Vol.				
No. 2	Letter from Mr. Pennington to Mr. Vitullo and Mr. Malesovas dated April 6, 2018	36	38	3				

THE STATE OF TEXAS X

COUNTY OF DALLAS X

I, Jackie Galindo, Official Court
Reporter for the Probate Court Number One, of Dallas
County, Texas, do hereby certify that the foregoing
exhibits constitute true and correct duplicates of the
original exhibits, excluding physical evidence,
admitted, tendered in the offer of proof or offered into
evidence during the HOPPER ESTATE MATTER, in the above
entitled and numbered cause as set out herein before the
Honorable Brenda Hull Thompson, Judge of The Probate
Court One of Dallas County, Texas.

I further certify that the total cost for the preparation of this Reporter's Record is  $\frac{$1,534.00}{}$  and was paid by Ms. Anne Johnson of Haynes and Boone Law Firm, LLC.

WITNESS MY OFFICIAL HAND, on this, the 1st day of June, 2018.

/s/: Jackie Galindo

Jackie Galindo, Texas CSR #7023
Expiration Date: 12/31/19
Official Court Reporter
Probate Court, Dallas County, Texas
Renaissance Tower, 2400-A
Dallas Texas
214-653-6066



#### CONTINGENCY FEE CONTRACT OF REPRESENTATION

The undersigned **Stephen Hopper**, and Laura Wassmer referred to as "Client" or "Clients" employ and retain Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP, and Malesovas Law Firm, (herein "Attorneys") to represent Client as set forth herein.

1. SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION: Attorneys agree to investigate and evaluate and litigate Client's possible claim or claims of negligence, fraud, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty against JP MORGAN CHASE and persons and companies relating to JP MORGAN CHASE BANKs wrongful acts in acting as the independent administrator of the Estate of Max Hopper..

Client understands and agrees that the scope of representation herein does not include the filing of any claim against any state or federal entity or employee or filing or pursuing an appeal from disposition in the Trial Court. Client understands and agrees that the scope of representation herein does not include defending any claims or lawsuits filed against Client. Client is retaining separate counsel on a flat fee agreement or other fee arrangement to defend them against any claims filed by any parties. Other than Chaple.

Client understands and agrees that the scope of representation herein does not include representing Clients in the probate lawsuit or lawsuit involving Chase bank, and defending Client against Chase bank or any other party.

Client understands and agrees that Attorneys will not file suit against entities that are in a foreign jurisdiction or are international companies whom in attorney's opinion cannot be sued in a United States court. Client understands and agrees that Attorneys are not obligated to pursue entities that are defunct and/or bankrupt.

Client hereby agrees and understands that Attorneys retain the right to withdraw from representation of Client at any time, so long as said withdrawal would not unduly prejudice Client's right to bring suit or to seek or retain another attorney to represent Client. In such event, Client agrees to timely sign an appropriate Motion for Substitution of Counsel. If after disposition in the trial court, Client desires to appeal, a new and separate agreement shall be entered into by the parties as to services and fees for any appeal, or Client shall retain separate counsel to handle any appeal and Attorneys shall retain their interest in the case under this agreement applicable to any recovery obtained by settlement or otherwise.

- **AUTHORITY OF ATTORNEYS:** Client empowers Attorneys to take all steps in this matter deemed by them to be advisable for the investigation and handling of Client's Claims, including hiring investigators, expert witnesses, and/or other attorneys and filing any legal action necessary. Client authorizes and empowers Attorneys to do any and all things necessary and proper in the enforcement, compromise, settlement, adjustment and collection of Client's Claim, and Client further authorizes and empowers them to sign any and all pleadings and all releases, checks, drafts, authorizations and other papers necessary and proper in connection with the prosecution or enforcement of Client's Claims and collection or settlement of the damages awarded or to be paid therefore, and to receive such funds or other property in Client's name and for Client on account of any judgment recovered or any settlement agreed upon in connection with Client's Claim. Full power and authority is given by Client to Attorneys to adjust, settle or compromise Client's Claim, but no final settlement shall be made and consummated by Attorneys without first submitting the offer, compromise, or adjustment to Client for approval, and Client agrees not to compromise or settle Client's Claim without the Attorneys' authority, agreement and consent. Should Client make a settlement in violation of this Agreement, Client agrees to pay Attorneys the full fee agreed upon under paragraph 3 "Attorneys' Fee", below.
- 3. ATTORNEYS' FEE: This Agreement is a contingency fee contract. Specifically, if Attorneys are successful in recovering money or anything of value for Client, by settlement prior to trial begins. Attorneys shall receive attorneys' fees in the amount of forty percent (40%) of the gross recovery. The attorney fee will be split amongst the attorneys as follows: FSSV 50% Malesovas Law Firm 50% If the matter is resolved after trial begins, Attorneys shall receive attorneys' fees in the amount of forty-five (45%) of the gross recovery. All attorneys' fees shall be a percentage of the gross recovery. Gross recovery means the gross amount of money or other value or property recovered for Client, before the deduction of expenses. Trial is considered to have commenced at 5:00 p.m. on the Friday closest to ten (10) days before jury selection begins or evidence is first presented to the trier of fact, whichever is the earlier of these two events. If Attorneys do not recover any money or other value or property for Client, Client will not owe any attorneys' fees. Client agrees that Attorneys may, in their discretion, employ associate counsel to assist in prosecuting Client's cause of action, and Client does not object to the participation of any lawyers Attorneys may choose to involve in this representation of Client. With the exceptions set forth below, payment of attorneys' fees to associate counsel is the responsibility of Attorneys. In the event that the case is settled by way of a structured settlement, Client approves and authorizes attorneys' fees to be based upon the present value benefit of the settlement and further authorizes Attorneys to take attorneys' fees either in cash or in structured payment, as Attorneys deem appropriate.

In some instances, it may be necessary for Attorneys to retain special outside counsel to assist on matters other than prosecuting Client's claims for damages. Examples of such instances include the following: a defendant may seek bankruptcy protection; or a defendant may attempt to fraudulently transfer some of its assets to avoid paying the Client's claim; a defendant may transfer assets out of the country thereby necessitating the retention of foreign counsel, or a complex, multi-party settlement may require an ethics opinion from outside counsel; or special action in probate court may be necessary apart from the usual probate proceedings involved in an estate; or a separate lawsuit may need to be filed against a defendant's insurance company. Client agrees that Attorneys may retain such special outside counsel to represent Client when Attorneys deem such assistance to be reasonably necessary, and that the fees of such counsel will be deducted from Client's share of the recovery.

- 4. <u>COSTS AND OTHER EXPENSES:</u> Clients WILL NOT BE responsible to pay for costs and expenses as incurred. Such costs include filing fees, expert witness fees, court reporter and video fees, copy charges, postage, mailing, t avel, witness fees, electronic document conversion fees, delivery fees, internal operating costs and other related charges incurred or paid as an expense on behalf of Client and paid to third-party vendors or incurred internally by Attorneys and charged to Client in connection with Attorneys' representation of Client.
- 5. **DISBURSEMENT OF PROCEEDS TO CLIENT:** Client understands that Attorneys make no guarantee or assurance of any kind regarding the likelihood of success of Client's claims. Upon receipt by Attorneys of the proceeds of any settlement or judgment, Attorneys shall (1) retain either forty percent (40%) of the proceeds as their attorneys' fees if the matter is settled or resolved before trial begins or forty-five (45%) percent of the proceeds as their attorneys' fees if the matter is settled or resolved after trial begins, (2) deduct from Client's share of the proceeds any costs and expenses, including the fees of any special outside counsel that Attorneys may incur on Client's behalf, and (3) disburse the remainder of Client's share of the proceeds to Client. At the time of disbursement of any proceeds, Client will be provided with a disbursement sheet reflecting the attorneys' fees, the expenses deducted out of Client's share, and the remainder of Client's share.

Upon some circumstances, health insurers, workers compensation carriers, or others who have paid benefits or provided services on Client's behalf may claim a right to recover a portion of the proceeds of any action brought on behalf of the Client and may place Attorneys on notice of their claim. Except as may be required by law, Attorneys will not agree to protect any claim of a subrogation carrier or other creditor without Client's consent.

- 6. **POWER OF ATTORNEY:** Client gives Attorneys a power of attorney to execute and negotiate all reasonable and necessary documents connected with the handling of this cause of action, including pleadings, contracts, checks or drafts, settlement agreements, compromises and releases, verifications, dismissals and orders, proofs of claim, ballots, verified statements including those pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2019, and all other documents that Client could properly execute. Client's claims will not be settled without obtaining Client's consent.
- 7. COOPERATION: ADDRESS CHANGE; RETURN OF DOCUMENTS: Client agrees to cooperate with Attorneys to permit Client's claims to be investigated and developed; to disclose to Attorneys all facts relevant to the claim; and to be reasonably available to attend any necessary meetings, depositions, preparation sessions, hearings and trial. Client shall appear on reasonable notice at any and all depositions and Court appearances and shall comply with all reasonable requests of Attorneys in connection with preparation and presentation of Client's claims. The Client acknowledges and agrees that all communications with Attorneys are privileged. The Client acknowledges that Attorneys may represent other individuals on the same or similar matters and therefore may communicate matters of common interest to all of Attorneys' clients. Therefore, Client agrees and understands that other individuals who are clients of Attorneys may also invoke the attorney client privilege as to Attorneys' communications with Client. The Client acknowledges and agrees not to provide attorney work product or attorney client communications to any other person.

Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any change of marital status or death of spouse. Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any bankruptcy proceedings involving Client or Client's spouse. Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any other legal proceedings to which Client or Client's spouse is a party.

Client agrees to notify Attorneys in writing of each change in Client's mailing address (work or home) or telephone number (work, home and cell) during the term of this representation within seven (7) days of each such change of address or telephone number. When the case is completed, and subject to any Court orders, Attorneys will provide Client the opportunity to retrieve any documents and/or materials that Client provided to Attorneys or that Attorneys have obtained from other sources in connection with the case. However, if Client has not retrieved those documents and/or materials within ninety (90) days after Attorneys have mailed to Client written notice that the case is completed and that those documents and/or material are available to Client, Attorneys may dispose of those documents and/or materials.

8. NO TAX ADVICE: Attorneys have advised Client that the pursuit of resolution of this claim may have various tax consequences. Client understands that Attorneys do not render tax advice and are not being retained to offer such advice to Client or to represent Client before the IRS. Moreover, Client accepts responsibility for making any payment or filings necessitated by the resolution of Client's claim.

Client understands that applicable State law may impose sales, service or other tax on any amount that Client may recover or the fees due Attorneys hereunder. Client also understands that applicable Federal income tax law may require that Client pay income tax on the fees due Attorneys hereunder, separate and apart from and in addition to any taxes owed by Attorneys. Client agrees that any such taxes (other than Federal and/or State income taxes that Attorneys may owe on monies actually received by them) shall be paid out of my share of any recovery.

- 9. **DEATH OF CLIENT:** The provisions of this Agreement will not terminate upon the death of Client. In the event of the death of Client, any duly appointed Representative of Client's heirs and/or estate will be bound by this Agreement to the extent allowed by applicable law, including without limitation, the provisions of this Agreement relating to the recovery of attorneys' fees and costs and other expenses. Any such Representative shall, upon request by Attorneys, execute a new Agreement in the capacity as Representative for the heirs and/or estate of the Client.
- 10. OFFER OF SETTLEMENT: Client understands that applicable law may, under certain circumstances, allow a Defendant to make an offer of settlement to Client and if Client rejects or does not accept such an offer, such may result in any award, verdict or judgment in Client's favor being reduced as provided by such law. Client understands that Client has the final authority to accept or reject any offer of settlement. Client understands that if Client rejects or does not accept such an offer, and Client's recovery is subsequently reduced, the fees owed to Attorneys will be calculated on the amount of any award, verdict or judgment before reduction, and the reduction shall be out of Client's share of any recovery.

- 11. SECURITY INTEREST: Client hereby assigns, transfers and conveys over to Attorneys an amount equal to either forty percent (40%) of the proceeds if the matter is settled or resolved before trial begins or forty-five percent (45%) of the proceeds if the matter is resolved after trial begins, of any property, money or other value recovered by settlement, compromise, verdict or judgment of the claims described in this contract. Client does hereby give and grant to Attorneys an express security interest, in addition to any statutory lien, upon Client's claims and any and all judgments recovered, and any and all funds or property realized or paid by compromise or settlement, as security for the compensation and costs and expenses advanced or due to be paid or reimbursed to Attorneys hereunder. This security interest is to continue in the event Attorneys are discharged without good cause. If the claims are not assignable at law, Client expressly assigns to Attorneys, to the extent of attorneys' fees and disbursements, any sum realized by way of a settlement or any judgment obtained thereon.
- 12. <u>BINDING EFFECT:</u> This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, legal representatives, successors and assigns.
- 13. TERMINATION OF REPRESENTATION: Client understands that Client can terminate Attorneys' representation of Client at any time by providing written notice to Attorneys. Should Client elect to terminate Attorneys' representation prior to the full conclusion of Attorneys' representation, Client understands and agrees that Attorneys have a claim for expenses of litigation and unpaid attorneys' fees which will become due upon receipt by Client or any successor attorney of Client or any proceeds for any remaining portion of Client's claim. Client understands that the obligation for unpaid attorneys' fees will be calculated based on the percentage of work completed on the case or claims at the time Client terminates Attorneys.
- 14. NO GUARANTEE OF RECOVERY: Client understands that no guarantee or assurances of any kind have been made regarding the likelihood of success of Client's claim, but that Attorneys will use their skill and diligence, as well as their experience, to diligently pursue Client's action.
- 15. MISCELLANEOUS: In case any one or more of the provisions contained in this agreement shall, for any reason, be held to be invalid, illegal, or unenforceable in any respect, such invalidity, illegality, or unenforceability shall not affect any other provision thereof, and this agreement shall be construed as if such invalid, illegal, or unenforceable provision had never been contained herein.

This contract constitutes the sole and only agreement of the parties hereto and supersedes any prior understandings, or written or oral agreements between the parties respecting within the subject matter.

16. **STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS:** Client understands that an issue may exist as to whether the applicable statute of limitations has expired. This issue is raised in many lawsuits

even if the Client's claims are not beyond the Statute of Limitations. Client understands that Attorneys must perform an evaluation of Client's claim prior to filing Client's lawsuit, and that this evaluation will first require Client to provide Attorneys with all relevant documents and other information requested. It is possible that the statute of limitations has already expired or may expire during the interim between the date of Client's signature below and the filing of Client's lawsuit. Client agrees to accept this risk.

- 17. REFERRAL OR ASSOCIATION OF ADDITIONAL COUNSEL: Client agrees that Attorneys may refer this matter to another lawyer or associate additional lawyers to assist in representing Client and prosecuting the Client's cause of action. Prior to the referral or association becoming effective, Client shall consent in writing to the terms of the arrangement after being advised of (1) the identity of the lawyer or law firm involved, (2) whether the fees will be divided based on the proportion of services rendered or by lawyers agreeing to assume joint responsibility for the representation, and (3) the share of the fee that each lawyer or law firm will receive or, if the division is based on the proportion of services performed, the basis on which the division will be made. The referral or association of additional attorneys will not increase the total fee owed by the Client.
- 18. NOTICE TO CLIENTS: Attorneys are only licensed to practice law in the State of Texas. To the extent that Attorneys are required to appear in Court in other States, Attorneys will seek permission of the appropriate Court to appear pro hac vice. If pro hac vice admission is granted, Attorneys will be subject to the disciplinary rules of that particular jurisdiction. Attorneys are also subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar of Texas. The State Bar of Texas investigates and prosecutes professional misconduct committed by Texas attorneys. For more information call (800) 932-1900.
- 20. ARBITRATION: It is Attorney's goal to maintain at all times a constructive and positive relationship with Client on the matter described above and on future matters in which Attorney may perform services for Client. However, should a dispute arise between Attorney and Client, a prompt and fair resolution is in the interests of all concerned. To this end, if any controversy or claim arises out of is related to this agreement, any services provided by Attorneys to Client in connection with Client's Claims, or any other matter that may arise between Client and Attorney (including malpractice claims and fee disputes), Attorneys and Client both waive any right to bring a court action or have a jury trial and agree that the dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration to be conducted in Dallas, Texas before the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA with one arbitrator who must be an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Texas..

CLIENT HAS READ AND UNDERSTANDS THIS CONTRACT AND AGREES AS STATED ABOVE AS OF THE DATE NOTED BELOW.

Laura Wassmer

Page 1

Malesovas Law Firm



The undersigned **Stephen Hopper**, and Laura Wassmer referred to as "Client" or "Clients" employ and retain Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP, and Malesovas Law Firm, (herein "Attorneys") to represent Client as set forth herein.

1. <u>SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION:</u> Attorneys agree to investigate and evaluate and litigate Client's possible claim or claims of negligence, fraud, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty against JP MORGAN CHASE and persons and companies relating to JP MORGAN CHASE BANKs wrongful acts in acting as the independent administrator of the Estate of Max Hopper..

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**2. AUTHORITY OF ATTORNEYS:** Client empowers Attorneys to take all steps in this matter deemed by them to be advisable for the investigation and handling of Client's

Claims, including hiring investigators, expert witnesses, and/or other attorneys and filing any legal action necessary. Client authorizes and empowers Attorneys to do any and all things necessary and proper in the enforcement, compromise, settlement, adjustment and collection of Client's Claim, and Client further authorizes and empowers them to sign any and all pleadings and all releases, checks, drafts, authorizations and other papers necessary and proper in connection with the prosecution or enforcement of Client's Claims and collection or settlement of the damages awarded or to be paid therefore, and to receive such funds or other property in Client's name and for Client on account of any judgment recovered or any settlement agreed upon in connection with Client's Claim. Full power and authority is given by Client to Attorneys to adjust, settle or compromise Client's Claim, but no final settlement shall be made and consummated by Attorneys without first submitting the offer, compromise, or adjustment to Client for approval, and Client agrees not to compromise or settle Client's Claim without the Attorneys' authority, agreement and consent. Should Client make a settlement in violation of this Agreement, Client agrees to pay Attorneys the full fee agreed upon under paragraph 3 "Attorneys' Fee", below.

ATTORNEYS' FEE: This Agreement is a contingency fee contract. Specifically, if Attorneys are successful in recovering money or anything of value for Client, by settlement prior to trial begins, Attorneys shall receive attorneys' fees in the amount of forty percent (40%) of the gross recovery. The attorney fee will be split amongst the attorneys as follows: FSSV 50% Malesovas Law Firm 50% If the matter is resolved after trial begins, Attorneys shall receive attorneys' fees in the amount of forty-five (45%) of the gross recovery. All attorneys' fees shall be a percentage of the gross recovery. Gross recovery means the gross amount of money or other value or property recovered for Client, before the deduction of expenses. Trial is considered to have commenced at 5:00 p.m. on the Friday closest to ten (10) days before jury selection begins or evidence is first presented to the trier of fact, whichever is the earlier of these two events. If Attorneys do not recover any money or other value or property for Client, Client will not owe any attorneys' fees. Client agrees that Attorneys may, in their discretion, employ associate counsel to assist in prosecuting Client's cause of action, and Client does not object to the participation of any lawyers Attorneys may choose to involve in this representation of Client. With the exceptions set forth below, payment of attorneys' fees to associate counsel is the responsibility of Attorneys. In the event that the case is settled by way of a structured settlement, Client approves and authorizes attorneys' fees to be based upon the present value benefit of the settlement and further authorizes Attorneys to take attorneys' fees either in cash or in structured payment, as Attorneys deem appropriate.

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avoid paying the Client's claim; a defendant may transfer assets out of the country thereby necessitating the retention of foreign counsel, or a complex, multi-party settlement may require an ethics opinion from outside counsel; or special action in probate court may be necessary apart from the usual probate proceedings involved in an estate; or a separate lawsuit may need to be filed against a defendant's insurance company. Client agrees that Attorneys may retain such special outside counsel to represent Client when Attorneys deem such assistance to be reasonably necessary, and that the fees of such counsel will be deducted from Client's share of the recovery.

- 4. <u>COSTS AND OTHER EXPENSES:</u> Clients **WILL NOT BE** responsible to pay for costs and expenses as incurred. Such costs include filing fees, expert witness fees, court reporter and video fees, copy charges, postage, mailing, travel, witness fees, electronic document conversion fees, delivery fees, internal operating costs and other related charges incurred or paid as an expense on behalf of Client and paid to third-party vendors or incurred internally by Attorneys and charged to Client in connection with Attorneys' representation of Client.
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Upon some circumstances, health insurers, workers compensation carriers, or others who have paid benefits or provided services on Client's behalf may claim a right to recover a portion of the proceeds of any action brought on behalf of the Client and may place Attorneys on notice of their claim. Except as may be required by law, Attorneys will not agree to protect any claim of a subrogation carrier or other creditor without Client's consent.

6. **POWER OF ATTORNEY:** Client gives Attorneys a power of attorney to execute and negotiate all reasonable and necessary documents connected with the handling of this cause of action, including pleadings, contracts, checks or drafts, settlement agreements, compromises and releases, verifications, dismissals and orders, proofs of claim, ballots, verified statements including those pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2019,

and all other documents that Client could properly execute. Client's claims will not be settled without obtaining Client's consent.

7. COOPERATION: ADDRESS CHANGE: RETURN OF DOCUMENTS: Client agrees to cooperate with Attorneys to permit Client's claims to be investigated and developed; to disclose to Attorneys all facts relevant to the claim; and to be reasonably available to attend any necessary meetings, depositions, preparation sessions, hearings and trial. Client shall appear on reasonable notice at any and all depositions and Court appearances and shall comply with all reasonable requests of Attorneys in connection with preparation and presentation of Client's claims. The Client acknowledges and agrees that all communications with Attorneys are privileged. The Client acknowledges that Attorneys may represent other individuals on the same or similar matters and therefore may communicate matters of common interest to all of Attorneys' clients. Therefore, Client agrees and understands that other individuals who are clients of Attorneys may also invoke the attorney client privilege as to Attorneys' communications with Client. The Client acknowledges and agrees not to provide attorney work product or attorney client communications to any other person.

Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any change of marital status or death of spouse. Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any bankruptcy proceedings involving Client or Client's spouse. Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any other legal proceedings to which Client or Client's spouse is a party.

Client agrees to notify Attorneys in writing of each change in Client's mailing address (work or home) or telephone number (work, home and cell) during the term of this representation within seven (7) days of each such change of address or telephone number. When the case is completed, and subject to any Court orders, Attorneys will provide Client the opportunity to retrieve any documents and/or materials that Client provided to Attorneys or that Attorneys have obtained from other sources in connection with the case. However, if Client has not retrieved those documents and/or materials within ninety (90) days after Attorneys have mailed to Client written notice that the case is completed and that those documents and/or material are available to Client, Attorneys may dispose of those documents and/or materials.

**8. NO TAX ADVICE:** Attorneys have advised Client that the pursuit of resolution of this claim may have various tax consequences. Client understands that Attorneys do not render tax advice and are not being retained to offer such advice to Client or to represent Client before the IRS. Moreover, Client accepts responsibility for making any payment or filings necessitated by the resolution of Client's claim.

Client understands that applicable State law may impose sales, service or other tax on any amount that Client may recover or the fees due Attorneys hereunder. Client also understands that applicable Federal income tax law may require that Client pay

income tax on the fees due Attorneys hereunder, separate and apart from and in addition to any taxes owed by Attorneys. Client agrees that any such taxes (other than Federal and/or State income taxes that Attorneys may owe on monies actually received by them) shall be paid out of my share of any recovery.

- 9. **DEATH OF CLIENT:** The provisions of this Agreement will not terminate upon the death of Client. In the event of the death of Client, any duly appointed Representative of Client's heirs and/or estate will be bound by this Agreement to the extent allowed by applicable law, including without limitation, the provisions of this Agreement relating to the recovery of attorneys' fees and costs and other expenses. Any such Representative shall, upon request by Attorneys, execute a new Agreement in the capacity as Representative for the heirs and/or estate of the Client.
- 10. OFFER OF SETTLEMENT: Client understands that applicable law may, under certain circumstances, allow a Defendant to make an offer of settlement to Client and if Client rejects or does not accept such an offer, such may result in any award, verdict or judgment in Client's favor being reduced as provided by such law. Client understands that Client has the final authority to accept or reject any offer of settlement. Client understands that if Client rejects or does not accept such an offer, and Client's recovery is subsequently reduced, the fees owed to Attorneys will be calculated on the amount of any award, verdict or judgment before reduction, and the reduction shall be out of Client's share of any recovery.
- Attorneys an amount equal to either forty percent (40%) of the proceeds if the matter is settled or resolved before trial begins or forty-five percent (45%) of the proceeds if the matter is resolved after trial begins, of any property, money or other value recovered by settlement, compromise, verdict or judgment of the claims described in this contract. Client does hereby give and grant to Attorneys an express security interest, in addition to any statutory lien, upon Client's claims and any and all judgments recovered, and any and all funds or property realized or paid by compromise or settlement, as security for the compensation and costs and expenses advanced or due to be paid or reimbursed to Attorneys hereunder. This security interest is to continue in the event Attorneys are discharged without good cause. If the claims are not assignable at law, Client expressly assigns to Attorneys, to the extent of attorneys' fees and disbursements, any sum realized by way of a settlement or any judgment obtained thereon.
- **12. BINDING EFFECT:** This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, legal representatives, successors and assigns.
- 13. <u>TERMINATION OF REPRESENTATION:</u> Client understands that Client can terminate Attorneys' representation of Client at any time by providing written notice to

Attorneys. Should Client elect to terminate Attorneys' representation prior to the full conclusion of Attorneys' representation, Client understands and agrees that Attorneys have a claim for expenses of litigation and unpaid attorneys' fees which will become due upon receipt by Client or any successor attorney of Client or any proceeds for any remaining portion of Client's claim. Client understands that the obligation for unpaid attorneys' fees will be calculated based on the percentage of work completed on the case or claims at the time Client terminates Attorneys.

- 14. <u>NO GUARANTEE OF RECOVERY:</u> Client understands that no guarantee or assurances of any kind have been made regarding the likelihood of success of Client's claim, but that Attorneys will use their skill and diligence, as well as their experience, to diligently pursue Client's action.
- 15. <u>MISCELLANEOUS:</u> In case any one or more of the provisions contained in this agreement shall, for any reason, be held to be invalid, illegal, or unenforceable in any respect, such invalidity, illegality, or unenforceability shall not affect any other provision thereof, and this agreement shall be construed as if such invalid, illegal, or unenforceable provision had never been contained herein.

This contract constitutes the sole and only agreement of the parties hereto and supersedes any prior understandings, or written or oral agreements between the parties respecting within the subject matter.

- 16. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: Client understands that an issue may exist as to whether the applicable statute of limitations has expired. This issue is raised in many lawsuits even if the Client's claims are not beyond the Statute of Limitations. Client understands that Attorneys must perform an evaluation of Client's claim prior to filing Client's lawsuit, and that this evaluation will first require Client to provide Attorneys with all relevant documents and other information requested. It is possible that the statute of limitations has already expired or may expire during the interim between the date of Client's signature below and the filing of Client's lawsuit. Client agrees to accept this risk.
- 17. REFERRAL OR ASSOCIATION OF ADDITIONAL COUNSEL: Client agrees that Attorneys may refer this matter to another lawyer or associate additional lawyers to assist in representing Client and prosecuting the Client's cause of action. Prior to the referral or association becoming effective, Client shall consent in writing to the terms of the arrangement after being advised of (1) the identity of the lawyer or law firm involved, (2) whether the fees will be divided based on the proportion of services rendered or by lawyers agreeing to assume joint responsibility for the representation, and (3) the share of the fee that each lawyer or law firm will receive or, if the division is based on the proportion of services performed, the basis on which the division will be

made. The referral or association of additional attorneys will not increase the total fee owed by the Client.

- 18. <u>NOTICE TO CLIENTS</u>: Attorneys are only licensed to practice law in the State of Texas. To the extent that Attorneys are required to appear in Court in other States, Attorneys will seek permission of the appropriate Court to appear pro hac vice. If pro hac vice admission is granted, Attorneys will be subject to the disciplinary rules of that particular jurisdiction. Attorneys are also subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar of Texas. The State Bar of Texas investigates and prosecutes professional misconduct committed by Texas attorneys. For more information call (800) 932-1900.
- 20. ARBITRATION: It is Attorney's goal to maintain at all times a constructive and positive relationship with Client on the matter described above and on future matters in which Attorney may perform services for Client. However, should a dispute arise between Attorney and Client, a prompt and fair resolution is in the interests of all concerned. To this end, if any controversy or claim arises out of is related to this agreement, any services provided by Attorneys to Client in connection with Client's Claims, or any other matter that may arise between Client and Attorney (including malpractice claims and fee disputes), Attorneys and Client both waive any right to bring a court action or have a jury trial and agree that the dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration to be conducted in Dallas, Texas before the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA with one arbitrator who must be an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Texas..

CLIENT HAS READ AND UNDERSTANDS THIS CONTRACT AND AGREES AS STATED ABOVE AS OF THE DATE NOTED BELOW.

Laura Wassmer

Stephen Hopper

Date: \_\_\_11/19/2015

Address: 3625 N Classen Blvd Oklahoma City, OK 7318

Telephone Numbers: 405-639-9186

ATTORNEYS:

Fee. Smith. Sharp & Vitullo. LLP

Malesovas Law Firm

# LAW OFFICES OF JAMES E. PENNINGTON

A Professional Corporation 900 Jackson Street, Suite 440 Dallas, Texas 75202-4473

JAMES E. PENNINGTON
LICENSED IN TEXAS AND COLORADO

PHONE (214) 741-3022 FAX (214) 741-3055 E-MAIL Jep@Jeplawyer.com

April 5, 2018

VIA EMAIL: blauten@brianlauten.com

Brian P. Lauten Brian Lauten, P.C. 3811 Turtle Creek Blvd. Suite 1450 Dallas, Texas 75219

Re: Case No. PR-11-3238-1; In re: Estate of Max Hopper, Deceased, Jo N. Hopper v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al., in the Probate Court of Dallas County, Texas.

Brian:

As you know, I represent Dr. Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer in connection with a dispute that has developed involving your clients, Anthony Vitullo and Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP. Please be advised that my clients have decided to terminate their relationship with Mr. Vitullo, Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP and John Malesovas. Their decision to terminate this relationship is based on a number of factors, which are too numerous to set forth herein. However, I provided you with a brief summary of those reasons yesterday during our call and suggested we meet in person to discuss this in more detail. Ultimately, as a result of several issues that were discovered by Jeff Levinger, the appellate lawyer retained to handle the appeal of the jury's verdict, my clients decided to settle the case with JP Morgan Chase. Most, if not all of these issues, were caused by your clients' omissions before and during trial, such as failing to present expert testimony and several jury charge issues which would have made an appeal very difficult for my clients. Additionally, I discovered a number of facts, some of which I outlined during our call, which indicate that the contingency fee agreement is probably not enforceable and which show that - even if it is enforceable - your clients breached the agreement. As a result, I am notifying you that my clients are - effective immediately -- terminating their relationship with Mr. Vitullo, Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP and Mr. Malesovas and his firm. It is unclear to me whether you are representing Mr. Malesovas or his firm. Please advise, so that I can notify Mr. Malesovas if needed.

At this time, I am requesting your clients to provide me with their *entire* file regarding their representation of my clients. Although your clients have previously provided me with

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Brian Lauten April 5, 2018 Page 2

portions of the file, the files which were provided are not complete and were not provided in the manner in which they were originally maintained by the firm. I am not suggesting anything improper about the manner in which the files were previously produced. However, I am pointing this out to emphasize the importance of making sure that I receive the complete file in the same manner that it was maintained by your clients. You may provide the electronic files on a portable hard drive and have this device, along with the physical files, delivered to my office.

Finally, as I indicated during our call, my clients are willing to discuss a resolution of the attorney's fees related to your clients' representation, so give this some more thought and let me know if you have a proposal. In the meantime, I will instruct Mr. Levinger to retain a percentage of the settlement in his trust account until this matter is resolved. Thank you for your anticipated cooperation. If you have any questions, please feel free to give me a call.

Sincerel

Jarnes E. Pennington

MR:588

# LAW OFFICES OF JAMES E. PENNINGTON

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 900 JACKSON STREET, SUITE 440 DALLAS, TEXAS 75202-4473

JAMES E. PENNINGTON LICENSED IN TEXAS AND COLORADO

PHONE (214) 741-3022 FAX (214) 741-3055 E-MAIL Jep@Jeplawyer.com

April 6, 2018

VIA EMAIL: john@malesovas.com jmalesovas@gmail.com

John Malesovas 1801 S. MoPac Expressway Suite 320 Austin, Texas 78746

VIA EMAIL: blauten@brianlauten.com

Brian P. Lauten Brian Lauten, P.C. 3811 Turtle Creek Blvd. Suite 1450 Dallas, Texas 75219

Re: Case No. PR-11-3238-1; In re: Estate of Max Hopper, Deceased, Jo N. Hopper v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al., in the Probate Court of Dallas County, Texas.

### Gentlemen:

This letter is in response to Mr. Lauten's email today regarding his notice of lien, and Mr. Malesovas' April 6, 2018 letter, and his Petition in intervention. I don't intend to respond to all of the various allegations and legal doctrines in your papers -- the only thing we all agree on at this point is that a dispute exists.

Rule 1.14 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct governs this dispute. Under that rule, the disputed portion of any funds is to remain in a lawyer's trust account or escrow account until the dispute is resolved. I have repeatedly assured Mr. Lauten that all settlement funds will be placed into Mr. Levinger's trust account and that the amount of disputed fees will not be disbursed until this dispute is resolved. My clients intend to fully comply with the requirements of Rule 1.14. The clients understand that you both claim a 45% interest in the settlement. Although we dispute this amount, Mr. Levinger is willing to retain 45% of the settlement in his trust account until this matter is resolved. Additionally, we will agree to retain a



John Malesovas/Brian Lauten April 6, 2018 Page 2

sufficient amount to cover any expenses you have incurred in representing the clients. However, I need to know the amount of any such expenses, so please let me know this amount.

If you are unwilling to agree to the disputed portion being deposited into Mr. Levinger's trust account, then let me know if you are willing to agree to these funds being deposited into my trust account or with an independent escrow agent. Thank you for your anticipated cooperation. If you have any questions, please feel free to give me a call.

Sincerel

mes E. Pennington

## CONTINGENCY FEE CONTRACT OF REPRESENTATION

The undersigned Stephen Hopper, and Laura Wassmer referred to as "Client" or "Clients" employ and retain Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP, and Malesovas Law Firm, (herein "Attorneys") to represent Client as set forth herein.

 SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION: Attorneys agree to investigate and evaluate and litigate Client's possible claim or claims of negligence, fraud, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty against JP MORGAN CHASE and persons and companies relating to JP MORGAN CHASE BANKs wrongful acts in acting as the independent administrator of the Estate of Max Hopper..

Client understands and agrees that the scope of representation herein does not include the filing of any claim against any state or federal entity or employee or filing or pursuing an appeal from disposition in the Trial Court. Client understands and agrees that the scope of representation herein does not include defending any claims or lawsuits filed against Client. Client is retaining separate counsel on a flat fee agreement or other fee arrangement to defend them against any claims filed by any parties. Other than Chang.

Client understands and agrees that the scope of representation herein does not include representing Clients in the probate lawsuit or lawsuit involving Chase bank, and defending Client against Chase bank or any other party.

Client understands and agrees that Attorneys will not file suit against entities that are in a foreign jurisdiction or are international companies whom in attorney's opinion cannot be sued in a United States court. Client understands and agrees that Attorneys are not obligated to pursue entities that are defunct and/or bankrupt.

Client hereby agrees and understands that Attorneys retain the right to withdraw from representation of Client at any time, so long as said withdrawal would not unduly prejudice Client's right to bring suit or to seek or retain another attorney to represent Client. In such event, Client agrees to timely sign an appropriate Motion for Substitution of Counsel. If after disposition in the trial court, Client desires to appeal, a new and separate agreement shall be entered into by the parties as to services and fees for any appeal, or Client shall retain separate counsel to handle any appeal and Attorneys shall retain their interest in the case under this agreement applicable to any recovery obtained by settlement or otherwise.

ATTORNEYS' EXHIBIT NO. 1 PAGE 1 of 7



MR:591

- AUTHORITY OF ATTORNEYS: Client empowers Attorneys to take all steps in 2. this matter deemed by them to be advisable for the investigation and handling of Client's Claims, including hiring investigators, expert witnesses, and/or other attorneys and filing any legal action necessary. Client authorizes and empowers Attorneys to do any and all things necessary and proper in the enforcement, compromise, settlement, adjustment and collection of Client's Claim, and Client further authorizes and empowers them to sign any and all pleadings and all releases, checks, drafts, authorizations and other papers necessary and proper in connection with the prosecution or enforcement of Client's Claims and collection or settlement of the damages awarded or to be paid therefore, and to receive such funds or other property in Client's name and for Client on account of any judgment recovered or any settlement agreed upon in connection with Client's Claim. Full power and authority is given by Client to Attorneys to adjust, settle or compromise Client's Claim, but no final settlement shall be made and consummated by Attorneys without first submitting the offer, compromise, or adjustment to Client for approval, and Client agrees not to compromise or settle Client's Claim without the Attorneys' authority, agreement and consent. Should Client make a settlement in violation of this Agreement, Client agrees to pay Attorneys the full fee agreed upon under paragraph 3 "Attorneys' Fee", below.
- ATTORNEYS' FEE: This Agreement is a contingency fee contract. Specifically, if Attorneys are successful in recovering money or anything of value for Client, by settlement prior to trial begins, Attorneys shall receive attorneys' fees in the amount of forty percent (40%) of the gross recovery. The attorney fee will be split amongst the attorneys as follows: PSSV 50% Malesovas Law Firm 50% If the matter is resolved after trial begins, Attorneys shall receive attorneys' fees in the amount of forty-five (45%) of the gross recovery. All attorneys' fees shall be a percentage of the gross recovery. Gross recovery means the gross amount of money or other value or property recovered for Client, before the deduction of expenses. Trial is considered to have commenced at 5:00 p.m. on the Friday closest to ten (10) days before jury selection begins or evidence is first presented to the trier of fact, whichever is the earlier of these two events. If Attorneys do not recover any money or other value or property for Client, Client will not owe any attorneys' fees. Client agrees that Attorneys may, in their discretion, employ associate counsel to assist in prosecuting Client's cause of action, and Client does not object to the participation of any lawyers Attorneys may choose to involve in this representation of Client. With the exceptions set forth below, payment of attorneys' fees to associate counsel is the responsibility of Attorneys. In the event that the case is settled by way of a structured settlement, Client approves and authorizes attorneys' fees to be based upon the present value benefit of the settlement and further authorizes Attorneys to take attorneys' fees either in cash or in structured payment, as Attorneys deem appropriate.

In some instances, it may be necessary for Attorneys to retain special outside counsel to assist on matters other than prosecuting Client's claims for damages. Examples of such instances include the following: a defendant may seek bankruptcy protection; or a defendant may attempt to fraudulently transfer some of its assets to avoid paying the Client's claim; a defendant may transfer assets out of the country thereby necessitating the retention of foreign counsel, or a complex, multi-party settlement may require an ethics opinion from outside counsel; or special action in probate court may be necessary apart from the usual probate proceedings involved in an estate; or a separate lawsuit may need to be filed against a defendant's insurance company. Client agrees that Attorneys may retain such special outside counsel to represent Client when Attorneys deem such assistance to be reasonably necessary, and that the fees of such counsel will be deducted from Client's share of the recovery.

- '4. <u>COSTS AND OTHER EXPENSES</u>: Clients WILL NOT BE responsible to pay for costs and expenses as incurred. Such costs include filing fees, expert witness fees, court reporter and video fees, copy charges, postage, mailing, travel, witness fees, electronic document conversion fees, delivery fees, internal operating costs and other related charges incurred or paid as an expense on behalf of Client and paid to third-party vendors or incurred internally by Attorneys and charged to Client in connection with Attorneys' representation of Client.
- 5. DISBURSEMENT OF PROCEEDS TO CLIENT: Client understands that Attorneys make no guarantee or assurance of any kind regarding the likelihood of success of Client's claims. Upon receipt by Attorneys of the proceeds of any settlement or judgment, Attorneys shall (1) retain either forty percent (40%) of the proceeds as their attorneys' fees if the matter is settled or resolved before trial begins or forty-five (45%) percent of the proceeds as their attorneys' fees if the matter is settled or resolved after trial begins, (2) deduct from Client's share of the proceeds any costs and expenses, including the fees of any special outside counsel that Attorneys may incur on Client's behalf, and (3) disburse the remainder of Client's share of the proceeds to Client. At the time of disbursement of any proceeds, Client will be provided with a disbursement sheet reflecting the attorneys' fees, the expenses deducted out of Client's share, and the remainder of Client's share.

Upon some circumstances, health insurers, workers compensation carriers, or others who have paid benefits or provided services on Client's behalf may claim a right to recover a portion of the proceeds of any action brought on behalf of the Client and may place Attorneys on notice of their claim. Except as may be required by law, Attorneys will not agree to protect any claim of a subrogation carrier or other creditor without Client's consent.

- 6. POWER OF ATTORNEY: Client gives Attorneys a power of attorney to execute and negotiate all reasonable and necessary documents connected with the handling of this cause of action, including pleadings, contracts, checks or drafts, settlement agreements, compromises and releases, verifications, dismissals and orders, proofs of claim, ballots, verified statements including those pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2019, and all other documents that Client could properly execute. Client's claims will not be settled without obtaining Client's consent.
- 7. COOPERATION: ADDRESS CHANGE: RETURN OF DOCUMENTS: Client agrees to cooperate with Attorneys to permit Client's claims to be investigated and developed; to disclose to Attorneys all facts relevant to the claim; and to be reasonably available to attend any necessary meetings, depositions, preparation sessions, hearings and trial. Client shall appear on reasonable notice at any and all depositions and Court appearances and shall comply with all reasonable requests of Attorneys in connection with preparation and presentation of Client's claims. The Client acknowledges and agrees that all communications with Attorneys are privileged. The Client acknowledges that Attorneys may represent other individuals on the same or similar matters and therefore may communicate matters of common interest to all of Attorneys' clients. Therefore, Client agrees and understands that other individuals who are clients of Attorneys may also invoke the attorney client privilege as to Attorneys' communications with Client. The Client acknowledges and agrees not to provide attorney work product or attorney client communications to any other person.

ATTORNEYS' EXHIBIT NO. 1 PAGE 3 of 7 Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any change of marital status or death of spouse. Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any bankruptcy proceedings involving Client or Client's spouse. Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any other legal proceedings to which Client or Client's spouse is a party.

Client agrees to notify Attorneys in writing of each change in Client's mailing address (work or home) or telephone number (work, home and cell) during the term of this representation within seven (7) days of each such change of address or telephone number. When the case is completed, and subject to any Court orders, Attorneys will provide Client the opportunity to retrieve any documents and/or materials that Client provided to Attorneys or that Attorneys have obtained from other sources in connection with the case. However, if Client has not retrieved those documents and/or materials within ninety (90) days after Attorneys have mailed to Client written notice that the case is completed and that those documents and/or material are available to Client, Attorneys may dispose of those documents and/or materials.

8. NO TAX ADVICE: Attorneys have advised Client that the pursuit of resolution of this claim may have various tax consequences. Client understands that Attorneys do not render tax advice and are not being retained to offer such advice to Client or to represent Client before the IRS. Moreover, Client accepts responsibility for making any payment or filings necessitated by the resolution of Client's claim.

Client understands that applicable State law may impose sales, service or other tax on any amount that Client may recover or the fees due Attorneys hereunder. Client also understands that applicable Federal income tax law may require that Client pay income tax on the fees due Attorneys hereunder, separate and apart from and in addition to any taxes owed by Attorneys. Client agrees that any such taxes (other than Federal and/or State income taxes that Attorneys may owe on monies actually received by them) shall be paid out of my share of any recovery.

- 9. <u>DEATH OF CLIENT:</u> The provisions of this Agreement will not terminate upon the death of Client. In the event of the death of Client, any duly appointed Representative of Client's heirs and/or estate will be bound by this Agreement to the extent allowed by applicable law, including without limitation, the provisions of this Agreement relating to the recovery of attorneys' fees and costs and other expenses. Any such Representative shall, upon request by Attorneys, execute a new Agreement in the capacity as Representative for the heirs and/or estate of the Client.
- 10. OFFER OF SETTLEMENT: Client understands that applicable law may, under certain circumstances, allow a Defendant to make an offer of settlement to Client and if Client rejects or does not accept such an offer, such may result in any award, verdict or judgment in Client's favor being reduced as provided by such law. Client understands that Client has the final authority to accept or reject any offer of settlement. Client understands that if Client rejects or does not accept such an offer, and Client's recovery is subsequently reduced, the fees owed to Attorneys will be calculated on the amount of any award, verdict or judgment before reduction, and the reduction shall be out of Client's share of any recovery.

ATTORNEYS' EXHIBIT NO. 1 PAGE 4 of 7

- 11. SECURITY INTEREST: Client hereby assigns, transfers and conveys over to Attorneys an amount equal to either forty percent (40%) of the proceeds if the matter is settled or resolved before trial begins or forty-five percent (45%) of the proceeds if the matter is resolved after trial begins, of any property, money or other value recovered by settlement, compromise, verdict or judgment of the claims described in this contract. Client does hereby give and grant to Attorneys an express security interest, in addition to any statutory lien, upon Client's claims and any and all judgments recovered, and any and all funds or property realized or paid by compromise or settlement, as security for the compensation and costs and expenses advanced or due to be paid or reimbursed to Attorneys hereunder. This security interest is to continue in the event Attorneys are discharged without good cause. If the claims are not assignable at law, Client expressly assigns to Attorneys, to the extent of attorneys' fees and disbursements, any sum realized by way of a settlement or any judgment obtained thereon.
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- 14. NO GUARANTEE OF RECOVERY: Client understands that no guarantee or assurances of any kind have been made regarding the likelihood of success of Client's claim, but that Attorneys will use their skill and diligence, as well as their experience, to diligently pursue Client's action.
- 15. <u>MISCELLANEOUS:</u> In case any one or more of the provisions contained in this agreement shall, for any reason, be held to be invalid, illegal, or unenforceable in any respect, such invalidity, illegality, or unenforceability shall not affect any other provision thereof, and this agreement shall be construed as if such invalid, illegal, or unenforceable provision had never been contained herein.

This contract constitutes the sole and only agreement of the parties hereto and supersedes any prior understandings, or written or oral agreements between the parties respecting within the subject matter.

16. <u>STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS</u>: Client understands that an issue may exist as to whether the applicable statute of limitations has expired. This issue is raised in many lawsuits

ATTORNEYS' EXHIBIT NO. 1 PAGE 5 of 7 even if the Client's claims are not beyond the Statute of Limitations. Client understands that Attorneys must perform an evaluation of Client's claim prior to filing Client's lawsuit, and that 'this evaluation will first require Client to provide Attorneys with all relevant documents and other information requested. It is possible that the statute of limitations has already expired or may expire during the interim between the date of Client's signature below and the filing of Client's lawsuit. Client agrees to accept this risk.

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- 20. ARBITRATION: It is Attorney's goal to maintain at all times a constructive and positive relationship with Client on the matter described above and on future matters in which Attorney may perform services for Client. However, should a dispute arise between Attorney and Client, a prompt and fair resolution is in the interests of all concerned. To this end, if any controversy or claim arises out of is related to this agreement, any services provided by Attorneys to Client in connection with Client's Claims, or any other matter that may arise between Client and Attorney (including malpractice claims and fee disputes), Attorneys and Client both waive any right to bring a court action or have a jury trial and agree that the dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration to be conducted in Dallas, Texas before the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA with one arbitrator who must be an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Texas.

CLIENT HAS READ AND UNDERSTANDS THIS CONTRACT AND AGREES AS STATED ABOVE AS OF THE DATE NOTED BELOW.

Laura Wassmer

ATTORNEYS' EXHIBIT NO. 1 PAGE 6 of 7 Stephen Hopper

Date: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Address: \_\_\_\_\_\_

Telephone Numbers:

ATTORNEYS:

Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP

Page 1

Malesovas Law Firm

### CONTINGENCY FEE CONTRACT OF REPRESENTATION

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Client understands and agrees that the scope of representation herein does not include the filing of any claim against any state or federal entity or employee or filing or pursuing an appeal from disposition in the Trial Court. Client understands and agrees that the scope of representation herein does not include defending any claims or lawsuits filed against Client. Client is retaining separate counsel on a flat fee agreement or other fee arrangement to defend them against any claims filed by any parties.


Client understands and agrees that the scope of representation herein does not include representing Clients in the probate lawsuit or lawsuit involving Chase bank, and defending Client against Chase bank or any other party.

Client understands and agrees that Attorneys will not file suit against entities that are in a foreign jurisdiction or are international companies whom in attorney's opinion cannot be sued in a United States court. Client understands and agrees that Attorneys are not obligated to pursue entities that are defunct and/or bankrupt.

Client hereby agrees and understands that Attorneys retain the right to withdraw from representation of Client at any time, so long as said withdrawal would not unduly prejudice Client's right to bring suit or to seek or retain another attorney to represent Client. In such event, Client agrees to timely sign an appropriate Motion for Substitution of Counsel. If after disposition in the trial court, Client desires to appeal, a new and separate agreement shall be entered into by the parties as to services and fees for any appeal, or Client shall retain separate counsel to handle any appeal and Attorneys shall retain their interest in the case under this agreement applicable to any recovery obtained by settlement or otherwise.

2. <u>AUTHORITY OF ATTORNEYS:</u> Client empowers Attorneys to take all steps in this matter deemed by them to be advisable for the investigation and handling of Client's

Page 1



EXHIBIT

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ATTORNEYS' EXHIBIT NO PAGE 1 of 8

Claims, including hiring investigators, expert witnesses, and/or other attorneys and filing any legal action necessary. Client authorizes and empowers Attorneys to do any and all things necessary and proper in the enforcement, compromise, settlement, adjustment and collection of Client's Claim, and Client further authorizes and empowers them to sign any and all pleadings and all releases, checks, drafts, authorizations and other papers necessary and proper in connection with the prosecution or enforcement of Client's Claims and collection or settlement of the damages awarded or to be paid therefore, and to receive such funds or other property in Client's name and for Client on account of any judgment recovered or any settlement agreed upon in connection with Client's Claim. Full power and authority is given by Client to Attorneys to adjust, settle or compromise Client's Claim, but no final settlement shall be made and consummated by Attorneys without first submitting the offer, compromise, or adjustment to Client for approval, and Client agrees not to compromise or settle Client's Claim without the Attorneys' authority, agreement and consent. Should Client make a settlement in violation of this Agreement, Client agrees to pay Attorneys the full fee agreed upon under paragraph 3 "Attorneys' Fee", below.

3. ATTORNEYS' FEE: This Agreement is a contingency fee contract. Specifically, if Attorneys are successful in recovering money or anything of value for Client, by settlement prior to trial begins, Attorneys shall receive attorneys' fees in the amount of forty percent (40%) of the gross recovery. The attorney fee will be split amongst the attorneys as follows: FSSV 50% Malesovas Law Firm 50% If the matter is resolved after trial begins, Attorneys shall receive attorneys' fees in the amount of forty-five (45%) of the gross recovery. All attorneys' fees shall be a percentage of the gross recovery. Gross recovery means the gross amount of money or other value or property recovered for Client, before the deduction of expenses. Trial is considered to have commenced at 5:00 p.m. on the Friday closest to ten (10) days before jury selection begins or evidence is first presented to the trier of fact, whichever is the earlier of these two events. If Attorneys do not recover any money or other value or property for Client, Client will not owe any attorneys' fees. Client agrees that Attorneys may, in their discretion, employ associate counsel to assist in prosecuting Client's cause of action, and Client does not object to the participation of any lawyers Attorneys may choose to involve in this representation of Client. With the exceptions set forth below, payment of attorneys' fees to associate counsel is the responsibility of Attorneys. In the event that the case is settled by way of a structured settlement, Client approves and authorizes attorneys' fees to be based upon the present value benefit of the settlement and further authorizes Attorneys to take attorneys' fees either in cash or in structured payment, as Attorneys deem appropriate.

In some instances, it may be necessary for Attorneys to retain special outside counsel to assist on matters other than prosecuting Client's claims for damages. Examples of such instances include the following: a defendant may seek bankruptcy protection; or a defendant may attempt to fraudulently transfer some of its assets to

avoid paying the Client's claim; a defendant may transfer assets out of the country thereby necessitating the retention of foreign counsel, or a complex, multi-party settlement may require an ethics opinion from outside counsel; or special action in probate court may be necessary apart from the usual probate proceedings involved in an estate; or a separate lawsuit may need to be filed against a defendant's insurance company. Client agrees that Attorneys may retain such special outside counsel to represent Client when Attorneys deem such assistance to be reasonably necessary, and that the fees of such counsel will be deducted from Client's share of the recovery.

- 4. <u>COSTS AND OTHER EXPENSES:</u> Clients **WILL NOT BE** responsible to pay for costs and expenses as incurred. Such costs include filing fees, expert witness fees, court reporter and video fees, copy charges, postage, mailing, travel, witness fees, electronic document conversion fees, delivery fees, internal operating costs and other related charges incurred or paid as an expense on behalf of Client and paid to third-party vendors or incurred internally by Attorneys and charged to Client in connection with Attorneys' representation of Client.
- 5. <u>DISBURSEMENT OF PROCEEDS TO CLIENT:</u> Client understands that Attorneys make no guarantee or assurance of any kind regarding the likelihood of success of Client's claims. Upon receipt by Attorneys of the proceeds of any settlement or judgment, Attorneys shall (1) retain either forty percent (40%) of the proceeds as their attorneys' fees if the matter is settled or resolved before trial begins or forty-five (45%) percent of the proceeds as their attorneys' fees if the matter is settled or resolved after trial begins, (2) deduct from Client's share of the proceeds any costs and expenses, including the fees of any special outside counsel that Attorneys may incur on Client's behalf, and (3) disburse the remainder of Client's share of the proceeds to Client. At the time of disbursement of any proceeds, Client will be provided with a disbursement sheet reflecting the attorneys' fees, the expenses deducted out of Client's share, and the remainder of Client's share.

Upon some circumstances, health insurers, workers compensation carriers, or others who have paid benefits or provided services on Client's behalf may claim a right to recover a portion of the proceeds of any action brought on behalf of the Client and may place Attorneys on notice of their claim. Except as may be required by law, Attorneys will not agree to protect any claim of a subrogation carrier or other creditor without Client's consent.

6. <u>POWER OF ATTORNEY:</u> Client gives Attorneys a power of attorney to execute and negotiate all reasonable and necessary documents connected with the handling of this cause of action, including pleadings, contracts, checks or drafts, settlement agreements, compromises and releases, verifications, dismissals and orders, proofs of claim, ballots, verified statements including those pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2019,

and all other documents that Client could properly execute. Client's claims will not be settled without obtaining Client's consent.

7. COOPERATION: ADDRESS CHANGE: RETURN OF DOCUMENTS: Client agrees to cooperate with Attorneys to permit Client's claims to be investigated and developed; to disclose to Attorneys all facts relevant to the claim; and to be reasonably available to attend any necessary meetings, depositions, preparation sessions, hearings and trial. Client shall appear on reasonable notice at any and all depositions and Court appearances and shall comply with all reasonable requests of Attorneys in connection with preparation and presentation of Client's claims. The Client acknowledges and agrees that all communications with Attorneys are privileged. The Client acknowledges that Attorneys may represent other individuals on the same or similar matters and therefore may communicate matters of common interest to all of Attorneys' clients. Therefore, Client agrees and understands that other individuals who are clients of Attorneys may also invoke the attorney client privilege as to Attorneys' communications with Client. The Client acknowledges and agrees not to provide attorney work product or attorney client communications to any other person.

Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any change of marital status or death of spouse. Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any bankruptcy proceedings involving Client or Client's spouse. Client shall promptly notify Attorneys of any other legal proceedings to which Client or Client's spouse is a party.

Client agrees to notify Attorneys in writing of each change in Client's mailing address (work or home) or telephone number (work, home and cell) during the term of this representation within seven (7) days of each such change of address or telephone number. When the case is completed, and subject to any Court orders, Attorneys will provide Client the opportunity to retrieve any documents and/or materials that Client provided to Attorneys or that Attorneys have obtained from other sources in connection with the case. However, if Client has not retrieved those documents and/or materials within ninety (90) days after Attorneys have mailed to Client written notice that the case is completed and that those documents and/or material are available to Client, Attorneys may dispose of those documents and/or materials.

8. NO TAX ADVICE: Attorneys have advised Client that the pursuit of resolution of this claim may have various tax consequences. Client understands that Attorneys do not render tax advice and are not being retained to offer such advice to Client or to represent Client before the IRS. Moreover, Client accepts responsibility for making any payment or filings necessitated by the resolution of Client's claim.

Client understands that applicable State law may impose sales, service or other tax on any amount that Client may recover or the fees due Attorneys hereunder. Client also understands that applicable Federal income tax law may require that Client pay

income tax on the fees due Attorneys hereunder, separate and apart from and in addition to any taxes owed by Attorneys. Client agrees that any such taxes (other than Federal and/or State income taxes that Attorneys may owe on monies actually received by them) shall be paid out of my share of any recovery.

- 9. <u>DEATH OF CLIENT:</u> The provisions of this Agreement will not terminate upon the death of Client. In the event of the death of Client, any duly appointed Representative of Client's heirs and/or estate will be bound by this Agreement to the extent allowed by applicable law, including without limitation, the provisions of this Agreement relating to the recovery of attorneys' fees and costs and other expenses. Any such Representative shall, upon request by Attorneys, execute a new Agreement in the capacity as Representative for the heirs and/or estate of the Client.
- 10. OFFER OF SETTLEMENT: Client understands that applicable law may, under certain circumstances, allow a Defendant to make an offer of settlement to Client and if Client rejects or does not accept such an offer, such may result in any award, verdict or judgment in Client's favor being reduced as provided by such law. Client understands that Client has the final authority to accept or reject any offer of settlement. Client understands that if Client rejects or does not accept such an offer, and Client's recovery is subsequently reduced, the fees owed to Attorneys will be calculated on the amount of any award, verdict or judgment before reduction, and the reduction shall be out of Client's share of any recovery.
- 11. <u>SECURITY INTEREST:</u> Client hereby assigns, transfers and conveys over to Attorneys an amount equal to either forty percent (40%) of the proceeds if the matter is settled or resolved before trial begins or forty-five percent (45%) of the proceeds if the matter is resolved after trial begins, of any property, money or other value recovered by settlement, compromise, verdict or judgment of the claims described in this contract. Client does hereby give and grant to Attorneys an express security interest, in addition to any statutory lien, upon Client's claims and any and all judgments recovered, and any and all funds or property realized or paid by compromise or settlement, as security for the compensation and costs and expenses advanced or due to be paid or reimbursed to Attorneys hereunder. This security interest is to continue in the event Attorneys are discharged without good cause. If the claims are not assignable at law, Client expressly assigns to Attorneys, to the extent of attorneys' fees and disbursements, any sum realized by way of a settlement or any judgment obtained thereon.
- 12. <u>BINDING EFFECT</u>: This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, legal representatives, successors and assigns.
- 13. <u>TERMINATION OF REPRESENTATION:</u> Client understands that Client can terminate Attorneys' representation of Client at any time by providing written notice to

Attorneys. Should Client elect to terminate Attorneys' representation prior to the full conclusion of Attorneys' representation, Client understands and agrees that Attorneys have a claim for expenses of litigation and unpaid attorneys' fees which will become due upon receipt by Client or any successor attorney of Client or any proceeds for any remaining portion of Client's claim. Client understands that the obligation for unpaid attorneys' fees will be calculated based on the percentage of work completed on the case or claims at the time Client terminates Attorneys.

- 14. <u>NO GUARANTEE OF RECOVERY:</u> Client understands that no guarantee or assurances of any kind have been made regarding the likelihood of success of Client's claim, but that Attorneys will use their skill and diligence, as well as their experience, to diligently pursue Client's action.
- 15. <u>MISCELLANEOUS</u>: In case any one or more of the provisions contained in this agreement shall, for any reason, be held to be invalid, illegal, or unenforceable in any respect, such invalidity, illegality, or unenforceability shall not affect any other provision thereof, and this agreement shall be construed as if such invalid, illegal, or unenforceable provision had never been contained herein.

This contract constitutes the sole and only agreement of the parties hereto and supersedes any prior understandings, or written or oral agreements between the parties respecting within the subject matter.

- 16. <u>STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS:</u> Client understands that an issue may exist as to whether the applicable statute of limitations has expired. This issue is raised in many lawsuits even if the Client's claims are not beyond the Statute of Limitations. Client understands that Attorneys must perform an evaluation of Client's claim prior to filing Client's lawsuit, and that this evaluation will first require Client to provide Attorneys with all relevant documents and other information requested. It is possible that the statute of limitations has already expired or may expire during the interim between the date of Client's signature below and the filing of Client's lawsuit. Client agrees to accept this risk.
- 17. REFERRAL OR ASSOCIATION OF ADDITIONAL COUNSEL: Client agrees that Attorneys may refer this matter to another lawyer or associate additional lawyers to assist in representing Client and prosecuting the Client's cause of action. Prior to the referral or association becoming effective, Client shall consent in writing to the terms of the arrangement after being advised of (1) the identity of the lawyer or law firm involved, (2) whether the fees will be divided based on the proportion of services rendered or by lawyers agreeing to assume joint responsibility for the representation, and (3) the share of the fee that each lawyer or law firm will receive or, if the division is based on the proportion of services performed, the basis on which the division will be

made. The referral or association of additional attorneys will not increase the total fee owed by the Client.

- 18. NOTICE TO CLIENTS: Attorneys are only licensed to practice law in the State of Texas. To the extent that Attorneys are required to appear in Court in other States, Attorneys will seek permission of the appropriate Court to appear pro hac vice. If pro hac vice admission is granted, Attorneys will be subject to the disciplinary rules of that particular jurisdiction. Attorneys are also subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar of Texas. The State Bar of Texas investigates and prosecutes professional misconduct committed by Texas attorneys. For more information call (800) 932-1900.
- 20. ARBITRATION: It is Attorney's goal to maintain at all times a constructive and positive relationship with Client on the matter described above and on future matters in which Attorney may perform services for Client. However, should a dispute arise between Attorney and Client, a prompt and fair resolution is in the interests of all concerned. To this end, if any controversy or claim arises out of is related to this agreement, any services provided by Attorneys to Client in connection with Client's Claims, or any other matter that may arise between Client and Attorney (including malpractice claims and fee disputes), Attorneys and Client both waive any right to bring a court action or have a jury trial and agree that the dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration to be conducted in Dallas, Texas before the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA with one arbitrator who must be an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Texas.

CLIENT HAS READ AND UNDERSTANDS THIS CONTRACT AND AGREES AS STATED ABOVE AS OF THE DATE NOTED BELOW.

Laura Wassmer

Stephen Hopper

Date: \_ 11/19/2015

Address: 362S N Classen Blvd Oklahoma City, OK 7318

Telephone Numbers: 405-639-9186

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ATTORNEYS:

Fee. Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP

Malesovas Law Firm



CAUSE No. PR-11-3238-1

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FILED

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IN THE PROBATE COURT

JOHN F. WARREN COUNTY CLERK DALLAS COUNTY

JO N. HOPPER

DECEASED

Plaintiff,

IN RE: ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER!

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER,

Defendants.

NO. 1

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

#### CHARGE OF THE COURT


MEMBERS OF THE JURY:

After the closing arguments, you will go to the jury room to decide the case, answer the questions that are attached, and reach a verdict. You may discuss the case with other jurors only when you are all together in the jury room.

Remember my previous instructions: Do not discuss the case with anyone else, either in person or by any other means. Do not do any independent investigation about the case or conduct any research. Do not look up any words in dictionaries or on the Internet. Do not post information about the case on the Internet. Do not share any special knowledge or experiences with the other jurors. Do not use your phone or any other electronic device during your deliberations for any reason.

Any notes you have taken are for your own personal use. You may take your notes back into the jury room and consult them during deliberations, but do not show or read your notes to your fellow jurors during your deliberations. Your notes are not evidence. Each of you should rely on your independent recollection of the evidence and not be influenced by the fact that another juror has or has not taken notes.

You must leave your notes with the bailiff when you are not deliberating. The bailiff will give your notes to me promptly after collecting them from you. I will make sure your notes are kept in a safe, secure location and not disclosed to anyone. After you complete your deliberations, the bailiff will collect your notes. When you are released from jury duty, the bailiff will promptly destroy your notes so that nobody can read what you wrote.



ATTORNEYS' EXHIBIT NO. 3 PAGE 1 of 54



ORIGINAL



MR:606

Here are the instructions for answering the questions.

- 1. Do not let bias, prejudice, or sympathy play any part in your decision.
- 2. Base your answers only on the evidence admitted in court and on the law that is in these instructions and questions. Do not consider or discuss any evidence that was not admitted in the courtroom.
- 3. You are to make up your own minds about the facts. You are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony. But on matters of law, you must follow all of my instructions.
- 4. If my instructions use a word in a way that is different from its ordinary meaning, use the meaning I give you, which will be a proper legal definition.
- 5. All the questions and answers are important. No one should say that any question or answer is not important.
- 6. Answer "yes" or "no" to all questions unless you are told otherwise. A "yes" answer must be based on a preponderance of the evidence unless you are told otherwise. Whenever a question requires an answer other than "yes" or "no," your answer must be based on a preponderance of the evidence unless you are told otherwise.

The term "preponderance of the evidence" means the greater weight of credible evidence presented in this case. If you do not find that a preponderance of the evidence supports a "yes" answer, then answer "no." A preponderance of the evidence is not measured by the number of witnesses or by the number of documents admitted in evidence. For a fact to be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, you must find that the fact is more likely true than not true.

A fact may be established by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or both. A fact is established by direct evidence when proved by documentary evidence or by witnesses who saw the act done or heard the words spoken. A fact is established by circumstantial evidence when it may be fairly and reasonably inferred from the other facts proved.

7. A party's conduct includes the conduct of another who acts with the party's authority or apparent authority. Authority for another to act for a party must arise from the party's agreement that the other act on behalf and for the benefit of the party. If a party so authorizes another to perform an act, that other party is also authorized to do whatever else is proper, usual, and necessary to perform the act expressly authorized. Apparent authority exists if a party (1) knowingly permits

another to hold himself out as having authority or, (2) through lack of ordinary care, bestows on another such indications of authority that lead a reasonably prudent person to rely on the apparent existence of authority to his detriment. Only the acts of the party sought to be charged with responsibility for the conduct of another may be considered in determining whether apparent authority exists.

- 8. Do not decide who you think should win before you answer the questions and then just answer the questions to match your decision. Answer each question carefully without considering who will win. Do not discuss or consider the effect your answers will have.
  - 9. Do not answer questions by drawing straws or by any method of chance.
- 10. Some questions might ask you for a dollar amount. Do not agree in advance to decide on a dollar amount by adding up each juror's amount and then figuring the average.
- 11. Do not trade your answers. For example, do not say, "I will answer this question your way if you answer another question my way."
- 12. Unless otherwise instructed, the answers to the questions must be based on the decision of at least five of the six jurors. The same five jurors must agree on every answer. Do not agree to be bound by a vote of anything less than five jurors, even if it would be a majority.
- 13. In answering questions about damages, answer each question separately. Do not increase or reduce the amount in one answer because of your answer to any other question about damages. Do not speculate about what a party's ultimate recovery may or may not be. Any recovery will be determined by the court when it applies the law to your answers at the time of the judgment. Do not add any amount for interest on damages, if any.

As I have said before, if you do not follow these instructions, you will be guilty of juror misconduct, and I might have to order a new trial and start this process over again. This would waste your time and the parties' money, and would require the taxpayers of this county to pay for another trial. If a juror breaks any of these rules, tell that person to stop and report it to me immediately.

## DEFINITIONS

"JPMorgan" means JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

"Fee Agreement" means Plaintiff's Exhibit 7.

"The Estate" means the Estate of Max D. Hopper.

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ATTORNEYS' EXHIBIT NO. 3 PAGE 4 of 54

After JPMorgan was appointed Independent Administrator on June 30, 2010, did JPMorgan fail to comply with one or more of the following fiduciary duties:

a. JPMorgan's duty to act toward Jo Hopper in the utmost good faith and exercise the most scrupulous honesty;

Answer "Yes" or "No": VCS

b. JPMorgan's duty to place the interests of Jo Hopper above its own and to not use the advantage of its position to gain any benefit for itself at the expense of Jo Hopper;

Answer "Yes" or "No": \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

c. JPMorgan's duty to fully and fairly disclose to Jo Hopper all material facts known to JPMorgan that might affect her rights.

Answer "Yes" or "No": \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

If you answered "Yes" to any subpart of Question No. 1, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

#### Question No. 2

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate Jo Hopper for her damages, if any, that were proximately caused by such conduct?

"Proximate cause" means a cause that was a substantial factor in bringing about an event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using the degree of care required of him or her would have foreseen that the event, or some similar event might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.

Consider the following element of damages, if any, and none other.

Do not add any amount for interest on damages, if any.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any.

a. Jo Hopper's mental anguish sustained in the past.

"Mental anguish" means a relatively high degree of mental pain and distress that is more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger.

Answer: \$ 500,000.00

b. Attorneys' fees paid by Jo Hopper before this lawsuit to address IPMorgan's breaches of its fiduciary duties.

Answer: \$ 222,780,95

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Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "yes" to Question No. 1 and with an amount greater than \$0 to any part of Question No. 2. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

To answer "yes" to the following question, your answer must be unanimous. You may answer "No" to the following question only upon a vote of five or more jurors. Otherwise, you must not answer the following question.

#### Question No. 3

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the harm to Jo Hopper from JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty resulted from malice?

"Clear and convincing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof that produces a firm belief or conviction of the truth of the allegation sought to be established.

"Malice" means a specific intent by JPMorgan to cause substantial injury or harm to Jo Hopper.

Answer "Yes" or "No": VAS

Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "Yes" to Question No. 3. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

You must unanimously agree on the amount of any award of exemplary damages.

#### Question No. 4

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, should be assessed against JPMorgan and awarded to Jo Hopper as exemplary damages, if any, for the conduct found in response to Question No. 3?

"Exemplary damages" means an amount that you may in your discretion award as a penalty or by way of punishment.

Factors to consider in awarding exemplary damages, if any, are-

- 1. The nature of the wrong,
- 2. The character of the conduct involved;
- 3. The degree of culpability of JPMorgan;
- 4. The situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned;
- 5. The extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice and propriety; and
- 6. The net worth of JPMorgan.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any.

Answer: \$ 2,000,000,000,00

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If you answered with an amount greater than \$0 to any subpart of Question 2, then answer the following question. Otherwise do not answer the following question.

#### Question No. 5

Did the negligence, if any, or knowing participation in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty, if any, of those named below proximately cause Jo Hopper's damages?

"Negligence" means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which a person of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.

"Ordinary care" means that degree of care that would be used by a person of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances.

"Proximate cause" means a cause that was a substantial factor in bringing about an event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using the degree of care required of him or her would have foreseen that the event, or some similar event might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.

"Knowing participation in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty" requires that (1) the person or entity knowingly participated in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty, and (2) that person or entity knew of the fiduciary relationship and was aware of his participation in JPMorgan's breach of its duty.

a. Answer "Yes" or "No" with regard to the negligence, if any, of the	: followin	Q.
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Jo Hopper

NO

b. Answer "Yes" or "No" with regard to knowing participation in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty, if any, of each of the following:

Stephen Hopper Laura Wassmer

Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray

NO NO

If you answered "Yes" to Question 5 for more than one of those named below, then answer the following question. Otherwise do not answer the following question.

Assign percentages of responsibility only to those you found caused or contributed to cause the injury you found in question 2. The percentages you find must total 100 percent. The percentages must be expressed in whole numbers. The percentage of responsibility attributable to any one is not necessarily measured by the number of acts or omissions found. The percentage attributable to any one need not be the same percentage attributed to that one in answering another question.

#### Question No. 6

For each person or entity you found caused or contributed to cause the injury, find the percentage of responsibility attributable to each for the conduct you have found:

JPMorgan	
Jo Hopper	
Stephen Hopper	
Laura Wassmer	
Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray	
•	
Total	100%

Did JPMorgan fail to comply with the Fee Agreement with regard to Jo Hopper?

Answer "Yes" or "No": VAS

If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 7, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

## Question No. 8

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate Jo Hopper for her damages, if any, that resulted from such failure to comply?

Consider the following elements of damages, if any, and none other.

Do not add any amount for interest on damages, if any.

Answer separately in dollars and cents for damages, if any, with respect to each of the following:

 Attorney's fees paid by Jo Hopper before this lawsuit to address JPMorgan's failure to perform its responsibilities under the Fee Agreement.

Answer: \$ 222,780.95

b. Money owed to Jo Hopper for reimbursement of expenses.

Answer: \$ 58,051,47

If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 7, then answer the following question. Otherwise do not answer the following question.

Question No. 9

What is a reasonable fee for the necessary services of Jo Hopper's attorneys regarding her claim for breach of contract, stated in dollars and cents?

Factors to consider in determining a reasonable fee include:

- 1. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal services properly.
- 2. The likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
- 3. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
- 4. The amount involved and the results obtained.
- 5. The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
- 6. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
- The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
- 8. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered.

Answer with an amount for each of the following:

<ol> <li>For representation through</li> </ol>	1 this	trial
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Answer: \$4,061,518.00

2. For representation through appeal to the court of appeals.

Answer: \$ 200,000,00

For representation at the petition for review stage in the Supreme Court of Texas.

Answer: \$ 50,000,00

4. For representation at the merits briefing stage in the Supreme Court of Texas.

Answer: \$ 75,000,00

5. For representation through oral argument and the completion of proceedings in the Supreme Court of Texas.

Answer: \$ 50,000,00

Does JPMorgan as Independent conscience belongs to Jo Hopper?

Answer "Yes" or "No": \\delta S

If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 10, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

Question No. 11

What is the amount of money held by JPMorgan as Independent Administrator that in equity and good conscience belongs to Jo Hopper?

Answer: \$ 58,682.00

What is a reasonable fee for the necessary services of Jo Hopper's attorneys regarding the Robledo claims, stated in dollars and cents?

"Robledo claims" mean all the declaratory judgment claims that regarding the house and lot located at 9 Robledo Drive, Dallas, Texas and other issues addressed in the court of appeals opinion issued in December 2014.

Factors to consider in determining a reasonable fee include:

- The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal services properly.
- 2. The likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
- The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
- The amount involved and the results obtained.
- 5. The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
- 6. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
- 7. The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the
- 8. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered.

Answer with an amount for each of the following:

For representation through this trial.

Answer: \$ 4,052,035,60

2. For representation in a future appeal through appeal to the court of appeals.

Answer: \$ 200,000,00

For representation in a future appeal at the petition for review stage in the Supreme Court of Texas.

Answer: \$ 50,000.00

4. For representation in a future appeal at the merits briefing stage in the Supreme Court of Texas.

Answer: \$ 75,000.00

For representation in a future appeal through oral argument and the completion of proceedings in the Supreme Court of Texas.

Answer: \$50,000

What is a reasonable fee for the necessary services of Jo Hopper's attorneys in obtaining a ruling that Jo Hopper does not owe the Estate any money for attorneys' fees, stated in dollars and cents?

Factors to consider in determining a reasonable fee include:

- 1. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal services properly.
- 2. The likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
- 3. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
- 4. The amount involved and the results obtained.
- The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
- 6. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
- 7. The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
- 8. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered.

Answer with an amount for each of the following:

1. For representation through this trial.

Answer: \$ 1469, 828,00

2. For representation through appeal to the court of appeals.

Answer: \$ 200,000.00

3. For representation at the petition for review stage in the Supreme Court of Texas.

Answer: \$ 30,000.00

For representation at the merits briefing stage in the Supreme Court of Texas.

Answer: \$ 75,000.00

 For representation through oral argument and the completion of proceedings in the Supreme Court of Texas.

Answer: \$ 50,000.00

17

ATTORNEYS' EXHIBIT NO. 3 PAGE 17 of 54

Did JPMorgan fail to comply with the Fee Agreement with respect to Stephen Hopper and/or Laura Wassmer?

Answer "Yes" or "No" for each of the following:

Stephen B. Hopper: Yes

If you answered Question Number 14 "Yes," Answer this Question. Otherwise do not answer the following question.

Question No. 15

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate Stephen B. Hopper and/or Laura S. Wassmer for their damages, if any, that resulted from JPMorgan's failure to comply with the Fee Agreement?

Consider the following elements of damages, if any, and none other.

1. The amount of legal fees Stephen Hopper paid to his attorneys prior to the inception of the litigation that were the natural, probable and forseeable consequence of JPMorgan's failure to comply with the Fee Agreement.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any, for the following:

Stephen B. Hopper: \$<u>84,300.00</u>

2. The amount of legal fees Laura Wassmer paid her attorneys prior to the inception of the litigation that were the natural, probable and forseeable consequence of JPMorgan's failure to comply with the Fee Agreement.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any, for the following:

Laura S. Wassmer: \$ 78,000.00

3. The loss of potential inheritance to Stephen B. Hopper that was a natural, probable and forseeable consequence of JP Morgan's failure to comply with the Fee Agreement.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any, for the following:

Stephen B. Hopper: \$1,847,300,06

4. The loss of potential inheritance to Laura S. Wassmer that was a natural, probable and forseeable consequence of JP Morgan's failure to comply with the Fee Agreement.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any, for the following:


Laura S. Wassmer: \$ 1,847,500,00


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There is no Question No. 17 21 ATTORNEYS' EXHIBIT NO. 3 PAGE 21 of 54

MR:626





After JPMorgan was appointed Independent Administrator on June 30, 2010, did JPMorgan fail to comply with one or more of the following fiduciary duties, which it owed Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer as beneficiaries of the Estate?

 JPMorgan's duty to act toward Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer in the utmost good faith and exercise the most scrupulous'honesty;

Answer "Yes" or "No": VES

b. JPMorgan's duty to place the interests of Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer above its own and to not use the advantage of its position to gain any benefit for itself at the expense of Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer;

Answer "Yes" or "No": YES

c. JPMorgan's duty to fully and fairly disclose to Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer all material facts known to JPMorgan that might affect their rights.

If you answered "Yes" to Question 20, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

## Question No. 21

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate the Estate for damages, if any, resulting from the conduct complained about in Question 20?

Consider the following elements of damages, if any, and none other.

Any reduction in the value of the Estate.

Do not add any amount for interest on damages, if any.

Answer in dollars and cents for damages, if any.

Answer: \$ 3,695,000.00

If you answered "Yes" to any subpart of Question 20, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

#### Question No. 22

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate the Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer for damages, if any, that were proximately caused by the conduct inquired about in Question 20?

"Proximate cause" means a cause that was a substantial factor in bringing about an event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using the degree of care required of him would have fore- seen that the event, or some similar event, might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.

Consider the following elements of damages, if any, and none other.

Any reduction in the value of the Estate.

Consider each element separately. Do not add any amount for interest on damages, if any.

Answer separately in dollars and cents for damages, if any.

For Stephen Hopper, in dollars and cents:

Answer: \$1,847,500.00

For Laura Wassmer, in dollars and cents:

Answer: \$ 1,847,500,00

If you answered with an amount greater than \$0 to any subpart of Question 21 or 22, then answer the following question. Otherwise do not answer the following question.

Question No. 23

Did the negligence, if any, or knowing participation in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty, if any, of those named below proximately cause Stephen Hopper's, Laura Wassmer's, or the Estate's damages?

"Negligence" when used with respect to Jo Hopper, Stephen Hopper, and Laura Wassmer means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which a person of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.

"Negligence" when used with respect to the conduct of Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray, means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which an attorney would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which an attorney would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.

"Ordinary care" means that degree of care that would be used by a person of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances.

"Proximate cause" means a cause that was a substantial factor in bringing about an event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using the degree of care required of him or her would have foreseen that the event, or some similar event might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.

"Knowing participation in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty" requires that (1) the person or entity knowingly participated in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty, and (2) that person or entity knew of the fiduciary relationship and was aware of his participation in JPMorgan's breach of its duty.

a. Answer "Yes" or "No" with regard to the negligence, if any, of the following:

Jo Hopper
Stephen Hopper
Laura Wassmer
Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray

VES

b. Answer "Yes" or "No" with regard to knowing participation in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty, if any, of each of the following:

27

ATTORNEYS' EXHIBIT NO. 3 PAGE 27 of 54 If you answered "Yes" to Question 23 for more than one of those named below, then answer the following question. Otherwise do not answer the following question.

Assign percentages of responsibility only to those you found caused or contributed to cause the injury you found in question 21. The percentages you find must total 100 percent. The percentages must be expressed in whole numbers. The percentage of responsibility attributable to any one is not necessarily measured by the number of acts or omissions found. The percentage attributable to any one need not be the same percentage attributed to that one in answering another question.

#### Question No. 24

For each person or entity you found caused or contributed to cause the injury, find the percentage of responsibility attributable to each for the conduct you have found:

JPMorgan
Jo Hopper (negligence)
Jo Hopper (knowing participation)
Stephen Hopper
Laura Wassmer (negligence)
Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray (negligence)
Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray (knowing participation)

90

Total

100%

Answer the following question only, if you unanimously answered "Yes" to any subpart of Question No. 20. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

To answer "yes" to the following question, your answer must be unanimous. You may answer "No" to the following question only upon a vote of five or more jurors. Otherwise, you must not answer the following question.

#### Question No. 25

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the harm to the Estate from JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty resulted from malice?

"Clear and convincing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof that produces a firm belief or conviction of the truth of the allegation sought to be established.

"Malice" means a specific intent by JPMorgan to cause substantial injury or harm to the Estate.

Answer "Yes" or "No": \( \square\{\textit{Q}\sqrt{\textit{Q}}\sqrt{\textit

Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "Yes" to Question Number 25. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

You must unanimously agree on the amount of any award of exemplary damages.

## Question No. 26

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, should be assessed against JPMorgan and awarded to Estate as exemplary damages, if any, for the conduct found in response to Question No. 25?

"Exemplary damages" means an amount that you may in your discretion award as a penalty or by way of punishment.

Factors to consider in awarding exemplary damages, if any, are-

- 1. The nature of the wrong;
- 2. The character of the conduct involved;
- The degree of culpability of JPMorgan;The situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned;
- 5. The extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice and propriety; and
- 6. The net worth of JPMorgan.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any.

Answer: \$ 2,000,000,000.00

Did JPMorgan commit fraud against Stephen B. Hopper and/or Laura S. Wassmer?

#### Fraud occurs when-

- 1. A party makes a material misrepresentation; and
- 2. The misrepresentation is made with knowledge of its falsity or made recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as a positive assertion, and
- 3. The misrepresentation is made with the intention that it should be acted on by the other party, and
- 4. The other party relies on the misrepresentation and thereby suffers injury.

#### Fraud also occurs when-

- 1. A party fails to disclose a material fact within the knowledge of that party; and
- 2. The party knows that the other party is ignorant of the fact and does not have an equal opportunity to discovery the truth; and
- 3. The party intends to induce the other party to take some action by failing to disclose the fact; and
- 4. The other party suffers injury as a result of acting without knowledge of the undisclosed fact.

#### "Misrepresentation" means-

- 1. A statement of opinion based on a false statement of fact; or
- 2. A statement of opinion that the maker knows to be false; or
- 3. An expression of opinion that is false, made by one who has, or purports to have, special knowledge of the subject matter of the opinion.

Answer "Yes" or "No" with for each of the following:

Stephen B. Hopper:

Laura S. Wassmer:

Answer the following question only if you answered "Yes" to Question Number 27 Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

Question No. 28

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer for their damages, if any, that were proximately caused by such fraud?

"Proximate cause" means a cause that was a substantial factor in bringing about an event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using the degree of care required of him would have foreseen that the event, or some similar event, might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.

Consider the following elements of damages, if any, and none other.

1. The amount of legal fees Stephen Hopper paid to his attorneys prior to the inception of the litigation that were the natural, probable and forseeable consequence of JPMorgan's fraud.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any, for the following:

Stephen B. Hopper: \$ 84,500,00

2. The amount of legal fees Laura Wassmer paid her attorneys prior to the inception of the litigation that were the natural, probable and forseeable consequence of JPMorgan's fraud.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any, for the following:

Laura S. Wassmer: \$ 78,000.00

3. The loss of potential inheritance to Stephen B. Hopper that was a natural, probable and forseeable consequence of JP Morgan's fraud.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any, for the following:

Stephen B. Hopper: \$ 1,847,500.60

4. The loss of potential inheritance to Laura S. Wassmer that was a natural, probable and forseeable consequence of JP Morgan's fraud.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any, for the following:

Laura S. Wassmer: \$ 1,847,500.00

If you answered "Yes" to Question 28, then answer the following question. Otherwise do not answer the following question.

Ouestion No. 29

Did the negligence, if any, or knowing participation in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty, if any, of those named below proximately cause Stephen Hopper's, Laura Wassmer's, or the Estate's damages?

"Negligence" when used with respect to Jo Hopper, Stephen Hopper, and Laura Wassmer means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which a person of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.

"Negligence" when used with respect to the conduct of Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray, means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which an attorney would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which an attorney would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.

"Ordinary care" means that degree of care that would be used by a person of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances.

"Proximate cause" means a cause that was a substantial factor in bringing about an event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using the degree of care required of him or her would have foreseen that the event, or some similar event might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.

"Knowing participation in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty" requires that (1) the person or entity knowingly participated in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty, and (2) that person or entity knew of the fiduciary relationship and was aware of his participation in JPMorgan's breach of its duty.

a. Answer "Yes" or "No" with regard to the negligence, if any, of the following:

b. Answer "Yes" or "No" with regard to knowing participation in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty, if any, of each of the following:

33

ATTORNEYS' EXHIBIT NO. 3 PAGE 33 of 54 If you answered "Yes" to Question 29 for more than one of those named below, then answer the following question. Otherwise do not answer the following question.

Assign percentages of responsibility only to those you found caused or contributed to cause the injury you found in question 28. The percentages you find must total 100 percent. The percentages must be expressed in whole numbers. The percentage of responsibility attributable to any one is not necessarily measured by the number of acts or omissions found. The percentage attributable to any one need not be the same percentage attributed to that one in answering another question.

#### Question No. 30

Total

For each person or entity you found caused or contributed to cause the injury, find the percentage of responsibility attributable to each for the conduct you have found:

JPMorgan	90
Jo Hopper (negligence)	0
Jo Hopper (knowing participation)	
Stephen Hopper	0
Laura Wassmer (negligence)	0.
Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray (negligence)	70
Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray (knowing participation)	

34

100%

Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "Yes" to any part of Question No. 27. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

To answer "yes" to the following question, your answer must be unanimous. You may answer "No" to the following question only upon a vote of five or more jurors. Otherwise, you must not answer the following question.

#### Question No. 31

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the harm to Stephen B Hopper and/or Laura S. Wassmer resulted from fraud as found in Question 27?

"Clear and convincing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof that produces a firm belief or conviction of the truth of the allegations sought to be established.

#### Fraud occurs when-

- 1. A party makes a material misrepresentation; and
- 2. The misrepresentation is made with knowledge of its falsity or made recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as a positive assertion, and
- 3. The misrepresentation is made with the intention that it should be acted on by the other party, and
- 4. The other party relies on the misrepresentation and thereby suffers injury.

#### Fraud also occurs when-

- 1. A party fails to disclose a material fact within the knowledge of that party; and
- 2. The party knows that the other party is ignorant of the fact and does not have an equal opportunity to discovery the truth; and
- 3. The party intends to induce the other party to take some action by failing to disclose the fact; and
- 4. The other party suffers injury as a result of acting without knowledge of the undisclosed fact.

#### "Misrepresentation" means-

1. A statement of opinion based on a false statement of fact; or

- 2. A statement of opinion that the maker knows to be false; or
- 3. An expression of opinion that is false, made by one who has, or purports to have, special knowledge of the subject matter of the opinion.

Answer "Yes" or "No" as to each of the following:

Stephen B. Hopper 105

Answer the following question regarding JPMorgan only if you unanimously answered "Yes" to Question 31 regarding that defendant. Otherwise, do not answer the following question regarding that defendant

#### Question No. 32

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, should be assessed against JPMorgan and awarded to Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer as exemplary damages, if any, for the conduct found in response to Question 31.

"Exemplary damages" means an amount that you may in your discretion award as a penalty or by way of punishment.

Factors to consider in awarding exemplary damages, if any, are-

- a. The nature of the wrong.
- b. The character of the conduct involved.
- c. The degree of culpability of JPMorgan
- d. The situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned
- e. The extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice and propriety
- f. The net worth of JPMorgan

Answer in dollars and cents, if any, as to each of the following:

Laura S. Wassmer \$1,000,000,000.00

Stephen B. Hopper \$ 1,000,000,000.00

Did the negligence, if any, of JP Morgan proximately cause injury to Stephen B. Hopper and/or Laura S. Wassmer?

"Negligence" means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which a person of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.

"Ordinary care" means that degree of care that would be used by a person of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances.

"Proximate cause" means a cause that was a substantial factor in bringing about an event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using the degree of care required of him would have foreseen that the event, or some similar event, might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.

Answer "Yes" or "No" for each of the following:

Laura S. Wassmer

Stephen B. Hopper

Yaz

Answer the following question only if you answered "Yes" to Question Number 33. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

#### Question No. 34

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer for their damages, if any, that were proximately caused by negligence?

"Proximate cause" means a cause that was a substantial factor in bringing about an event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using the degree of care required of him would have foreseen that the event, or some similar event, might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.

Consider the following elements of damages, if any, and none other. Answer in dollars and cents, if any, for the following:

1. The amount of legal fees Stephen Hopper paid to his attorneys prior to the inception of the litigation that were the natural, probable and forseeable consequence of JPMorgan's negligence.

Stephen B. Hopper: \$ 84,500,00

 The amount of legal fees Laura Wassmer paid her attorneys prior to the inception of the litigation that were the natural, probable and forseeable consequence of JPMorgan's negligence.

Laura S. Wassmer: \$ 78,000.00

3. The loss of potential inheritance to Stephen B. Hopper that was a natural, probable and forseeable consequence of JP Morgan's negligence.

Stephen B. Hopper: \$1.847,500.60

4. The loss of potential inheritance to Laura S. Wassmer that was a natural, probable and forseeable consequence of JP Morgan's negligence.

Laura S. Wassmer: \$ 1,847, 500,00

If you answered "Yes" to Question 34, then answer the following question. Otherwise do not answer the following question.

#### Ouestion No. 35

Did the negligence, if any, or knowing participation in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty, if any, of those named below proximately cause Stephen Hopper's or Laura Wassmer's damages?

"Negligence" when used with respect to Jo Hopper, Stephen Hopper, and Laura Wassmer means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which a person of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.

"Negligence" when used with respect to the conduct of Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray, means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which an attorney would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing that which an attorney would not have done under the same or similar circumstances.

"Ordinary care" means that degree of care that would be used by a person of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances.

"Proximate cause" means a cause that was a substantial factor in bringing about an event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using the degree of care required of him or her would have foreseen that the event, or some similar event might reasonably result therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.

"Knowing participation in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty" requires that (1) the person or entity knowingly participated in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty, and (2) that person or entity knew of the fiduciary relationship and was aware of his participation in JPMorgan's breach of its duty.

Answer "Yes" or "No" with regard to the negligence, if any, of the following:

Jo Hopper

Stephen Hopper

Laura Wassmer

Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray

b. Answer "Yes" or "No" with regard to knowing participation in JPMorgan's breach of fiduciary duty, if any, of each of the following:

Jo Hopper

Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray

If you answered "Yes" to Question 35 for more than one of those named below, then answer the following question. Otherwise do not answer the following question.

Assign percentages of responsibility only to those you found caused or contributed to cause the injury you found in question 34. The percentages you find must total 100 percent. The percentages must be expressed in whole numbers. The percentage of responsibility attributable to any one is not necessarily measured by the number of acts or omissions found. The percentage attributable to any one need not be the same percentage attributed to that one in answering another question.

#### Question No. 36

For each person or entity you found caused or contributed to cause the injury, find the percentage of responsibility attributable to each for the conduct you have found:

JPMorgan	90
Jo Hopper (negligence)	3
Jo Hopper (knowing participation)	$\triangle$
Stephen Hopper	_Ŏ
Laura Wassmer (negligence)	O
Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray (negligence)	10
Gary Stolbach and Glast, Phillips & Murray (knowing participation)	

Total

100%

Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "Yes" to Question 33. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

To answer "Yes" to any part of the following question, your answer must be unanimous. You may answer "No" to any part of the following question only upon a vote of 5 more jurors. Otherwise, you must not answer that part of the following question.

#### Question No. 37

Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the harm to Stephen B. Hopper, Laura S. Wassmer, or the Estate resulted from gross negligence attributable to JPMorgan?

"Clear and convincing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof that produces a firm belief or conviction of the truth of the allegations sought to be established.

"Gross negligence" means an act or omission by JPMorgan

- 1. which when viewed objectively from the standpoint JPMorgan at the time of its occurrence involves an extreme degree of risk, considering the probability and magnitude of the potential harm to others; and
- 2. of which JPMorgan has actual, subjective awareness of the risk involved, but nevertheless proceeds with conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare of others.

You are further instructed that JPMorgan may be grossly negligent because of an act by Susan Novak if, but only if--

- 1. JPMorgan authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or
- 2. Susan Novak was unfit and JPMorgan was reckless in employing her, or
- 3. Susan Novak was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of employment, or
- 4. JPMorgan or a manager of JPMorgan ratified or approved the act.

A person is a manager or is employed in a managerial capacity if--

1. that person has authority to employ, direct, and discharge an employee of JPMorgan; or

2. JPMorgan has confided to that person the management of the whole or a department or division of the business of JPMorgan

Answer "Yes" or "No" as to each of the following:

Laura S. Wassmer \_\_\_\_\_

Stephen B. Hopper <u>VCS</u>

Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "Yes" to Question 37. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

Question No. 38

You must unanimously agree on the amount of any award of exemplary damages.

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, should be assessed against JPMorgan and awarded to Stephen B. Hopper, Laura Wassmer or the Estate as exemplary damages, if any, for the conduct unanimously found in response to Question 37?

"Exemplary damages" means an amount that you may in your discretion award as a penalty or by way of punishment.

Factors to consider in awarding exemplary damages, if any, are-

- 1. The nature of the wrong.
- 2. The character of the conduct involved.
- 3. The degree of culpability of JPMorgan.
- 4. The situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned.
- 5. The extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice and propriety.
- 6. The net worth of JPMorgan.

Answer in dollars and cents, if any, for each of the following:

Laura S. Wassmer \$1,000,000,000.00

Stephen B. Hopper \$/,000,000,000

Did JPMorgan commit conversion against the Estate?

Conversion occurs when:

- 1. a party owned or had possession of the property or entitlement to possession, and
- another party unlawfully and without authorization assumed and exercised control
  over the property to the exclusion or, or inconsistent with, the plaintiff's rights as an
  owner, and
- 3. the first party demanded return of the property, and
- 4. the other party refused to return the property.

Answer "Yes" or "No."

Answer: YCS

If you answered "Yes" to Question 39, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

Question No. 40

What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly compensate the Estate for the value of the property JPMorgan converted, if any, valued at the time of such conversion?

Answer in dollars and cents for damages, if any:

Answer: \$3,695,000.00

Does JPMorgan as Independent Administrator hold money that in equity and good conscience belongs to the Estate?

Answer "Yes" or "No": 195

If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 41, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.

### Question No. 42

What is the amount of money held by JPMorgan as Independent Administrator that in equity and good conscience belongs to the Estate?

Answer: \$3,695,000.00

Did JPMorgan as Independen Administrator act in good faith, whether successful or not, in defending the action for its removal?

From September 21, 2011 through December 7, 2015, JPMorgan as Independent Administrator defended Jo Hopper's Removal Action.

"Removal Action" means Mrs. Hopper's claims for removal of JPMorgan as Independent Administrator.

"Good faith" means an action that is prompted by honesty of intention and a reasonable belief that the action was probably correct.

Answer "Y	es" or "No."
	17)
V 2221022	111/ /

What is a reasonable fee for the necessary services of the attorneys for JPMorgan as Independent Administrator in connection with its defense of the Removal Action, stated in dollars and cents?

Factors to consider in determining a reasonable fee include—

- 1. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal services properly.
- 2. The likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
- 3. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
- 4. The amount involved and the results obtained.
- 5. The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
- 6. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
- 7. The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
- 8. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered.

Attorneys' Fees Incurred in Defense of the Removal Action:

\$1,185,775.∞

What is the amount of JPMorgan as Independent Administrator's reasonable attorneys' fees necessarily incurred in connection with the proceedings and management of the estate?

Factors to consider in determining a reasonable fee include—

- 1. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal services properly.
- 2. The likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer:
- 3. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
- 4. The amount involved and the results obtained.
- 5. The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
- 6. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
- 7. The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
- 8. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered.

Answer with an amount for representation after December 7, 2015:

1. For representation through trial and the completion of proceedings in the trial court.

Answer: \$ 685, 632.00

2. For representation through appeal to the court of appeals.

Answer: \$ 100,000,00

3. For representation at the petition for review stage in the Supreme Court of Texas.

Answer: \$ 75,000.00

4. For representation at the merits briefing stage in the Supreme Court of Texas.

Answer: \$ 50,000.08

5. For representation through oral argument and the completion of proceedings in the Supreme Court of Texas.

Answer: \$ 50,000.00

#### Presiding Juror:

- 1. When you go into the jury room to answer the questions, the first thing you will need to do is choose a presiding juror.
  - 2. The presiding juror has these duties:
    - have the complete charge read aloud if it will be helpful to your deliberations;
    - b. preside over your deliberations, meaning manage the discussions, and see that you follow these instructions;
    - c. give written questions or comments to the bailiff who will give them to the judge;
    - d. write down the answers you agree on;
    - e. get the signatures for the verdict certificate; and
    - f. notify the bailiff that you have reached a verdict.

· Do you understand the duties of the presiding juror? If you do not, please tell me now.

#### Instructions for Signing the Verdict Certificate:

- 1. Unless otherwise instructed, you may answer the questions on a vote of five jurors. The same five jurors must agree on every answer in the charge. This means you may not have one group of five jurors agree on one answer and a different group of five jurors agree on another answer.
  - 2. If five jurors agree on every answer, those five jurors sign the verdict.

If all six of you agree on every answer, you are unanimous and only the presiding juror signs the verdict.

- All jurors should deliberate on every question. You may end up with all six of you agreeing on some answers, while only five of you agree on other answers. But when you sign the verdict, only those five who agree on every answer will sign the verdict.
- 4. There are some special instructions before Questions 3, 4, 25, 26, 31, 32, 37, and 38 explaining how to answer those questions. Please follow the instructions. If all six of you answer those questions, you will need to complete a second verdict certificate for those questions.

Do you understand these instructions? If you do not, please to me nov

#### Verdict Certificate

Check one:	
Our verdict is unanimo presiding juror has signed the certification	us. All six of us have agreed to each and every answer. Thate for all six of us.
Signature of Presiding Juror	Printed Name of Presiding Juror
Our verdict is not unani have signed the certificate below.	mous. Five of us have agreed to each and every answer and
Signature	Name Printed
1. Ran Sai	BANDY GOUT
2. Julie Alme	Trelsie Alvanz
3 Bold Mil	ly Book Miller
4.	Stacey WOMACK
5. Duxing Dire	Grovanna Palegur
If you have answered Question	No. 4, 26, 32, and 38, then you must sign this certificate also

#### Additional Certificate

I certify that the jury was unanimous in answering the following questions. All six of us agreed to each of the answers. The presiding juror has signed the certificate for all six of us.

Questions 3, 25, 31, and 37 and 4, 26, 32, and 38.

#### Verdict Certificate

Check one:	
Our verdict is unanim presiding juror has signed the certifi	tous. All six of us have agreed to each and every answer. The cate for all six of us.
Signature of Presiding Juror	Printed Name of Presiding Juror
Our verdict is not una have signed the certificate below.	nimous. Five of us have agreed to each and every answer and
Signature  1. Randa Am  2. Julia Am  3. Bolda Ma  4. Landa Am  5. Marrine Ma	Name Printed  RANDY GOUT  Tressie Alvarez  Books Miller  Stacy Worach  GIVNANNON Paleguez
If you have answered Question	ń No. 4, 26, 32, and 38, then you must sign this certificate also.
	Additional Cartificate

I certify that the jury was unanimous in answering the following questions. All six of us agreed to each of the answers. The presiding juror has signed the certificate for all six of us.

Questions 3, 25, 31, and 37 and 4, 26, 32, and 38.



April 4, 2018

JEFFREY S. LEVINGER Board Certified Civil Appellate Law Texas Board of Legal Specialization

By E-Mail

Van H. Beckwith Baker Botts L.L.P. 2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 700 Dallas, TX 75201

Re: No. PR-11-3238-1; In re Estate of Max D. Hopper; Jo N. Hopper v. JPMorgan Chase

Bank, et al..; in the Probate Court No. 1 of Dallas County, Texas

Dear Van:

This Rule 11 letter will confirm that Laura Wassmer, Stephen Hopper, the Estate of Max Hopper, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. have agreed to settle this case based on the confidential terms set forth in the email communication between Robert Sacks and me dated April 3 and 4, 2018. Laura Wassmer, Stephen Hopper, and the Estate agree to withdraw their Motion for Judgment and the hearing set on it for April 5-6, 2018, and the parties shall announce this settlement to the Court. I would appreciate it if you would sign this letter below to signify your acceptance of it.

Sincerely,

Jeffrey S. Levinger

Counsel for Laura Wassmer, Stephen Hopper, and the Estate

of Max Hopper

JL/rh Enclosure

AGREED

Van H. Beckwith

Counsel for JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

EXHIBIT THEY LENGTS HOW TO HE WE

LEVINGER PC | 1445 ROSS AVENUE | SUITE 2500 | DALLAS, TEXAS 75202 | P 214.855.6817 | F 214.855.6808 | E jlevinger@levingerpc.com

ATTORNEYS' EXHIBIT NO. 6 PAGE 1 of 1

#### LAW OFFICES OF JAMES E. PENNINGTON

A Professional Corporation 900 Jackson Street, Suite 440 Dallas, Texas 75202-4473

JAMES E. PENNINGTON LICENSED IN TEXAS AND COLORADO PHONE (214) 741-3022 FAX (214) 741-3055 E-MAIL Jep@Jeplawyer.com

April 5, 2018

VIA EMAIL: blauten@brianlauten.com

Brian P. Lauten Brian Lauten, P.C. 3811 Turtle Creek Blvd. Suite 1450 Dallas, Texas 75219

Re: Case No. PR-11-3238-1; In re: Estate of Max Hopper, Deceased, Jo N. Hopper v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al., in the Probate Court of Dallas County, Texas.

Brian:

As you know, I represent Dr. Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer in connection with a dispute that has developed involving your clients, Anthony Vitullo and Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP. Please be advised that my clients have decided to terminate their relationship with Mr. Vitullo, Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP and John Malesovas. Their decision to terminate this relationship is based on a number of factors, which are too numerous to set forth herein. However, I provided you with a brief summary of those reasons yesterday during our call and suggested we meet in person to discuss this in more detail. Ultimately, as a result of several issues that were discovered by Jeff Levinger, the appellate lawyer retained to handle the appeal of the jury's verdict, my clients decided to settle the case with JP Morgan Chase. Most, if not all of these issues, were caused by your clients' omissions before and during trial, such as failing to present expert testimony and several jury charge issues which would have made an appeal very difficult for my clients. Additionally, I discovered a number of facts, some of which I outlined during our call, which indicate that the contingency fee agreement is probably not enforceable and which show that - even if it is enforceable - your clients breached the agreement. As a result, I am notifying you that my clients are - effective immediately -- terminating their relationship with Mr. Vitullo, Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP and Mr. Malesovas and his firm. It is unclear to me whether you are representing Mr. Malesovas or his firm. Please advise, so that I can notify Mr. Malesovas if needed.

At this time, I am requesting your clients to provide me with their entire file regarding their representation of my clients. Although your clients have previously provided me with



ATTORNEYS' EXHIBIT NO. 7 PAGE 1 of 2



Brian Lauten April 5, 2018 Page 2

portions of the file, the files which were provided are not complete and were not provided in the manner in which they were originally maintained by the firm. I am not suggesting anything improper about the manner in which the files were previously produced. However, I am pointing this out to emphasize the importance of making sure that I receive the complete file in the same manner that it was maintained by your clients. You may provide the electronic files on a portable hard drive and have this device, along with the physical files, delivered to my office.

Finally, as I indicated during our call, my clients are willing to discuss a resolution of the attorney's fees related to your clients' representation, so give this some more thought and let me know if you have a proposal. In the meantime, I will instruct Mr. Levinger to retain a percentage of the settlement in his trust account until this matter is resolved. Thank you for your anticipated cooperation. If you have any questions, please feel free to give me a call.

Sincerely

James E. Pennington

#### LAW OFFICES OF JAMES E. PENNINGTON

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 900 JACKSON STREET, SUITE 440 DALLAS, TEXAS 75202-4473

JAMES E. PENNINGTON LICENSED IN TEXAS AND COLORADO PHONE (214) 741-3022 FAX (214) 741-3055 E-MAIL Jep@Jeplawyer.com

April 5, 2018

VIA EMAIL: john@malesovas.com jmalesovas@gmail.com

John Malesovas 1801 S. MoPac Expressway Suite 320 Austin, Texas 78746

Re: Case No. PR-11-3238-1; In re: Estate of Max Hopper, Deceased, Jo N. Hopper v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al., in the Probate Court of Dallas County, Texas.

Mr. Malesovas:

In the event you have not previously been advised, I have been retained to represent Dr. Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer in connection with a dispute that has developed involving your representation in the above-referenced matter. Please be advised that my clients have decided to terminate their relationship with you and Mr. Vitullo, and your respective law firms. Mr Vitullo was advised of this decision earlier today. The clients' decision to terminate this relationship is based on a number of factors, which are too numerous to set forth herein. Yesterday, I spoke with Mr. Vitullo's attorney, Brian Lauten, and provided him with a brief summary of those reasons and I offered to meet in person to discuss this in more detail. Ultimately, as a result of several issues that were discovered by Jeff Levinger, the appellate lawyer retained to handle the appeal of the jury's verdict, my clients decided to settle the case with JP Morgan Chase. Most, if not all of these issues, were caused by the attorneys' omissions before and during trial, such as failing to present expert testimony and several jury charge issues which would have made an appeal very difficult for my clients. Additionally, I discovered a number of facts, some of which I outlined during my call yesterday with Mr. Lauten, which indicate that the contingency fee agreement is probably not enforceable and which show that even if it is enforceable - you and/or Mr. Vitullo breached the agreement. As a result, I am notifying you that my clients are - effective immediately -- terminating their relationship with you and your law firm.

At this time, I am requesting you to provide me with your entire file regarding your representation of my clients. Please make sure that I receive the complete file in the same



ATTORNEYS' EXHIBIT NO. 8 PAGE 1 of 2



John Malesovas April 5, 2018 Page 2

manner that it was maintained by you and/or your law firm. You may provide the electronic files on a portable hard drive and have this device, along with the physical files, delivered to my office.

Finally, as I indicated to Mr. Lauten during our call, my clients are willing to discuss a resolution of the attorney's fees related to your representation, so please discuss this with Mr. Vitullo and let me know if you have a proposal. In the meantime, I will instruct Mr. Levinger to retain a percentage of the settlement in his trust account until this matter is resolved. Thank you for your anticipated cooperation. If you have any questions, please feel free to give me a call.

Sincerely

Jaunes E. Pennington



Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo LLP Texas Trial Attorneys

877-FEESMITH feesmith.com

1801 S MoPac Expressway Suite 320 Austin, Texas 78746 P 512-479-6400 F 512-479-8402

Three Galleria Tower 13155 Noel Road Suite 1000 Dallas, Texas 75240 P 972-934-9100 F 972-934-9200

> Anthony L. Vitullo 972-980-3254 Direct Dial

Ivitullo@feesmith.com

October 8, 2015

BY E-MAIL Mr. John Eichman Hunton & Williams LLP 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700 Dallas, Texas 75202



Re: Stephen Hopper and Laura Wassmer v. JP Morgan Chase

#### CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT COMMUNICATION PROTECTED BY TRE AND FRE 408

Dear John:

In anticipation of the global mediation to occur with respect to this matter on November 9, 2015, you requested information regarding the settlement expectations of Dr. Stephen Hopper and Mrs. Laura Wassmer (the "Children").

I begin by reference to the fee letter agreement (the "Fee Agreement") dated April 15, 2010 between the Children, Mrs. Jo Hopper and JPMorgan Chase Bank (the "IA"). On the Estate Settlement Services fee schedule (the "Fee Schedule") attached to the Fee Agreement, reference is made that additional fees are charged for litigation regarding according to an "Additional Services Fee Schedule." We have no evidence that such Additional Services Fee Schedule was ever provided to or agreed to by the Children. The Fee Schedule also references that attorney fees are an expense of the estate and are in addition to the estate settlement fees.

While the Children do not dispute that the IA is entitled to reimbursement of reasonable legal fees and expenses from the estate assets, the level of legal fees and expenses paid from the estate in this matter (in large part paid to Flunton & Williams) is anything but reasonable. Given that the Second Amended Inventory reflects total estate assets of approximately \$10 million, the in excess of \$2 million in legal fees and expenses paid from the estate assets represents more than 20% of the value of the estate. The IA has breached its fiduciary duties to safeguard estate assets and appears to have made no effort whatsoever to monitor or mitigate the fees and expenses generated by its legal counsel. Of the approximately \$2 million in legal fees and expenses incurred, roughly 50% of such fees and expenses were incurred with respect to general estate administration matters (a significant portion of which were incurred during periods of time

ATTORNEYS' EXHIBIT NO. 11 PAGE 1 of 3



MR:666

when there were no material litigation activities). The Children believe that the evidence will ultimately show that the IA delegated to its legal counsel many of the duties that it should have performed itself in consideration for its account administration fee.

It should be noted that over \$1 million in legal fees were incurred by the IA to deal with the "Robledo Issue". The Children are seeking legal recourse against Gary Stolbach, Mark Enoch and Glast Phillips for the recovery of those legal fees and they are not seeking those legal fees from the IA in this matter.

The Children also have numerous complaints regarding the quality of services performed by the IA and/or its legal counsel and accountants. For example:

- The IA improperly calculated the cost basis for the estate assets which, if such matter had not been brought to the IA's attention by the Children's prior counsel, would have resulted in material adverse tax consequences to the Children.
- Similarly, numerous other tax filings with respect to the estate were filed incorrectly, late
  or not at all, resulting in additional material adverse tax consequences to the Children.
- The IA failed to timely and properly appraise the property of the Estate of Max Hopper.
- The IA failed to timely and properly secure the records of Sarah Williamson.
- The IA failed to disclose its prior special business arrangement with Jo Hopper that allowed Jo Hopper to be charged less then the Children for equivalent services. This constituted a conflict of interest.
- The IA allowed Hunton and Williams to perform services that the IA should have performed under the services agreement which increased the cost of the administration of the Estate of Max Hopper
- The IA did not properly account for distributions that were made to Jo Hopper related to the Gartner Inc. stock, Instantis stock, Insight Venture Partners, Innophos Holdings, and Bain Capital and other property
- The IA improper distribution and administration of the Pollack Property
- The IA improper retention of over \$800,000 in assets without distributing the same
- The IA improperly charged fees to the Children that should have also been charged to Jo Hopper

In light of the foregoing, the Children seek reimbursement of \$1.2 million of the legal fees and expenses deducted from the estate assets by the IA. The Children further seek and demand attorney fees in the amount of \$480,000.00 which represents 40% of the \$1.2 million in damages. Therefore the Children currently demand \$1,680,000 for full and final settlement against JP Morgan Chase.

You previously stated that the IA is due account administration fees in the aggregate amount of \$266,825. However, based on the second amended inventory, the value of the estate assets was only \$10 million. Accordingly, the IA's account administration fee is only \$220,000, and \$10.000 of the \$230,000 previously deducted from the estate should be refunded by the IA.

Mrs. Jo Hopper should reimburse the estate for her fair share of third party expenses incurred with respect to her community property. While we have not conducted a complete analysis of this item, based on your previous statements we believe that amount to be not less than \$80,000.

All cash and any other assets remaining in the estate must be distributed.

Any settlement is conditioned upon also obtaining a complete and final settlement between the Children and Mrs. Jo Hopper.

This settlement demand will expire at 5:30pm CST on November 10, 2015.

Please also find the enclosed deposition notice of a corporate representative of JP Morgan Chase. Obviously I am willing to work with you on the dates but I wanted to get this notice to you as soon as possible so that you can start working on identifying the appropriate witness. Please let me know if you have an alternative date for the deposition if this date does not work.

Should you have any question, comments or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me regarding this matter.

Very truly yours,

FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, L.L.P.

Anthony L. Vitullo

ALV/MS

----Original Message----

From: Stephen Hopper [mailto:dr.hopper@me.com]

Sent: Monday, January 25, 2016 8:19 PM

To: Anthony "Lenny" Vitullo Subject: Conference call

Lenny, I completely understand your reaction to Laura's email and can only conclude that her email was coming from, as she said her fear and anxiety. I do not question your commitment to our case and I'm well aware that you are the only person who has steered us through this "quagmire". I also know that there is no other attorney who would have touched this. Regardless of the outcome, I will always be grateful for the support you have given me over the past several years and I recognize that you have done this without charge. Please know you will always have my thanks. I am sorry that you had to question that today.

Stephen Hopper



ATTORNEYS' EXHIBIT NO. 13 PAGE 1 of 1



MR:669

#### CAUSE NO. PR-11-3238-1

IN RE: ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED	80 600 600	IN THE PROBATE COURT
JO N. HOPPER	- 8	NO. 1
Plaintiff, v.	9 9	110.1
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.	§	
STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S.	§	
WASSMER, AND QUAGMIRE, LLC,  Defendants.	§ §	DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

### ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEGAL RULINGS REGARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CLAIMS

On January 4, 2018, came on to be considered *Plaintiff's Motion for Legal Rulings Regarding Attorneys' Fees for Declaratory Judgment Claims* ("Motion"), filed in the above-styled action. After duly considering the Motion, the pleadings on file, the authorities, the arguments of counsel, and the trial record in this case, including but not limited to the jury's answer to the jury charge, this Court hereby GRANTS this Motion and finds that:

- (A) An award of attorneys' fees to Plaintiff Jo N. Hopper ("Plaintiff") against JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (the "Bank") in the amount of \$4.052.035.00 incurred in connection with the Robledo claims (as that term is defined in Question 12 of the jury charge) is equitable and just;
- (B) An award of attorneys' fees to Plaintiff in the amount of \$0 against Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer, individually, jointly and severally (collectively, the "Heirs") incurred in connection with the Robledo claims (as that term is defined in Question 12 of the jury charge) is equitable and just:



.<u>AINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEGAL RULINGS</u> ATTORNEYS' FEES FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CLAIMS

PAGE 1



ATTORNEYS' EXHIBIT NO. 66 PAGE 1 of 2

- (C) An award of attorneys' fees and expenses to Plaintiff in the amount of \$1,469,828.00 against the Bank incurred in connection with obtaining a ruling that Jo Hopper does not owe the Estate any money for attorneys' fees (as described in Question 13 of the jury charge) is equitable and just; and
- (D) In the event the Bank files an appeal of the final judgment entered in this matter with respect to Plaintiff's declaratory judgment claims as described in Questions 12 and 13 of the jury charge, an award of the following attorneys' fees would be equitable and just: \$200,000 in the event of an appeal to the court of appeals, \$50,000 in the event of a petition for review filed with the Texas Supreme Court, \$75,000 in the event of briefing at the merits stage of a petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court, and \$50,000 for preparation and presentation of oral argument to the Texas Supreme Court and completion of appellate proceedings for appellate fees.

SO ORDERED on this 35 day of Mach, 2018.

Melal

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEGAL RULINGS
REGARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CLAIMS

PAGE 2

From: Jeffrey S Levinger [mailto:jlevinger@levingerpc.com]

Sent: Tuesday, April 03, 2018 5:12 PM
To: Anthony "Lenny" Vitullo; John Malesovas - Malesovas


Subject: jury questions 43 and 44.

The bank's JNOV brief on liability makes a fairly big deal out of the jury's answers to Questions 43 and 44 relating to the reasonableness and necessity of its own fees and expenses relating to its defense of the removal action (about \$1.2 million) and its management of the estate after December 7, 2015 (about \$685,000). I previously had not focused much on those findings. What's our best argument about why those findings shouldn't matter?

JEFFREY S. LEVINGER

1445 ROSS AVENUE | SUITE 2500 | DALLAS, TEXAS 75202 P 214.855.6817 | F 214.855.6808 | E <u>| llevinger@levingerpc.com</u> | <u>www.levingerpc.com</u>

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ATTORNEYS' EXHIBIT NO. 70 PAGE 1 of 1



MR:672

From: Laura Wassmer [mailto:lhoppy@gmail.com]

Sent: Monday, January 25, 2016 8:26 PM To: Anthony "Lenny" Vitullo; James Bell

Cc: Steve Hopper

Subject: Response to Declatory Action

Lenny, thank you for taking the time to call tonight—our conversation was helpful. Again, I apologize for coming across as ungrateful for all you are doing and for taking my frustration with Jo out on you. I know that you, James and the entire team are working hard for us. I'm scared and just needed some added reassurance. As Steve mentioned, I think getting some additional response to our emails to know if we are on the right track or not would be helpful. I don't know if anything below would be helpful—just some notes I jotted down as I read through the declaratory action. Please let me know if there is any additional information I can provide. Thanks again! Laura

Response to Declatory Action





#### LAW OFFICES OF JAMES E. PENNINGTON

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 900 JACKSON STREET, SUITE 440 DALLAS, TEXAS 75202-4473

JAMES E. PENNINGTON
LICENSED IN TEXAS AND COLORADO

PHONE (214) 741-3022 FAX (214) 741-3055 E-MAIL Jep@Jeplawyer.com

April 6, 2018

VIA EMAIL: john@malesovas.com jmalesovas@gmail.com

John Malesovas 1801 S. MoPac Expressway Suite 320 Austin, Texas 78746

VIA EMAIL: blauten@brianlauten.com

Brian P. Lauten Brian Lauten, P.C. 3811 Turtle Creek Blvd. Suite 1450 Dallas, Texas 75219

Re: Case No. PR-11-3238-1; In re: Estate of Max Hopper, Deceased, Jo N. Hopper v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., et al., in the Probate Court of Dallas County, Texas.

#### Gentlemen:

This letter is in response to Mr. Lauten's email today regarding his notice of lien, and Mr. Malesovas' April 6, 2018 letter, and his Petition in intervention. I don't intend to respond to all of the various allegations and legal doctrines in your papers -- the only thing we all agree on at this point is that a dispute exists.

Rule 1.14 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct governs this dispute. Under that rule, the disputed portion of any funds is to remain in a lawyer's trust account or escrow account until the dispute is resolved. I have repeatedly assured Mr. Lauten that all settlement funds will be placed into Mr. Levinger's trust account and that the amount of disputed fees will not be disbursed until this dispute is resolved. My clients intend to fully comply with the requirements of Rule 1.14. The clients understand that you both claim a 45% interest in the settlement. Although we dispute this amount, Mr. Levinger is willing to retain 45% of the settlement in his trust account until this matter is resolved. Additionally, we will agree to retain a



John Malesovas/Brian Lauten April 6, 2018 Page 2

sufficient amount to cover any expenses you have incurred in representing the clients. However, I need to know the amount of any such expenses, so please let me know this amount.

If you are unwilling to agree to the disputed portion being deposited into Mr. Levinger's trust account, then let me know if you are willing to agree to these funds being deposited into my trust account or with an independent escrow agent. Thank you for your anticipated cooperation. If you have any questions, please feel free to give me a call.

9/14

Sincerel

mes E. Pennington

#### CAUSE NO. PR-11-03238-1

IN RE: ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED

IN THE PROBATE COURT

JO N. HOPPER

Plaintiff,

V.

JP MORGAN CHASE, N.A., STEPHEN B. HOPPER and LAURA S. WASSMER

Defendants.

JOHN L. MALESOVAS, d/b/a MALESOVAS LAW FIRM, and FEE, SMITH, SHARP & VITULLO, LLP

Intervenors,

v.

STEPHEN B. HOPPER, LAURA S. WASSMER, and JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,

Defendants.

NO. 1

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

## ORDER GRANTING INTERVENTION DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

ON THIS DAY, the Court considered the Motion to Compel Arbitration and the Supplement to the Motion to Compel Arbitration (collectively, the "Motion to Compel Arbitration") filed by Intervention Defendants Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer.

Having considered the Motion to Compel Arbitration, any responses and replies, and the arguments of counsel, the Court is of the opinion that the Motion to Compel Arbitration should be GRANTED.





IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Intervention Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration is hereby GRANTED;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the claims of Intervenors John Malesovas and Fee, Smith, Sharp & Vitullo, LLP in this matter are compelled to arbitration before the American Arbitration Association;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Intervenors' claims, and any proceedings related thereto, are stayed pending such arbitration.

SIGNED THIS day of May, 2018.



PR 11 -03238-1



NO.	

# IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT DALLAS

In re Stephen B. Hopper and Laura S. Wassmer,

#### Relators.

# AFFIDAVIT OF ANNE M. JOHNSON IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

STATE OF TEXAS §

§

COUNTY OF DALLAS §

BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public, on this day personally appeared Anne M. Johnson, known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed below, who, being by me duly sworn stated on her oath the following:

1. My name is Anne M. Johnson. I am a Partner with the law firm of Haynes and Boone, LLP, attorneys of record for Relators in this matter. In this capacity, I am authorized to make this affidavit. I am over twenty-one years of age, have never been convicted of a felony, and am not aware of any reason why I would be disqualified from making this affidavit. The facts stated herein are true and correct and based upon my personal knowledge or known to me through my duties and responsibilities as counsel for Relators.

MR: 679

- 2. I have read Relators' Petition for Writ of Mandamus. All factual statements contained therein, not independently proved or otherwise verified through the Mandamus Record, are true and correct.
- 3. The documents included in Pages MR:001-393 of the Mandamus Record are true and correct copies of documents filed in the underlying matter, *In re Estate of Max D. Hopper*, Case No. PR-11-03238-1, in Probate Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas, and documents compiled and certified as part of the Clerk's Record in a related interlocutory appeal in this Court, *Hopper v. Malesovas*, Case No. 05-18-00558-CV. For the sake of consistency, these documents have been included here in the same form as they appear in the related Clerk's Record.
- 4. The documents included in Pages MR:394-675 of the Mandamus Record are true and correct copies of hearing transcripts and exhibits from the underlying matter, which were also compiled and certified as part of the Reporter's Record in Case No. 05-18-00558-CV. Again for the sake of consistency, these documents have been included here in the same form as they appear in the related Reporter's Record.
- 5. The document included in Pages MR:676-678 of the Mandamus Record is a true and correct copy of an original document filed in the underlying matter.

MR: 680

#### FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

Anne M. Johnson

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 2614 day of July, 2018, to certify which witness my hand and seal of office.

Notary Public

BRENDA L. STACKS

Notary Public, State of Texas

Comm. Expires 04-02-2020

Notary ID 10486878